Brady v. Whitefield Police Department et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Darren Brady
v. 	Case No. 19-cv-00147-JL
Whitefield Police Department,
Eoin Stapleton,
Wendy E. Roberts, and
Sandra St. Pierre
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the court is pro se plaintiff Darren Brady’s
complaint (Doc. No. 1) filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights
by subjecting him to false arrest, false imprisonment, and
malicious prosecution. 	The complaint is before this magistrate
judge for preliminary review, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
and LR 4.3(d)(1).
Background
This action relates to Brady’s February 18, 2017 arrest and
detention for one or more sexual assault charge(s) involving a
child. 	The court has done its best to identify the relevant
factual allegations and summarize them here.1
1 The complaint is repetitive, loaded with tangential and
extraneous information, and given to philosophical meanderings.
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According to the complaint, Defendant Eoin Stapleton, a
police officer with the Whitefield Police Department (“WPD”),
arrested Brady on February 18, 2017. 	See Compl. (Doc. No. 1),
at 1. 	Brady does not state the reason for his arrest on that
date. 	A warrant for Brady’s arrest was issued on March 27,
2017, see id., at 6, and a probable cause hearing was held on
April 7, 2017, see id. at 1. 	The charge(s) against Brady were
dismissed on April 7, 2017, after the probable cause hearing.
See id. 	Brady was held in pre-trial detention from February 18,
2017 until April 7, 2017. 	See id.
In the complaint, Brady also alleges that Stapleton and
Defendant Sandra St. Pierre, identified as a special education
helper “- [C]oos [C]ounty – of the Whitefield N.H.
Superintendent-school district- White Mountains Regional
school,” id. at 2, conducted a sexual assault investigation
targeting Brady. 	Brady alleges: 	1) neither Stapleton nor St.
Pierre was trained or certified to conduct interviews of victims
of sexual assault, see Compl. (Doc. No. 1), at 10-11; 2)
Stapleton and St. Pierre subjected the victim to days of
repeated psychological brainwashing and mental and physical
abuse, see id. at 2, 4; 3) Stapleton and St. Pierre targeted
Brady because of past conflicts he had with each; and 4) St.
Pierre was a friend of the victim’s and the real assailant’s
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foster parents and wanted to cover up allegations of abuse
within the foster family, see id.
Brady alleges he and Stapleton have a history of conflict,
including: 	Stapleton refused to investigate rape allegations
Brady’s girlfriend made against “a gang of white guys,” id. at
1; Stapleton blamed Brady when Stapleton was refused alcohol
service at a local establishment, see id. at 4; and Brady made
numerous complaints about Stapleton being drunk while tending
bar before Stapleton became a police officer, see id. at 5.
Brady accuses St. Pierre of causing trouble after Brady refused
to date St. Pierre and of stalking him and his family on social
media. 	See Compl. (Doc. No. 1), at 3, 10. 	Brady asserts that
he has filed numerous complaints against St. Pierre with the WPD
and the New Hampshire Board of Education. 	See id. at 3, 6.
Brady alleges that defendants Stapleton, St. Pierre, and
Coos County prosecutor Wendy E. Roberts knowingly provided false
information to a Coos County judge in order to obtain the March
27, 2017 warrant for Brady’s arrest. 	See id. at 1-2.
Specifically, Brady asserts that the defendants told the judge
that the victim, identified as an eight-year-old girl with
mental health needs, was sexually assaulted by a black male,
when they knew the girl repeatedly had identified a white female
as her assailant. 	See id. at 2, 4. 	Brady asserts he is the
only black male in Whitefield. 	See id. at 3. 	Brady also
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alleges that the defendants told the court that St. Pierre was a
Child Advocate Center (“C.A.C.”) investigator and a New
Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, Division of
Children, Youth and Families ("DCYF") worker who was trained to
interview victims of sexual assault, when they knew St. Pierre
did not work for either entity and was not trained or certified
to interview victims of sexual assault. 	See id. at 10-12.
Brady further alleges that during his probable cause
hearing, Stapleton identified St. Pierre as a C.A.C.
investigator who had worked with him on the case, see Compl.
