H.B. et al v. The County Of Suffolk et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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H.B. by his mother and natural guardian Jennette
Lotrean, and JENNETTE LOTREAN,
Plaintiffs,
ORDER
24-cv-07067 (SJB) (JMW)
-against-
THE COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, et al.,
Defendants.
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A P P E A R A N C E S:
Peter E. Sverd
Law Offices of Peter Sverd, PLLC
255 Broadway, Suite 613
New York, NY 10007
Jon Alec Stockman
The Law Office of Jon A. Stockman
11 Broadway, Suite 615
New York, NY 10004
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Steven V. Dalton1
Nassau County Attorneys’ Office
262 Old Country Road
Mineola, NY 11501
Attorney for Nassau County Defendants
1 Deputy County Attorney Steven V. Dalton authored the opposition yet neither he nor or anyone on
behalf of the Nassau County Defendants has filed an appearance on this case since the departure of
Victoria LaGreca on September 5, 2025. The Nassau County Defendants are hereby directed to have
counsel file an appearance on or before December 24, 2025.
12/17/2025
FILED
CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
LONG ISLAND OFFICE
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“Quo usque tandem abutere, Catilina, patientianostra? . . . Quem as finem sese
effrenata iactabit audacia?” 2
WICKS, Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff H.B., by his mother and natural guardian Jennette Lotrean, and Jennette Lotrean
(collectively “Plaintiffs”) commenced the underlying action on October 18, 2024 asserting
causes of action against the Suffolk County Defendants3 and Nassau County Defendants4 for: (i)
conspiracy to violate Plaintiffs civil rights against individual defendants in their official
capacities as employees of the Town of Suffolk County and the County of Nassau, (ii) fabrication
of evidence/denial of the right to a fair trial against individual Defendants employed by the
County of Nassau, (iii) fabrication of evidence/denial of the right to a fair trial against individual
Defendants employed by the County of Suffolk, (iv) malicious abuse of process against
individual Defendants employed by the County of Suffolk and the County of Nassau, (v) the
right to petition against individual Defendants, and (vi) negligent retention hiring. (ECF No. 1 at
pp. 21-28.)
The parties are now before the Court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, on
Plaintiffs’ motion for discovery sanctions against the Nassau County Defendants for their failure
2 “How long, Cataline, will you abuse our patience? . . . To what end will your unbridled effrontery toss
itself about?” Cicero in The First Oration Against Cataline (63 B.C.) delivered in the Roman Senate.
3 The “Suffolk County Defendants” are comprised of: the County of Suffolk, Suffolk County
Commissioner of Social Services Frances Pierre, CPS Senior Caseworker Leslie Krieger Individually and
in her Official Capacity, Caseworker Ida Santos Individually and in her Official Capacity, Caseworker
Ashley Lawrence Individually and in her Official Capacity, Senior Caseworker Heidi Lobianco
Individually and in her Official Capacity, CPS Supervisor/Bureau Chief Dennis Nowak Individually and
in her Official Capacity, Suffolk County Detective John Barrios Special Victims Unit Individually and in
his Official Capacity, CPS Supervisor/Bureau Chief Traci Barnes Individually and in her Official
Capacity, and Caseworker Ashley Burke Individually and in her Official Capacity.
4 The “Nassau County Defendants” are comprised of: the County of Nassau, Nassau County Department
of Social Services, Nancy Nunziata Commissioner, Individually and in her Official Capacity, Mary Nealy
Supervisor Nassau County Attorney's Office Individually and in her Official Capacity, and Tracy Aull
CPS Agent Individually and in her Official Capacity.
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to produce discovery directed by this Court’s October 8, 2025 Order which was based on their
failure to respond to Plaintiffs’ Second Request for Production (“RFP”) and Second Set of
Interrogatories that Plaintiffs served on August 29, 2025. (See ECF No. 64.) Specifically,
Plaintiffs seek sanctions in the form of striking Nassau County Defendants’ Answer and
Affirmative Defenses, that Plaintiffs be afforded leave to move for a default judgment against the
Nassau County Defendants, and that adverse findings of fact be made by the Court in support of
Plaintiffs’ underlying claims. (See id. at pp. 1-2.) The Nassau County Defendants oppose. (ECF
No. 71.)
