Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
FIDEL A. CRESPO TACURI,
Petitioner,
– against –
KENNETH GENALO, 	New York Field
Office Director, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement and Removal Operations
(ICE/ERO), 	KRISTI NOEM, 	Secretary of
the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), PAMELA BONDI, 	United States
Attorney General, RAUL MALDONADO,
JR., 	Warden, Metropolitan Detention
Center, Brooklyn (MDC Brooklyn)
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
25-cv-06896 (NCM)
NATASHA C. MERLE, United States District Judge:
On December 15, 2025, petitioner Fidel A. Crespo Tacuri, filed a Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus challenging the lawfulness of his detention by Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) and seeking, 	inter alia, his immediate release from custody. 	See 	Pet.
for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Pet.”) 16–17, ECF No. 1.1 	Petitioner alleges that on August 29,
2025, ICE officers, stopped his vehicle while searching for someone else and unlawfully
arrested and detained him. Pet. ¶ 18. Petitioner’s writ argues that his detention by
respondents violates 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), certain federal bond regulations, and rights
guaranteed by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
1 	Throughout this Order, page numbers for docket filings refer to the page numbers
assigned in ECF filing headers.
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Respondents are Kenneth Genalo, the New York City Field Office Director for ICE;
Kristi Noem, the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”); Pamela
Bondi, Attorney General of the United States; and, Raul Maldonado, Jr., Warden of MDC
Brooklyn (“respondents” or “the government”). Respondents argue that petitioner’s
detention is lawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Mem. of Law in Resp. to Order to Show
Cause (“Resp.”) 1, 18–30, ECF No. 18.
On December 24, 2025, after the parties’ briefing, the Court held oral argument on
the petition and 	GRANTED 	the petition in a ruling from the bench. This opinion sets
forth the Court’s reasoning.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Fidel A. Crespo Tacuri is a 49-year-old citizen of Ecuador who has lived
in the United States for approximately 26 years.2 	See 	Decl. of Robert E. Martinez
(“Martinez Decl.”) ¶ 4, ECF No. 1-1. Petitioner represents that he entered the United States
in 1999 without inspection. 	See 	Pet. ¶¶ 13, 44; 	see also 	So Decl. ¶ 4. He is married and has
an 18-year-old U.S. citizen daughter. Martinez Decl. ¶ 5. In 2022, petitioner started a
construction business with his brother in Westchester County. Martinez Decl. ¶ 6. Prior to
that, petitioner was a self-employed construction worker. Martinez Decl. ¶ 6. In 2023, he
and his wife purchased a home in Mahopac, New York. 	See 	Martinez Decl. ¶ 5. Prior to his
detention 	on 	August 	29, 	2025, 	petitioner 	never 	had 	contact 	with 	immigration
2 	The Court’s factual recitation relies on facts asserted in the Petition; and a
declaration submitted by respondents. 	See 	Pet.; Decl. of Mincheol So (“So Decl.”), ECF No.
19. The facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. 	See 	O.F.B., 2025 WL 3277677, *1 n.2.
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enforcement. Martinez Decl. ¶ 9; So Decl. ¶ 4. Petitioner states, and respondents do not
refute, that he has had no contact with criminal law enforcement.3 	Martinez Decl. ¶ 9.
On August 29, 2025, petitioner was stopped and detained by respondents. Pet. ¶ 18.
Petitioner was driving in Ossining, New York, when officers employed by ICE and other
agencies (hereinafter “ICE officers”), followed petitioner and initiated a vehicle stop after
determining petitioner matched the description of another individual. Martinez Decl., Ex.
1 at 2 (“DHS Form I-213”), Pet., ECF No. 1-2. Petitioner provided his New York State
driver’s license to ICE officers, who ran his identification through DHS databases. So Decl.
