GROSSBERGER v. CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT et al

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
BEZALEL GROSSBERGER,
Plaintiff,
v.
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 21-19959 (GC) (JTQ)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
CASTNER, District Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon two Motions filed by Defendants. 	First,
the Clerk of the New Jersey Superior Court and the Clerk of the New Jersey Supreme Court (the
State Defendants) moved to dismiss Plaintiff Bezalel Grossberger’s Amended Complaint (ECF
No. 89) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule) 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 98.)
Second, the Monmouth County Clerk moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c).
(ECF No. 102.) 	Grossberger opposed the Motions, and the Monmouth County Clerk replied.
(ECF Nos. 105, 106.) Also pending are Grossberger’s Motion to Stay Pending Appeal and Motion
for Third Circuit Jurisdiction. (ECF Nos. 109, 119.) The Court has carefully reviewed the parties’
submissions and decides the matter without oral argument pursuant to Rule 78(b) and Local Civil
Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth below, and other good cause shown, Defendants’ Motions
(ECF Nos. 98, 102) are GRANTED. Grossberger’s Motion to Stay Pending Appeal and Motion
for Third Circuit Jurisdiction (ECF Nos. 109, 119) are DENIED as moot.
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I. 	BACKGROUND1
A. 	Factual Background
Plaintiff Bezalel Grossberger alleges that the State Defendants “conspired with each other
and colluded with unnamed parties, to ensure that [P]laintiff never has any recourse to file any
form of complaint at any State Court or quasi-judicial State authority.” 	(ECF No. 89 at 1.2)
Specifically, Grossberger objects to his filings in New Jersey state court being labeled frivolous
and therefore subject to screening and/or rejection prior to docketing.3 (Id. at 2.) According to
Grossberger, “[i]n the past 10 years, almost without exception, every single submission is deemed
frivolous without process of law.” (Id. at 3.) Grossberger claims his filings were marked frivolous
without a hearing or an explanation.4 (Id.)
1 	On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all facts as true, but
courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citation and quotations omitted).
2 	Page numbers for record cites (i.e., “ECF Nos.”) refer to the page numbers stamped by the
Court’s e-filing system and not the internal pagination of the parties.
3 	See Grossberger v. State, 2018 WL 4309414, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 11,
2018) (“Under [New Jersey Court] Rule 1:4-8(b)(3), the trial court on its own initiative can impose
sanctions upon a pro se party for filing frivolous litigation.”); Grossberger v. Div. of L., Civ. No.
21-12102, 2023 WL 7110619, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 17, 2023) (“The court in [Rosenblum v. Borough
of Closter, 755 A.2d 1184 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000)] found that a litigant, including a pro
se litigant, can be prevented from filing a complaint when the plaintiff’s prior litigation
demonstrates a pattern of frivolous pleadings, as long as the Assignment Judge reviewed the
complaint and is satisfied that it has no merit, and traditional sanctions have not provided a
deterrent to the plaintiff.”).
4 	Separately, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has upheld the
imposition of a filing injunction against Grossberger by a court in this district. See Grossberger
v. Ruane, 535 F. App’x 84, 86 (3d Cir. 2013) (“It is clear that Grossberger is unhappy with the
District Court’s decision to dismiss his case, and apparently he has made it his goal to change the
Court’s mind. 	But in the process, he has ‘established a pattern of groundless and vexatious
litigation.’ . . . 	Grossberger’s filings are not only numerous, they are also without any merit.”)
(internal citation omitted).
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Grossberger also alleges that there were various “abnormalities” regarding the screening
of his filings. 	(Id. at 3.) 	For instance, he claims that he received “mailings in hand-written
envelopes without stamps” and “return address [being the] same as [the] addressee.” (Id. at 3.) As
for the “rare” hearings in his cases, Grossberger claims that these proceedings were “not conducted
normally” in that “parties may not be sworn in, need not stand when addressing the court; and the
court opens with adversary despite the rules providing ‘movant is heard first.’” (Id. at 3-4.)