For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs’ motion (ECF No. 64) is GRANTED. The Nassau
County Defendants are hereby sanctioned. The Nassau County Defendants are directed to
reimburse Plaintiffs the costs and attorneys’ fees associated with bringing the prior motion to
compel. Although the Nassau County Defendant’s conduct during the course of discovery is
inexcusable, it does not rise to the level that justifies the striking of pleadings, moving for
default, or drawing an adverse inference.
BACKGROUND
The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the facts underlying this action as set
forth in this Court’s October 8, 2025 Order granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs’ motion
to compel discovery from the Nassau County Defendants. See H.B. by Lotrean v. County of
Suffolk, No. 24-cv-07067 (SJB) (JMW), 2025 WL 2855355 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2025). The Court,
therefore, focuses on the background germane to the current dispute.
On September 9, 2025, Plaintiffs requested that the Nassau County Defendants: (i) re-
produce certain documents with less redactions, (ii) produce messages and communications from
certain individuals working for Nassau County, (iii) produce documents relevant to Plaintiffs’
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negligent retention hiring claim, and (iv) produce documents relating to a separate Child Abuse
and Maltreatment report. See id. at *2. The Nassau County Defendants did not oppose this
motion and, on October 8, 2025, the Court ruled on Plaintiffs’ motion to compel as follows:
Plaintiffs’ motion as to the production of the redacted documents is granted such
that the Nassau County Defendants shall review the redacted documents and
produce those documents redacted only to reflect privileged information, and
produce a privilege log reflecting the redacted portions;
Plaintiffs’ motion to compel production with respect to Document Request XXVII
is granted; and
Plaintiffs’ 	motion 	seeking 	production 	of 	documents 	with 	Nassau 	County
Defendants’ possession, custody, or control concerning SCR Case ID 28187771
and/or concerning any report made to SCR on 1/11/2023 alleging that Ms.
Lotrean and/or Dwight Bruno abused or maltreated a child is granted.
Id. at *5.
The Court directed that “[a]ll production in accordance with this Order [] be completed
by November 7, 2025 . . . .” Id.
That same day, the parties appeared for a Status Conference to address additional
discovery disputes. (See Electronic Order dated October 8, 2025.) During this Conference,
Plaintiffs raised that the Nassau County Defendants never responded to Plaintiffs Second RFP
and Second Interrogatories which were both served on the Nassau County Defendants August 29,
2025. (See ECF No. 64-1, 64-2; see also ECF No. 64 at p. 3.) During this October 8 Conference,
the Court directed the Nassau County Defendants to serve responses by October 22, 2025. They
did not.
Because the Nassau County Defendants did not timely comply, counsel for Plaintiffs
emailed counsel for the Nassau County Defendants on October 23, 2025 warning that Plaintiffs
would move for sanctions if responses were not produced by October 29, 2025. (See id.; see also
ECF No. 64-3.) Attorney Matthew Rozea responded in “less than an hour” explaining that the
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attorney handling this case for the Nassau County Defendants, Mr. Klopman, “unexpectedly and
without notice resigned from our office today” and the Nassau County Defendants were put “in
an untenable situation but one that I’m sure we can resolve.” (ECF No. 64 at p. 4.) Counsel for
Plaintiffs and Mr. Rozea spoke the next day and Plaintiffs agreed to “give the Nassau Defendants
a little more time before seeking sanctions, but [he] needed to touch base on 10/29/25.” (Id.)
Since this communication, Plaintiffs’ counsel has not “heard from anyone representing the
Nassau Defendants . . . .” (Id.) Plaintiffs’ counsel reached out on October 29, 2025 inquiring into
the status of the RFP and Interrogatory responses, but no attorney for the Nassau County
Defendants responded. (See id.)
