USA v. Muldrew et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KADONTA MULDREW,
Defendant.
8:24-CR-104
TENTATIVE FINDINGS REGARDING
DEFENDANT’S OBJECTIONS TO
SECOND REVISED PRESENTENCE
INVESTIGATION REPORT
On August 18, 2025, defendant Kadonta Muldrew pleaded guilty to the following three
counts of the Indictment: Count I, conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute
40 grams or more of fentanyl; Count II, possession with the intent to distribute 40 grams or more of
fentanyl; and Count III, being a felon in possession of a firearm. Filing 76 (Text Minute Entry). The
defendant’s sentencing hearing is set for November 19, 2025. Filing 77. The defendant has objected
to 14 paragraphs in the Second Revised Presentence Investigation Report.1 Filing 144. As is the
Court’s practice, the Court will address the defendant’s objections during the sentencing hearing
before pronouncing the sentence in this case. However, due to the amount and nature of those
objections, the Court issues these tentative findings prior to sentencing. Although the Court’s
1 The defendant first filed his objections to the original presentence investigation report. Filing 138. After the
defendant filed those objections, a revised presentence investigation report was submitted. The defendant then filed a
Written Statement of Position on the revised presentence investigation report that struck some of his previously filed
objections but largely reiterated his original objections as they applied to the revised presentence investigation report.
Filing 139. Then, the Second Revised Presentence Investigation report was filed, and the defendant filed a Second
Written Statement of Position addressing the Second Revised Presentence Investigation Report. Filing 144. Because the
Second Revised Presentence Investigation Report is the operative report at sentencing, the Court will refer to the
defendant’s objections as they are set forth in his Second Written Statement of Position.
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tentative findings address issues related to the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the Court notes
that, pursuant to United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), those Guidelines are advisory.
I. BACKGROUND
The defendant objects to paragraphs 33, 39, 41, 44, 48, 50, 51, 61, 63, 67, 81, 82, 88 and
1242 of the Second Revised Presentence Investigation Report (Second Revised PSR). Filing 144.
The defendant has not filed a brief in support of his objections. Instead, he has provided one to three
sentences explaining the grounds for each objection. See generally Filing 144. The Government has
filed a sentencing memorandum that responds to some of the defendant’s objections.3 Filing 148.
The Government’s position is that all of the defendant’s objections should be overruled and that
“[t]he probation officer’s rationale contained in the [Second Revised PSR’s] addendum is correct.”
Filing 148 at 4. The Court will address the defendant’s objections below, but first, the Court will
sort the defendant’s objections into four categories to facilitate analysis. The Court will refer to these
same four categories during the defendant’s sentencing hearing.
The first category contains the defendant’s objections to the drug quantity attributed to him.
Within that category, the Court will consider the defendant’s objections to paragraphs 39, 41, and
44. The second category involves the defendant’s objections to his offense level calculations in
paragraphs 48, 50, 51, 61, 63, and 67. In the third category, the Court will address the defendant’s
objections to paragraphs 81 and 82 dealing with the defendant’s criminal history computation.
2 The defendant’s Second Written Statement of Position objects to paragraph 120, Filing 144 at 2, but it appears
that the defendant means to object to paragraph 124. Paragraph 120 of the Second Revised PSR contains information
from a collateral interview with the defendant’s mother, while paragraph 124 of the Second Revised PSR describes the
defendant’s employment record from November 2020 to May 2024, which is consistent with the topic of the defendant’s
objection. Second Revised PSR at 23–24; Filing 144 at 2.
3 The Government’s Sentencing Memorandum also responds to the defendant’s Motion for Downward Departure
or Variance, Filing 140. As is its practice, the Court will address that motion during the sentencing hearing.
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Finally, the Court will consider the defendant’s remaining objections to paragraphs 33, 88, and 124,
none of which affect the defendant’s Guidelines calculations.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Category One: Attributed Drug Quantity
The Court begins with the defendant’s objections to the quantity of drugs attributed to him.
Paragraphs 39, 41, and 44 of the Second Revised PSR outline three separate controlled buys
conducted by law enforcement officers against individuals other than the defendant. Second Revised
PSR at 8–9. All three controlled buys involved fentanyl pills, and the fentanyl pills received during
all three controlled buys were tested and weighed. Second Revised PSR at 8–9. The defendant
objects to “the drug quantity being attributed to him” in paragraphs 39 and 41, as that drug quantity
“raises double counting issues due to money being converted to drug quantity.” Filing 144 at 1. The
defendant objects to paragraph 44, alleging that it contains “[h]earsay by Latasha Collier which is
not reliable” and that it raises the “issue of double counting the controlled substance when cash is
being converted to drug quantities.” Filing 144 at 1.