Separately, Grossberger appears to challenge the recording of certain deeds by the
Monmouth County Clerk. (Id. at 5.) According to Grossberger, the Clerk “filed [deeds] that are
facially apparent as un-recordable,” and Grossberger claims he has standing to challenge those
deeds as an “interested party.” (Id.) Grossberger apparently believes he has a right to the property
that was the subject of the challenged deeds, as he “invested great effort to consummate the
purchase through his assignee.”5 (ECF No. 89-7 at 4.) In an attachment to his Amended Complaint
labeled “Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint Within Time,” Grossberger asserts that
the original owner of the property “prepared a Deed and Hud-1 statement, but ultimately refused
to proceed with the sale without coherent explanation.” (Id.) Grossberger alleges that the property
was sold to another buyer. (See id. at 4-5.)
B. 	Procedural Background
On April 16, 2020, Grossberger commenced his suit in the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Mercer County. (ECF No. 1 at 2 n.1.) On October 8, 2021, Plaintiff filed an
Amended Complaint in state court. Grossberger named the following Defendants in his Amended
Complaint: “Clerk of the Supreme Court”; “Clerk(s) of the Superior Court”; “Clerk(s) of the
5 	The property at issue is located at 413 Oak Glen Road in Howell, NJ 07333. (ECF No. 89-
7 at 4.)
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Municipal Court”; “County Clerk(s)”; “Office of Attorney Ethics”; “State Prosecutors office”;
“County Prosecutors office”; and “Clerk of the United States District Court.” (ECF No. 1-2 at 3-
4.) 	On November 12, 2021, Defendant Clerk of the United States District Court removed the
matter to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442. 	(ECF No. 1.) 	Grossberger thereafter sought the
issuance of a temporary restraining order, (ECF Nos. 24-27), which the Court denied, (ECF No.
39).
Defendants moved to dismiss Grossberger’s Amended Complaint. (ECF Nos. 7, 19, 42.)
Grossberger also filed four Motions for a Permanent Injunction and an Application for an Order to
Show Cause. (ECF Nos. 29-32, 36.) On February 27, 2023, the Court dismissed the following
claims with prejudice: (i) all claims against the Office of Attorney Ethics; (ii) claims against the
Clerk of the Supreme Court and the Clerk of the Superior Court in their official capacities; and
(iii) all claims against the Clerk of the United States District Court. 	(ECF No. 51.) The Court
dismissed without prejudice: (i) claims against the Clerk of the Supreme Court and the Clerk of
the Superior Court in their individual capacities; and (ii) claims against the Monmouth County
Clerk. (Id.) The Court denied Grossberger’s requests for injunctive relief, but it granted him leave
to file an amended complaint by March 24, 2023. (Id.)
The next day, Grossberger filed a “Motion for Clarification.” 	(ECF No. 52.) 	Then, on
March 20, 2023, Grossberger sought an extension of time to file his amended complaint pending
the Court’s resolution of his Motion for Clarification. (ECF No. 53.) On September 12, 2023, the
Court denied Grossberger’s Motion for Clarification, construing it as a reconsideration request.
(ECF No. 55.) However, the Court granted in part Grossberger’s request for an extension of time
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to file an amended complaint, permitting Grossberger to seek leave to file an amended complaint
within 30 days.6 (Id.)
Over a span of two months, Grossberger proceeded to file eight motions seeking leave to
amend his complaint. (ECF Nos. 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 71.) As noted by the Magistrate Judge,
“[e]ach motion is somewhat different and each contains a copious number of exhibits.” (ECF No.
73.) On April 2, 2024, the Magistrate Judge terminated all of Grossberger’s pending motions and
directed him to “file a single motion for leave to amend.” 	(Id.) 	The Magistrate Judge further
ordered that any motion for leave to amend “must include a proposed amended complaint.” (Id.
(emphasis in original).)