¶ 5. Petitioner was then arrested after it was determined he was in the United States
unlawfully. So Decl. ¶¶ 5–6; Pet. ¶ 18. ICE officers took petitioner to the ICE Sub Office in
Newburgh, New York, where he was personally served a notice to appear (“NTA”)
designating petitioner as removable and commencing removal proceedings. So Decl. ¶ 7;
Martinez Decl., Ex. 2 at 2 (“Crespo Tacuri NTA”), Pet., ECF No. 1-3. Later that day,
petitioner was transported to the Orange County Correctional Facility in Goshen, New
York, and on September 2, 2025, petitioner was booked at the MDC in Brooklyn where he
was detained until December 24, 2025. Martinez Decl. ¶ 8; 	see 	Letter Certifying Release
from Custody (“Letter Certifying Release”), Dec. 26, 2025, ECF No. 22. Respondents were
legal custodians of petitioner. Pet. ¶¶ 14–17.
On September 4, 2025, petitioner filed his first Bond Redetermination Request with
the Immigration Court. Pet. ¶ 19. On September 8, 2025, petitioner appeared for his first
Master Calendar Hearing, where he sought cancellation of removal under Section
3 	In their briefs or during oral argument, respondents did not dispute that petitioner
does not have a criminal history. 	See generally 	Resp.; Oral Argument Tr. Dated Dec. 24,
2025, 	Crespo Tacuri v. Genalo, No. 25-cv-06896 (“Dec. 24 Tr.”), ECF No. 23.
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240A(b)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), and a second master calendar hearing was
scheduled for September 17, 2025. Pet. ¶ 21.
On September 10, 2025, the Immigration Judge denied petitioner’s bond request
on the grounds that petitioner was “not eligible for bond under [8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)]”
based on 	Matter of Yajura Hurtado. Pet. ¶ 22; 	see 	Martinez Decl. Ex. 3 at 1 (“First Bond
Order”) (citing 	Matter of Yajura Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)), Pet., ECF No. 1-
4. In 	Matter of Yajure Hurtado, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) held that all
noncitizens who enter the United States without inspection or admission are applicants
for admission as defined under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) and must be detained for the
duration of their removal proceedings. 	Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. at 220.
Given this decision, the Immigration Court declined to hear petitioner’s argument on the
misapplication of Section 1225(b)(2)(A). Pet. ¶ 22. At the second Master Calendar hearing
on September 17, 2025, petitioner filed an application for cancellation of removal pursuant
to Section 1229b(b)(1). Pet. ¶ 24.
On November 26, 2025, petitioner filed a second Bond Redetermination Request
with the Immigration Court on the grounds that the first request was improperly denied
because his detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) , which provides discretionary
authority 	to 	detain 	noncitizens 	who 	are 	already 	in 	the 	country 	pending 	removal
proceedings and in light of 	Bautista v. Santacruz, Jr., No. 25-cv-01873, 2025 WL 3288403
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (certifying class). Pet. ¶ 28.
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On December 2, 2025, the Immigration Court held petitioner’s individual merits
hearing on his claim for relief under Section 1229b(b)(1)4, and determined petitioner did
not qualify for relief under Section 1229b(b)(1), and accordingly, ordered his removal to
Ecuador. Pet. ¶ 29; So Decl. ¶ 12. By the hearing, the Immigration Judge had not reviewed
petitioner’s second Bond Redetermination Request. Pet. ¶ 29. On the evening of December
2, 2025, the Immigration Judge issued an order denying petitioner’s second Bond
Redetermination Request without a hearing and on the grounds that the court in 	Bautista
did not issue a class-wide injunction or a final judgment on the matter, and thus 	Bautista
does not have preclusive effect on other cases, like that of petitioner. Pet. ¶ 30; 	see 	Martinez
Decl. Ex. 4 at 1 (“Second Bond Order”), Pet., ECF No. 1-5. The Immigration Court held that
because 	Matter of Yajure Hurtado 	is the prevailing authority, petitioner’s request for
redetermination based on 	Bautista 	is denied. 	See 	Second Bond Order at 1.
On December 15, 2025, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
Eastern District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking, 	inter alia, immediate
release from detention. Pet. 17. The same day, the Court issued an order to preserve its
jurisdiction enjoining respondents from moving petitioner to a location outside the
Eastern District of New York, the Southern District of New York, or the District of New
Jersey. Scheduling Order 2, ECF No. 13. The Court also directed respondents to show cause
as to why the relief sought in the petition should not be granted. Scheduling Order 3. The
4 	Petitioner’s individual merits hearing on his Section 1229b relief request was
originally scheduled for October 15, 2025. Petitioner’s individual merits hearing was
rescheduled for November 20, 2025; at that date, the hearing commenced but terminated
early due to a court emergency. Pet. ¶¶ 25–26. The individual merits hearing was again
rescheduled for December 2, 2025. Pet. ¶¶ 25–26.