The defendant’s overarching concern with paragraphs 39, 41, and 44 is that the quantity of
drugs identified in each paragraph was “double counted” against the defendant because the money
received in exchange for those drugs was presumably part of the cash recovered during the various
searches referenced throughout the Second Revised PSR, and because that cash was itself converted
into drug weight in paragraph 51. This concern appears to be unfounded. Paragraphs 39, 41, and 44
all contain the following language: “To avoid double counting, the amount of fentanyl from this
controlled buy is not attributed to the defendant, as the United States currency that was found during
the residence searches is converted to drug weight and may contain the cash obtained from this
controlled buy.” Second Revised PSR at 8–9. Thus, the Court’s tentative finding is that there are no
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double counting issues in paragraphs 39, 41, and 44, and the defendant’s objections to those
paragraphs should be overruled. To the extent that the defendant also objects to paragraph 44
because it contains hearsay, the Court tentatively finds that the objection should be overruled on
those grounds as well. “At sentencing, a district court ‘may consider relevant information without
regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, including hearsay and
double hearsay,’ so long as that information has ‘sufficient indicia of reliability to support its
probable accuracy.’” United States v. Campos, 79 F.4th 903, 916 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting United
States v. Harris, 44 F.4th 819, 822 (8th Cir. 2022)). “The reliability of hearsay evidence can depend
on ‘the consistency of the hearsay testimony, the timing and nature of the declarant’s statements,
and the witness’s impressions of the declarant’s demeanor, as well as other corroborating
evidence.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Sheridan, 859 F.3d 579, 583 (8th Cir. 2017)). The Court
tentatively finds that the statement of Latasha Collier contained in paragraph 44 possesses sufficient
indicia of reliability to be considered by the Court. Collier made that statement during a post-
Miranda interview, and her statement that the defendant supplied codefendant Jeron Morris with
fentanyl pills which Morris then sold is corroborated by the defendant’s plea of guilty to conspiring
with Morris to distribute fentanyl. Filing 79 (Petition to Enter a Plea of Guilty).
B. Category Two: Offense Level Calculations
The Court turns to the second category of the defendant’s objections. Like the first category,
some of the defendant’s objections here deal with the quantity of drugs attributed to him. Unlike the
first category, however, the drug quantities challenged under this second category actually were
attributed to the defendant, meaning those quantities contributed to the total drug weight used to
calculate the defendant’s base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. The defendant objects to that
calculated base offense level, and he also objects to the adjusted offense level. The second category
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of objections contains the defendant’s objections to paragraphs 48, 50, 51, 61, 63, and 67. The Court
will consider each of those objections in order.
1. Paragraph 48
Paragraph 48 of the Second Revised PSR describes the search of a residence belonging to
the defendant, 1405 Sherwood Avenue, Omaha, Nebraska, 68110, as well as the search of Jeron
Morris, the codefendant in this case. Second Revised PSR at 9. Multiple items were located during
those searches, including cash and various drugs. Second Revised PSR at 9. Fentanyl pills were
recovered during the search of the residence, and those pills were tested and weighed. Second
Revised PSR at 9. Paragraph 48 attributes to the defendant 101.9 grams of fentanyl/4-ANPP/meta-
fluorofentanyl and 8.955 grams of fentanyl/meta-fluorofentanyl. Second Revised PSR at 9. The
defendant’s concern with paragraph 48 is that the “fentanyl was all in Co-Defendant, Morris’[s]
bedroom and pants.”4 Filing 144 at 1. In response, both the Government and the probation officer
point out that under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, the “relevant conduct” of a defendant includes “all acts and
omissions of others that were . . . (i) within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, (ii)
in furtherance of that criminal activity, and (iii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that
criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. 1B1.3(a)(1)(B); Second Revised PSR at 33; Filing 148 at 4–5. The
Government argues that codefendant Morris’s “possession of fentanyl pills qualifies as relevant
conduct based on the unobjected-to facts in the [Second Revised PSR].” Filing 148 at 4–5.
The Eighth Circuit has established that “[t]he government bears the burden of proving drug
quantity by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Johnson, 75 F.4th 833, 846 (8th Cir.
