United States of America v. Washington, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	) 	CASE NO. 1:19-cr-184-2
)
)
Plaintiff, 	) 	CHIEF JUDGE SARA LIOI
)
vs. 	)
)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
CESAR FRANCISCO MELENDEZ-
PEREZ,
)
)
)
Defendant. 	)
Now before the Court is the pro se motion of defendant Cesar Francisco Melendez-Perez
(“defendant” or “Melendez-Perez”) to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)–(c)(2).
(Doc. No. 629 (Motion).) Appointed counsel filed a notice of no intent to supplement the motion.
(Doc. No. 631 (Notice).) Plaintiff United States of America (the “government”) opposes the
motion (Doc. No. 632 (Response)), and defendant filed a reply. (Doc. No. 638 (Reply).) For the
reasons that follow, the motion for early release is denied.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On August 27, 2020, Melendez-Perez was sentenced to a custody term of 163 months, and
four years of supervised release, following his guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to distribute
and possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; and one count of
possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C).
(Doc. No. 470 (Judgment); Minutes of Proceedings [non-document], 8/27/2020; see Minutes of
Change of Plea Hearing [non-document], 3/9/2020; Doc. No. 345 (Plea Agreement).) Melendez-
Perez is currently serving his sentence at Gilmer FCI and has an anticipated release date of January
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12, 2032.1
On January 13, 2026, Melendez-Perez filed the present motion seeking a sentence
reduction under “§ 3582(c)(1)–(c)(2).” (Doc. No. 629, at 1.) In his pro se motion, Melendez-Perez
represents that he should receive early release because his sentence would be significantly less if
he were sentenced today, and because the goals of sentencing can be accomplished with a shorter
sentence. (Id.)
The government opposes the motion, arguing that the motion for compassionate release
should be denied because Melendez-Perez has failed to establish the existence of extraordinary
and compelling reasons under the governing statute and because the sentencing factors at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) do not weigh in favor of early release. (Doc. No. 632, at 5–10.) Also, to the extent
defendant’s motion can be construed as requesting a sentence reduction under Amendment 821 to
the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the government argues the motion should be denied
because Melendez-Perez does not qualify for relief under the Amendment. (Id. at 3–5.)
II. 	MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE
A. Governing Law
The sentencing court has no inherent authority to reconsider and/or modify an otherwise
valid sentence. United States v. Washington, 584 F.3d 693, 700 (6th Cir. 2009). Instead, the
authority of the Court to resentence a defendant is limited by statute. United States v. Houston,
529 F.3d 743, 748–49 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Ross, 245 F.3d 577, 585 (6th Cir.
2001)); see United States v. Alexander, 951 F.3d 706, 707 (6th Cir. 2019) (“Generally speaking,
once a court has imposed a sentence, it does not have the authority to change or modify that
1 See https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/, last visited March 10, 2026.
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sentence unless such authority is expressly granted by statute.”) Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), a court
may only modify a term of imprisonment under the following circumstances: (1) upon a motion
of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) or defendant for compassionate release; (2) as
expressly permitted by statute or by Fed. R. Crim. P. 35; or (3) where a defendant has been
sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been
lowered by the Sentencing Commission. § 3582(c)(1)–(2).
With respect to compassionate release motions under § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court may
grant a sentence reduction “only if it finds that the defendant satisfies three requirements: (1)
‘extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction’; (2) the ‘reduction is consistent
with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission’; and (3) the relevant §
3553(a) factors support the reduction.” United States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555, 561 (6th Cir. 2021)
(quoting § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); United States v Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 518 (6th Cir. 2021)); see United
States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1101 (6th Cir. 2020). Additionally, exhaustion of administrative
remedies is a mandatory claims-processing rule that must be satisfied before a defendant may seek
compassionate release. United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 833–34 (6th Cir. 2020) (citations
omitted).
The policy statement applicable to compassionate release motions, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (as
amended), describes six categories of extraordinary and compelling reasons that individually, or
in combination, may support a request for compassionate release. These categories are: (1) medical
circumstances of the defendant; (2) the age of the defendant; (3) a defendant’s family
circumstances; (4) sexual or physical abuse suffered by the defendant while in custody involving
a “sexual act” or “serious bodily injury”; (5) “other reasons” similar in gravity as those articulated
in (1)–(4); and (6) an “unusually long sentence.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b).
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B. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons
Melendez-Perez suggests, without supporting documentation, that he has exhausted his
administrative remedies. (Doc. No. 638, at 3.)2 The government acknowledges that Federal Bureau
of Prisons (“BOP”) records show that Melendez-Perez submitted an administrative request for
immediate release in early January 2026. (Doc. No. 632, at 8.) Because the government concedes
exhaustion (see id.), the Court finds this mandatory claims-processing rule to have been satisfied.
The Court, therefore, turns to a consideration of whether defendant has demonstrated the existence
of extraordinary and compelling reasons identified in § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), and discussed in detail
in § 1B1.13(b), as amended.
