BOOKER et al v. ALLEN et al

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
HAZEL BOOKER and TRACY HOLLEN,
Plaintiffs,
v.
VIDAL ALLEN, 1 ST ST. USA LLC,
BALLERS CORNER CAPITAL LLC, and
NEXTRES LLC.,
Defendants.
Case No.: 26-12783
OPINION AND ORDER
October 15, 2026
SEMPER, District Judge.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Plaintiffs Hazel Booker (“Booker”) and
Tracey Hollen’s (“Hollen”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order.
(ECF 2, “Motion” or “Mot.”) 	Defendant Nextres LLC (“Nextres”) opposed Plaintiffs’ Motion.
(ECF 7, “Opposition” or “Opp.”) Plaintiffs did not file a reply. The Court has decided the Motion
without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1.
For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ Motion is DENIED.
WHEREAS Plaintiffs seek a temporary restraining order and injunctive relief preventing
Defendant Vidal Allen (“Allen”), 1 st St. USA LLC (“1 st St.”), Ballers Corner Capital LLC
(“Ballers”), and Nextres (collectively, “Defendants”) from enforcing a mortgage loan and
foreclosing on their residence. (Mot. at 2.) Plaintiffs reside in property located at 303-307 17th
Avenue, Paterson, New Jersey 07504 (the “Property”). 	(Id. at 1.) 	Plaintiffs’ property faced
foreclosure when they fell behind on their New Jersey Federal Credit Union (“NJCFU”) mortgage
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in October 2023. (Id.) Allen assisted Plaintiffs with their mortgage refinance. (Id.) While the
facts remain in dispute, Plaintiffs allege Allen created a limited liability company, Seventeen H&B
Holdings LLC (“H&B”), and transferred the Property’s title from Hollen to H&B. (Id.; ECF 1,
“Complaint” or “Compl.” ¶¶ 29, 21.) Allen also allegedly obtained a commercial bridge loan (the
“Bridge Loan”) through Nextres, and H&B Holdings executed a Note and Mortgage in favor of
Nextres in the amount of $276,000 on April 10, 2025. (Mot. at 1; Compl. ¶¶ 44, 56.) The Note
had an annual interest rate of 13.99% and required the loan balance to be paid by May 1, 2026.
(Mot. at 1; Compl. ¶ 58.) Plaintiffs also allege Allen filed multiple construction liens against the
Property as part of securing the Bridge Loan. (Mot. at 1; Compl. ¶¶ 38, 40.) Plaintiffs defaulted
on the Bridge Loan, and on August 19, 2026, Nextres filed a foreclosure action against them in the
Superior County of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Passaic County.1 (Mot. at 2; Compl. ¶¶ 93-
94); and
WHEREAS Plaintiffs initiated this action against Defendants on September 29, 2026,
asserting claims for fraud, violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, breach of fiduciary
duty, recession of the Bridge Loan and other construction liens, violations of the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures 	Act (“RESPA”) 	and Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), unjust
enrichment, and civil conspiracy. (Compl. ¶¶ 95-153.) Plaintiffs simultaneously filed the present
Motion asking this Court to prevent Defendants from enforcing both the Bridge Loan and
construction liens, and foreclosing on the Property. (Mot. at 2.) Plaintiffs argue that they have
demonstrated irreparable harm, their underlying claims have a clear likelihood of success on the
merits, and that the balance of equities and public interest weigh in their favor. 	(Id. at 4-17.)
1 The Court notes that the parties present different docket numbers for the ongoing state court
foreclosure action. Plaintiffs assert the docket number is F-007121-24 and Nextres asserts the
docket number is F-9417-26. (See Compl. ¶ 20; Opp. at 2.)
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Nextres filed an opposition on October 7, 2026, arguing that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over this case because Plaintiffs fail to adequately plead diversity of citizenship, the
Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Nextres because Nextres was not served, and that the Anti-
Injunction Act prohibits this Court from entering any order or injunction that would halt the state
foreclosure proceeding. 	(Opp. at 1-4.) 	On the merits, Nextres argues that Plaintiffs have not
demonstrated irreparable harm, a likelihood of success on the merits, or that an injunction would
benefit the public interest. (Id. at 4-6); and
WHEREAS the Court is satisfied that it maintains subject matter jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs’ claims. “The Court has an independent obligation to satisfy itself of its subject matter
jurisdiction, and the Court ‘always has jurisdiction to determine its [own] jurisdiction.’” Foster v.
Holiday Hosp. Franchising, LLC, No. 24-10031, 2025 WL 2267978, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 8, 2025).
In their Complaint, Plaintiffs contend that this Court has diversity, federal question, and
supplemental jurisdiction over their claims. (See Compl. ¶ 1.) It is true that Plaintiffs incorrectly
cite a removal statute as the basis of this Court’s diversity jurisdiction,2 and that they have not
alleged complete diversity of citizenship between themselves and each Defendant in this case.3
(Id. ¶¶ 1-10; Opp. at 4); Foster, 2025 WL 2267978, at *2 (“Critically, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332,
there must be complete diversity of citizenship among the parties, meaning each plaintiff is
2 Plaintiffs assert this Court has diversity jurisdiction over their claims under 28. U.S.C. § 1441.
(Id. ¶ 1.) However, the statutory basis for diversity jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
3 For example, in their Complaint, Plaintiffs appear to assert that they, along with Defendants Allen
and 1st St., are citizens of New Jersey, as they note that they and Allen reside in New Jersey, and
that 1st St. maintains a mailing address in New Jersey. 	(Id. ¶¶ 3, 5, 7-8; ECF Nos. 8-1, 8-3);
Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010) (“A natural person
is deemed to be a citizen of the state where he is domiciled. A corporation is a citizen both of the
state where it is incorporated and of the state where it has its principal place of business.” (internal
citations omitted)).
