MINAYA v. WARDEN, FCI FORT DIX

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
YASMIL MINAYA,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN, FCI FORT DIX,
Respondent.
Civil Action
No. 25-15490 (CPO)
OPINION
O’HEARN, District Judge.
Petitioner is a federal prisoner currently incarcerated at Federal Correctional Institution
Fort Dix, in Fort Dix, New Jersey. He is proceeding pro se with an Amended Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus (hereinafter “Petition’), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 5). For the
reasons stated in this Opinion, the Court will dismiss the Petition without prejudice for Petitioner’s
failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises from Petitioner’s challenge to the execution of his sentence. He contends
that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has wrongfully refused to apply certain credits under the First
Step Act (“FSA”), 28 C.F.R. § 523.40 et. seq., and has not authorized the maximum period of
prerelease custody1 available to him under the Second Chance Act (“SCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c).
(See ECF No. 5, at 15–16).2 Petitioner concedes that he has not attempted to exhaust his
administrative remedies as to these claims. (Id. at 11–12, 15 (“I have not appealed th[ese]
1 Prerelease custody permits a prisoner to serve a portion of his sentence in conditions designed to
facilitate his return to the community, such as placement in a community correctional facility or
home confinement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1)–(2).
2 Petitioner included two copies of his petition but signed only the second copy. (See ECF No. 5,
at 1–18). Accordingly, the Court will treat the second copy as the operative pleading.
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issue[s].”)). The BOP’s records confirm that Petitioner has not pursued the administrative remedy
process. (ECF No. 8-1, ¶ 6).
Petitioner filed the instant Petition in February of 2026. (ECF No. 5). Respondent filed a
Limited Answer opposing relief, (ECF No. 8), and Petitioner did not file a reply. In terms of relief,
Petitioner seeks the application of his FSA credits and the maximum prerelease placement
available under the Second Chance Act. (ECF No. 5, at 17).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Courts hold pro se pleadings to less stringent standards than more formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Courts must construe pro se habeas
petitions and any supporting submissions liberally and with a measure of tolerance. See Royce v.
Hahn, 151 F.3d 116, 118 (3d Cir. 1998). If a court does not dismiss the petition at the screening
stage, the court “must review the answer, any transcripts and records . . . to determine whether”
the matter warrants an evidentiary hearing. Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases
in the United States District Courts (made applicable to proceedings under § 2241 by Rule 1(b)).
“Whether to order a hearing is within the sound discretion of the trial court,” and depends on
whether the hearing “would have the potential to advance the petitioner’s claim.” Campbell v.
Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 2000); States v. Friedland, 879 F. Supp. 420, 434 (D.N.J.
1995) (applying the § 2255 hearing standard to a § 2241 petition), aff’d, 83 F.3d 1531 (3d Cir.
1996).
III. DISCUSSION
The Court must address the issue of exhaustion as it appears that Petitioner has failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies. Although 28 U.S.C. § 2241 contains no statutory exhaustion
requirement, a federal prisoner may not ordinarily bring a § 2241 petition, challenging the
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execution of his sentence, until he has exhausted all available administrative remedies. E.g.,
Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000); Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d
757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Federal prisoners are ordinarily required to exhaust their administrative
remedies before petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241.” (emphasis added)).
Courts require exhaustion for three reasons: “(1) allowing the appropriate agency to
develop a factual record and apply its expertise facilitates judicial review; (2) permitting agencies
to grant the relief requested conserves judicial resources; and (3) providing agencies the
opportunity to correct their own errors fosters administrative autonomy.” Moscato, 98 F.3d at
761–62; see also Gambino v. Morris, 134 F.3d 156, 171 (3d Cir. 1998); Lyons v. U.S. Marshals,
840 F.2d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 1988). Nevertheless, exhaustion is not required where it would not
promote these goals. For example, exhaustion may be excused if it “would be futile, if the actions
of the agency clearly and unambiguously violate statutory or constitutional rights, or if the
administrative procedure is clearly shown to be inadequate to prevent irreparable harm.” Lyons,
840 F.2d at 205; see also, e.g., Gambino, 134 F.3d at 171 (finding that exhaustion is not required
where petitioner demonstrates futility).
To determine whether a prisoner has exhausted his administrative remedies, courts look to
the agency’s applicable grievance procedure and rules, in this case, the BOP. See Jones v. Bock,
549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). Pursuant to the BOP’s administrative remedy program, an inmate must
generally attempt to informally resolve the issue by presenting it to staff through a BP-8
form. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.13. See generally 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(b) (“An informal resolution
attempt may be waived in individual cases at the Warden or institution Administrative Remedy
Coordinator’s discretion when the inmate demonstrates an acceptable reason for bypassing
informal resolution.”). If that fails to informally resolve the issue, then the inmate may submit a
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BP-9 form to the warden. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.14. An inmate who is dissatisfied with the warden’s
response may appeal to the regional director with a BP-10 form, and an inmate who is dissatisfied
with the regional director’s decision may appeal to the general counsel in the central office through
a BP-11 form. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). An appeal to the general counsel is the final level of
administrative appeal. Id.
Here, Petitioner concedes that he did not pursue the administrative remedy process as to
his claims. (ECF No. 5, at 11–12, 15). The BOP’s records confirm that, as of the date of the
Limited Answer, Petitioner had not initiated the administrative remedy process. (ECF No. 8-1, ¶
6). Petitioner has not made any argument that he should be excused from exhaustion.
Further, “Petitioner’s case fits squarely within the parameters of the purposes of
exhaustion.” Cf. Furando v. Ortiz, No. 20-3739, 2020 WL 3264161, at *3 (D.N.J. June 17, 2020).
First, the record does not reveal whether, how, or on what basis the BOP calculated Petitioner’s
FSA and SCA entitlements, as Petitioner has not presented a formal BOP decision. (See generally
ECF Nos. 5, 5-2). This lack of information shows the need for “Petitioner to attempt to resolve
this at the administrative level first” and develop a factual record. See Chaparro v. Ortiz, No. 20-
5272, 2020 WL 4251479, at *5 (D.N.J. July 24, 2020) (noting the need to develop the factual
record when the BOP’s efforts are in dispute). “Second, Petitioner could potentially obtain relief
from the BOP without using judicial resources.” Furando, 2020 WL 3264161, at *3. The BOP
could very well grant Petitioner the relief he seeks. See Shoup v. Shultz, No. 09-0585, 2009 WL
1544664, at *5 (D.N.J. June 2, 2009) (“Having no information as to what the decisions of these
officials would be, this Court cannot find . . . [that] these decisions would be ‘hypothetically
illegal,’ same as the Court cannot deem the exhaustion process ‘futile.’”). Finally, because
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Petitioner contends that the BOP has made mistakes, the BOP should have an opportunity to
correct its own errors.
For all those reasons, the Court finds that requiring Petitioner to exhaust his administrative
remedies would promote the goals of exhaustion and that exhaustion was not futile. Nor does
Petitioner allege any facts that would permit the Court to find that requiring exhaustion would
subject him to irreparable injury or otherwise warrant excusing exhaustion. (See generally ECF
Nos. 5, 5-2). Accordingly, the Court will not excuse Petitioner’s failure to exhaust and will dismiss
the Petition for his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss the Petition for Petitioner’s failure to
exhaust his administrative remedies. This dismissal is without prejudice to the filing of a new
petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, under a new docket number, after Petitioner has exhausted
his administrative remedies. An appropriate Order follows.
Dated: October 14, 2026
/s/ Christine P. O’Hearn
Christine P. O’Hearn
United States District Judge
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