4 The defendant’s objection to paragraph 48 also references other drugs and “items of contraband” located during
the search of the 1405 Sherwood Avenue residence, but those drugs were not included in the total drug weight used to
calculate the defendant’s base offense level.
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2023) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “For the purpose of calculating drug quantity
in a drug conspiracy case, the district court may consider amounts from drug transactions in which
the defendant was not directly involved if those dealings were part of the same course of conduct or
scheme.” United States v. Escobar, 909 F.3d 228, 246–47 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v.
King, 898 F.3d 797, 809 (8th Cir. 2018)). “This includes all transactions known or reasonably
foreseeable to the defendant that were made in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Id. (quoting same).
“The court’s approximation may be ‘based on imprecise evidence so long as the record reflects a
basis for the court’s decision.’” Johnson, 75 F.4th at 846 (quoting United States v. Yellow Horse,
774 F.3d 493, 497 (8th Cir. 2014)). Furthermore, “[a] fact in a PSR to which the defendant has not
specifically objected is a fact admitted by the defendant.” United States v. Trevino, 829 F.3d 668,
675 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Abrica-Sanchez, 808 F.3d 330, 334 (8th Cir. 2015)).
Although the Court will ultimately resolve this issue on the evidence at sentencing, the
Court’s tentative finding is that the drug quantities identified in paragraph 48 should be attributed
to the defendant as relevant conduct. Both the defendant and Morris belonged to a conspiracy to
distribute fentanyl, as evidenced by the defendant’s guilty plea to Count I of the Indictment. Filing
79; Filing 1. Unobjected-to portions of the Second Revised PSR indicate that the defendant was
aware that Morris lived at the 1405 Sherwood Avenue residence, as the defendant paid the utilities
for the residence and maintained a room at the house. Second Revised PSR at 7 (paragraphs 29 and
335). The defendant himself stored drugs and drug-trafficking items at the residence. Second
Revised PSR at 7 (paragraph 29). Based on this evidence, the Court tentatively finds that the
5 As discussed below, the defendant’s objection to paragraph 33 is that he “was moving clothes, etc. after [a]
burglary at the residence.” Filing 144 at 1. The defendant does not object to the first sentence of paragraph 33, which
states that “Muldrew paid the utilities at the stash house and visited it frequently.” Second Revised PSR at 7.
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amounts of fentanyl located at the 1405 Sherwood Avenue residence are properly attributed to the
defendant because even if the defendant was not directly involved with that fentanyl, the
preponderance of the evidence suggests that it was part of the same course of conduct or scheme
that the defendant pleaded guilty to. This tentative finding is further supported by Latasha Collier’s
post-Miranda statement that the defendant supplied Morris with fentanyl pills to sell—a statement
that the Court has already tentatively found to possess sufficient indicia of reliability to support its
probable accuracy. See Campos, 79 F.4th at 916. The Court therefore further tentatively finds that
the defendant’s objection to paragraph 48 should be overruled.
2. Paragraph 50
Paragraph 50 attributes to the defendant 234.439 grams of fentanyl analogue. Second
Revised PSR at 10. That amount of fentanyl analogue is derived from the drug quantities identified
in paragraphs 47, 48, and 49. Second Revised PSR at 9–10. Specifically, paragraph 47 attributes to
the defendant 24.219 grams of fentanyl/4-ANPP/para-fluorofentanyl, paragraph 48 attributes to him
101.9 grams of fentanyl/4-ANPP/meta-fluorofentanyl and 8.955 grams of fentanyl/meta-
fluorofentanyl, and paragraph 49 attributes to him 99.365 grams of fentanyl/4-ANPP/meta-
fluorofentanyl. Second Revised PSR at 9–10. The defendant’s objection to paragraph 50 is an
objection “to the conversion to fentanyl analogue.” Filing 144 at 2. The defendant argues that he
“was indicted for fentanyl, a schedule II drug,” while “[f]entanyl analogue is a schedule I narcotic.”
The Court’s tentative finding is that this objection is without merit. Under the Guidelines,
“[t]ypes and quantities of drugs not specified in the count of conviction may be considered in
determining the offense level.” United States v. Maxwell, 61 F.4th 549, 560 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, cmt. n.5 (citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2))). The distinction between the drug
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charged—fentanyl—and the drug used to calculate the defendant’s base offense level—fentanyl
analogue— is therefore immaterial.
