Daley v. Nassau County Sheriff's Department et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Brian Daley,
Plaintiff,
-v-
Nassau County Sheriff’s Department; et al.,
Defendants.
2:25-cv-07052
(NJC) (SIL)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Brian Daley, proceeding pro se, initiated this action with the filing of Complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) against the Nassau County Sheriff’s Department
(“NCSD”), Nassau County Sheriff Anthony LaRocco, Richard V. Kanter, Esq., Chad Young, Neko
Investments, LLC (“Neko”), Deputy Sheriff J. Pratt, Navy Federal Credit Union (“NFCU”), and
Judge Joseph Patrick Whyte (collectively, “Defendants”) together with the filing fee. (See Compl.,
ECF No. 1; Filing Fee, ECF No. 4.)1 Daley presented summonses for the Defendants other than
NFCU, and those summonses were issued by the Clerk of the Court. (Prop. Summonses, ECF No. 3;
Issued Summonses, ECF No. 5.) On March 19, 2026, Daley filed a return of service for the NCSD,
LaRocco, Pratt, and Judge Whyte. (See Summons Ret., ECF No. 7.)
Upon review of the returns of service, it is apparent that service upon NCSD, LaRocco, Pratt,
and Judge Patrick does not comport with the requirements of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil
1 Daley also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 2), which the Court denied
without prejudice on January 28, 2026, after affording Daley two opportunities to file proof of
service with the Court. (See Elec. Order, Jan. 28, 2026 (citing Elec. Orders, Dec. 24, 2025 and
Jan. 15, 2026).)
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Procedure. (See id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.) For the reasons that follow, the Complaint is
dismissed without prejudice in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).
BACKGROUND
On December 23, 2025, Daley filed a Complaint pursuant to Section 1983 against the
Defendants together with the filing fee and a motion seeking a preliminary injunction. (See ECF
Nos. 1, 2, 4.) Daley also presented a summons for each of the Defendants other than NFCU and,
the summonses were issued on December 23, 2025. (ECF Nos. 3, 5.) On December 24, 2025, the
Court ordered Daley to file proof of service of the Complaint, the motion for a preliminary
injunction, and the Court’s Order in accordance with Rule 4 by December 30, 2025. (Elec.
Order, Dec. 24, 2025 (“Plaintiff must also ensure that Defendants are served with the Summons
and Complaint in a manner consistent with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).)
The Court also ordered that any opposition to the motion for a preliminary injunction be filed by
January 13, 2026. (Id.)
After the expiration of the December 30, 2025 deadline for filing proof of service, in the
absence of any communication from Daley, on January 12, 2026, the Court ordered that Daley
comply with Rule 4(m)’s service deadline of March 23, 2026, and cautioned that failure to do so,
absent a showing of good cause, would result in dismissal of the Complaint without prejudice.
(See Order, ECF No. 6 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (“If a defendant is not served within 90 days
after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must
dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant . . . .”).) In addition, after the
expiration of the January 13, 2026 deadline for Defendants’ response to the motion for a
preliminary injunction, on January 15, 2026, the Court issued an Order noting that Daley had
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“not filed any proof indicating that Defendants have received notice of this action, nor have
Defendants entered an appearance in this action. The deadline for Defendants to file any
response to the motion for a preliminary injunction passed on January 13, 2026 without any
filing from Defendants.” (Elec. Order, Jan. 15, 2026.) In an abundance of caution and in light of
Daley’s pro se status, the Court extended the deadline within which Daley “must file proof that
he has provided the Complaint, the motion for a preliminary injunction, the Court’s December
24, 2025 Order, and this Order to Defendants” through January 22, 2026. (Id.)
Having received no response from Daley or Defendants, on January 28, 2026, the Court
denied the motion for a preliminary injunction without prejudice for failure to provide proof of
service and “reminded [Daley] of the March 23, 2026 deadline within which to effect service
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).” (Elec. Order, Jan. 28, 2026 (citing Order,
ECF No. 6).)
