USA v. Gamboa et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA
EASTERN DIVISION
United States of America, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	) 	ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
) 	REDUCE SENTENCE
vs. 	)
) 	Case No. 3:02-cr-47(1)
Michael Gerald Gamboa, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
Defendant Michael Gerald Gamboa moves again for a sentence reduction. Doc. 657. The
United States opposes the motion. Doc. 673. Gamboa seeks a reduction in his sentence based on
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First
Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”). As explained below, his motion is denied.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On January 9, 2003, a jury found Gamboa guilty of: (1) conspiracy to possess with intent
to distribute methamphetamine, (2) possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, (3)
simple possession of cocaine, (4) using and carrying firearms during and in relation to a drug
trafficking crime, (5) possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and (6)
possession of firearms and ammunition by a convicted felon. Doc. 417. Gamboa was sentenced to
life imprisonment on counts 1, 2, and 5; 90 days’ imprisonment on count 3; 30 years’ imprisonment
on count 4; and 10 years’ imprisonment on count 6. Id. The Court ordered counts 1, 2, 3, and 6 to
run concurrently; count 4 to run consecutively to those sentences; and count 5 to run consecutively
to the sentence imposed in count 4. Id. Gamboa appealed. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,
affirmed in part and reversed in part, with the reversal vacating a conviction on a seventh count,
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which the amended judgment reflects. United States v. Gamboa, 439 F.3d 796 (8th Cir. 2006). The
court affirmed the other six convictions. See id.
This is Gamboa’s second motion for a sentence reduction and compassionate release. The
Court previously denied his first motion to reduce sentence (Doc. 647). Gamboa appealed that
decision (Doc. 648), and the Eighth Circuit summarily affirmed. Doc. 652.
II. 	DISCUSSION
Because criminal sentences are final judgments, a court ordinarily “may not modify a term
of imprisonment once it has been imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). As one narrow exception to that
rule, a court “may reduce the term of imprisonment” when “extraordinary and compelling reasons”
exist and the “reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors must also support
the reduction. Id. The burden to establish that a sentence reduction is warranted under 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c) rests with the defendant. See United States v. Jones, 836 F.3d 896, 899 (8th Cir. 2016).
A. 	Administrative Exhaustion
With the enactment of the FSA, federal courts may grant compassionate release “upon
motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal
a failure of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse
of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever
is earlier.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Here, Gamboa has exhausted his administrative rights (Doc.
657-1).
B. 	Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons
The FSA does not define “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” But now, the United
States Sentencing Guidelines Manual articulates what constitutes “extraordinary and compelling
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reasons.” The applicable Sentencing Commission policy statement is Section 1B1.13 of the
Sentencing Guidelines Manual. Relevant here, Section 1B1.13(b)(6) states:
(6) UNUSUALLY LONG SENTENCE.—If a defendant received an unusually
long sentence and has served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment, a change
in the law (other than an amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not been
made retroactive) may be considered in determining whether the defendant presents
an extraordinary and compelling reason, but only where such change would
produce a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely
to be imposed at the time the motion is filed, and after full consideration of the
defendant’s individualized circumstances.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6).
In his second motion, Gamboa specifically moves for compassionate release under Section
1B1.13(b)(6). He argues his life sentence is an unusually long sentence within the scope of Section
1B1.13(b)(6) and that he would receive a significantly shorter sentence if sentenced today. While
his motion was pending, the United States Supreme Court granted petitions for a writ of certiorari
in two relevant cases—(1) Rutherford v. United States, S. Ct. No. 24-820, and (2) Carter v. United
States, S. Ct. No. 24-860. These consolidated cases asked whether disparities created by the FSA’s
nonretroactive change to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)’s mandatory consecutive penalties can qualify as an
“extraordinary and compelling” reason for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
In late May 2026, the Supreme Court decided the cases. See Rutherford v. United States, 608 U.S.
__, Nos. 24-820, 24-860, 2026 WL 1485535, at *3 (U.S. May 28, 2026). The Supreme Court held
that a nonretroactive amendment to a sentencing statute cannot serve as an “extraordinary and
compelling reason” for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). It specifically held
that Congress’s nonretroactive change in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)’s mandatory penalties cannot serve
as an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction, either “considered by itself or
in combination with other factors.” Id. at *3, *11. Moreover, Rutherford settled a circuit split and
confirmed that nonretroactive changes in the law are not grounds for compassionate release under
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18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Supreme Court’s decision in Rutherford essentially invalidates
Gamboa’s argument for compassionate release under Section 1B1.13(b)(6) and is dispositive.
Because of that, his motion to reduce sentence must be denied.
C. 	18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
But even if Gamboa’s argument for a sentence reduction was not foreclosed by Rutherford
or other reasons, the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors do not support a sentence reduction. A court may
only grant compassionate relief after consideration of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a). After review, the Court is not satisfied that Gamboa’s release is consistent
with the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. Specifically, Gamboa was the principal leader of
a massive drug trafficking operation based in Grand Forks and Fargo. He and his co-conspirators
distributed hundreds of pounds of methamphetamine in that area between 2000 and 2002. The
conspiracy also involved violence, intimidation, and the use of firearms. It is difficult to summarize
in words the extent of Gamboa’s criminal enterprise. Beyond that, his criminal history is
significant and extensive. He has a history of drug trafficking and violence and poses a danger to
the community. Put simply, the § 3553(a) factors heavily weigh against a sentence reduction.
III. 	CONCLUSION
The Court has extensively reviewed the entire record, the parties’ filings, and the relevant
legal authority. Gamboa’s motion to reduce sentence (Doc. 657) is DENIED. Given that decision,
the remaining ancillary motions in the docket (Docs. 680, 682, 686, 690, 695) are MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 8th day of June, 2026.
/s/ Peter D. Welte
Peter D. Welte, Chief Judge
United States District Court
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