Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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A.C.R. et al.,
Plaintiffs,
-against-
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; et
al.,
Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER
25-CV-3962 (EK)(TAM)
ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:
This case concerns the plaintiffs’ effort to overturn
an administrative action taken in 2025 by United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). 	Specifically,
USCIS rescinded a policy the agency had announced in 2022,
during a prior presidential administration, that conferred
substantial benefits on young people with Special Immigrant
Juvenile Status. 	See generally Compl., ECF No. 1. 	At the
outset of this litigation, Plaintiffs sought an immediate stay,
and eventual vacatur, of the 2025 rescission, as well as certain
injunctive relief. 	Mot. for O.S.C. 2-4, ECF No. 5.1
On November 19, the Court granted the plaintiffs
relief under the Administrative Procedure Act, staying certain
aspects of the 2025 rescission pending further judicial review
1 Page numbers in citations to record documents other than briefs refer
to ECF pagination.
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(and granting, in certain minor aspects, additional injunctive
relief). 	See Order on Mot. for Prelim. Inj. 48, ECF. No. 60.
At the same time, the Court’s order contained a footnote
indicating that, while the stay would restore the effectiveness
of the 2022 Policy Alert that the agency had publicly issued,
the order should not be read to require USCIS to restore certain
changes to its internal Policy Manual. 	Id. at 45 n.24; see also
Apr. 18, 2025 Policy Manual (the “Prior Policy Manual”), ECF No.
9-26.2
The factual and procedural background are recited in
the Court’s prior order and need not be repeated here in detail.
In brief: the 2022 Policy Manual changes went further than those
contained in the Policy Alert itself. 	The Alert provided simply
that Special Immigrant Juveniles (“SIJs”) who were ineligible
for adjustment to lawful-permanent-resident status due to visa
unavailability would be considered for deferred action. 	See
generally 2022 Policy Alert, ECF No. 1-1. 	The Alert said little
2 The Court’s November 19 order erroneously referred to this document as
the 2024 Policy Manual, see ECF No. 60, at 6, by which it meant the version
of the manual in place prior to the 2025 rescission of SIJS-DA. 	In
actuality, the parties provided archived versions of the Policy Manual from
May 2022 and April 2025. 	Compare ECF Nos. 68-1, and 68-2, with ECF No. 9-26.
As between the May 2022 and April 2025 versions of the Policy Manual, the
only difference is the April 2025 Policy Manual’s deletion of a reference to
a Biden-era ICE Directive. 	See Letter-Br. in Further Supp. of Mot. for
Recons. (“Reply Letter-Br.”) 1 n.2, ECF No. 71. 	That difference is
irrelevant to the analysis in this Order. 	This Order refers principally to
the April 2025 version of the Policy Manual, since that is the version the
plaintiffs argue should be restored. 	See id. 	However, we cite the 2022
version of certain sections of the Policy Manual because that was the only
version of those sections provided.
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about the substance of that consideration — only that USCIS
would endeavor “on a case-by-case basis to determine whether”
deferred action was warranted. 	Id. at 3.
The Policy Manual changes went further, putting a
heavy thumb on the scale in favor of deferred action. 	As
amended, the 2022 Manual provided that:
One particularly strong positive factor that weighs
heavily in favor of granting deferred action is that
the person [under consideration] has an approved Form
I-360 and will be eligible to apply for adjustment of
status as soon as an immigrant visa number becomes
available. 	Additionally, the eligibility criteria for
SIJ classification are generally strong positive
factors in such a determination, including that a
juvenile court determined that it was in the best
interest of the SIJ not to be returned to the country
of nationality or last habitual residence of the SIJ
or the SIJ’s parents.
ECF No. 68-1, at 5. 	As is common in agencies’ internal policy
manuals, however, USCIS’s Policy Manual included (and continues
to include) a disclaimer counseling against reliance: it stated
that it did not “create any substantive or procedural right or
benefit that is legally enforceable.” 	May 2022 Policy Manual 2,
ECF No. 68-2; see also, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual
§ 1-1.0003; DHS Off. of Intel. & Analysis Pol’y Manual 5 (2025).4
On December 3, Plaintiffs moved for “clarification or
reconsideration” — really, reconsideration — of footnote 24 of
the November 19 order. 	Mem. of L. in Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. for
3 https://perma.cc/QJJ8-HZGJ.
4 https://perma.cc/9SVF-AYKC.
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Clarification or Recons. (“Recons. Mot.”), ECF No. 61-1.