3. Paragraphs 51 and 61
Paragraph 51 converts $130,5956 in United States currency to 832.15 grams of fentanyl
analogue, attributing that amount of fentanyl analogue to the defendant along with the 234.439
grams of fentanyl analogue discussed in paragraph 50 for a total drug weight of 1,066.589 grams
(1.066 kilograms) of fentanyl analogue. Second Revised PSR at 10. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. §
2D1.1(a)(5) and (c)(3), this total drug weight is then used to calculate a base offense level of 34,
which is reflected in paragraph 61. Second Revised PSR at 10–11. The defendant objects to
paragraph 51’s conversion of cash to drug weight, arguing that “[d]iscovery shows law enforcement
began watching the Defendant in January 2024 and the Defendant did not get fentanyl until February
2024,” so the converted cash “was not exclusively from fentanyl sales.” Filing 144 at 2. The
defendant objects to the base offense level reflected in paragraph 61 “for the reasons stated in
objection to Paragraph 51.” Filing 144 at 2.
“[I]n order to accurately reflect the scale of drug trafficking activity, the Guidelines authorize
the district court to convert seized money into a quantity of drugs.” United States v. Grays, 638 F.3d
569, 571–72 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also U.S.S.G. §
2D1.1, cmt. n.5 (“Where there is no drug seizure or the amount seized does not reflect the scale of
the offense, the court shall approximate the quantity of the controlled substance.”). “The court may
6 Paragraph 51 states that $135,995 in United States currency was found in the defendant’s possession. Second
Revised PSR at 10. This cash was located during searches of the defendant’s person, residences, and storage unit. Second
Revised PSR at 9–10 ($11,301 in paragraph 47; $5,694 in paragraph 48; and $119,000 in paragraph 49). Rather than
converting all $135,995 to drug weight, the Second Revised PSR subtracts $5,400 from that total to account for the
$5,400 the defendant received in exchange for the fentanyl pills he sold during the four controlled buys outlined in
paragraphs 42, 43, 45, 46. Second Revised PSR at 10.
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make a specific numeric determination of quantity based on imprecise evidence.” United States v.
Sicaros-Quintero, 557 F.3d 579, 582 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
A court “may consider relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the rules of
evidence applicable at trial, provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to
support its probable accuracy.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting U.S.S.G. §
6A1.3(a)).
Because the Government has the burden to prove drug quantity and base offense level by a
preponderance of the evidence, the Court will ultimately resolve this issue on the evidence at
sentencing. United States v. Poor Bear, 359 F.3d 1038, 1041 (8th Cir. 2004) (“If the defendant
objects to any of the factual allegations contained therein on an issue on which the government has
the burden of proof, such as the base offense level and any enhancing factors, the government must
present evidence at the sentencing hearing to prove the existence of the disputed facts.”). However,
based on the unobjected-to facts in the Second Revised PSR, the Court tentatively finds that the
money seized during searches of the defendant’s person, his residences, and his storage unit should
be converted to drug weight to more accurately reflect the scale of the defendant’s drug trafficking
activity, and that the defendant’s objection to paragraph 51 should be overruled.