According to Plaintiffs, to date, the Nassau County Defendants have neither produced the
discovery required by this Court’s October 8, 2025 Order nor have they responded to Plaintiffs’
Second RFP and Interrogatories. (See id. at pp. 3-4.) It is this failure that Plaintiffs contend is
“willful” and “completely inexcusable and warrants the harshest discovery sanctions available.”
(Id. at pp. 4, 5.)
The Nassau County Defendants oppose arguing that their conduct was not willful, their
noncompliance has not been “inordinately long in duration” and the “County has not received an
adequate warning that noncompliance could result in sanctions.” (ECF No. 71 at p. 2.) The
Nassau County Defendants sheepishly concede that “discovery is incomplete in this case” and
that the “delays are unacceptable” but note that they are “willing to meet whatever reasonable
timeline for discovery the Court is willing to set as an alternative to the imposition of sanctions.”
(Id. at pp. 2, 4.)
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THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
“The imposition of sanctions under Rule 37 lies within the broad discretion of the district
court.” Perros v. Cnty of Nassau, CV 15-5598 (GRB)(AKT), 2021 WL 4480666, at *7
(E.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2021) (noting that “Rule 37 is most relevant when a party fails to comply
with a court order to produce discovery or fails to produce to an adversary relevant, requested
information”) (internal quotation and citation omitted). With this discretion, the Court is granted
a panoply of options once it is determined that discovery sanctions are warranted. “Rule 37
provides a district court with a wide range of sanctions which it may apply to a wide range of
circumstances -- potential sanctions extend from payment of expenses and similar monetary
sanctions at one end of the spectrum to default judgment on the other.” Abante Rooter &
Plumbing, Inc. v. Shore Funding Sols., Inc., No. CV176499 (ADS)(AKT), 2019 WL 2436239, at
*5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 1986606 (E.D.N.Y.
May 6, 2019).
When a party has exhibited misconduct that warrants sanctioning, but the misconduct is
not as offensive as to warrant striking of the answer and entering default, courts will impose
other, less draconian sanctions. See e.g., Abante Rooter & Plumbing, Inc. 2019 WL 2436239, at
*6. (“[T]he Court concludes that a default judgment as a sanction under Rule 37 would not be
appropriate in the instant circumstances. However ... in the absence of any justification for
[Defendant's] conduct, it is clear to the Court that some form of sanction under Rule 37 is
appropriate”); Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Grecian Travel, Inc., 170 F.R.D. 351 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)
(“Here, [Defendant's] actions do not quite reach the level where such extreme sanctions should
be imposed ... [Defendant's] dilatory behavior warrants an order compelling discovery”).
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The Rules authorize sanctions in the form of “directing that the matters embraced in the
order or other designated facts be taken as established for purposes of the action, as the
prevailing party claims,” “prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing
designate claims or defenses, or from introducing designated matters in evidence,” and “striking
pleadings in whole or in part.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iii). Moreover, pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 37(d), the court may order sanctions if “a party, after being properly served with
interrogatories under Rule 33 or a request for inspection under Rule 34, fails to serve its answers,
objections, or written response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(1)(A)(ii). Under this provision, sanctions
include “any of the orders listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi)” in addition to “reasonable expenses,
including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified, or
other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(1)(3).
It is within this framework that the Court considers Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions.
DISCUSSION
i. 	The Nassau County Defendants’ Non-Compliance with the
Court’s Orders Warrants Sanctions Under Rule 37
“The two predicates to the imposition of sanctions under Rule 37(b) are (1) a ‘court order
directing compliance with discovery requests,” and (2) “non-compliance with that order[.]’” In
re Keurig Green Mountain Single-Serve Coffee Antitrust Litigation, 673 F. Supp. 3d 345, 356
(S.D.N.Y. 2023) (quoting Shanghai Weiyi Int'l Trade Co. v. Focus 2000 Corp., No. 15 Civ. 3533
(CM) (BCM), 2017 WL 2840279, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2017)). “A party that fails to
cooperate in discovery or comply with court orders is subject to sanctions under Rule 37 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Stavola v. Macro Digital Tech. Corp., No. 24-cv-00026
(GRB) (JMW), 2025 WL 2466991, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2025) (quoting Allied 100, LLC v.