Plaintiffs argue that USCIS must be required to follow the Prior
Policy Manual in adjudicating SIJS-DA applications during the
stay in order to restore the status quo ante. 	Id. at 1-2. 	The
Court denied this motion on January 5, indicating that a
reasoned opinion would follow. 	We set out the reasons why the
motion for reconsideration must be denied below.
Legal Standard
“A motion for reconsideration should be granted only
when the [moving party] identifies an intervening change of
controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need
to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” 	Kolel
Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable Tr.,
729 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013).5 	“[R]econsideration will
generally be denied unless the moving party can point to
controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked.” 	Van
Buskirk v. United Grp. of Cos., 935 F.3d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 2019);
see also Local Civ. Rule 6.3 (requiring party moving for
reconsideration to identify “the matters or controlling
decisions which the moving party believes the court has
overlooked”).
5 Unless otherwise noted, when quoting judicial decisions this order
accepts all alterations and omits all citations, footnotes, and internal
quotation marks.
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Discussion
Plaintiffs fail to identify any controlling decisions
or data that the Court overlooked. 	Their initial motion focused
on the need to restore the SIJS-DA adjudication process to its
form prior to the rescission in order to preserve the status quo
ante. 	See Recons. Mot. 8. 	But Plaintiffs did little to explain
why USCIS’s changes to its internal Policy Manual — as opposed
to its decision to rescind the SIJS-DA program entirely —
violated the APA in the first place. 	The Court raised this
question and, relatedly, the significance of the USCIS Policy
Manual’s disclaimer language, in a December 5 order. 	See ECF
No. 65. 	Plaintiffs’ response does not merit any change.
Courts have generally held that internal policy
manuals like the one at issue here have no legal force. 	See,
e.g., Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 789 (1981) (SSA Claims
Manual “has no legal force”); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith
Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (DOJ guidelines
“provide no enforceable rights”); cf. Thevarajah v. McElroy, No.
1-CV-3009, 2022 WL 923914, at *5 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (INS
memorandum was “an internal document and as such does not grant
petitioner any rights”); but see Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199,
235 (1974) (requiring Bureau of Indian Affairs to follow
procedures in its own internal manual). 	The Miller court relied
in large part on the “function [the DOJ guidelines] govern,”
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i.e. “the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.” 	Miller, 438
F.3d at 1153; see also United States v. Cooks, 589 F.3d 173, 184
(5th Cir. 2009) (collecting circuit decisions holding that the
DOJ guidelines “do not create enforceable rights for criminal
defendants”).6 	So too here, the relevant USCIS guidelines govern
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and are therefore
unlikely to create enforceable rights for SIJS petitioners.
These cases may appear, at first blush, to be in
tension with the Accardi line of cases that Plaintiffs rely on
in their reply letter-brief. 	See, e.g., Ruiz, 415 U.S. at 235
(“[I]t is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures
. . . even where the internal procedures are possibly more
rigorous than otherwise would be required.”). 	However, Accardi
is not directly applicable in this context.
The Accardi doctrine requires “agencies to follow
their own procedures” where “the rights of individuals are
affected.” 	Reply Letter-Br. 2 (quoting Montilla v. INS, 926
F.2d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 1991)); see generally United States ex
rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). 	But the
6 The DOJ has also regularly altered its internal guidance regarding
corporate criminal enforcement. 	See, e.g., Memorandum from the Deputy Att’y
Gen. to All Component Heads & U.S. Att’ys re Bringing Criminal Charges
Against Corporations (June 16, 1999); Memorandum from the Deputy Att’y Gen.
to Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Att’s re Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003); Memorandum from the
Deputy Att’y Gen. to Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Att’s re Principles of
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Dec. 12, 2006). 	To the
Court’s knowledge, no court has ever suggested that those internal policy
changes are governed by the change-in-position doctrine.
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primary thrust of Accardi is that agencies cannot depart sub
silentio from their operative policies, not that they can never
change those policies. 	The cases Plaintiffs cite for the
proposition that “a boilerplate disclaimer will not insulate the
government from judicial review,” Reply Letter-Br. 2, illustrate
this point: all applied Accardi to invalidate a sub silentio
departure from a still-current policy. 	See Abdi v. Duke, 280 F.
Supp. 3d 373, 381 (W.D.N.Y. 2017); Damus v. Nielsen, 313 F.
Supp. 3d 317, 326 (D.D.C. 2018); Aracely v. Nielsen, 319 F.
Supp. 3d 110, 120 (D.D.C. 2018). 	Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs
agree that USCIS officially changed its SIJS-DA policy (and
edited its policy manual accordingly) on June 6, 2025. 	Compl.