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domiciled in a different state than each defendant[.]” (emphasis in original)). Regardless, the Court
concludes it maintains federal question and supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims.
Plaintiffs cite the proper statutes as bases for such jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, and
assert claims under two federal laws: RESPA and FCRA. (See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 130-41); Rockefeller
v. Comcast Corp., 424 F. App’x 82, 83 (3d Cir. 2021) (“Federal question jurisdiction exists only
if a federal question is presented on the face of the complaint.” (citation omitted)). Further, given
that all of Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of Defendants’ alleged transfer of the Property’s title to H&B,
obtainment of the Bridge Loan and construction liens, and representations about the mortgage
financing, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiffs’ state breach of contract, fiduciary duty, recission,
NJCFA, unjust enrichment, civil conspiracy, and quiet title claims arise out of the same case or
controversy and common nucleus of operative fact as their federal claims. (See Compl. ¶¶ 95-129,
142-58); Testa v. Hoban, No. 17-1618, 2018 WL 623681, at *6 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2018)
(“Supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate when there is a common nucleus of operative fact and
whether the claims are part of the same case or controversy under Article III.” (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted)). As such, the Court maintains federal question and supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims; and
WHEREAS while Nextres contends that it was not served with process and that this Court
therefore lacks personal jurisdiction over it, (Opp. at 3), this case’s docket indicates that Nextres
was properly and successfully served pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 on October 2,
2026. (ECF Nos. 4, 8.) “A court obtains personal jurisdiction over the parties when the complaint
and summons are properly served upon the defendant.” Lampe v. Xouth, Inc., 952 F.2d 697, 700-
01 (3d Cir. 1991). “Under Rule 4(h), a corporation may be served ‘by delivering a copy of the
summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent
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authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process[.]’” 	G&G Closed Circuit
Events, LLC v. Remsen Assocs., Inc., No. 19-13019, 2021 WL 1139873, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 24,
2021) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B)). The docket here reflects that Plaintiffs filed proof of
service as to Nextres. Specifically, the affidavit of service states that the summons, Complaint,
and Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order were served on Nicole Brown on October 2, and
that Nicole Brown was a managing agent of the corporation who was “authorized to accept
service.” (ECF 8 at 1.) The Court concludes it has personal jurisdiction over Nextres; and
WHEREAS the Anti-Injunction Act provides that a federal district court “may not grant
an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by an Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”
28 U.S.C. § 2283. “[E]xceptions in the Anti-Injunction Act are to be construed narrowly,” In re
Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d 220, 233 (3d Cir. 2001), and “[a]ny doubts as to the propriety of a federal
injunction against state court proceedings should be resolved in favor of permitting the state courts
to proceed in an orderly fashion to finally determine the controversy.” Atl. Coast Line R. Co. v.
Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 297 (1970); and
WHEREAS courts in this District have held that the Anti-Injunction Act “prohibits a
federal court from entering an injunction that would enjoin mortgage foreclosure actions.” 	See
Hernandez v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, No. 14-7950, 2015 WL 3386126, at *3 (D.N.J. May 26,
2015) (declining to enjoin the plaintiff’s pending state foreclosure action because doing so would
“run afoul of the Anti-Injunction Act”); Mestman v. Runaway Beach Condo. Assoc., No. 21-16529,
2021 WL 4848602, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2021) (concluding that a plaintiff’s request that it order
the state court to stay foreclosure proceedings was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act); Patrick v.
Am.’s Servicing Co., No. 14-6563, 2015 WL 1759567, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 17, 2015) (declining to
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enjoin the defendants from evicting the plaintiff and selling his home because “the Anti-Injunction
Act forbids a party from filing a federal suit that seeks to prevent defendants from proceeding on
a foreclosure action”); St. Clair v. Wertzberger, 637 F. Supp. 2d 251, 255 (D.N.J. 2009) (abstaining
from deciding a plaintiff’s claims arising out of the foreclosure of his home in part because any
ruling would “constitute an injunction enjoining the state court from ordering a foreclosure sale,
which is prohibited by the Anti-Injunction Act”); and
WHEREAS here, “Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief asks this Court to enjoin the
pending foreclosure action” and thus “run[s] afoul of the Anti-Injunction Act.” See Hernandez,
2015 WL 3386126, at *3; Muniz v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No. 26-6004, 2026 WL
2334055, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 12, 2026). 	The Court may not grant Plaintiffs’ requested relief;
therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion is DENIED.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, and for good cause shown,
IT IS, on this 15th day of October 2026,
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion (ECF 2) is DENIED.
/s/ Jamel K. Semper
H ON. JAMEL K. S EMPER
United States District Judge
Orig: 	Clerk
cc: 	Parties
Alex D. Silagi, U.S.M.J.
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