Chadha, No. 20-CV-03493 (AMD) (PK), 2021 WL 7184241, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 26, 2021)).
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Here, the Nassau County Defendants admittedly failed to comply with this Court’s
October 8, 2025 Order by not providing any of the documents directed therein by November 7,
2025. (See ECF No. 64 at p. 3.) Similarly, the Nassau County Defendants admittedly failed to
respond to Plaintiffs Second RFP’s and Interrogatories despite being initially provided them on
August 29, 2025, being resent the documents on October 7, 2025, and being ordered by this
Court to produce the responses on or before October 22, 2025. (See id.; see also ECF No. 61 at
p. 1.) As of the date of Plaintiffs’ motion, the Nassau County Defendants have not produced any
of this ordered discovery. See McNamee v. Clemens, No. 09 CV 1647 (SJ), 2014 WL 12775660,
at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2014) (finding defendant’s decision not to produce responsive
documents in violation of the court’s order amounted to sanctionable conduct). This slugabed,
foot-dragging approach to discovery obligations runs afoul of Rule 1’s admonition that the rules
should be construed “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action,”
and will not be countenanced.
Accordingly, finding that sanctionable conduct exists, the Court’s next function is to
fashion an appropriate remedy. See In re Keurig Green Mountain Single-Serve Coffee Antitrust
Litigation, 673 F. Supp. 3d at 360 (analyzing whether monetary sanctions are appropriate after
determining defendants failed to comply with prior courts orders).
ii. 	Monetary Costs and Expenses Incurred in Bringing
the Motion to Compel are Appropriate
Rule 37(a)(5) explicitly provides that if a motion to compel is granted, “the court must ...
award reasonable motion expenses incurred in making the motion.” Underdog Trucking, L.L.C.
v. Verizon Servs. Corp., 273 F.R.D. 372, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(a)(5)(A)). An award of reasonable expenses, however, is not appropriate where the movant
filed the motion before a good faith meet and confer, the nondisclosure was “substantially
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justified,” or “other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Underdog Trucking,
L.L.C., 273 F.R.D. at 377 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(i)—(iii)). Similarly, pursuant to
Rule 37(b)(2)(C), if a party disobeys an order to provide discovery, “the court must order the
disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses,
including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or
other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.”
Here, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to compel. See H.B., 2025 WL 2855355, at *4,
*5. Further, the imposition of costs is proper considering counsel for Plaintiffs was forced to
expend time and resources (i.e., through meeting and conferring with Defendants’ counsel
numerous times, resending RFP’s and Interrogatories, and filing the motion to compel) to secure
the aforementioned responses that should have been disclosed previously. See Stavola v. Macro
Digital Tech. Corp., No. 24-cv-00026 (GRB) (JMW) , 2025 WL 2240297, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.
6, 2025) (granting motion to compel discovery responses and determining an award of attorneys
fees was appropriate in light of the time spent meeting with opposing counsel, addressing
extensions of time to respond to interrogatories, and filing the motion to compel); see also
Ritchie Risk-Linked Strategies Trading (Ir.), Ltd. v. Coventry First LLC, 280 F.R.D. 147, 162-63
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (ordering plaintiff to pay reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred in making
the motion to compel and costs associated with the additional discovery). Moreover, counsel for
the Nassau County Defendants points to no “substantial justification” or “other circumstances”
as to why an award of costs and fees incurred in bringing the motion to compel is unjust. See
Sadowski v. Yeshiva World News, LLC, No. 21-cv-7207 (AMD) (MMH), 2023 WL 6812273, at
*2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2023) (determining plaintiff was entitled to reasonable attorney's fees for
bringing a motion to compel where there was “nothing to suggest” substantial justification or
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“that any other circumstances exist that would make an award of fees unjust”) (quoting Republic
of Guatemala v. IC Power Asia Dev. Ltd., No. 22-cv-394 (CM) (JW), 2023 WL 3294277, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2023)). Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and
expenses incurred in bringing the prior motion to compel. Counsel for Plaintiffs is directed to
submit a declaration or affidavit setting forth the basis for costs and attorneys’ fees, with the
appropriate supporting documentation.