(Doc. No. 1), at 6, and testified that the child had been
questioned at the Groveton C.A.C., see id. at 2, 4, 6. 	Brady
claims in the complaint that St. Pierre does not work for the
C.A.C. and that the C.A.C. has no record of the child having
been questioned at any of its locations. 	See id. at 4.
Brady asserts that the WPD knew of his conflicts with
Stapleton and St. Pierre when it authorized them to investigate
sexual assault allegations involving the victim. 	He also
alleges the WPD knew St. Pierre was not a C.A.C. investigator, a
DCYF worker, or licensed, certified, or trained to question
victims of sexual assault, but allowed her to be represented as
such in the warrant application.
Brady seeks $350,000 in damages, court filing fees,
unspecified state fees, and out-of-state college fees. 	He seeks
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an order requiring that the victim’s school locker be moved away
from his stepdaughter’s locker; enjoining the defendants from
“stopping him” from working for DCYF or the “human services
field”; requiring the defendants to hand over any and all
information concerning him, and ordering the defendants to stop
talking about him. 	Brady also seeks assistance relocating. 	See
id. at 27.
Preliminary Review Standard
The court reviews complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs to
determine, among other things, whether plaintiff has asserted
any claim upon which relief might be granted. 	See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2), LR 4.3(d)(1). 	In determining whether a pro se
pleading states a claim, the court construes the pleading
liberally. 	See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(citation omitted). 	Disregarding any legal conclusions, the
court considers whether the factual content in the pleading and
inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, taken as true, state a
claim to relief. 	Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 102-
03 (1st Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
Discussion
Liberally construed, the Complaint appears to assert Fourth
Amendment claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and
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malicious prosecution and a Fourteenth Amendment due process
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “which provides a cause of action
for state deprivations of federal rights,” Nieves v. Bartlett,
No. 17-1174, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 3556, at *10, 2019 WL 2257157, at
*4 (U.S. May 28, 2019). 	Brady also alleges, under state law,
that the defendants are liable to him for “breach of fiduciary
duty,” Compl. (Doc. No. 1), at 10, breach of duty of reasonable
care, see id. at 13-14, and negligent supervision and training,
see id. at 14.
I. 	42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims
A. 	Whitefield Police Department
A municipal police department is not an entity subject to
suit under § 1983. 	Henschel v. Worcester Police Dep't, 445 F.2d
624 (1st Cir. 1971) (“If a Police Department may be successfully
sued, it is the city which will pay; the result is the same as
suing the city.”); see also Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cty., 480 F.3d
1072, 1080–81, n.10 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The complaint against the
[Miami–Dade County Police Department and the Miami–Dade County
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation] was dismissed
because they are not legal entities subject to suit. 	The case
proceeded against only Miami–Dade County.”). 	Moreover, in a §
1983 case, a city or other local governmental entity cannot be
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subject to liability at all unless the harm was caused in the
implementation of “official municipal policy.” 	Lozman v. City
of Riviera Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945, 1951 (2018) (citing Monell v.
N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); L.A. Cty.
v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 36 (2010)).
The assertions in the complaint do not demonstrate that the
WPD was implementing an official municipal policy when it
allegedly authorized Stapleton and St. Pierre to investigate
sexual assault allegations against the victim notwithstanding
their lack of training in that area and their prior conflicts
with Brady. 	Nor does Brady allege the WPD was acting pursuant
to some official municipal policy when it purportedly permitted
misrepresentation of St. Pierre’s employment and training in the
warrant application. 	Furthermore, the complaint contains no
facts which would permit a reasonable inference there was an
official municipal policy behind either of WPD’s alleged acts.
Accordingly, the district judge should dismiss all the § 1983
claims asserted against the Whitefield Police Department.
B. 	Individual Defendants
1. 	False Arrest and False Imprisonment
In general, an arrest is lawful under the Fourth Amendment
if the police officer has probable cause. 	See Holder v. Town of
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Sandown, 585 F.3d 500, 504 (1st Cir. 2009). 	“[T]he general rule
[is] that Fourth Amendment seizures are ‘reasonable’ only if
based on probable cause to believe that the individual has
committed a crime.” 	Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 192
(2013) (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 	To that end, a police
officer has probable cause when, at the time of the arrest, the
“facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge . . .
are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable
caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the
suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an
offense.” 	Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979); see
also Acosta v. Ames Dep't Stores, 386 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 2004).
