Gila Regional Medical Center v. Lobera

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
In re:
ALEX LOBERA,
Debtor. 	No. 7-10-13203-SL
GILA REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Adv. No. 11-1112 S
ALEX LOBERA,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION ON DEFENDANT/
DEBTOR’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON OBJECTION TO DISCHARGE
UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)
AND ON JURISDICTION TO ENTER A
MONEY JUDGMENT ON § 523 CLAIM
This matter is before the Court on Defendant/Debtor Alex
Lobera’s (“Lobera”) Motion for Summary Judgment on 1) Plaintiff’s
Objection to Discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) and 2) on this
Court’s jurisdiction to enter a money judgment on Plaintiff’s 11
U.S.C. § 523 claim (“Motion”). 1 	Doc 8. 	Plaintiff Gila Regional
Medical Center (“Gila”) responded, doc 10, and Lobera replied,
doc 11. 2 	For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny
the Motion.
1The Court has subject matter and personal jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1334 and 157(b); this is a core
proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§157(b)(2)(A), (I) and/or (J);
and these are findings of fact and conclusions of law as may be
required by Rule 7052 F.R.B.P.
2 Gila appears through its attorney Thuma & Walker, P.C.
(Thomas D. Walker). 	Lobera appears through his attorney the Law
Office of George “Dave” Giddens, P.C. (Christopher M. Gatton).
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Bankruptcy Rule 7056 adopts Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 on summary
judgment. 	Rule 56(a) provides:
A party may move for summary judgment, identifying
each claim or defense--or the part of each claim or
defense--on which summary judgment is sought. 	The
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. 	The court should state on the record the
reasons for granting or denying the motion.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
The third sentence of Rule 56(c) 3 provides for the
immediate rendition of a judgment in the event that the
matters considered by the court on a motion for summary
judgment disclose "that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law." 	This provision,
which is the very heart of the summary-judgment
procedure, demonstrates that the principal judicial
inquiry required by Rule 56 is whether a genuine issue
of material fact exists. 	If no such issue exists, the
rule permits the immediate entry of judgment.
It necessarily follows from the standard set forth
in the rule that when the only issues to be decided in
the case are issues of law, summary judgment may be
granted.
10A Wright, Miller, Kane and Marcus, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. §
2725 (3d ed.)(Footnotes omitted.)
First, Lobera argues that this Court’s Memorandum Opinion on
3Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 was amended in 2010 and former Rule 56(c)
now appears as Rule 56(a). 	The Advisory Committee Notes for the
2010 amendments state:
The standard for granting summary judgment remains
unchanged. 	The language of subdivision (a) continues
to require that there be no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and that the movant be entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. 	The amendments will not
affect continuing development of the decisional law
construing and applying these phrases.
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Gila’s Motion to Dismiss precludes, either under res judicata or
collateral estoppel grounds, Gila’s current claims challenging
his discharge under section 727. 	Second, he argues that the
Bankruptcy Court lacks constitutional jurisdiction to determine
monetary damages on the state law claims raised in Gila’s section
523 claims. 	Each will be addressed. 	First, the Court will set
forth Lobera’s proposed undisputed facts:
1. Defendant filed a voluntary petition for relief
under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on June 25, 2010
(Case No. 7-10-13203-SA).
2. On July 21 and 23, 2010, Plaintiff filed a motion to
dismiss or convert Defendant?s bankruptcy case (Docket
Nos. 14 and 161).
3. Said motion was filed twice as the clerk?s office
requires motions seeking alternative relief, i.e.
conversion or dismissal, to be docketed under each
“event code.”
4. Following a preliminary hearing, Plaintiff and
Barton and Associates conducted discovery, including
deposing Defendant on September 13, 2010.
5. After the completion of discovery, Barton and
Associates filed its brief in support of Plaintiff?s
motion for conversion or dismissal of Defendant?s
bankruptcy case on September 14, 2010 (Docket No. 27).
6. On September 15, 2010, Plaintiff filed its brief in
support of its motion for conversion or dismissal
(Docket No. 32).