iii. 	Plaintiffs are not Entitled to Sanctions of Striking the Answer,
Moving for Default Judgment, or Adverse Findings
Counsel for Plaintiffs seeks “the harshest discovery sanctions available,” in the form of
striking Nassau County Defendants’ Answer and Affirmative Defenses, moving for a default
judgment against the Nassau County Defendants, and that the Court make certain adverse
findings of fact relating to the heart of Plaintiffs’ claims. (ECF No. 64 at p. 1.) The specific
adverse findings are:
• 	On 1/11/2023, the Nassau Defendants made a report against Jennette Lotrean to
the New York Statewide Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment
(“SCR”) that Jennette Lotrean abused and maltreated HB. Said report caused SCR
to open SCR Case No. 28187771 against Ms. Lotrean;
• 	The Nassau Defendants made the aforementioned 1/11/2023 report against Ms.
Lotrean to the SCR in retaliation for Ms. Lotrean exercising her first amendment
right to petition;
• 	The Nassau Defendants made the aforementioned 1/11/2023 report in an effort to
silence and subdue her reporting to said defendants;
• 	The Nassau Defendants made the aforementioned 1/11/2023 report with no reason
to believe Ms. Lotrean abused or maltreated a child
(Id. at p. 2.)
The sanction of striking a defendant’s answer and entering a default is severe. Such a
dramatic sanction is only appropriate “in the most extreme cases,” typically after a showing of
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willfulness or bad faith on the part of the noncompliant party is made. Abante Rooter &
Plumbing, Inc., 2019 WL 2436239, at *5; Syntel Sterling Best Shores Mauritius Ltd. v. TriZetto
Grp., 328 F.R.D. 100, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Striking an answer, like dismissal or entry of
default, is a drastic remedy generally to be used only when the district judge has considered
lesser alternatives ... and it is only appropriate if failure to comply with discovery orders was due
to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of the party sanctioned.”)
“Noncompliance with discovery orders is considered willful when the court's orders have
been clear, when the party has understood them, and when the party’s noncompliance is not due
to factors beyond the party’s control.” In re Keurig Green Mountain Single-Serve Coffee
Antitrust Litigation, 673 F. Supp. 3d at 360 (citation omitted). Oftentimes too, the striking of an
answer or entry of default is imposed where the discovery misconduct is repetitive and spans
over a lengthy period. See Park v. Sancia Healthcare, Inc., No. 17 Civ. 720 (NSR) (JCM), 2019
WL 6831382, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2019) (collecting cases striking an answer where parties
“repeatedly failed to follow the court’s discovery orders” and engaged in a “pattern” of not
responding to discovery requests), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 4736181
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2019).
On the other hand, striking an answer and permitting default is not an appropriate where,
like here, defendants have made some efforts to produce the discovery, but the non-production
was due to circumstances beyond the defendants’ control. See e.g., Volpe v. Ryder, No. 19-cv-
02236 (JMA) (JMW), 2022 WL 4329475, at *4-5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2022) (awarding attorneys
fees and costs for discovery violations after the motion to compel was granted, but declining to
strike the answer or enter default against defendants, where defendants represented that they
have made efforts to obtain the requested discovery but the delayed production was due to delays
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by outside entities tending to “other pressing investigations”); see also Abusikin v. City of New
York, No. 18-CV-4582 (ATK) (NF), 2020 WL 3547773, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2020), report
and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 3546882 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2020) (awarding a
monetary sanction, rather than default or dismissal, where plaintiff conceded he did not comply
with the court's order but had a “reasonable explanation” as to why).
Here, the Nassau County Defendants admit that they have delayed discovery in this case.
(See ECF No. 71 at p. 4.) They blame their delayed production, however, on circumstances
beyond their control—the unexpected departure from the lead attorney on this matter followed
by the “indefinite medical leave” of replacement counsel. (Id. at p. 2.) Additionally, after being
reminded of the deficient discovery production, counsel for the Nassau County Defendants
assured Plaintiffs that the assigned attorney would be turning over the documents and responses.
