Parker v. Bartlett, NH, Police Chief et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
ROBERT W. PARKER
v. 	Case No. 26-cv-160-SM-TSM
STATE OFFICIALS OF
NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET AL.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Self-represented Plaintiff Robert W. Parker, appearing in forma pauperis, sued several
Defendants in connection with a landlord-tenant dispute in Glen, New Hampshire in July 2022, a
subsequent eviction attempt and confrontation with police, and a related criminal case in New
Hampshire state court. Mr. Parker’s complaint (Doc. No. 1) is before the undersigned Magistrate
Judge for preliminary review, pursuant to LR 4.3(d)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The magistrate judge conducts a preliminary review of pleadings, like Mr. Parker’s, that
are filed in forma pauperis. See LR 4.3(d). The magistrate judge may recommend to the district
judge that one or more claims be dismissed if, among other things, the court lacks jurisdiction, a
defendant is immune from the relief sought, or the complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); LR 4.3(d). 	In conducting its preliminary
review, the court construes pro se complaints liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (per curiam). The complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). The court
treats as true all well-pleaded factual allegations, and construes reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s
Case 1:26-cv-00160-SM-TSM Document 3 Filed 03/31/26 Page 1 of 5

2
favor. See Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011). An unrepresented
plaintiff’s complaint must be read liberally in this regard, see Donovan v. Maine, 276 F.3d 87, 94
(1st Cir. 2002), but must still contain “the crucial detail of who, what, when, where, and how” in
order to provide fair notice of what the claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. Byrne v.
Maryland, No. 1:20-cv-00036-GZS, 2020 WL 1317731, at *5 (D. Me. Mar. 20, 2020) (rec. dec.),
aff'd, 2020 WL 2202441 (D. Me. May 6, 2020).
OTHER CASES
Upon review, Mr. Parker’s complaint seems to be largely duplicative of three pending cases
he has filed in this court, all of which stem from the same incident. See Parker v. Jarvis, No. 25-
cv-59-JL-AJ (filed Feb. 6, 2025); Parker v. Maine Health Memorial Hosp., No. 25-cv-282-JL-
TSM (filed July 29, 2025); Parker v. Lozier, No. 25-cv-444-SM-TSM (filed Nov. 6, 2025).1 It
appears to the court that all of the factual allegations, legal claims, and responsible defendants that
Mr. Parker addresses in the instant complaint have been raised in one or more of the pending suits.
DISCUSSION
Courts, including those in our Circuit, have held that a “plaintiff has ‘no right to maintain
two separate actions involving the same subject matter at the same time in the same court and
against the same defendant.’” Montoyo-Rivera v. Pall Life Sci. PR, LLC, 245 F. Supp. 3d 337,
342 (D.P.R. 2017) (citing Commerce Oil Ref. Corp. v. Miner, 303 F.2d 125, 127 (1st Cir. 1962))
(cleaned up). Accordingly, the “pendency of a prior pending action in the same federal court is
ground for abatement of the second action.” Id. (quoting Sutcliffe Storage & Warehouse Co. v.
1 The court also dismissed two other cases arising from the July 2022 incident. See Parker v.
Conway NH Police Department, No. 25-cv-280-SE-TSM (filed July 29, 2025; dismissed Oct. 6,
2025); Parker v. Jarvis, No. 25-cv-281-SM-AJ (filed July 29, 2025; dismissed Aug. 21, 2025).
Case 1:26-cv-00160-SM-TSM Document 3 Filed 03/31/26 Page 2 of 5