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Court heard argument from the parties after respondents filed a response, 	see 	Resp., and
petitioner filed a reply, Reply, ECF No. 20.
LEGAL STANDARD
Section 2241 authorizes federal district courts “to grant a writ of habeas corpus
whenever a petitioner is ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.’” 	Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3)). Under Section 2241, “[f]ederal courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas
corpus 	claims 	by 	noncitizens 	challenging 	the 	constitutionality 	of 	their 	detention.”
Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-06065, 2025 WL 3314420,
at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2025) (citing 	Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 850 (2d Cir.
2020)).
DISCUSSION
Petitioner’s case raises three issues. First, whether petitioner—who has resided in
the United States since 1999—was detained pursuant to Section 1225(b)(2)(A), which
mandates detention of certain noncitizens “seeking admission” to the U.S., or pursuant to
Section 1226(a), which “provides for discretionary authority to detain other noncitizens
who are already in the country.” 	Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 483
(S.D.N.Y. 2025) (quoting 	Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288–89 (2018)). Second,
if the Court finds that petitioner was detained under Section 1226(a), whether his initial
detention violated Constitutional protections afforded to him by the Due Process Clause
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of the Fifth Amendment. Finally, if the Court finds that petitioner’s detention violates the
Due Process Clause, what remedy is due.5
The core legal issue in this case is one considered by hundreds of federal courts over
recent months: whether a noncitizen at liberty, residing in the United States for years, and
unexpectedly arrested and detained by ICE on the basis of a novel interpretation of the
INA, must be detained until the conclusion of their removal proceedings.6 	The judges that
have considered this issue within the Eastern District of New York in the last four months
have unanimously rejected the government’s interpretation. 	See, e.g., 	Iza v. Larocco, No.
25-cv-06915, 2025 WL 3712274, at *5–6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2025) (Choudhury, J.); 	Y- C-
v. Genalo, No. 25-cv-06558, 2025 WL 3653496, at *3–5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2025) (Merle,
J.); 	Ye v. Maldonado, No. 25-cv-06417, 2025 WL 3521298, at *3–6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2025)
(Donnelly, J.); 	Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at *12–21 (Choudhury, J.); 	O.F.B. v.
Maldonado, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-06336, 2025 WL 3277677, at *3–5 (E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 25, 2025) (Gonzales, J.); 	Sarmiento Guerrero v. Noem, No. 25-cv-05881, 2025 WL
3214787, at *3–6 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2025) (Komitee, J.); 	Hyppolite v. Noem, No. 25-cv-
5 	Because petitioner has brought his claims through the vehicle of a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and because the Court has found it appropriate
to grant the writ under the legal standard governing Section 2241 petitions, the Court
declines to reach petitioner’s arguments or respondents’ counterarguments regarding
petitioner’s substantive due process rights and claim under the Fourth Amendment. Pet.
¶¶ 58–65, 74–79; Resp. 30–32.
6 	As previously described, “the central issue in this case — the administration’s new
position that all noncitizens who came into the United States illegally, but since have been
living in the United States, must be detained until their removal proceedings are
completed — has been challenged in at least 362 cases in federal district courts. The
challengers have prevailed, either on a preliminary or final basis, in 350 of those cases
decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different courts spread across the
United States.” 	Barco Mercado v. Francis, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-06582, 2025 WL
3295903, at *4 & n.22 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (collecting cases) (emphasis omitted).
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04304, 2025 WL 2829511, at *7–12 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2025) (Morrison, J.); 	Artiga v.
Genalo, No. 25-cv-05208, 2025 WL 2829434, at *4–8 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2025) (Merchant,
J.); 	J.U. v. Maldonado, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-04836, 2025 WL 2772765, at *4–9
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2025) (Merchant, J.). More broadly, of the over two dozen district
courts throughout the Second Circuit to consider the issue, all but two have sided with the
view of the overwhelming majority of courts nationwide. 	See 	Ye, 2025 WL 3521298, at *2
n.7 (noting that only two decisions within the Second Circuit have agreed with the
government’s interpretation of the INA); 	Barco Mercado, 2025 WL 3295903, at *13
(listing seventeen pre-November 26, 2025 cases within the Second Circuit that ruled
against the government). 	But see 	Candido v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-00867, 2025 WL 3484932,
at *1–4 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2025) (upholding government’s interpretation); 	Chen v.