To prevail on a claim for false imprisonment, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that:
(1) the defendant acted with the intent of confining
him within boundaries fixed by the defendant; (2) the
defendant's act directly or indirectly resulted in the
plaintiff's confinement; (3) the plaintiff was
conscious of or harmed by the confinement; and (4) the
defendant acted without legal authority.
Ojo v. Lorenzo, 64 A.3d 974, 982 (N.H. 2013). 	“Although ‘a lack
of probable cause is not an element of false imprisonment’” that
must be pled under state common law, “probable cause is ‘a
defense to a [tort] claim for false imprisonment resulting from
a warrantless detention.’” 	Farrelly v. City of Concord, 130
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A.3d 548, 560 (N.H. 2015).
Brady alleges that Stapleton, St. Pierre, and Roberts
arrested him, or successfully sought a warrant for his arrest,
based upon personal animus and/or information they knew to be
false. 	Brady also alleges that as a result of his arrest, he
was detained from February 18, 2017 until April 7, 2017.
Finally, Brady asserts that he has been unable to find work in
his chosen field and has suffered economic, mental, and
emotional harm due to his arrest and detention on charges of
sexually assaulting a child.
The allegations in the complaint, taken as true for
purposes of preliminary review, sufficiently state a claim for
false arrest and false imprisonment to survive preliminary
review. 	In an Order issued this date, the court has directed
service of Brady’s Fourth Amendment false arrest and false
imprisonment claims against Stapleton, St. Pierre, and Roberts.
2. 	Malicious Prosecution
“[A] plaintiff may bring a suit under § 1983 ... [for a
Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim] if he can
establish that: ‘the defendant (1) caused (2) a seizure of the
plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable
cause, and (3) criminal proceedings terminated in plaintiff’s
favor.’” 	Hernandez-Cuevas, 723 F.3d at 101 (citation omitted).
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Similarly, under state law, the elements of malicious
prosecution are: 	“(1) the plaintiff was subjected to a criminal
prosecution ... instituted by the defendant; (2) without
probable cause; (3) with malice; and (4) the prior action
terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.” 	Farrelly, 130 A.3d at
560.
The allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state a
claim for malicious prosecution, to survive preliminary review.
In an Order issued this date, the court has directed service of
Brady’s Fourth Amendment claims for malicious prosecution
against Stapleton, St. Pierre, and Roberts.
3. 	Due Process
Brady alleges that the defendants refused to provide him
with “all written words, audio, video[ ] of . . . illegal
brainwashing, questioning of . . . so- called victim in so- call
(C.A.C.) Groveton NH location; that points to the real person
that should be in jail[.]” 	Compl. (Doc. No. 1), at 16. 	Brady
claims the defendants’ failure to provide him the aforementioned
information violated the disclosure obligation articulated in
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
“[A] state actor violates a criminal defendant's due
process rights by the knowing use of perjured testimony or the
deliberate suppression of evidence leading to the defendant's
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conviction.” 	Drumgold v. Callahan, 707 F.3d 28, 38 (1st Cir.
2013) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 86; Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.
419, 432 (1995)). 	In Brady, the Supreme Court held that a
prosecutor violates a criminal defendant's due process rights
merely by failing to disclose material evidence in his
possession that is favorable to the defendant, irrespective of
the good or bad faith of the prosecutor. 	Drumgold, 707 F.3d at
38 (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87). 	Evidence is favorable to a
defendant if it is either exculpatory or impeaching in nature.
See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). 	Evidence
is material if there is a “reasonable probability” that, had it
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. 	Id. at 682. 	A reasonable
probability exists when the withholding of evidence undermines
confidence in the outcome of the proceeding. 	See Kyles, 514
U.S. at 434.