3
United States, 162 F.2d 849, 851 (1st Cir. 1947)); see also Schiefel v. Zyburt, No. 2:25-CV-185,
2025 WL 2908175, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 14, 2025) (“Plaintiffs generally have ‘no right to
maintain two separate actions involving the same subject matter at the same time in the same court
and against the same defendants.’” (quoting Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir.
1977))).
Although not identical, Mr. Parker’s instant complaint is essentially a compendium of the
three pending cases and the dismissed cases, in that it asserts claims based on events beginning
with the eviction and police confrontation, and continuing through his medical treatment and his
related state court case. There is also almost a complete overlap between the named defendants in
this case and those named across the others. See Amaefuna v. Wilkie, No. 17-12496-IT, 2018 WL
4403313, at *2 (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2018) (“A later-filed action is generally found duplicative of
an earlier-filed suit if the claims, parties and available relief do not differ significantly between the
two actions.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 17-CV-12496-IT, 2018 WL 4380989 (D.
Mass. Sept. 14, 2018); see also Congress Credit Corp. v. AJC Int'l, Inc., 42 F.3d 686, 689 (1st Cir.
1994) (“[F]or an action to be ‘duplicative’ of another, so as to warrant its dismissal for that reason
alone, the one must be materially on all fours with the other.”); Elliott-Lewis v. Abbott Labs., 378
F. Supp. 3d 67, 70 (D. Mass. 2019) (“A second lawsuit is impermissibly duplicative where it would
be precluded by a final judgment in the first lawsuit.”);
“After finding that a suit is duplicative and weighing the equities of the case, a court may
exercise its discretion to dismiss a later-filed action, to stay that action pending resolution of the
previously filed action, to enjoin the parties from proceeding with it, or to consolidate both
actions.” Montoyo-Rivera v. Pall Life Scis. PR, LLC, 245 F. Supp. 3d 337, 342 (D.P.R. 2017); see
also Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that courts also have the
Case 1:26-cv-00160-SM-TSM Document 3 Filed 03/31/26 Page 3 of 5

4
discretion to dismiss a complaint under section 1915 if it “merely repeats pending or previously
litigated claims”).
Here, in addition to the overlap between the instant complaint and the prior actions, the
equities favor dismissal of Mr. Parker’s sixth case stemming from the same incident. “As an initial
matter, ‘[d]ismissal of the duplicative lawsuit, more so than the issuance of a stay or the enjoinment
of proceedings, promotes judicial economy and the ‘comprehensive disposition of litigation.’”
Montoyo-Rivera, 245 F. Supp. 3d at 342 (quoting Adams v. Cal Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d
684, 692 (9th Cir. 2007)); see also Sutcliffe Storage & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 162 F.2d
849, 851 (1st Cir. 1947) (“There is no reason why a court should be bothered or a litigant harassed
with duplicating lawsuits on the same docket ....”); Ridge Gold Standard Liquors, Inc. v. Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 1210, 1213 (N.D. Ill. 1983). (Observing that “[t]he
irrationality of tolerating duplicative litigation in the federal system is all the more pronounced
where, as here, two federal judges sitting on the same district court are . . . devoting scarce judicial
resources to the adjudication of the same charges” by the same plaintiff against the same
defendants.”).
Given that the claims and defendants in this case are indiscernible from Mr. Parker’s other
cases in this court arising from the 2022 incident, both the interests of judicial economy and the
equities favor dismissal of this action.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the district judge should dismiss this case because it is duplicative
of the multiple cases Mr. Parker already filed regarding the incident that began with the attempted
eviction in 2002.
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen days of
Case 1:26-cv-00160-SM-TSM Document 3 Filed 03/31/26 Page 4 of 5

5
receipt of this notice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The fourteen-day period may be extended upon
motion. Only those issues raised in the objection(s) to this Report and Recommendation are subject
to review in the district court. See Sch. Union No. 37 v. United Nat'l Ins. Co., 617 F.3d 554, 564
(1st Cir. 2010). Any issues not preserved by such objection(s) are precluded on appeal. See id.
Failure to file any objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the district court's
Order. See Santos-Santos v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016).
__________________________________
Talesha L. Saint-Marc
United States Magistrate Judge
March 31, 2026
cc: 	Robert W. Parker, pro se
Case 1:26-cv-00160-SM-TSM Document 3 Filed 03/31/26 Page 5 of 5