Almodovar, No. 25-cv-08350, 2025 WL 3484855, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2025) (same).
I. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
The threshold question presented by the petition is whether petitioner is detained
pursuant to the government’s authority under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) or Section 1226(a).
The government argues that the former applies mandating petitioner’s detention, Resp.
25–30, while petitioner argues that his detention is governed by the latter and thus is
discretionary, Reply 2–5. “[T]he two provisions are exclusive; a noncitizen can only be
subject to [Section] 1225 or [Section] 1226, not both.” 	J.U., 2025 WL 2772765, at *4.
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) states in relevant part that “an alien seeking admission [who]
is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted . . . shall be detained for a
proceeding under Section 1229a.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Meanwhile, Section 1226
“authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the
outcome of removal proceedings.” 	Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289; 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), (c).
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Detention under Section 1225 is mandatory except that the government may parole the
noncitizen into the United States “on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons
or significant public benefit.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); 	see Ye, 2025 WL 3521298, at *3.
Detention under Section 1225 precludes a bond hearing. 	See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 296–
303. By contrast, detention under Section 1226(a) is discretionary, and a noncitizen who
is detained may appeal an “initial custody determination” and request a bond hearing
before an immigration judge, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1), where the noncitizen “may
secure his release if he can convince the officer or immigration judge that he poses no flight
risk and no danger to the community,” 	Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 397–98 (2019). 	See
also 	O.F.B., 2025 WL 3277677, at *3. As the Supreme Court noted in 	Jennings, Section
1226(a) applies to noncitizens “already in the country.” 	Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288–89.
The government argues that “[p]etitioner falls squarely within the ambit of
[Section] 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention requirement.” Resp. 18. Petitioner’s case, the
government contends, is one warranting straightforward statutory application of Section
1225. Because petitioner entered the country without inspection, petitioner has “not been
admitted,” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a), and is thus “an ‘applicant for admission’ to the United
States” pursuant to Section 1225(b)(2)(A), Resp. 18–19. Moreover, respondents argue,
“‘applicant[s] for admission [are] a subset of those who are ‘seeking admission.’” Resp. 22.
The Court finds respondents’ argument unavailing.
First, 	the 	plain 	language 	of 	the 	mandatory 	detention 	provision 	of 	Section
1225(b)(2)(A) requires that the “applicant for admission” be just that: an individual
“seeking admission.” 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(2)(A). The INA defines “admission” and “admitted”
as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization
by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(a). By using the term “seeking
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admission,” Section 1225(b)(2)(A) limits its statutory application to noncitizens actively
attempting to enter the United States lawfully at its port of entry and does not extend to
those already present in the United States. That interpretation is supported by Section
1225’s repeated reference to “arriving aliens”7 	and the existence of Section 1226—a
separate statute that allows for detention and removal of aliens, i.e. noncitizens, who are
already present in the country. Respondents’ reading of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) would
“render the phrase ‘seeking admission’ in [Section] 1225(b)(2)(A) mere surplusage.”
Lopez-Benitez, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 487. Petitioner did not arrive in the United States and
seek admission when he was detained by the government on August 29, 2025. Instead, he
has lived within the United States for almost 30 years. 	See 	Martinez Decl. ¶ 4. He has built
a life with his family, purchased a home in his community and runs a business to provide
for his family. 	See 	Martinez Decl. ¶¶ 5–6. Petitioner is far beyond “seeking” admission into
the United States.
Respondents’ argument that the many cases in this Circuit that have already
dispensed with their arguments were wrongly decided, including the decision by this
Court, is insufficient. 	See 	Resp. 19–24. Respondents also attempt to distinguish this case
from the Court’s decision in 	Y- C- v. Genalo, No. 25-cv-06558, 2025 WL 3653496
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2025) because petitioner in the instant case was not released on his own
recognizance, but instead has been residing in the United States without inspection.