Next, Grossberger filed two motions seeking injunctive relief—a “Motion for a Protective
Order” (ECF No. 75) and a “Motion for Mandamus” (ECF No. 76)—both of which this Court
denied because there was no operative complaint at the time, (ECF No. 85). 	On June 6, 2024,
Grossberger filed a Motion for Leave to Amend. 	(ECF No. 77.) 	The Magistrate Judge denied
this Motion because, despite Grossberger being previously ordered to file a proposed amended
complaint, it was “simply unclear to the Court which documents are motion papers and which
documents, if any, are intended to comprise a proposed Amended Complaint.” (ECF No. 86.) The
Magistrate Judge granted Grossberger until December 2, 2024 to file a renewed motion for leave
to amend. (Id.) Grossberger timely filed his renewed Motion for Leave to Amend, (ECF No. 87),
which the Magistrate Judge granted as unopposed, (ECF No. 88).
6 	Grossberger filed an appeal of the Court’s September 12, 2023 Memorandum Order, but
the Third Circuit dismissed the appeal because Grossberger did not pay the filing fee. (ECF No.
72.)
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Grossberger asserts the following causes of action in his operative Amended Complaint:
“Denial of Plaintiffs’ First and Fourth Amendment Rights to access the court”7 (Count 1);
“Conspiracy to deny plaintiff his First and Fourteenth Amendment Right” (Count 2); “Denial of
Equal Protection of the Laws” (Count 3); “Retaliation” (Count 4); “RICO” (Count 5); “Deprivation
of Property Rights” (Count 6); “Without Due Process of Law” (Count 7); “Substantive Due
Process” (Count 8); “Discrimination Animus” (Count 9); “Malicious Abuse of Process” (Count
10); “Malicious Prosecution” (Count 11); and “Defamation” (Count 12).8 (ECF No. 89.)
After the Court accepted Grossberger’s Amended Complaint (id.), Grossberger moved to
renew his requests for injunctive relief that the Court previously denied for lack of an operative
pleading, (ECF No. 90). The Court denied Grossberger’s Motions, and he appealed. (ECF No.
107.) While Grossberger’s appeal was pending, Grossberger filed a Motion for a Stay (ECF No.
109) and a Motion for Third Circuit Jurisdiction (ECF No. 119). On November 4, 2025, the Third
Circuit summarily affirmed this Court’s Order denying Grossberger’s requests for injunctive relief,
concluding that Grossberger’s appeal did not present a substantial question. See Grossberger v.
Clerk of the Supreme Court, No. 25-1925, at ECF No. 11 (3d Cir. Nov. 4, 2025).
7 	Although Grossberger does not specifically cite to any federal statutes in his Amended
Complaint, courts have found allegations of constitutional violations made by pro se litigants to
be sufficient for purposes of federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See, e.g., Hull
v. Mallon, Civ. No. 00-5698, 2001 WL 964115, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2001) (“Although
plaintiff makes no reference to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he does allege constitutional violations in a
context sufficient to support original subject matter jurisdiction.”).
8 	Grossberger also asserts that “[a]dditional counts may be forthcoming, pending disposition
of the matters within by an Order or denial thereof, entering declaratory judgment and injunctive
relief,” which he labels as “Count 13.”
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. 	Rule 12(b)(1)
Rule 12(b)(1) permits a defendant to move at any time to dismiss the complaint for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction on either facial or factual grounds. 	Gould Electronics Inc. v. United
States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000). 	A facial challenge asserts that “the complaint, on its
face, does not allege sufficient grounds to establish subject matter jurisdiction.” Iwanowa v. Ford
Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 438 (D.N.J. 1999). In analyzing a facial challenge, a court “must
only consider the allegations of the complaint and documents . . . attached thereto, in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.” 	Gould Elecs. Inc., 220 F.3d at 176. 	“A court considering a facial
challenge construes the allegations in the complaint as true and determines whether subject matter
jurisdiction exists.” Arosa Solar Energy Sys., Inc. v. Recom Solar, LLC, Civ. No. 18-1340, 2021
WL 1196405, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2021).
