SIMS v. TRANSUNION LLC

[Docket Nos. 1, 4]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
FRANK L. SIMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
TRANSUNION LLC,
Defendant.
Civ. A. No. 25-16362
(RMB/SAK)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
& ORDER
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon the Complaint [Docket No. 1]
and renewed Application to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) [Docket No. 4] by pro se
Plaintiff Frank L. Sims (“Plaintiff”). Plaintiff alleges Defendant TransUnion LLC
(“Defendant”) “report[ed] false and unverified negative information and …
continu[ed] to furnish inaccurate data after being placed on notice of disputes.”
[Docket No. 1 at 1.]
Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 54.3, “the Clerk shall not be required to enter any
suit, file any paper, issue any process, or render any other service for which a fee is
prescribed . . . unless the fee is paid in advance.” Under certain circumstances,
however, this Court may permit an indigent plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis.
A court may permit a litigant to proceed without prepayment of fees if he
submits a proper IFP application and establishes that he is unable to pay the requisite
fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Courts within the Third Circuit only grant leave to
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proceed IFP “based on a showing of indigence.” Douris v. Newtown Borough, Inc.,
207 Fed. Appx. 242, 243 (3d Cir. 2006). While IFP status is not reserved solely for the
“absolutely destitute,” the litigant “must establish that he is unable to pay the costs of
[his] suit.” Hurst v. Shalk, 659 Fed. Appx. 133, 134 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Walker v.
People Express Airlines, Inc., 886 F.2d 598, 601 (3d Cir. 1989)). The litigant seeking IFP
status bears the burden “to provide the Court with the financial information it needs
to make a determination as to whether he qualifies for IFP status.” Freeman v. Edens,
2007 WL 2406789, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2007) (cleaned up). “[A] plaintiff must state
the facts concerning [his] poverty with some degree of particularity, definiteness or
certainty.” Gross v. Cormack, 2013 WL 5435463, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 27, 2013) (quoting
Simon v. Mercer Cnty. Comm. College, 2011 WL 551196, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 9, 2011)).
While Section 1915 “is designed to ensure that indigent litigants have
meaningful access to the federal courts,” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989),
proceeding IFP “is a privilege, not a constitutional right.” Atl. Cnty. Cent. Mun. Ct. Inc.
v. Bey, 2024 WL 1256450, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2024). “Failure to submit a
completed financial affidavit renders an IFP application incomplete and this defect
warrants the application’s denial.” Id. (citing Rohn v. Johnston, 415 Fed. Appx. 353,
355 (3d Cir. 2011)).
In his IFP application, Plaintiff states that he has zero income, zero assets, and
zero assets in his checking account. [Docket No. 4 at 1–3.] Plaintiff claims to have
monthly expenses of the following: $1,150 in housing, $150 in utilities, and $290 in
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food. [Id. at 4–5.] Yet he does not explain how he covers these expenses with no
income whatsoever.
Plaintiff’s IFP application is patently deficient. A litigant seeking IFP status
cannot claim indigency by merely marking zeros across the board in an IFP
application. See, e.g., Afshar v. Rutgers Univ., 2024 WL 4476154, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 11,
2024) (denying IFP application, finding plaintiff did not make “a good faith effort to
state his income and assets” where plaintiff wrote “‘0’ for every single box” in IFP
application). That is essentially what Plaintiff has done here. Based upon Plaintiff’s
submission, the Court cannot properly determine Plaintiff’s financial status and
whether he is eligible to proceed IFP. Accordingly, the Court will deny his IFP
application without prejudice.
In addition, the Court notes that even if Plaintiff addresses the IFP deficiencies,
and the full filing fee or any part of it has been paid, the Court must dismiss the case if
it finds that the action: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (in forma pauperis actions). As explained
below, the current complaint would likely be dismissed at screening for failure to state
a claim for relief.
Plaintiff alleges violations of the FCRA. Section 1681e(b) of the FCRA
provides, in relevant part: “Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a
consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible
accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.”
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15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). To state a claim under this section, a plaintiff must plead the
following elements: (1) inaccurate information was included in a credit report; (2) the
inaccuracy was due to the consumer reporting agency's failure to follow reasonable
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy; (3) the consumer suffered an injury;
and (4) that injury was caused by the inclusion of the inaccurate entry. See Hafez v.
Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 666 F. Supp. 3d 455, 460–61 (D.N.J. 2023) (citing Cortez v.
Trans Union, LLC, 617 F.3d 688, 712–13 (3d Cir. 2010)).
The FCRA also confers on consumers the right to have negative information in
their credit reports investigated (or “reinvestigated”) for accuracy. Specifically, §
1681i(a) provides that if a consumer disputes information and properly notifies the
CRA of the same, the CRA must “conduct a reasonable reinvestigation to determine
whether the disputed information is inaccurate.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A). To state
a claim under § 1681i, a plaintiff must—in addition to pleading inaccuracy—establish
that the CRA “(1) had a statutory duty to reinvestigate, and (2) would have discovered
a discrepancy had it undertaken a reasonable investigation.” Stephens v. Equifax, Inc.,
2023 WL 8531825, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2023) (citing Cortez, 617 F.3d at 713–14).
As stated above, to make out a claim under § 1681e(b), a plaintiff must allege
that the “inaccurate information was included in a consumer's credit report[.]” Bibbs
v. Trans Union LLC, 43 F.4th 331, 342 (3d Cir. 2022). Section 1681i(a) similarly
requires a plaintiff to allege “that the reported information was in fact inaccurate.” Id.
at 344. General allegations of inaccurate information in a consumer credit report are
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not sufficient to state a plausible violation of the FCRA. See Anigbogu v. Midland Credit
Mgt., Inc., 2025 WL 99581, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 15, 2025) (collecting cases).
Here, Plaintiff alleges “Defendant knowingly and recklessly failed to maintain
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy in Plaintiff’s credit file”
and “deliberately ignored Plaintiff’s disputes and failed to conduct a lawful
reinvestigation[.]” [Docket No. 1 at 2.] Although Plaintiff asserts Defendant reported
late payments which were unfairly designated as late [Docket No. 1 at 2], Plaintiff does
not identify the particular late payment entries at issue or allege facts explaining why
the reported information was inaccurate. The claims under Sections 1681e(b) and
1681i(a) of the FCRA would therefore fail. Covington v. Equifax Info. Servs., Inc., 2019
WL 4254375, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2019); see Williams v. TransUnion LLC, 2025 WL
3628618, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 15, 2025) (quotation marks omitted) (granting
TransUnion's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims under §§ 1681e(b) and
1681i(a) for only alleging “multiple inaccuracies, inaccurate information, and disputed
accounts”).1
Plaintiff also brings claims for defamation against Defendant for publishing
false credit information. [Docket No. 1 at 3.] Section 1681h(e) of the FCRA
“provides that defamation, invasion of privacy, or negligence claims, while ordinarily
preempted by the FCRA, can be brought against a consumer reporting agency if ‘false
1 Because Plaintiff has not stated a plausible underlying violation of either § 1681e(b)
or § 1681i(a), there is no reason to address whether the Complaint adequately alleges
that Defendant’s willful or negligent noncompliance violated the FCRA, as Plaintiff
claims. [Docket No. 1 at 3.]
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information [is] furnished with malice or willful intent.’” Frazier v. TransUnion, 2023
WL 6323088, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2023) (quoting Williams v. Navient Sols., LLC,
2017 WL 3784039, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2017)).
Here, Plaintiff alleges “Defendant acted with malice and willful intent to injure
Plaintiff by publishing false credit information.” [Docket No. 1 at 3.] These
“threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements,” would not suffice. Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 131 (3d
Cir. 2010).
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY on this 14th day of October 2026,
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s IFP application is DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk shall administratively terminate this matter; and it is
further
ORDERED that, within thirty (30) days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff shall
either pay the requisite $405 filing fee or submit a properly completed IFP application;
and it is further
ORDERED that, if Plaintiff wishes to proceed in this action, he should also
submit an amended complaint within thirty (30) days because the current complaint is
likely to be dismissed at screening, even assuming the IFP deficiencies are addressed;
and it is further
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ORDERED that, if Plaintiff fails to timely pay the filing fee or timely submit a
completed IFP application, the Court intends to close the file in this matter without
further notice and subject to reopening only upon good cause shown; and it is finally
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall, notwithstanding Plaintiff’s
consent to receive documents electronically, MAIL a copy of this Memorandum
Opinion and Order to Plaintiff via regular U.S. mail and NOTE the completion of
same on the docket.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
Chief United States District Judge
DATED: October 14, 2026
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