Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

1:26-cv-00445Nhd21 sept. 2026

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Ederson Martignago,
Petitioner
v. Case No. 26-cv-445-SM-AJ
Opinion No. 2026 DNH 134
Warden, Strafford County
Department of Corrections, et al.,
Respondents
O R D E R
Ederson Martignago is a civil immigration detainee from
Brazil. He filed this habeas corpus petition seeking a court
order directing respondents to release him immediately from ICE
custody or, in the alternative, to provide him with a prompt,
constitutionally adequate bond hearing before a neutral
decisionmaker. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He has been
detained by ICE since early April of 2026.
On June 1, 2026, the respondents were directed to show
cause why the court should not grant the petition to the extent
it seeks an order directing them to afford petitioner a bond
hearing based upon his apparent membership in the class
certified in Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz, 813 F. Supp. 3d 185
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(D. Mass. 2025), and/or his similarity to the petitioner in
Destino v. FCI Berlin, Warden, No. 25-cv-374-SE-AJ, 2025 WL
4010424 (D.N.H. Dec. 24, 2025).
On June 4, 2026, the federal respondents filed their
response, in which they assert that petitioner is not entitled
to the relief he seeks. Specifically, they assert that
petitioner has been convicted of two separate charges of
larceny. And, they say, larceny is a crime involving moral
turpitude, which makes petitioner inadmissible under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (providing that any alien convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude is inadmissible). See generally
Onwuamaegbu v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 405, 407 n.2 (1st Cir. 2006)
(“Larceny is generally considered a crime of moral turpitude.”)
(citing Lawrence v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 221, 226-67 (1st Cir.
2006)).
Consequently, respondents assert that petitioner is subject
to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(a) and is not
entitled to either immediate release or a bond hearing. But, as
the government itself has conceded in a similar case, “mandatory
detention under section 1226(c) without a bond hearing violates
the Due Process Clause when it becomes unreasonably prolonged in
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relation to its purpose in ensuring the removal of deportable
criminal noncitizens.” Reid v. Donelan, 17 F.4th 1, 8 (1st Cir.
2021) (quoting Reid v. Donelan, 390 F. Supp. 3d 201, 209 (D.
Mass. 2019)). See also Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 142 (2d
Cir. 2024) (“a noncitizen’s constitutional right to due process
precludes his unreasonably prolonged detention under section
1226(c) without a bond hearing.”), cert. granted sub nom. Genalo
v. Black, No. 25-886, 2026 WL 1718025 (U.S. June 15, 2026);
German Santos v. Warden, 965 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2020)
(similarly holding that due process mandates that noncitizens
detained under § 1226(c) be afforded a bond hearing once
detention becomes unreasonably prolonged). See generally Fils-
Aime v. FCI Berlin, Warden, 808 F. Supp. 3d 218, 224 (D.N.H.
2025) (holding that this court “joins the several district and
circuit courts that have suggested and held that prolonged
mandatory detention [under section 1225(b)] pending removal
proceedings, without a bond hearing, will at some point violate
the right to due process.”) (collecting cases); Rosales-Navares
v. FCI Berlin, Warden, 2026 WL 1133463 at *4 (D.N.H. April 27,
2026) (“Apart from citing Zadvydas and Arteaga-Martinez, the
government does not explain why Rosales-Navares lacks the same
right against unreasonably prolonged detention recognized by my
colleagues in Fils-Aime, K-S-, and Beneche. Persuaded instead
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that my colleagues’ view is correct, I join their consensus and
proceed to examine Rosales-Navares’s prolonged-detention claim
under the same multi-factor rubric.”).
In light of the foregoing, the court will defer ruling on
Martignago’s petition until after October 7, 2026 (the point at
which petitioner will have been detained for the presumptively-
reasonable period of six months). Then, on or before October
14, 2026, the government shall file a status report. If the
petitioner has not either: (a) been provided a constitutionally
adequate bond hearing before an immigration judge, or (b) been
removed to Brazil (or a third country), the federal respondents
shall show cause why the court should not grant the petition to
the extent it seeks an order directing them to provide
petitioner with a prompt, constitutionally adequate bond hearing
before a neutral decisionmaker, based upon the conclusion that
his detention has become unreasonably prolonged and due process
compels such a hearing. See generally Dixon v. Warden, FCI
Berlin, no. 26-cv-593 (D.N.H. Aug. 25, 2026) (discussing the
factors that are relevant when determining whether such a bond
hearing is warranted).
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Petitioner may file a response within 10 days after the
government has responded to this order.
SO ORDERED.
____________________________
Steven J. McAuliffe
United States District Judge
September 21, 2026
cc: Counsel of Record
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