USA v. Belgarde

3:21-cr-00058Ndd28 juil. 2022

Texte intégral

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA
EASTERN DIVISION
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Cody James Belgarde,
Defendant.
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ORDER
Case No. 3:21-cr-58
Before the Court is Defendant Cody James Belgarde’s renewed motion for an order finding
his competency unrestorable. Doc. No. 44. The Government opposed the motion (Doc. No. 47),
and Belgarde filed a reply. Doc. No. 51. 	For the reasons below, Belgarde’s motion is denied.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The Court is quite familiar with the facts and procedural posture of this case. 	As noted
above, this is Belgarde’s second motion for an order finding his competency unrestorable. 	The
Court denied the first motion on February 23, 2022, and the Court specifically incorporates the
background section from that order here. Doc. No. 42.
By way of brief review, in August 2021, after evaluation by a forensic psychologist with
the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), the parties stipulated that Belgarde was incompetent,
agreed a competency hearing was unnecessary, and sought to proceed with competency restoration
under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1). Id. After an inadvertent transportation miscommunication by the
BOP, Belgarde was transferred back to the District of North Dakota instead of being directly
transported to a Federal Medical Center (“FMC”) for restoration. Id. Eventually, he was admitted
to FMC Butner for restoration on February 15, 2022.
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Belgarde then began competency restoration with BOP. On June 23, 2022, the BOP mailed
its completed competency restoration evaluation and certificate of restoration of competency to
stand trial. Doc. No. 52. The date of the forensic evaluation is June 16, 2022. Id. In the evaluation,
BOP forensic psychologist Dr. Evan S. Du Bois made findings that Belgarde “is not currently
suffering from a mental disease or defect which renders him incompetent to stand trial.” 	Id.
Consistent with those findings, BOP issued a certificate of restoration of competency to stand trial.
Id. The certificate of restoration is date June 23, 2022. Id.
Two days before the evaluation was mailed by BOP, on June 21, 2022, Belgarde filed this
renewed motion for an order finding his competency unrestorable. In the motion, he again asks
the Court to find his competency unrestorable because the “Attorney General exceeded the
statutory time limit” for restoration. Doc. No. 38. According to Belgarde, the four months for
restoration, as authorized by statute, expired on June 15, 2022, and BOP did not provide its report
until June 23, 2022. 	His position is that the Court must find his competency unrestorable and
proceed to a dangerousness assessment under 18 U.S.C. § 4246(b). For its part, the Government
opposes the motion, noting that the BOP did not exceed the statutory time limit and that Belgarde’s
restoration effectively moots the motion.
II. 	DISCUSSION
In the Court’s February 23, 2022, order (Doc. No. 42), it concluded:
[T]he plain language of § 4241(d)(1) provides that such commitment begins when
Belgarde is hospitalized and admitted to FMC Butner to begin restoration. While
the Court recognizes the inadvertent mistake by BOP in returning Belgarde to the
District of North Dakota instead of holding him for competency restoration, which
resulted in a short delay for Belgarde’s admission to FMC Butner, per the plain
language 	of 	the 	statute, 	the 	statutory 	four-month 	period 	is 	triggered 	by
hospitalization. See Magassouba, 544 F.3d at 408 (“[W]e construe § 4241(d)(1) to
impose a four-month limit only on the Attorney General’s authority to hold an
incompetent defendant in custodial hospitalization for the purpose of determining
the probability of his regaining competency.”). This is entirely consistent with the
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purpose of the statute, which is “to enable medical professionals to accurately
determine whether a criminal defendant is restorable to mental competency.”
United States v. Strong, 489 F.3d 1055, 1062 (9th Cir. 2007).
Accordingly, and consistent with the plain language of the statute and relevant legal
authority, the Court finds that Belgarde’s statutory period for hospitalization was
triggered when Belgarde arrived at FMC Butner on February 15, 2022.
Doc. No. 42. So, to the extent Belgarde renews his argument that the Attorney General exceeded
the four months in § 4241(d)(1) because of the length of time between the Court’s order for
competency restoration (August 12, 2021) and his admission to Butner (February 15, 2022), the
Court denies the motion consistent with its prior findings and conclusions on that issue. Id.
More salient to this motion is Belgarde’s latest argument that the Attorney General now
exceeded the four-month statutory period for competency restoration proceedings, since he was
admitted to FMC Butner on February 15, 2022, but the forensic evaluation and certificate of
competency was dated June 23, 2022. In support of his position, Belgarde cites United States v.