Resp. 17. This argument is also unavailing. Respondents rely on several cases, only two of
7 	“The term arriving alien means an applicant for admission coming or attempting to
come into the United States at a port-of-entry, or an alien seeking transit through the
United States at a port-of-entry, or an alien interdicted in international or United States
waters and brought into the United States by any means, whether or not to a designated
port-of-entry, and regardless of the means of transport.” 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(q).
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which are in this circuit, to support their argument that a noncitizen present without
inspection and residing in the United States for decades is subject to mandatory detention
under Section 1225(b). Resp. 19–21. However, as the government admits, none of the cases
cited turn on the fact that petitioner was not inspected at the border. 	See 	Dec. 24 Oral
Argument Tr. 7:12–20. The cases instead turned on the question of whether the noncitizen
had been admitted, 	see 	Dec. 24 Tr. 7:19–20, because those courts read “applicant for
admission” and “seeking admission” as synonyms, not distinct criteria for Section 1225 to
apply. 	As explained in the Court’s opinion in 	Y- C-, the Court respectfully disagrees with
that interpretation. 	See Y- C-, 2025 WL 3653496, at *4. Reading “applicant for admission”
and “seeking admission” to mean the same thing would be “highly unnatural.” 	Id. 	“If
Congress had understood the terms to be synonyms, Congress could have replaced ‘an
alien seeking admission’ with ‘the alien’ or even ‘he or she’—[a] much clearer expression,
with (ostensibly) no change in meaning.” 	Id. 	(quoting 	Sarmiento Guerrero, 2025 WL
3214787, at *3).
Respondents’ interpretation is also at odds with 	Jennings, and their challenge of
this Court’s interpretation of 	Jennings 	is unconvincing. Resp. 21–22. Despite the clear
language in 	Jennings, respondents seem to assert that all undocumented individuals in
the United States are “applicants for admission” regardless of their proximity to the
border, the length of time that they have been present in the United States, or whether they
ever had the subjective intent to properly apply for admission. 	See 	Resp. 21–22. In
Jennings, the Supreme Court discussed immigration law’s two central purposes: “(1) who
may enter the country and (2) who may stay here after entering.” 	Jennings, 585 U.S. at
286. The government quotes language where the Supreme Court stated that “[a]pplicants
for admission fall into one of two categories, those covered by [Section] 1225(b)(1) and
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those covered by [Section] 1225(b)(2).” Resp. 21 (quoting 	Jennings, 582 U.S. at 287).
However, the government erroneously seizes on this language in the Supreme Court’s
discussion of “who may enter,” to argue that the determination of “who may stay” always
triggers the application of Section 1225.
Further, respondents argue that noncitizens are “seeking admission” no matter how
long they have been present in the United States “absent a choice to pursue voluntary
withdrawal or voluntary departure.” Resp. 22–23. Essentially, respondents’ position is
that a noncitizen seeks admission by default; thus, unless the noncitizen tries to leave the
United States, he is seeking admission. However, while a noncitizen arrested after residing
in the country for almost 30 years might qualify as “an alien present in the United States
who has not been admitted,” § 1225(a)(1), the mandatory detention provision upon which
respondents rely, limits its scope to an “applicant for admission” who is “seeking
admission,” § 1225(b)(2)(A). To say it differently, “U.S. immigration law authorizes the
Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§
1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already
in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).”
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289.
Accordingly, this Court finds that Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not reach someone
who has been residing the United States for nearly 30 years, like petitioner.8 	See also, e.g.,
8 	Further, respondents’ argument that petitioner is subject to detention under
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) is at odds with the Executive Office of Immigration Review’s own
regulations. Following the enactment of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) and Section 1226(a), the
EOIR drafted regulations explaining that individuals who enter without inspection are not
subject to expedited removal. 	See 	8 C.F.R. § 235.3(c)(1); 	Lopez Benitez, 795 F. Supp. at
489 (“Pursuant to those regulations, the term arriving alien is treated as roughly
interchangeable with an applicant seeking admission, and is defined as ‘an applicant for
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Rocano Buestan v. McShane, 	No. 25-cv-08544, 2025 WL 3496361, at *1–5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
5, 2025); 	R.P.L. v. Maldonado, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-06886, 2025 WL 3731864, at
*1–3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2025). As someone “already in the country,” petitioner may be
subject to detention only as a matter of discretion pursuant to Section 1226(a). 	Jennings,
