Russo v. New Hampshire Neurospine Institute, P.A. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Gina Russo
v. 	Case No. 21-cv-703-SM-TSM
Opinion No. 2024 DNH 097
New Hampshire Neurospine
Institute, P.A. and
Uri M. Ahn
O R D E R
Gina Russo brings claims against her former employer, New
Hampshire Neurospine Institute, P.A. (“Institute”), and a
physician in that practice, Uri M. Ahn. 	Dr. Ahn moved for
summary judgment. 	Doc. no. 42. 	The Institute filed a document
styled “Joinder in Motion for Summary Judgment,” without seeking
leave to join the motion, and without providing any briefing or
further argument to support judgment in its favor. 	Doc. no. 43.
Dr. Ahn’s motion for summary judgment and supporting memorandum
address the claims brought against Dr. Ahn but do not address
the claims brought against the Institute. 	Doc. no. 42-1, at 10.
As such, the Institute’s “joinder” is not effective to include
the Institute as a co-movant for summary judgment, and the court
will consider the motion for summary judgment only with respect
to the moving party, Dr. Ahn.
The Institute filed a motion to strike, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), part of Russo’s objection to Dr.
Ahn’s motion for summary judgment. 	Specifically, the Institute
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challenges that part of Russo’s statement of additional facts in
her objection in which Russo alleges that the Institute
fabricated evidence in the case. 	Doc. no. 47, at 6-7. 	Russo
objects to the motion to strike.
Rule 12(f) permits parties to move to “strike from a
pleading . . . redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous
matter.” 	Id. (emphasis added). 	Pleadings are “(1) a complaint;
(2) an answer to a complaint; (3) an answer to a counterclaim
designated as a counterclaim; (4) an answer to a crossclaim;
(5) a third-party complaint; (6) an answer to a third-party
complaint; and (7) if the court orders one, a reply to an
answer.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a). 	An objection to a motion for
summary judgment is not a “pleading” as described in the rule,
so it is not governed by Rule 12(f). 	In re T-Mobile Customer
Data Security Breach Litig.¸111 F.4th 849, 	857 (8th Cir. 2024);
Davis v. Theriault, No. 1:22-CV-00275-JDL, 2023 WL 5628193, at
*9 (D. Me. Aug. 31, 2023)
An objection to a motion for summary judgment is not a pleading.
FRCP 7(a); 5C Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and A.
Benjamin Spencer, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1380 (3d ed.
2023) (“Rule 12(f) motions only may be directed towards
pleadings as defined by Rule 7(a); thus, motions, affidavits,
briefs, and other documents outside of the pleadings are not
subject to Rule 12(f).”).
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Therefore, the Institute provides no grounds to strike the
challenged part of Russo’s objection to Dr. Ahn’s motion for
summary judgment.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Institute’s “joinder”
(document no. 43) is ineffective, and the Institute’s motion to
strike (document no. 56) is denied.
SO ORDERED.
______________________________
Steven J. McAuliffe
United States District Judge
November 15, 2024
cc: 	Counsel of Record
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