Carter, 2022 WL 483636, No. 19-cr-261 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 2022), a recent decision from the United
States District Court for the District of Washington, D.C. 	In response, the Government notes
Belgarde’s competency restoration was completed within the four-month statutory framework. It
further notes that a certificate of restoration of competency was issued and argues his motion is
moot considering the latest forensic evaluation and certificate of restoration.
As an initial matter, Carter is not binding authority. 	Moreover, there are some factual
distinctions between Carter and this case. 	For example, in Carter, there was a contested
competency hearing and discussion before restoration was ordered about the possibility of a local
hospital placement for restoration. Id. Here, the parties stipulated to competency restoration and
there was no discussion among the parties as to the possibility for local placement. All that said,
Carter does take issue with the lengthy admission waiting period for the FMCs (which was the
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issue in Belgarde’s first motion) and concluded that the four-month statutory period for restoration
in § 4241(d)(1) begins, not on the date of admission for hospitalization (as this Court previously
determined in this case), but on the date that a court orders competency restoration. Id. Because
the Attorney General exceeded the four-month window, the Carter court concluded the appropriate
remedy was either dismissal of the indictment or civil commitment. Id.
While 	the 	Carter 	decision 	raises 	important 	issues 	and 	arguments 	against 	lengthy
competency restoration proceedings, particularly concerning transportation, this Court ultimately
disagrees with the statutory interpretation of § 4241(d)(1) articulated in Carter. Specifically, the
Court disagrees that the four-month period for competency restoration begins on the date that
competency restoration is ordered. And while the Court welcomes guidance from a higher court
on the § 4241(d)(1) timing issue, especially given the COVID-19 pandemic and the lengthy
waiting periods for admission to any of the three FMCs that handle restoration across the country,
this Court stands by its plain language interpretation of the text of that statute, which states: “The
Attorney General shall hospitalize a defendant for treatment in a suitable facility for such a
reasonable period of time, not to exceed four months[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1) (emphasis added).
So, consistent with that interpretation, the Court is not persuaded to follow Carter at this time,
absent controlling case law directing otherwise.
Additionally, the facts in the record cut against Belgarde’s argument that the Attorney
General exceeded the four-month restoration period. Indeed, the record appears to indicate that
the Attorney General completed Belgarde’s restoration within the four-month window. Although
the letter attaching and mailing the forensic evaluation is dated June 23, 2022 (along with the
certificate of restoration of competency), it is important to note that the date of the evaluation itself
is June 16, 2022. Doc. No. 52. Thus, the fact that the evaluation was completed on June 16, 2022,
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indicates that his hospitalization for restoration was completed before June 16, 2022. And recall,
four months from February 15, 2022 (Belgarde’s admission date) is June 15, 2022. On these facts,
the Court concludes that the Attorney General completed competency restoration within the four-
month statutory period authorized in § 4241(d)(1).1 	Accordingly, the Court again declines
Belgarde’s invitation to deem his competency unrestorable and to proceed to a dangerousness
assessment under 18 U.S.C. § 4246. Consistent with the above, Belgarde’s motion (Doc. No. 44)
is denied.
III. 	CONCLUSION
The Court has reviewed the record, the parties’ filings, and the relevant legal authority. For
the reasons above, Belgarde’s renewed motion for an order finding his competency unrestorable
(Doc. No. 44) is DENIED. Belgarde shall be transported back to the District of North Dakota as
soon as reasonably practical for a competency hearing. Because the Court previously found him
incompetent, until a competency hearing is held and the Court finds that Belgarde’s competency
has been restored, the Court will cancel the August 30, 2022, trial date and will hold the trial date
in abeyance pending a decision on his competency to proceed to trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(4).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 28th day of July, 2022.
/s/ Peter D. Welte
Peter D. Welte, Chief Judge
United States District Court
1 As the Court noted in its prior order, the statute also allow for extensions as to restoration. See
Doc. No. 42 (“Moreover, and importantly, the statutory framework of 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)
expressly embraces flexibility in timing and specifically contemplates situations where the
Attorney General may need additional time, beyond four months, to complete restoration. See 18
U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2).”).
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