A factual challenge, on the other hand, “attacks allegations underlying the assertion of
jurisdiction in the complaint, and it allows the defendant to present competing facts.” Hartig Drug
Co. Inc. v. Senju Pharm. Co., 836 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2016). The “trial court is free to weigh
the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case” and “the plaintiff
will have the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist.” Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462
F.3d 294, 302 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d
884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)). 	“Therefore, a 12(b)(1) factual challenge strips the plaintiff of the
protections and factual deference provided under 12(b)(6) review.” Hartig Drug Co., 836 F.3d at
268. Regardless of the type of challenge, the plaintiff bears the “burden of proving that the court
has subject matter jurisdiction.” Cottrell v. Heritages Dairy Stores, Inc., Civ. No. 09-1743, 2010
WL 3908567, at *2 (D.N.J. Sep. 30, 2010) (citing Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891).
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B. 	Rule 12(b)(6)
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, courts
“accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the plaintiff, and assess whether the complaint and the exhibits attached to it ‘contain enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Wilson v. USI Ins. Serv. LLC, 57 F.4th 131,
140 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting Watters v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Scranton, 975 F.3d 406, 412 (3d Cir.
2020)). 	“A claim is facially plausible ‘when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”
Clark v. Coupe, 55 F.4th 167, 178 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Mammana v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
934 F.3d 368, 372 (3d Cir. 2019)). When assessing the factual allegations in a complaint, courts
“disregard legal conclusions and recitals of the elements of a cause of action that are supported
only by mere conclusory statements.” 	Wilson, 57 F.4th at 140 (citing Oakwood Lab’ys LLC v.
Thanoo, 999 F.3d 892, 904 (3d Cir. 2021)). The defendant bringing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion bears
the burden of “showing that a complaint fails to state a claim.” In re Plavix Mktg., Sales Pracs. &
Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. II), 974 F.3d 228, 231 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d
333, 349 (3d Cir. 2016)).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court can only consider “the complaint, exhibits
attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents
if the complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223,
230 (3d Cir. 2010). A court may also consider any document “integral to or explicitly relied upon
in the complaint” when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig.,
114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997).
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C. 	Rule 12(c)
“After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move
for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). “Judgment will not be granted unless the
movant ‘clearly establishes there are no material issues of fact, and [the movant] is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.’” Bedoya v. Am. Eagle Express Inc., 914 F.3d 812, 816 n.2 (3d Cir.
2019) (citing Sikirica v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 2005)). “In considering
a motion for judgment on the pleadings, [the Court] must accept as true all facts presented in the
complaint and answer and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. . . .”
Id. (citation omitted). The Court “does not consider matters outside the pleadings.” Mele v. Fed.
Reserve Bank of N.Y., 359 F.3d 251, 257 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Bedoya, 914 F.3d at 816 n.2. If
the Court considers matters outside of the pleadings, “the motion must be treated as one for
summary judgment under Rule 56,” and the Court must give notice to all parties. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(d). 	However, the Court may consider “(1) exhibits attached to the complaint, (2) matters of
public record, and (3) all documents that are integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint”
without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. Dovale v. Marketsource, Inc., Civ.
No. 05-2872, 2006 WL 2385099, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2006). 	“In challenging lack of subject
matter jurisdiction on a Rule 12(c) motion, the court will treat a motion for judgment on the
pleadings based upon a lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss the
complaint.” Martin v. Piserchia, Civ. No. 23-21669, 2024 WL 3812071, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 14,
2024) (citation modified).
