USA v. Roberts, et al.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA
EASTERN DIVISION
United States of America, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	) 	ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
) 	REDUCE SENTENCE
vs. 	)
) 	Case No. 3:20-cr-148
Shareen Marie Roberts, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
Defendant Shareen Marie Roberts moves for a sentence reduction. 	Doc. No. 87. 	The
Government opposes the motion. Doc. No. 93. Roberts seeks a reduction in her sentence based
on “extraordinary and compelling reasons” under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) as amended by the
First Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”). For the reasons below, the motion is denied.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On August 3, 2021, the Court sentenced Roberts to 204 months’ imprisonment for
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distribute a controlled substance, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 846. Doc. No. 79. The Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) placed Roberts at FCI Waseca, in
Minnesota. 	Now 54 years old, Roberts has a projected release date in February 2035. 	Inmate
Locator, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited May 4, 2023).
As grounds for release, Roberts cites several of her own “severe health conditions” and her
desire to take care of her husband. Doc. No. 87. She submitted a request for compassionate release
to the warden at FCI Waseca, and the warden recently denied the request. Doc. No. 93-1.
II. 	DISCUSSION
Because sentences are final judgments, a court ordinarily “may not modify a term of
imprisonment once it has been imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). As one narrow exception to that
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rule, a court “may reduce the term of imprisonment” when “extraordinary and compelling reasons”
exist and the “reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission.” 1 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors also must support
the reduction. Id. The burden to establish that a sentence reduction is warranted under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c) rests with the defendant. See United States v. Jones, 836 F.3d 896, 899 (8th Cir. 2016).
A. 	Administrative Exhaustion
With the enactment of the FSA, federal courts may grant compassionate release “upon
motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal
a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30
days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is
earlier.” 	18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 	Roberts has exhausted her administrative rights to appeal
(Doc. No. 93-1), so the Court will proceed to the merits.
B. 	Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons
The compassionate release statute does not define what constitutes “extraordinary and
compelling reasons.” Instead, Congress dictated that the Sentencing Commission, through a policy
statement, “shall describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for
sentence reduction, including . . . a list of specific examples.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). 	To meet its
statutory obligation, the Commission promulgated § 1B1.13 in the 2018 Sentencing Guidelines
Manual (“USSG”). The policy statement itself largely mirrors the compassionate release statute’s
language. See USSG § 1B1.13(1)-(3).
1 In lieu of extraordinary and compelling reasons, the statute also permits a sentence reduction
where a defendant is at least 70 years old and certain additional conditions are met. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii). Roberts is 54 years old, so this avenue for relief is foreclosed.
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Application Note 1 to the policy statement provides limited guidance as to what constitutes
“extraordinary and compelling reasons.” So long as a defendant does not pose “a danger to the
safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g),” the
Application Note describes four instances that demonstrate extraordinary and compelling reasons
for compassionate release. USSG § 1B1.13(2); id. app. n.1. The first three circumstances set out
in subdivisions (A) through (C) pertain to a defendant’s medical condition, age, or family
circumstances, respectively. See id. app. n.1(A)-(C). Subdivision (D)—the catch-all provision—
authorizes a sentence reduction when: “As determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons,
there exists in the defendant’s case an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in
combination with, the reasons described in subdivisions (A) through (C).” Id. app. n.1(D).
Because § 1B1.13 was issued when the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) had the sole authority
to bring motions for release under § 3582(c)(1)(A), the guideline (and specifically subdivision (D))
by its terms is limited to motions filed by the BOP. 	However, consistent with United States v.
Marcussen, 15 F.4th 855 (8th Cir. 2021), the Court will treat § 1B1.13 as a useful guide in
determining how to exercise its discretion, while also recognizing that it has the authority to grant
a reduction even in circumstances that do not comport with the terms of that provision.
Turning to the substance of her motion, Roberts appears to argue extraordinary and
compelling reasons exist under either subdivision (A) or (C). But she fails to clear the high bar
necessary to warrant a sentence reduction under either subdivision. 	Roberts broadly argues for
release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) for medical reasons—primarily citing her Type 2 diabetes
and high blood pressure. From a review of the available records though, Roberts is generally in
good health beyond these conditions. And importantly, there is nothing in the record to show that
Roberts’s medical conditions substantially diminish her ability to provide self-care. 	USSG §
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1B1.13, app. n.1(A)(ii). 	As a result, there is no basis to find extraordinary and compelling
circumstances under subdivision (A).
While sympathetic to Roberts’s desire to take care of her husband, she offers no supporting
documentation or explanation to satisfy the family circumstances provision under subdivision (C).
There is nothing in the record to demonstrate that her husband is incapacitated or that Roberts is
his only available caregiver. Without more, there is no basis in the record to find extraordinary
and compelling circumstances based on family circumstances.
C. 	Additional Requirements
Even if extraordinary and compelling reasons were present, the Court is not satisfied that
Roberts’s release is consistent with the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. See United States
v. Hylander, No. 18-cr-60017-BLOOM, 2020 WL 1915950, at *2-3 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2020)
(denying compassionate release where 66-year-old defendant had two underlying conditions but
failed to show that he did not pose a danger and that § 3553(a) supported release); United States
v. Moskop, No. 11-CR-30077-SMY, 2020 WL 1862636, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 2020) (denying
compassionate release where 72-year-old defendant had chronic medical conditions but § 3553(a)
counseled against release).
At sentencing, the Court designated her as a career offender and in criminal history
category VI, the highest criminal history category. Notably, Roberts has an extensive history of
distributing controlled substances and has committed drug offenses even when on court-imposed
supervision. 	The seriousness of her conduct cannot be overlooked in weighing the § 3553(a)
factors. Ultimately, the need to protect the public, ensure just and adequate punishment, promote
deterrence, and avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities outweigh any factor Roberts may rely on
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to justify compassionate release. 	The applicable § 3553(a) factors, taken as a whole, favor
continued incarceration.
D. 	Home Confinement
Finally, to the extent Roberts also moves for home confinement, the Court lacks
jurisdiction to consider that request. See United States v. Brown, No. 12-cr-172(3) (SRN), 2020
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69965, at *6 (D. Minn. Apr. 21, 2020). 	A request for transfer to home
confinement is essentially for a request for a change in the location of confinement rather than the
length of confinement. 	Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621(b) and 3624(c), the BOP possesses the
exclusive authority to determine the placement of prisoners. Id. at *5; see also United States v.
Kluge, No. CR 17-61 (DWF), 2020 WL 209287, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 14, 2020). While the FSA
expanded release opportunities for inmates, “it is BOP—not the courts—who decides whether
home detention is appropriate[.]” Brown, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *5-6 (quoting United States
v. Yates, No. 15-40063-01-DDC, 2019 WL 1779773, *4 (D. Kan. Apr. 23, 2019)).
III. 	CONCLUSION
The Court has reviewed the entire record, the parties’ filings, and the relevant legal
authority. For the reasons above, Roberts’s motion to reduce sentence (Doc. No. 87) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 4th day of May, 2023.
/s/ Peter D. Welte
Peter D. Welte, Chief Judge
United States District Court
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