583 U.S. at 289.
II. 	Due Process
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates his procedural due process rights
under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Pet. ¶¶ 66–73. The Due
Process Clause states that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “Freedom from imprisonment—from
government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of
the liberty that [the] Clause protects.” 	Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). The
Clause “applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their
presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” 	Id. 	at 693; 	see also 	Rocano
Buestan, 2025 WL 3496361, at *4 (same); 	Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 850 (same); 	Reno v.
Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (“It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles
aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.”). Complying with the Due Process
Clause requires that “a person in jeopardy of serious loss be given notice of the case against
him and opportunity to meet it.” 	Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
A. Due Process Clause Applies
admission coming or attempting to come into the United States.’”). Though not binding,
agency regulations are “a useful reference point for understanding a statutory scheme,
particularly 	where 	those 	regulations 	were 	issued 	roughly 	contemporaneously 	with
enactment,” 	Lopez Benitez, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 489 n.8, because it speaks to the agency’s
knowledge of what the particular terms of a law mean. 	See id. 	at 490 (discussing the
longstanding practice of applying Section 1226(a) to noncitizens already in the country).
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Respondents argue that the Due Process Clause does not apply to petitioner under
the Supreme Court’s precedents, including the so-called “entry fiction” doctrine. Resp. 17–
18. 	Specifically, 	the 	government 	asserts 	that 	noncitizens 	like 	petitioner 	do 	not
automatically enjoy rights granted by the United States Constitution, but rather enjoy only
rights granted to them by Congress in a statute. Resp. 18 (citing 	Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 214–15 (1953)). The Court finds this argument to be
without merit.
The facts of this case are similar to many other cases within this Circuit and across
the country where courts have concluded that noncitizens present in the United States
enjoy the protections of the Due Process Clause, including this Court in 	Y- C-, 2025 W
3653496. Thus, the Court need not belabor the point again. As a “person[] within the
United States,” petitioner enjoys due process rights. 	Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693; 	see
Barrera Simon v. Olson, No. 25-cv-14799, 2025 WL 3567469, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 13,
2025) (“The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies to all persons within the
United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary,
or permanent.”) (citing 	Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693); 	see also Rocano Buestan, 	2025 WL
3496361, at *4 (holding that procedural due process rights applied to petitioner who
entered without inspection); 	R.P.L., 2025 WL 3731864, at *3 (same).
The government’s reliance on 	DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 139–40 (2020)
is misplaced. There, the Supreme Court held that a petitioner who was still “at the
threshold of initial entry,” though technically in the country, could still be treated as “an
alien seeking initial entry.” 	Id. 	at 107, 114, 139. There, the noncitizen was detained “within
25 yards of the border” and nearly immediately upon crossing it, and thus treated as if
stopped at the border and lacking due process protections. 	Id. 	at 114. 	Thuraissigiam
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presents a scenario distinguishable from the one before the Court, where petitioner was
not detained close to the border “shortly after unlawful entry,” 	id. 	at 140, but rather has
resided in the United States for decades.
Moreover, the government’s attempt to distinguish this case from the Court’s
previous order in 	Y- C- 	does not move the needle. Specifically, the government argues that
in 	Y- C- 	the Court was persuaded to grant the petition because petitioner was released on
his own recognizance prior to the arrest in question, while by contrast petitioner here had
never previously been apprehended by DHS. 	Resp. 17; 	see Y- C-, 2025 WL 3653496, at *1.
However, the Court does not agree that this is a relevant difference. An individual who has
been within the United States for nearly 30 years cannot be treated as if stopped at the
border simply because he was not previously released on his own recognizance.