(See ECF No. 64-2.) Further, the delay has been for roughly three weeks—hardly the “pattern”
of discovery misconduct arising to the severe sanctions requested. Lastly, the Nassau County
Defendants assured the Court that upon Mr. Carnevale’s return from leave, this case would be
“prioritized” and that they would assuredly comply with these outstanding demands. (ECF No.
71 at pp. 2-3.) Accordingly, the Court finds that striking the Answer and permitting Plaintiffs to
move for default to be too severe a sanction under the circumstances presented.
Plaintiffs also request that the Court make adverse factual findings against the Nassau
County Defendants. (See ECF No. 64 at p. 1.) An adverse finding is also considered “an extreme
sanction and should not be given lightly.” Williams v. New York City Transit Auth., No. 10 CV
08822 (ENV), 2011 WL 5024280, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2011) (quoting Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg L.L.C., 220 F.R.D. 212, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). An adverse factual finding is typically
awarded where parties engage in “willful noncompliance” and “dilatory tactics for over one
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year,” see Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. V. Kowalski, No. 3:21-cv-00541 (VAB), 2024 WL
4653136, at *11-12 (D. Conn. Nov. 1, 2024), or where the failure to produce evidence was done
with “gross negligence or ordinary negligence.” Creative Resources Group of New Jersey, Inc. v.
Creative Resources Group, Inc., 212 F.R.D 94, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). Conversely, an adverse
finding is not appropriate where, like here, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated sufficient prejudice
resulting from the failure to produce discovery and the Nassau County Defendants did not act
with a sufficiently culpable mental state. See FDIC v. Horn, No. CV 12-5958 (DRH) (AKT),
2015 WL 1529824, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015). Here, as noted above, the Nassau County
Defendants have not willfully evaded their discovery obligations.
Moreover, making adverse findings is inappropriate where, like here, doing so would
establish determinative issues in this case. Plaintiffs assert causes of action for, inter alia, the
right to petition, retaliation, and denial of a fair trial stemming from Lotrean’s repeated, yet
unanswered attempts to report and prevent the alleged sexual incidents from occurring to H.B.
(See ECF No. 1 at pp. 21-28.) As such, Plaintiffs seek damages for the injuries resulting from the
Defendants acts, omissions, recklessness, corruption, and/or dereliction of duty. (Id. at p. 28.)
Because making the requested adverse factual findings goes towards “ultimate determinative
issues” in this case, this sanction is inappropriate. See Chen v. Thai Greenleaf Restaurant Corp.,
No. No. 21-cv-01382 (MKB) (JMW), 2025 WL 1519145, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. May 28, 2025)
(denying motion for discovery sanctions seeking an adverse instruction because the requested
sanction would establish a claim asserted in the Amended Complaint); see also Sagax Dev. Corp.
v. ITrust S.A., No. 19-cv-3386 (RA) (KNF), 2021 WL 5360121, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2021)
(refusing to order the requested adverse findings of fact because “deeming the facts designated
by the plaintiff [as] established . . . would be tantamount to entering judgment”).
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Accordingly, striking the Nassau County Defendants’ Answer, permitting Plaintiffs to
move for default against the Nassau County Defendants, and making certain adverse findings
against the Nassau County Defendants are not appropriate sanctions under the circumstances.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs’ motion for discovery sanctions (ECF No. 64) is
GRANTED. In addition,
1. 	Counsel for Plaintiffs is directed to submit an attorney’s affidavit or declaration setting
forth the basis for costs and attorney’s fees, with the appropriate supporting
documentation, on or before December 30, 2025;
2. 	The Nassau County Defendants are directed to appear through counsel by filing an
appearance on or before December 24, 2025;
3. 	The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this Order upon Nassau County Attorney
Thomas Adams on or before December 23, 2025, and note such service on the docket;
and
4. 	Any opposition to the fees requested shall be filed on or before January 13, 2026.
Dated: 	Central Islip, New York
December 17, 2025
S O 	O R D E R E D:
/s/ James M. Wicks
JAMES M. WICKS
United States Magistrate Judge
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