7. Although Plaintiff and Barton and Associates
originally appeared to base their grounds for
conversion or dismissal solely on Defendant?s income,
following discovery Plaintiff argued that the totality
of the circumstances warranted conversion or dismissal,
including “various inconsistencies, incomplete
schedules and statement of affairs and transfers.” See
Docket Nos. 32, 69.
8. Trial on Plaintiff?s motion to dismiss or convert
took place on September 16, 2010, and October 14, 2010,
with the deposition of Defendant?s girlfriend, Ms.
Quiroz, occurring between the two trial dates on
September 30, 2010.
9. On March 16, 2011, the Court entered its Order
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denying Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss or convert
(Docket No. 51), and issued a 66 page Memorandum
Opinion Regarding Gila Regional Medical Center?s Motion
to Dismiss or Convert Case to Chapter 11 (the
“Memorandum Opinion”) setting forth extensive findings
of fact and conclusions of law (Docket No. 50).
10. Plaintiff filed its Complaint Objecting to
Discharge Under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) and to Determine
Dischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and for
a Non-Dischargeable Money Judgment (the “Complaint”) on
July 5, 2011, (Docket No. 69), which initiated this
adversary proceeding.
11. The Court specifically found in the Memorandum
Opinion that it:
had no sense that Debtor, or for that matter Ms.
Quiroz, had attempted to hide assets from the
Court or creditors, or had attempted to hide
transactions that would result in recoveries by a
trustee. 	Both seemed completely honest. 	The
Court also finds that Debtor appeared, and
actually admitted, that the financial matters over
the last year have caused him great stress and
embarrassment, and this may have impeded his
ability to be more effective in the preparation of
his bankruptcy. 	It is also apparent that he
relied on his counsel, perhaps more than he should
have, but in a way which was not unreasonable
under the circumstances. 	In sum, the Court found
Debtor to be an honest debtor deserving of
bankruptcy relief.
Memorandum Opinion, page 20-21.
12. The Court also found that:
[t]here is not a good faith requirement for a non-
consumer business debtor to file a Chapter 7 case.
Even if there were such a requirement, GRMC and
Barton have failed to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that Debtor initiated this Chapter 7
case in bad faith. 	To the extent only an honest
and deserving debtor is eligible to file a Chapter
7 petition, the Court finds that the Debtor is
eligible. 	The facts elucidated and arguments made
by GRMC and Barton are addressable by less drastic
remedies than dismissal. 	For example, to the
extent they established facts which could suggest
that a trustee could recover preferences or
fraudulent transfers, the case trustee is fully
competent to investigate those transfers and
recover them if proper. The Court therefore finds
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that the transactions alleged do not constitute
cause. 	Finally, the Court finds Debtor’s
testimony regarding omitted items credible, and
finds no evidence that Debtor attempted to hide
assets or hinder their discovery.
Memorandum Opinion, page 60 (emphasis added).
13. In the Complaint, Plaintiff now alleges as grounds
for its objection to Defendant’s discharge the same
facts that it previously alleged in its brief and at
trial on dismissal or conversion. 	See Docket Nos. 32,
50, and 69.
14. In addition to challenging Defendant’s discharge
and the dischargeability of its debt, Plaintiff
incorporated by reference a state court complaint and
is seeking a monetary judgment in an amount to be
proven at trial.
Gila does not dispute any material facts. 	Rather, it argues that
all of the facts are not relevant to their adversary proceeding
and it disagrees on the application of the law to those facts.
PRECLUSION
Lobera’s preclusion arguments focus on this Court’s earlier
Memorandum Opinion and accompanying Order regarding the Motion to
Dismiss or Convert this bankruptcy case. 	This was a federal
ruling made by a federal court on a federal question of
bankruptcy law. 	The Court therefore applies federal preclusion
law to the issues in this adversary proceeding. 	See
Petromanagement Corp. v. Acme-Thomas Joint Venture, 835 F.2d
1329, 1332 (10 th Cir. 1988)(“Section 87 of the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments (1982) ... establishes the following
general rule: ‘Federal law determines the effects under the rules
of res judicata of a judgment of a federal court.’ 	If the prior
judgment of the federal court is based on federal law, then the
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application of this rule seems uncontroversial.”)(Citations
omitted.)