¶ 3.7
Moreover, even if the USCIS Policy Manual’s disclaimer
language is properly interpreted — as Plaintiffs suggest — to
merely deny them a private right of action, their attempt to
preserve the Prior Policy Manual would still fail under the APA.
More relevant than Accardi here is the change-in-position
7 Plaintiffs do contend, however, that USCIS ceased following the 2022
Policy Alert and the Prior Policy Manual sub silentio in April 2025. 	See
Compl. ¶¶ 138-44. 	In our prior order, the Court found that USCIS had likely
violated the Accardi doctrine as to the subset of SIJS recipients whose
petitions were granted between April and June 2025. ECF No. 60, at 38-40.
USCIS should consider that subclass of plaintiffs for deferred action
pursuant to the Prior Policy Manual during the stay. 	See Ruiz, 415 U.S. at
235 (“Where the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon
agencies to follow their own procedures.”). 	We reach a different conclusion
as to that period because it is controlled by Accardi itself rather than the
change-in-position doctrine.
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doctrine, which requires an agency revising a policy to show
“awareness that it is changing position,” offer “good reasons
for the new policy,” and explain the justifications for
“disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were
engendered by the prior policy.” 	Encino Motorcars, LLC v.
Navarro, 579 U.S. 211, 221-22 (2016). 	But Plaintiffs cite no
case — let alone a controlling case — in which a court has
applied the change-in-position doctrine to revisions to an
agency’s internal policy manual, nor has the Court been able to
identify such a case.8
Plaintiffs cite Yale-New Haven Hospital v. Leavitt,
470 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2006), as “upholding [the] vacatur of [a]
Medicare policy manual provision adopted in violation of [the]
change of position doctrine.” 	Reply Letter-Br. 2. 	But that
case involved a very different kind of manual: one issued to
“fiscal intermediaries” who were contractually bound to follow
it. 	Leavitt, 470 F.3d at 74, 80;9 see also Yale-New Haven Hosp.,
Inc. v. Thompson, 162 F. Supp. 2d 54, 57–58 (D. Conn. 2001)
8 The Supreme Court recently left open the question of whether the
change-in-position doctrine applies to agency decisions that are not subject
to notice and comment. 	See Food & Drug Admin. v. Wages & White Lion Invs.,
LLC, 604 U.S. 542, 570 n.5 (2025); but cf. Encino, 579 U.S. at 222-23
(applying FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009) to policy
originally enshrined in opinion letter and field operations handbook but
altered via notice-and-comment rulemaking).
9 Leavitt noted that, by regulation, “fiscal intermediaries must only
pay claims for services that are covered by Medicare, see 42 C.F.R. §
421.100(a); this responsibility includes the contractual obligation (to
Medicare) to make coverage determinations in accordance with . . . less-
formal agency instructions such as instructional manuals and intermediary
letters.” 	470 F.3d at 73.
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(same). 	And the record here reveals no indication that the
policy manual at issue in that case contained a disclaimer like
that in the USCIS Policy Manual. 	Because Plaintiffs have cited
no binding case that contradicts this Court’s prior order, their
motion for reconsideration motion must be denied. 	Van Buskirk,
935 F.3d at 54.
Finally, even if there are limits on an agency’s
ability to change its own internal manual, one of the most
important considerations undergirding the change-in-position
doctrine — reliance — is of limited applicability here. 	As
discussed, the USCIS Policy Manual expressly disclaimed the
creation of “any substantive or procedural right or benefit that
is legally enforceable.” 	See May 6, 2022 Policy Manual 2.
Therefore, Plaintiffs could not have reasonably relied on the
procedures laid out in the Prior Policy Manual in the same
manner that they may have relied on the SIJS-DA policy writ
large. 	While the government notes that the 2022 Policy Alert
also stated that it contained “internal policy clarifications,”
Opp’n to Mot. for Recons. 5, ECF No. 68, that is not the same as
a disclaimer expressly denying that a policy carries any legal
weight.
Conclusion
Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is denied.
During the pendency of this litigation, USCIS must abide by the
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2022 Policy Alert. 	Except as to the Accardi subclass, USCIS is
not bound by those portions of the Prior Policy Manual that go
further, including the requirement that adjudicating officers
treat SIJ status as a “strong factor that weighs heavily in
favor of granting deferred action.”
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Eric Komitee
ERIC KOMITEE
United States District Judge
Dated: 	January 14, 2025
Brooklyn, New York
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