Between February and May of 2024, the defendant sold just under 400 fentanyl pills during
four controlled buys for a total of $5,400. Second Revised PSR at 8–9 (72 pills for $1,000 in
paragraph 42; 65 pills for $1,000 in paragraph 43; 81 pills for $1,000 in paragraph 45; and 202 pills
for $2,400 in paragraph 46). The evidence supports a finding that the scale of the defendant’s drug
trafficking was much larger than those four controlled buys. Although the defendant argues that he
“did not get fentanyl until February 2024,” he has pleaded guilty to participating in a conspiracy to
distribute fentanyl beginning on or about January 3, 2024, and continuing to on or about May 17,
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2024. Filing 79; Filing 1. Unobjected-to portions of the Second Revised PSR show that the
defendant was distributing fentanyl to other fentanyl dealers as early as January 2024 and that he
was still discussing the distribution of fentanyl with other dealers in April 2024. Second Revised
PSR at 8 (paragraph 40), 6 (paragraph 25). Furthermore, law enforcement officers located more than
one thousand fentanyl pills and $135,995 in cash during searches of the defendant’s property, even
though the defendant was admittedly unemployed in the years leading up to his arrest.7 In light of
this evidence, the Court tentatively finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the cash located
during searches of the defendant’s property was drug proceeds and should be converted to drug
weight to more accurately reflect the scale of his drug trafficking activity. The Court also tentatively
finds that the conversion rate of $156.94 per gram—based on the highest pricing from the
defendant’s controlled buys reflected in the unobjected-to portions of the Second Revised PSR—is
appropriate. See United States v. Roach, 164 F.3d 403, 413–14 (8th Cir. 1998) (“The court may
make a specific numeric determination of quantity based on imprecise evidence, so long as the
record reflects a basis for the court’s decision.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
Based on the Court’s tentative findings, above, that the defendant’s objections to paragraphs
48 and 50 should be overruled and based on the Court’s tentative finding here that the defendant’s
objection to paragraph 51 should also be overruled, the Court further tentatively finds that the
calculated base offense level of 34 is correct based on a total drug weight of 1.066 kilograms of
fentanyl analogue. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(3) (assigning a base offense level of 34 when the
7 As the Court discusses in more detail below, the defendant does object to paragraph 124, the paragraph outlining
his employment history immediately preceding his arrest. However, the defendant’s objection does not challenge the
fact that he was unemployed in the years prior to his arrest. Instead, the defendant admits that he “did not work in 2022
and 2023.” Filing 144 at 2. Neither the Second Revised PSR nor the defendant’s objection specifically states the
defendant’s employment status during the first five months of 2024. Second Revised PSR at 24; Filing 144 at 2.
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defendant is attributed “[a]t least 1 KG but less than 3 KG of a Fentanyl Analogue”). Accordingly,
the Court also tentatively finds that the defendant’s objection to paragraph 61 should be overruled,
and the base offense level should remain 34.
4. Paragraphs 63 and 67
Paragraph 63 applies a two-level increase to the defendant’s offense level pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) on the grounds that the defendant maintained a premises for the purpose
of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance. Second Revised PSR at 11–12. The
defendant objects to paragraph 63. Filing 144 at 2. The defendant also objects to paragraph 67,
which reflects an adjusted offense level of 38 after adding to the defendant’s base offense level of
34 the two-level enhancement from paragraph 63 and an unobjected-to two-level enhancement from
paragraph 62. Filing 144 at 2; Second Revised PSR at 11–12.
“The government bears the burden of providing ‘the facts necessary to establish a sentencing
enhancement’ by a preponderance of the evidence.” Campos, 79 F.4th at 917–18 (quoting United
States v. Guzman, 926 F.3d 991, 1000 (8th Cir. 2019)). The Court will ultimately resolve this issue
on the evidence at sentencing, but the Court does tentatively find that the two-level enhancement in
paragraph 63 should be applied. Section 2D1.1(b)(12) of the Guidelines provides, “If the defendant
maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance,
increase by 2 levels.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) (emphasis in the original). Paragraph 54 of the
Second Revised PSR—which the defendant has not objected to—indicates that the “defendant
maintained three residences and a storage unit that were found to contain a large amount of
controlled substances, distribution tools, and United States Currency.” Second Revised PSR at 10.
The defendant also has not objected to paragraph 29, which states that “a room associated with
Muldrew” at the “stash house” contained “marijuana, a money counter, and $3,000 cash.” Second
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Revised PSR at 7. Paragraphs 30 and 32, two more unobjected-to paragraphs, reveal that the
defendant stored marijuana and approximately 963 fentanyl pills at his mother’s residence. Second
Revised PSR at 7. Taking these unobjected-to facts together, the Court tentatively finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) is
appropriate and the defendant’s objections to paragraphs 63 and 67 should be overruled. Trevino,
829 F.3d at 675 (“A fact in a PSR to which the defendant has not specifically objected is a fact
admitted by the defendant.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
C. Category Three: Criminal History Computation
In his third category of objections, the defendant raises objections to his criminal history
computation by challenging paragraphs 81 and 82 of the Second Revised PSR. Paragraph 81 assigns
the defendant 3 criminal history points for a drug trafficking conviction in case number CR14-1830
in the Douglas County District Court, Omaha, Nebraska. Second Revised PSR at 16–17. Related to
that case, the defendant was sentenced to 3 years of probation in 2015. Second Revised PSR at 16.
On August 4, 2016, his probation was revoked, and he was sentenced to 3 to 6 years of
imprisonment. Second Revised PSR at 16. Paragraph 82 assigns the defendant 3 criminal history
points for a 2016 conviction for attempted possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person.