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III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	The Monmouth County Clerk
Defendant Monmouth County Clerk argues that Grossberger lacks standing to assert claims
against it for filing deeds related to the property Grossberger previously sought to purchase. The
Court agrees that dismissal is warranted on this basis.9
Article III of the United States Constitution limits a federal court’s jurisdiction to actual
cases or controversies. U.S. Const., art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The doctrine of Article III standing is “an
additional 	limitation 	on 	the 	federal 	judicial 	power 	derived 	from 	the 	case-or-controversy
requirement,” which prohibits courts from issuing “advisory opinions.” Lutter v. JNESO, 86 F.4th
111, 123-24 (3d Cir. 2023). 	“The plaintiff, as the party invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the
burden of establishing” standing. 	Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016) (citation
omitted). 	To have standing, a plaintiff must “allege: 1) an injury in fact; 2) causation; and 3)
redressability.” 	In re Liquid Aluminum Sulfate Antitrust Litig., Civ. No 16-2687, 2017 WL
3131977, at *18 (D.N.J. July 20, 2017) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-
61 (1992)).
The Monmouth County Clerk asserts that Grossberger has failed to allege an injury in fact.
(ECF No. 102-1 at 13.) This is so, the Monmouth County Clerk argues, because “[n]owhere in the
Amended Complaint does [Grossberger] allege, or even contend, that he had a legal right or
entitlement to purchase the property.” (ECF No. 102-1.) To allege an injury in fact, a plaintiff
9 	To the extent the Monmouth County Clerk asserts in its Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings that Grossberger lacks standing to pursue his claims, the Court analyzes the Motion
under a Rule 12(b)(1) standard. See Ricciardi Fam. LLC v. U.S. Postal Serv., Civ. No. 10-3133,
2011 WL 3022521, at *2 (D.N.J. July 22, 2011) (“A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the
pleadings based upon a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is treated as a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to
dismiss the complaint.”) (citation omitted).
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must allege that he suffered “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is ‘concrete and
particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent,’ rather than ‘conjectural or hypothetical.’” Wayne Land
& Min. Grp. LLC v. Del. River Basin Comm’n, 894 F.3d 509, 524 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation
modified). In Grossberger’s opposition brief, he makes vague assertions about his “investments”
in the property, which he claims give him a right to challenge the recorded deeds. (See ECF No.
105 at 1.) But as correctly noted by the Monmouth County Clerk, Grossberger provides no details
about any such investment in his Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 106 at 2; see generally ECF No.
89.) At bottom, Grossberger takes issue with the Monmouth County Clerk for recording a deed to
a property that Grossberger wanted to purchase at some point in the past. Grossberger’s allegations
are insufficient for standing purposes.10 See Penn., Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Sebelius, 674 F.3d
139, 156 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[V]ague and indefinite allegations are inadequate to establish injury-in-
fact.”).
Accordingly, Grossberger’s claims against the Monmouth County Clerk are dismissed
without prejudice.11
10 	Even if Grossberger had plausibly alleged an injury, he has not alleged that any such injury
was caused by the Monmouth County Clerk. See Wayne Land & Min. Grp. LLC, 894 F.3d at 524
(3d Cir. 2018) (noting that to show standing “there must be a causal link between the injury and
the allegedly improper conduct”).
11 	See Schaller v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., 844 F. App’x 566, 573 (3d Cir. 2021) (“Dismissal
for lack of standing reflects a lack of jurisdiction, so dismissal . . . should [be] without prejudice.”)
(citation omitted) (alterations in original). The Court does not reach the Monmouth County Clerk’s
remaining arguments for judgment on the pleadings because the Court concludes that Grossberger
lacks standing. See Cottrell v. Alcon Lab’ys, 874 F.3d 154, 164 n.7 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[T]he absence
of standing leaves the court without subject matter jurisdiction to reach a decision on the
merits[.]”).
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B. 	The State Defendants
The State Defendants argue that the claims against them—for allegedly refusing to file
documents submitted by Grossberger—should be dismissed because they are shielded by absolute
immunity. 	The Court agrees.
“Quasi-judicial immunity attaches 	to public officials whose roles 	are functionally
comparable to that of a judge.” Keystone Redevelopment Partners, LLC v. Decker, 631 F.3d 89,
95 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether a government actor
was fulfilling a quasi-judicial role, courts “examine the nature of the functions with which a
particular official or class of officials has been lawfully entrusted” and “the effect that exposure to
particular forms of liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise of those functions.”
