Gakuba v. NH Attorney General

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Peter Gakuba
v. Civil No. 26-cv-341-JL-AJ
New Hampshire Attorney General
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Peter Gakuba has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(Doc. No. 1), challenging his convictions for sex crimes in state court in Illinois. The matter is
before this court for preliminary review under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases
(“§ 2254 Rules”) and LR 4.3(d)(4).
§ 2254 Rule 4 Review Standard
Pursuant to § 2254 Rule 4, a judge must promptly examine any petition for habeas relief,
and if “it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition.” Id. “Federal courts
are authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas petition that appears legally insufficient on its
face.” McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994). The court construes Gakuba’s pleadings
liberally, in light of his pro se status. See Dutil v. Murphy, 550 F.3d 154, 158 (1st Cir. 2008).
Background
Petitioner has been an active federal court litigant in the years following his state
conviction. He litigated a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under § 2254 in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, challenging the same set of state convictions.
That court denied relief on the merits. See Gakuba v. Brannon, No. 17 C 50337, 2018 WL
10127255 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2018). Then, the Seventh Circuit denied Gakuba’s request to file a
Case 1:26-cv-00341-JL-AJ Document 5 Filed 05/15/26 Page 1 of 4

2
successive petition. See Gakuba v. Jeffreys, No. 22-3039, 2022 WL 18863593, at *1 (7th Cir.
Nov. 21, 2022).
Gakuba was undeterred by his unsuccessful attempts to collaterally attack his
conviction in Illinois and turned to other jurisdictions. He filed no fewer than ten
petitions for federal habeas corpus relief in seven separate federal district courts.
All were transferred or dismissed as successive.
Gakuba v. Md. Att’y Gen.’s Off., No. 25-cv-415, 2025 WL 2940726, at *1 (D. Md. Sept. 24,
2025) (collecting cases). The Petition before this court challenges the validity of the same
convictions addressed in Petitioner’s first-in-time § 2254 petition.
Discussion
“A second-in-time § 2254 petition generally qualifies as a second or successive
application, triggering the requirements of § 2244(b), when an earlier filed petition has been
decided on the merits and a judgment exists.” Rivers v. Guerrero, 605 U.S. 443, 459 (2025).
The courts that have addressed the issue have concluded that the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois considered the merits of Gakuba’s first § 2254 petition when that court denied
relief in Gakuba’s case. See, e.g., Gakuba v. Att’y Gen. of Me., No. 2:23-CV-00009-GZS, 2023
WL 349328, at *1 (D. Me. Jan. 18, 2023), R&R adopted, 2023 WL 315697 (D. Me. Jan. 19,
2023).
. . . “Before a second or successive application . . . is filed in the district court, the
applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing
the district court to consider the application.” [28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).] See
also First Circuit Rule 22.1. “Such authorization is available only when the
second or successive petition is based either on (1) newly discovered evidence
that would establish innocence or (2) a new rule of constitutional law made
retroactive on collateral review by the Supreme Court.” The First Circuit has
“interpreted [these provisions] as ‘stripping the district court of jurisdiction over a
second or successive habeas petition unless and until the court of appeals has
decreed that it may go forward.’”
Att’y Gen. of Me., 2023 WL 349328, at *1 (internal citations omitted).
Case 1:26-cv-00341-JL-AJ Document 5 Filed 05/15/26 Page 2 of 4

3
The record lacks any federal appellate court order under § 2244(b) authorizing Gakuba to
file a second or successive petition. Following the well-reasoned findings and conclusions of
those courts that have deemed his prior § 2254 petitions to be successive, relative to his first-in-
time filing in the Northern District of Illinois, see, e.g., Md. Att’y Gen’s Off., 2025 WL
2940726, at *1 (collecting cases), the district judge here should conclude that Gakuba’s instant
Petition (Doc. No. 1) is successive, and that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider it.
Transfer or Dismissal
A “district court, faced with an unapproved second or successive habeas petition, must
either dismiss it, or transfer it to the appropriate court of appeals,” so that the appellate court can
decide whether to allow Petitioner to proceed with a successive petition. Pratt v. United States,
129 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 1997) (footnote and citation omitted). In general, a transfer is
presumptively preferable, but the presumption may be overcome if the administration of justice
is better served by dismissal. See Britell v. United States, 318 F.3d 70, 73 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing
28 U.S.C. § 1631).
There do not appear to be any exigent circumstances here suggesting that a transfer in
lieu of dismissal without prejudice would serve the interests of justice. The First Circuit
previously denied Gakuba’s application for leave to file a successive § 2254 petition after the
District of Maine dismissed his petition there as successive. See Gakuba v. Frey, No. 23-1084,
2024 WL 3549125, at *1 (1st Cir. Apr. 10, 2024). Gakuba’s capacity for vexatious litigation
favors dismissal. See, e.g., Md. Att'y Gen.’s Off., 2025 WL 2940726, at *3 (“Gakuba’s litigation
history reveals that he lacks a good-faith basis to continue filing habeas petitions, has serially
abused his access to the courts, and has placed unnecessary burdens on judicial resources.”).
Accordingly, the district judge here should dismiss this § 2254 Petition for lack of jurisdiction,
Case 1:26-cv-00341-JL-AJ Document 5 Filed 05/15/26 Page 3 of 4

4
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1631 & 2244(b), in lieu of a transfer.
Certificate of Appealability
The Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings require the court to “issue or deny a
certificate of appealability [‘COA’] when it enters a final order adverse to the party.” § 2254
Rule 11(a).
When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without
reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when
the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether
the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in
its procedural ruling.
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (emphasis added). Here, the grounds for dismissal
are purely procedural, and not substantive. Reasonable jurists would not find it debatable that
the instant petition is an unauthorized “successive” petition that is subject to dismissal. The
district judge should thus decline to issue a COA here.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district judge should dismiss Petitioner’s § 2254 Petition
for lack of jurisdiction; all pending motions should be denied as moot; and the district judge
should decline to issue a certificate of appealability. Any objections to this Report and
Recommendation must be filed within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(2). The fourteen-day period may be extended upon motion. Failure to file objections
within the specified time waives the right to appeal the district court’s order. See Santos-Santos
v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016).
__________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
May 15, 2026
cc: Peter Gakuba, pro se
Case 1:26-cv-00341-JL-AJ Document 5 Filed 05/15/26 Page 4 of 4