On March 19, 2026, Daley filed proof of service for four of the eight defendants:
LaRocco, Pratt, the NCSD, and “Judge Joseph Patrick.”2 (ECF No. 7.) Each of the returns of
service reflect that Daley himself mailed the summons to each of these Defendants on January
12, 2026 by certified mail, return receipt requested. Daley also filed the return postcard receipts.
(Id. at 6.) To date, no proof of service has been filed with regard to Defendants Kanter, Young,
Neko, and NFCU.
2 The Court understands that Daley intended to refer to Judge Joseph Patrick Whyte.
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DISCUSSION
Under Federal Rule Civil Procedure 4, which governs the service of a summons and
initial complaint, “[a]ny person who is at least 18 years old and not a party may serve a
summons and complaint.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2) (emphasis added). Rule 4(c)(1) requires that
“[a] summons must be served with a copy of the complaint.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1). In addition,
Rule 4 provides that an individual may be served pursuant to state law, by personal service, by
leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at their usual place of abode with someone of
suitable age and discretion who resides there, or by delivering a copy of the summons and
complaint to an agent authorized to receive service of process. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). As for
serving a local government such as Nassau County, Rule 4(j)(2) requires that service be made
by:
(A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to its chief executive
officer; or (B) serving a copy of each in the manner prescribed by the state’s law
for serving a summons or like process on a defendant.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2)(A)–(B). The proofs of service reflect that LaRocco, Pratt, the NCSD, and
Judge Whyte were purportedly served by Daley himself only by certified mail. (See ECF No. 7.)
Moreover, the summonses do not reflect that a copy of the Complaint was served together with
the summons. (See id.) Thus, service does not comport with the requirements of Rule 4.
Nevertheless, the Court has considered whether to extend the Rule 4(m) service deadline
of March 23, 2026 and declines to do so for several reasons. First, the Complaint’s allegations
suggest that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Daley’s claims in this Court. Daley, a New York
citizen, is challenging a Missouri state court judgment against him, which resulted in the seizure
of $25,414 from his NFCU account located in New York. (ECF No. 1 at 1–4.) Under the Rooker-
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Feldman doctrine, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over “cases brought by state-court
losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Second, absolute
judicial immunity shields Judge Whyte from the damages claims set forth in the Complaint.
Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 209–210 (2d Cir. 2009) (recognizing that judicial immunity bars
claims against a judge that challenge “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before
the judge” that “are considered judicial in nature,” even where there are “allegations of bad faith
or malice”). Moreover, Section 1983, as amended in 1996, provides that “in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief
was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Third, the NCSD has no independent identity such that it
can be sued. “Under New York law, departments that are merely administrative arms of a
municipality do not have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and, therefore,
cannot sue or be sued.” Davis v. Lynbrook Police Dep’t, 224 F. Supp. 2d 463, 477 (E.D.N.Y.
2002). Fourth, although LaRocco is named in the caption, the Complaint does not include any
allegations of conduct or inaction attributable to him, which thereby renders the claims against
him implausible. See, e.g., Walker v. Dean, No. 26-cv-6177-mav, 2026 WL 1045317, at *3
(W.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2026) (“To establish liability against an official under § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege that individual’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation; it is not
enough to assert that the defendant is a link in the chain of command.”). Indeed, “a plaintiff must
plead and prove ‘that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual
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actions, has violated the Constitution.’” Tangreti v. Bachman, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020)
(cleaned up).
For all of these reasons, extending the deadline for service would contravene the
requirement that this Court construe and apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a manner
that “secure[s] the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Accordingly, given that the deadline for service expired on March 23, 2026,
and having provided notice that dismissal without prejudice would result absent timely service in
accordance with Rule 4’s requirements (see Order, ECF No. 6), the Complaint is dismissed
without prejudice pursuant to Rule 4(m) due to Daley’s failure to serve any Defendants. The
Clerk of the Court shall: (1) enter judgment accordingly; (2) mail a copy of this Order and
judgment to Daley at his address of record; and (3) note such mailing on the docket.
Although Daley paid the filing fee to commence this action, the Court certifies pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and
therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369
U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).
Dated: Central Islip, New York
May 8, 2026
/s/ Nusrat J. Choudhury
NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY
United States District Judge
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