First, the Court will review Gila’s Motion to Dismiss or
Convert. 	In that motion, Gila argued that there was “cause” to
dismiss the chapter 7 case or, alternatively, that it should be
converted to chapter 11. 	Bankruptcy Code section 707(a) allows
the court to dismiss a Chapter 7 case “for cause.” 	As cause,
Gila cited Debtor’s high monthly income, high disposable income,
excessive and inflated monthly expenses and an alleged omission
of assets from his schedules. 	It also urged the Court to review
the totality of the circumstances and to bar refiling another
Chapter 7 bankruptcy for one year. 	Alternatively, it sought
conversion to a Chapter 11 in which Gila believed the Debtor
could easily fund a plan in the amount of $33,000 per month.
“Cause” is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code. 	Nor is
“cause” limited to the three examples set forth in section
707(a) 4
. 	However, bankruptcy courts do not enjoy untrammeled
discretion to dismiss a bankruptcy case. 	Bucurescu v. 190A
Realty Corp. (In re Bucurescu), 282 B.R. 124, 133 (S.D. N.Y.
2002). 	Instead, they must engage in case-by-case analysis to
determine what constitutes “cause” sufficient to warrant
dismissal and must consider the best interest of all parties in
4Section 102(3) states that the terms “includes” and
“including” are not limiting.
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interest. 	Id. (Citations omitted.)
If the Court had granted the motion to dismiss, section
349(a) (“Effect of dismissal”) would apply:
Unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, the
dismissal of a case under this title does not bar the
discharge, in a later case under this title, of debts
that were dischargeable in the case dismissed; nor does
the dismissal of a case under this title prejudice the
debtor with regard to the filing of a subsequent
petition under this title, except as provided in
section 109(g) of this title.
Next, the Court will review Gila’s current adversary
proceeding. 	Gila alleges that Debtor failed to disclose assets
and liabilities in his Schedules; failed to disclose transfers in
the Statement of Financial Affairs (“SFA”); failed generally to
answer the questions in the SFA accurately, honestly and in good
faith; amended his Schedules and SFA after discovery, but failed
to do so completely and that additional relevant facts came out
during the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss or Convert; failed in
particular to adequately disclose a transaction in which he
transferred his interest in Lobera Imaging to a third party in
exchange for an employment agreement and $400,000 in cash and
failed to disclose that he was a director of Lobera Imaging;
failed to disclose his use of the $400,000 which included
transfers to insiders and conversion of it into exempt property;
failed to disclose significant gifts and preferential transfers
to related parties; failed to identify his ex-wife or current
alleged common-law wife in the SFA. 	Gila argues that these
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allegations establish that 1) Debtor transferred, removed,
destroyed or concealed property (or attempted to do so) in the
year before filing, 2) he failed to keep or preserve records of
these activities to enable a determination of his financial
condition, 3) his actions and omissions constituted a false oath
or account, 4) his actions constitute a knowing and fraudulent
attempt to obtain money or an advantage for acting or forbearing
to act, 5) he is unable to explain the inability to pay his debts
and 6) the actions and omissions also concern an insider. 	The
remainder of Gila’s adversary proceeding seeks a determination
that its claim is nondischargeable under section 523.
A. 	Collateral Estoppel.
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is
designed to prevent needless relitigation and bring
about some finality to litigation. 	United States v.
Botefuhr, 309 F.3d 1263, 1282 (10th Cir. 2002).
Collateral estoppel bars a party from relitigating an
issue once it has suffered an adverse determination on
the issue, even if the issue arises when the party is
pursuing or defending against a different claim. 	Park
Lake Res. Ltd. Liab. Co. v. USDA, 378 F.3d 1132, 1136
(10th Cir. 2004).
Moss v. Kopp, 559 F.3d 1155, 1161 (10th Cir. 2009)(Footnote
omitted.)