Russell v. Richardson, 905 F.3d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219,
224 (1988)). The quasi-judicial immunity analysis focuses on the “general nature of the challenged
action, without inquiry into such specifics as the [official’s] motive or the correctness of his or her
decision.” 	Gallas v. S. Ct. of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 769 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Keystone
Redevelopment Partners, LLC, 631 F.3d at 95 (“Thus, in evaluating whether quasi-judicial
immunity grants immunity to a particular official, a court inquires into the official’s job function,
as opposed to the particular act of which the plaintiff complains.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). 	Like 	judicial 	immunity, 	quasi-judicial 	immunity 	is 	“absolute.” 	Keystone
Redevelopment Partners, LLC, 631 F.3d at 95.
Grossberger alleges that the State Defendants are liable for carrying out a pre-filing
injunction issued against him by a New Jersey state court judge. (See ECF No. 89 at 2 (“The Clerk
of the Supreme Court has adopted a policy to reject any of [Grossberger’s] submissions. . . . This
is accomplished by conspiring with the Chief Judge of that court[.]”).) 	However, “[t]he Third
Circuit has found . . . that clerks of the Superior Court are entitled to ‘absolute quasi-judicial
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immunity for [their] actions taken in [their] capacity as [a] [c]lerk of the Superior Court.’”
Grossberger, 2023 WL 7110619, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 17, 2023) (quoting Nemeth v. Off. of Clerk of
Superior Ct. of N.J., 837 F. App’x 924, 928 (3d Cir. 2020) (alterations in Grossberger)); Gallas v.
Supreme Ct. of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 772 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that court personnel are immune
from suit for carrying out court orders).
And as relevant here, the Third Circuit has held that court personnel implementing orders
not to accept a litigant’s filings are protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity. See Funches v.
Bucks Cnty., 586 F. App’x 864, 868 (3d Cir. 2014); see also Sawyer v. Gorman, 317 F. App’x 725,
728 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Absolute judicial immunity has thus been extended to non-judicial officers,
like clerks of court, ‘where their duties had an integral relationship with the judicial process.’ . . .
In rejecting, pursuant to a court order, [the plaintiff’s] pro se filing, [the clerk] was acting ‘as an
official aide of the judge,’ and is accordingly absolutely immune[.]”) (internal citations omitted).
Indeed, in affirming this Court’s denial of Grossberger’s requests for injunctive relief, the Third
Circuit observed that “to the extent that [Grossberger’s] claims can be deciphered, it appears that
the defendants may be immune from suit.” 	Grossberger, No. 25-1925, at ECF No. 11 (3d Cir.
Nov. 4, 2025) (citing Gallas, 211 F.3d at 772). For these reasons, the Court agrees that the State
Defendants are absolutely immune from suit.
Accordingly, Grossberger’s claims against the State Defendants are dismissed with
prejudice.12
12 	Because the Court dismisses Grossberger’s claims on the basis of quasi-judicial immunity,
the Court need not reach the State Defendants’ other arguments for dismissal.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and other good cause shown, Defendants’ Motions (ECF Nos.
98, 102) are GRANTED. 	Grossberger’s claims against the Monmouth County Clerk are
DISMISSED without prejudice, and his claims against the State Defendants are DISMISSED
with prejudice. 	Grossberger’s Motion to Stay Pending Appeal (ECF No. 109) and Motion for
Third Circuit Jurisdiction (ECF No. 119) are DENIED as moot.13 An appropriate Order follows.
Dated: November 25, 2025
______________________________
G EORGETTE CASTNER
UNITED S TATES DISTRICT JUDGE
13 	The Third Circuit decided Grossberger’s appeal—which was the subject of Grossberger’s
Motions—on November 4, 2025. See Grossberger, No. 25-1925, at ECF No. 11.
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