The criminal proceeding at issue here is Brady’s probable
cause hearing.2 	According to the complaint, the charges against
Brady were dismissed at the probable cause hearing. 	Therefore,
he cannot demonstrate that the undisclosed evidence was material
to the outcome of the proceeding. 	See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682;
2Although plaintiff contends the defendants violated Brady
by failing to disclose “all the facts” to the judge issuing the
arrest warrant, those allegations go to the issue of whether his
arrest and prosecution violated the Fourth Amendment.
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Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. 	Consequently, Brady has failed to state
a claim for relief against these defendants based on a failure
to provide him, or his defense attorney, exculpatory
information. 	Accordingly, the district judge should dismiss
Brady’s due process claims.
II. 	State Tort Claims
A. 	Breach of Duties
Brady alleges that the defendants breached their “fiduciary
duty” to the child victim in this case, Compl. (Doc. No. 1), at
10, and that the defendants and DCYF3 breached their “duty to
exercise reasonable care in the legal custody and control of the
child,” id. at 13-14. 	The child victim is not a plaintiff in
this action. 	Furthermore, Brady is prohibited from representing
anyone other than himself, as pro se litigants cannot prosecute
claims on behalf of anyone other than themselves in this court.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1654; LR 83.2(d). 	Thus, Brady may not obtain
relief for a breach of duty allegedly owed to the child, and the
district judge should dismiss Brady’s claims asserted on behalf
of the child victim.
3DCYF is not a defendant in this action, and the complaint
does not allege that DCYF played any role in the sexual assault
investigation, Brady’s arrest, or his detention.
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B. 	Negligent Training and Supervision
Brady asserts that “[n]egligent training and supervision on
all the defendant[s]” have caused him pain and suffering, past,
present and future permanent mental and emotional pain and
suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, the cost of therapeutic
and medical care and treatment, and lost earning capacity.
Compl. (Doc. No. 1), at 14. 	“[A] claim of negligent hiring,
training and supervision can encompass direct liability as a
result of the misconduct of [an] employee.” 	Cutter v. Town of
Farmington, 498 A.2d 316, 320 (N.H. 1985). 	“A principal who
conducts an activity through an agent is subject to liability
for harm to a third party caused by the agent's conduct if the
harm was caused by the principal's negligence in selecting,
training, retaining, supervising, or otherwise controlling the
agent.” 	Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.05 (2006).
As an initial matter, Brady does not allege facts
demonstrating, or from which it could be reasonably inferred,
that defendants Stapleton, St. Pierre, or Roberts employ or have
supervisory authority over any of the other defendants. 	As
such, Brady has failed to state a claim for relief against
Stapleton, St. Pierre, and Roberts for negligent training and
supervision, and the district judge should dismiss Brady’s
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claims asserting negligent training and supervision against
those defendants.
Brady alleges the WPD has supervisory authority over
defendants Stapleton and St. Pierre. 	He contends that neither
Stapleton nor St. Pierre was trained to conduct sexual assault
investigations; that the WPD knowingly allowed false information
about St. Pierre’s training and expertise to be included in the
warrant application for Brady’s arrest; that Stapleton and St.
Pierre had a negative history with Brady that pre-dated the
sexual assault investigation; that Brady filed complaints
against Stapleton and St. Pierre with the WPD prior to the
sexual assault investigation, and that Stapleton and St. Pierre
knew the victim identified a white female as her assailant, but
they alleged in the warrant application that she identified a
black male as her assailant.
The allegations in the complaint sufficiently state claims
for negligent selection and supervision against the WPD to
survive preliminary review. 	In an Order issued this date, the
court has directed service of state tort claims for negligent
selection and supervision against the WPD.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district judge should
dismiss: 	all § 1983 claims against the Whitefield Police
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Department, the § 1983 due process claims against Stapleton, St.
Pierre, and Roberts, and the state law claims of negligence
asserted on behalf of the child victim. 	Any objections to this
Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen days of
receipt of this notice. 	See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 	The
fourteen-day period may be extended upon motion. 	Failure to
file specific written objections to the Report and
Recommendation within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the district court’s order. 	See Santos-Santos v. Torres-
Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016).
__________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
June 13, 2019
cc: 	Darren Brady, pro se
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