Collateral estoppel will bar a claim if four
elements are met: (1) the issue previously decided is
identical with the one presented in the action in
question, (2) the prior action has been finally
adjudicated on the merits, (3) the party against whom
the doctrine is invoked was a party or in privity with
a party to the prior adjudication, and (4) the party
against whom the doctrine is raised had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action.
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Id. (Citing Frandsen v. Westinghouse Corp., 46 F.3d 975, 978
(10th Cir. 1995)).
The Court’s earlier Memorandum Opinion discussed Gila’s
motion to dismiss or convert case to Chapter 11. 	One message of
that Memorandum Opinion was that if a situation was governed by
another section of the bankruptcy code with a less drastic remedy
than dismissal, that situation was probably not “cause” to
dismiss the case because a dismissal would moot the less drastic
remedy. 	In the end, the Court found that there was no “cause” to
dismiss.
Gila’s current adversary proceeding is based, in part, on
Bankruptcy Code section 727(a), which provides in relevant part:
(a) The court shall grant the debtor a discharge,
unless--
...
(2) the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud a creditor or an officer of the estate charged
with custody of property under this title, has
transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or
concealed, or has permitted to be transferred, removed,
destroyed, mutilated, or concealed--
(A) property of the debtor, within one year before
the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) property of the estate, after the date of the
filing of the petition;
(3) the debtor has concealed, destroyed, mutilated,
falsified, or failed to keep or preserve any recorded
information, including books, documents, records, and
papers, from which the debtor's financial condition or
business transactions might be ascertained, unless such
act or failure to act was justified under all of the
circumstances of the case;
(4) the debtor knowingly and fraudulently, in or in
connection with the case--
(A) made a false oath or account;
(B) presented or used a false claim;
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(C) gave, offered, received, or attempted to
obtain money, property, or advantage, or a promise
of money, property, or advantage, for acting or
forbearing to act; or
(D) withheld from an officer of the estate
entitled to possession under this title, any
recorded information, including books, documents,
records, and papers, relating to the debtor's
property or financial affairs;
(5) the debtor has failed to explain satisfactorily,
before determination of denial of discharge under this
paragraph, any loss of assets or deficiency of assets
to meet the debtor's liabilities;
(6) the debtor has refused, in the case--
(A) to obey any lawful order of the court,
other than an order to respond to a material
question or to testify;
....
(7) the debtor has committed any act specified in
paragraph (2), (3), (4), (5), or (6) of this
subsection, on or within one year before the date of
the filing of the petition, or during the case, in
connection with another case, under this title or under
the Bankruptcy Act, concerning an insider[.]
The Court’s Memorandum Opinion did not make findings of fact
applicable to the elements of section 727(a). 	It did make some
specific findings that the specific actions proved by Gila (and
admitted to by the Debtor) were not sufficient to establish
“cause” to dismiss. 	In fact, the Memorandum left open the issue
of whether further actions might be pursued if the Chapter 7 case
continued. 	The Court did state that, based on the evidence
presented, it found no evidence that the Debtor attempted to hide
assets or hinder their discovery. 	However, the focus of the
motion was “cause” for dismissal including an argument that a
large disposable income was sufficient bad faith to constitute
“cause.” 	There was no necessity for Gila to introduce all
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evidence of attempts to hide assets or hinder their discovery
because that was not the focus of the motion. 	Similarly, there
was no need for Gila to introduce evidence of the other elements
of section 727.
In summary, the Court finds that the issue previously
decided is not identical with the one presented in the action
currently before the Court. 	Therefore, collateral estoppel does
not apply.
B. 	Res judicata.
The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion,
will prevent a party from relitigating a legal claim
that was or could have been the subject of a previously
issued final judgment. [Satsky v. Paramount
Communications, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464], 1467 [(10th Cir.
1993)]. 	Under Tenth Circuit law, claim preclusion
applies when three elements exist: (1) a final judgment
on the merits in an earlier action; (2) identity of the
parties in the two suits; and (3) identity of the cause
of action in both suits. 	Wilkes v. Wyo. Dep't of
Employment Div. of Labor Standards, 314 F.3d 501, 504
(10th Cir. 2003). 	If these requirements are met, res
judicata is appropriate unless the party seeking to
avoid preclusion did not have a “full and fair
opportunity” to litigate the claim in the prior suit.