Second Revised PSR at 17–18. That conviction occurred in case number CR15-2998 in the Douglas
County District Court, Omaha, Nebraska, and on August 4, 2016, the defendant was sentenced to 4
to 7 years of imprisonment to be served consecutive to his sentence in CR14-1830. Second Revised
PSR at 17. The defendant objects to paragraphs 81 and 82, arguing that the convictions “should be
counted as one sentence for a total of 3 points,” instead of two sentences for a total of 6 criminal
history points. Filing 144 at 2.
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Section 4A1.2(a)(2) of the Guidelines provides that for the purpose of computing criminal
history, “[p]rior sentences always are counted separately if the sentences were imposed for offenses
that were separated by an intervening arrest (i.e., the defendant is arrested for the first offense prior
to committing the second offense).” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2). “If there is no intervening arrest, prior
sentences are counted separate unless (A) the sentences resulted from offenses contained in the same
charging instrument; or (B) the sentences were imposed on the same day.” Id. Here, it is clear from
the Second Revised PSR that the defendant was sentenced in CR14-1830 and CR15-2998 on the
same day: August 4, 2016. Second Revised PSR at 16–17. Despite this fact, it is the Court’s tentative
finding that those sentences should be counted separately because, as the probation officer points
out, those sentences were imposed for offenses that were separated by an intervening arrest. Second
Revised PSR at 34. Although the defendant was sentenced in both cases on the same day, he was
arrested for the CR14-1830 drug crime in May 2014, well before he committed the CR15-2998
firearm offense in October 2015. See United States v. Harvey, 617 Fed.Appx. 592, 594 (8th Cir.
2015) (unpublished) (per curiam) (holding that an intervening arrest separated a 2002 assault from
a 2004 drug offense—even though the court revoked the defendant’s probation for the 2002 assault
after he committed the 2004 drug offense and even though the court imposed concurrent sentences
for the 2002 probation revocation and the 2004 drug offense—because “[p]olice arrested [the
defendant] for the 2002 assault long before he committed the relevant drug offense in late 2004”).
Accordingly, the Court tentatively finds that the defendant’s objections to paragraphs 81 and 82
should be overruled.
D. Category Four: Remaining Objections
Finally, the Court turns to the fourth category of the defendant’s objections. This category
contains the defendant’s remaining objections to paragraphs 33, 88, and 124 of the Second Revised
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PSR. Paragraph 33 is part of the Government’s version of events and states in full: “Muldrew paid
the utilities at the stash house and visited it frequently. Surveillance officers noticed Muldrew
carrying duffel bags, a tote, and a trash bag in and out of the house.” Second Revised PSR at 7. The
defendant objects to the second sentence of this paragraph on the grounds that he “was moving
clothes, etc. after [a] burglary at the residence. Morris moved in thereafter.” Filing 144 at 1.
Paragraph 88 states that “[t]he Omaha Police Department identifies Kadonta Muldrew as an active
member of the Omaha South Family Bloods gang.” Second Revised PSR at 19. The defendant
objects that “he is not an active gang member.” Filing 144 at 2. Finally, paragraph 124 describes the
defendant’s employment record from November of 2020 to May 17, 2024, as follows:
The defendant was unemployed and completing odd jobs under the table such as
lawn mowing and snow removal. He was collecting unemployment benefits and
stimulus checks during this time. The defendant also suffered a concussion and neck
injury in an automobile accident in 2022, which contributed to his unemployment.
Second Revised PSR at 24. The defendant objects to this characterization of his employment history,
arguing instead that he “was laid off in 2021 due to Covid and received unemployment benefits,
then stimulus checks.” Filing 144 at 2. He explains that he “sold dinners and did snow removal” and
“did not work in 2022 and 2023 after suffering a concussion and neck injury in an auto accident.”
Filing 144 at 2. None of these remaining objections affect the defendant’s Guideline calculations.
Because the Government bears the burden of proving these facts by a preponderance of the
evidence, Poor Bear, 359 F.3d at 1041, the Court will resolve these objections on the evidence at
sentencing.
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III. CONCLUSION
The parties will have the opportunity to make further arguments at the defendant’s
sentencing hearing, and the Court will rule on the defendant’s objections at that time. The Court’s
tentative findings set forth in this order should guide the parties’ arguments at sentencing.
Dated this 18th day of November, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
_________________________
Brian C. Buescher
United States District Judge
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