Furthermore, the government cites several cases where the entry fiction doctrine
applied after several years to a noncitizen who had been paroled into the United States, 	see
Resp. 17–18 (first citing 	Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925); and then citing 	Poonjani
v. Shanahan, 319 F. Supp. 3d 644, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)), but being paroled into the United
States is a distinct circumstance not present here. Noncitizens who are paroled into the
country are released on the condition that the government reserves the right to treat them
as if they were still stopped at the border. 	See Y- C-, 2025 WL 3653496, at *6 (“Parole into
the United States under section 1182(d)(5)(A) permits a non-citizen to physically enter the
country, subject to a reservation of rights by the Government that it may continue to treat
the non-citizen as if stopped at the border.”). Here, however, while petitioner has not been
released on his own recognizance, he has also not been paroled into the United States. He
thus cannot be considered stopped at the border.
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The Court concludes that “petitioner was in this country when ICE agents arrested
him without notice and transferred him to the MDC. He is therefore, like any other person
in this country, entitled to due process.” 	Ye, 2025 WL 3521298, at *6.
B. 	Mathews v. Eldridge 	Balancing Test
Given that the Due Process Clause applies to petitioner’s detention, the Court turns
next to whether the detention satisfies the three-part balancing test set out in 	Mathews v.
Eldridge. 	See Ye, 2025 WL 3521298, at *6 (citing 	Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 851).
Matthews 	requires the Court to balance (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the
official action;” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.” 	Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
Applying the three-part balancing test set forth in 	Mathews, petitioner’s detention
without a bond hearing violates procedural due process. First, petitioner has a cognizable
private interest in being freed from unlawful detention. 	See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 529 (2004) (“[T]he most elemental of liberty interests—the interest in being free from
physical detention by [the] government.”); 	see also Ye, 2025 WL 3521298, at *7 (first citing
Artiga, 2025 WL 2829434, at *8; and then citing 	Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 851). Second,
there is a severe risk of erroneous deprivation based on the factual record and the fact that
without a hearing, an immigration judge is unable to determine whether the requirements
are met for detention. Specifically, since the Immigration Judge found petitioner was being
detained under 1225(b)(2)(A), he did not conduct an individualized assessment because
under 1225, detention is mandatory. The risk of erroneously depriving petitioner of his
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liberty is further emphasized by the fact that respondents have not argued that petitioner
is a flight risk or a danger to his community, particularly given that he has been present in
the United States for almost three decades with no interactions with law enforcement. And
third, the government’s interest in continued detention is slight insofar as petitioner was
detained without an individualized custody determination that evaluated dangerousness
and flight risk or any articulated change in circumstances. As other courts have concluded
in factually similar cases, petitioner’s detention without a bond hearing amounts to a due
process violation. 	See, e.g., 	Ochoa Ochoa v. Noem, No. 25-cv-10865, 2025 WL 2938779,
at *7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2025); 	Rocano Buestan, 2025 WL 3496361, at *11.
III. 	Appropriate Remedy
To remedy petitioner’s deprivation of due process, the Court held that petitioner is
entitled to immediate release from detention. “Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful
executive detention. The typical remedy for such detention is, of course, release.” 	Munaf
v. Green, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008). Petitioner was summarily detained without “a
deliberative process prior to, or contemporaneous with, the initial decision to strip [him]
of the freedom that lies at the heart of the Due Process Clause.” 	Rocano Buestan, 2025 WL
3496361, at *6 (ordering petitioner’s release because the government’s “failure to conduct
any 	kind 	of 	individualized 	assessment 	before 	detaining 	him 	[renders] 	any 	post-
deprivation review by an immigration judge . . . inadequate”). Respondents caused
petitioner to be detained in violation of his due process rights. No relief short of petitioner’s
immediate release would be appropriate or sufficient in this case.
Accordingly, the Court ordered petitioner’s immediate release on December 24,
2025.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court 	GRANTED 	petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
The Court ORDERED petitioner’s immediate release from custody on December
24, 2025. Respondents were directed to file a letter on the docket no later than 5:00 p.m.
on December 26, 2025, certifying their compliance. 	See 	Letter Certifying Release.
The Court further ORDERED that petitioner shall not be re-detained pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) absent a change in relevant circumstances.
Should petitioner seek an award of reasonable fees and costs pursuant to the Equal
Access to Justice Act, he may do so by filing a letter application on the docket within thirty
days of this Order.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment consistent with the
Order and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Natasha C. Merle
NATASHA C. MERLE
United States District Judge
Dated: 	January 6, 2026
Brooklyn, New York
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