Yapp v. Excel Corp., 186 F.3d 1222, 1226 n. 4 (10th
Cir. 1999).
MACTEC, Inc. v. Gorelick, 427 F.3d 821, 831 (10 th Cir. 2005).
Although this Court treated the “full and fair opportunity” to
litigate as an exception to application of res judicata, it noted
that earlier cases had required that as an element:
In a number of our cases, we have characterized
the “full and fair opportunity to litigate” as a fourth
requirement of res judicata. 	See, e.g., Plotner v. AT
& T Corp., 224 F.3d 1161, 1168 (10th Cir. 2000).
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However, as we noted in Yapp, the absence of a full and
fair opportunity to litigate is more appropriately
treated as an exception to the application of claim
preclusion when the three referenced requirements are
met. 	Yapp, 186 F.3d at 1226 n.4.
Id. at 831 n.6.
To determine what constitutes a “cause of action” for
preclusion purposes, this court has adopted the
“transactional approach” found in the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 24. 	Petromanagement Corp. v.
Acme-Thomas Joint Venture, 835 F.2d 1329, 1335 (10th
Cir. 1988). 	Under this approach, a cause of action
includes all claims or legal theories of recovery that
arise from the same transaction. 	Id.
Id. at 832.
"The transactional approach provides that a claim
arising out of the same ‘transaction, or series of
connected transactions’ as a previous suit, which
concluded in a valid and final judgment, will be
precluded." 	Yapp, 186 F.3d at 1227. 	"What constitutes
the same transaction or series of transactions is ‘to
be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such
considerations as whether the facts are related in
time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a
convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a
unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business
understanding or usage.’" 	Id. (quoting Restatement
[Second of Judgments] § 24).
Hatch v. Boulder Town Council, 471 F,3d 1142, 1149 (10 th Cir.
2006).
As a leading commentator explains, "[a] subsequent
action that simply alleges new facts in support of
claims asserted in a prior action will usually not
avoid application of the claim preclusion doctrine.
However, if such [new] facts in themselves establish
independent grounds for a claim against the defendants
in the previous action, claim preclusion does not
apply." 	See 18 James William Moore, Moore's Federal
Practice § 131.22[1], at 131-55 (3d ed. 2006) (emphasis
added).
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Id. at 1150 n.8.
In this adversary proceeding, it is clear that all elements
of res judicata are met except the identity of the cause of
action in the two matters. 	The Court finds they are different.
The motion to dismiss or convert was not concerned with the
behaviors proscribed by section 727. 	Therefore, evidence of the
actions proscribed by 727, while possibly relevant, are not an
essential part of the proof of a 707 dismissal motion. 	And, the
relief sought in the two matters is different. 	A dismissal does
not impact the Debtor’s right to seek a discharge in the future.
Section 349. 	A denial of discharge bars discharge of the debts
in a future case. 	Section 523(a)(10).
In summary, the Court finds that the issue previously
decided is not related to the transactions presented in the
action currently before the Court. 	Therefore, res judicata does
not apply.
LOBERA’S JURISDICTIONAL ARGUMENT
Lobera agrees that this Court has jurisdiction to determine
the dischargeability of his debts to Gila, but argues that it
lacks the jurisdiction to enter a money judgment on the claims.
He cites Stern v. Marshall, 564 U. S. ____, 131 S. Ct. 2594
(2011). 	The Court believes that this argument extends the Stern
holding too far.
First, this Court is bound to apply the law established by
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the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit unless it is
subsequently overruled by a United States Supreme Court ruling or
a Tenth Circuit en banc ruling. 	In Johnson v. Riebesell (In re
Riebesell), 586 F.3d 782, 793-94 (10 th Cir. 2009) the Tenth
Circuit unequivocally ruled that bankruptcy courts have
jurisdiction to enter a money judgement as a part of a core
adversary proceeding.
This Court finds that Stern is not to the contrary. 	Stern
dealt with jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C)
(“counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims
against the estate”). 	The Court’s jurisdiction in this adversary
proceeding is based on 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I) (“determinations
as to the dischargeability of particular debts”). 	Stern ruled
that the estate’s counterclaim far exceeded the contours of the
relief sought by the claimant, the claim being for defamation –
that debtor had wrongly claimed that claimant had tortiously
interfered with her right to receive an inheritance – and the
counterclaim being for damages and punitive damages under Texas
law (on which there was no controlling Texas authority) for that
alleged tortious interference. 	“There thus was never reason to
believe that the process of ruling on Pierce's proof of claim
would necessarily result in the resolution of Vickie's
counterclaim.” 	564 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2617-18. 	On the
other hand, inherent in the process of determining
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dischargeability at some point, whether in the bankruptcy court
or some other forum, is the process of determining whether there
is a debt owed which will be nondischargeable. 	One of the core
functions of the bankruptcy process is (and has always been) to
determine “allowance or disallowance of claims against the
estate”. 	28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B). 	Nothing in Stern even
remotely suggests otherwise, of course. 	As well, the bankruptcy
court is authorized to “adjust the debtor-creditor ...
relationship”, 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(O), and administer the case.
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A). 	All of these functions embrace in some
way the process of liquidating the claim itself.
And if, as in Stern, a creditor can be held to have agreed
to the Court’s jurisdiction by filing a proof of claim, 564 U.S.
at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2608, even more so should a debtor who has
filed the bankruptcy case and in effect asked the bankruptcy
court to administer it in its many aspects. 	Riebesell is quite
instructive on this point in its discussion of the bankruptcy
court’s jurisdiction to liquidate the debt and enter a monetary
judgment against the debtor:
According to the circuit courts that have considered
this issue, bankruptcy courts do possess such
jurisdiction. See, e.g., 	Morrison [v. W. Builders of
Amarillo, Inc. (In re Morrison)], 555 F.3d [473] at
478-480 [(5th Cir. 2009)]; Cowen v. Kennedy (In re
Kennedy), 108 F.3d 1015, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 1997); Longo
v. McLaren (In re McLaren), 3 F.3d 958, 965–66 (6th
Cir. 1993); cf. Porges v. Gruntal & Co. (In re Porges),
44 F.3d 159, 163–65 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding bankruptcy
court had jurisdiction to enter money judgment after
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determining validity of contested proof of claim, even
after voluntary dismissal of bankruptcy case); N.I.S.
Corp. v. Hallahan (In re Hallahan), 936 F.2d 1496,
1507–08 (7th Cir. 1991) (rejecting debtor's claim of a
right to jury trial on underlying debt in
dischargeability proceeding). 	The reasons usually
given include: 1) determination of the debt lies within
the equitable jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court; 2)
the debtor by filing bankruptcy has consented to
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court over matters
necessary to the determination of adversarial
proceedings; and 3) judicial economy and efficiency
require that the bankruptcy court be empowered to
settle both the dischargeability of the debt and the
amount of the monetary judgment. 	See, e.g., Hallahan,
936 F.2d at 1507–08. Our prior case law is not
inconsistent with these rationales. 	See generally RTC
v. McKendry (In re McKendry), 40 F.3d 331, 336 (10th
Cir. 1994) (“In bankruptcy court there are two separate
and distinct causes of action[.] 	One cause of action
is on the debt and the other cause of action is on the
dischargeability of that debt.” 	(quotation omitted)).
Finding these cases persuasive, we conclude that the
bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to enter a monetary
judgment against Mr. Riebesell as a part of this
adversarial proceeding.
Id. at 793-94 (emphasis added).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court finds that
Defendant/Debtor Alex Lobera’s Motion for Summary Judgment is not
well taken and should be denied. 	The Court will enter an Order
denying the Motion.
Honorable James S. Starzynski
United States Bankruptcy Judge
Date Entered on Docket: 	August 9, 2012
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Copies to:
Thomas D Walker
500 Marquette Ave NW
Albuquerque, NM 87103
Christopher M Gatton
Law Office of George Dave Giddens, PC
10400 Academy Rd., #350
Albuquerque, NM 87111
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