Melendez-Perez appears to invoke U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6)—Unusually Long Sentence—
as the basis for compassionate release, which provides:
Unusually Long Sentence.—If a defendant received an unusually long sentence
and has served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment, a change in the law
(other than an amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not been made
retroactive) may be considered in determining whether the defendant presents an
extraordinary and compelling reason, but only where such change would produce
a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be
imposed at the time the motion is filed, and after full consideration of the
defendant’s individualized circumstances.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6). Melendez-Perez argues that, if he were sentenced today, he would have
received a much shorter sentence due to the change in the law relating to the treatment of the term
“violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). Citing the Supreme Court’s
decision in Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420, 429, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 210 L. Ed. 2d 63 (2021),
which held that an offense committed with a mens rea of ordinary reckless no longer qualifies as
2 While defendant represents that he has attached proof of exhaustion to his reply brief (see id.), no such documentation
is appended to either his motion or reply. (See Doc. Nos. 629, 638.)
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a violent felony under the so-called “force clause” of the ACCA, Melendez-Perez argues that his
two prior domestic violence convictions would no longer serve as predicate offenses under ACCA.
(Doc. No. 629, at 2–6.)
Melendez-Perez’s argument that he has established an extraordinary and compelling reason
for compassionate release under § 1B1.13(b)(6) fails for several reasons. First and foremost, the
Sixth Circuit has recently determined § 1B1.13(b)(6) to be invalid. In United States v. Bricker, 135
F.4th 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2025), the Sixth Circuit held that the United States Sentencing
Commission exceeded its authority in promulgating § 1B1.13(b)(6) by “issu[ing] a policy
statement that is plainly unreasonable under the statute and in conflict with the separation of
powers.” This Court is bound by the ruling in Bricker, and, for this reason alone, defendant’s
compassionate release motion must be denied.
Second, Melendez-Perez was not sentenced under the ACCA; rather, his advisory
sentencing guidelines range was enhanced because he was deemed a career offender under
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. (Doc. No. 493 (Sentencing Hearing Transcript), at 16; see also Doc. No. 440
(Presentence Investigation Report), at 17 ¶ 66.) The ruling in Borden is irrelevant and
inconsequential to Melendez-Perez’s complaint regarding his sentence under the sentencing
guidelines. See, e.g., Carr v. United States, 3:20-cr-43, 2023 WL 7975165, at *8 n.13 (N.D. W.Va.
July 28, 2023) (noting that “Borden did not address the career offender enhancement under § 4B1.1
of the sentencing guidelines”), report and recommendation adopted by 2023 WL 6638061 (N.D.
W.Va. Oct. 12, 2023). Moreover, Melendez-Perez would still qualify as a career offender under
the guidelines (and ACCA) because his domestic violence convictions under Ohio Rev. Code §
2919.25(A) required a finding that he acted “knowingly” and not “recklessly” as Melendez-Perez
suggests. (See Doc. No. 510 (Order), at 2.) These predicate offenses, therefore, would still serve
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to enhance Melendez-Perez’s sentence if he were sentenced today.3
Accordingly, the Court finds that Melendez-Perez has failed to demonstrate the existence
of an extraordinary and compelling reason to justify early release.
C. Sentencing Factors
But even if Melendez-Perez had cleared the initial hurdle of demonstrating the existence
of extraordinary and compelling reasons, the Court would still have denied his motion because the
sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) do not favor release. The nature and circumstances of
Melendez-Perez’s offenses—conspiracy with intent to distribute controlled substances and
distribution of controlled substances—are serious. See United States v. Stone, 608 F.3d 939, 947
n.6 (6th Cir 2010) (“To be sure, drug trafficking is a serious offense, that, in itself, poses a danger
to the community.” (citations omitted)). Melendez-Perez was one of 15 individuals charged in a
large-scale drug trafficking organization, wherein Melendez-Perez and his co-defendants obtained
substantial quantities of controlled substances, including cocaine, from co-conspirators to
redistribute throughout the Lorain, Ohio area. (Doc. No. 440, at 4 ¶¶ 1–5.) This case did not
represent the first time Melendez-Perez was convicted of drug trafficking. (See id. at 14, ¶ 57.)
Moreover, Melendez-Perez’s criminal history—which began when he was only 16 years of age
and spans more than 20 years—also contains numerous other violent crimes. His adult criminal
record includes multiple felony convictions for abduction, assault, and, as previously noted,
domestic violence, and a felony conviction for kidnapping. (See id. at 10–11, 13–15, ¶¶ 43, 46, 49,
54, 57, 60.)
3 Additionally, Melendez-Perez fails to satisfy the requirement of § 1B1.13(b)(6) that a defendant has served “at least
10 years” of his sentence. As the government correctly observes, defendant’s federal custody did not begin until July
3, 2019. (See Doc. No. 632, at 9 (citing Doc. No. 440, at 2).)
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Prior custody sentences for drug trafficking and other violent crimes have failed to
discourage Melendez-Perez from returning to dangerous and destructive behavior like drug
trafficking. Additionally, his criminal record also reflects multiple instances where he violated the
terms of probation or community control. (See id. at 11–12, 14–15 ¶¶ 49, 53, 57–58, 60.) The
Court has grave doubts that, if released early, Melendez-Perez would be able to abide by any
condition of release the Court might set, including the condition that he refrain from engaging in
illegal behavior.
After considering all of the § 3353(a) factors, the Court finds that a reduction in sentence
would undermine the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offenses,
promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offenses, afford adequate deterrence,
and protect the public from further crimes of the defendant. Based on these same facts, the Court
also finds that defendant continues to pose a danger to the community. For these reasons, the Court
denies defendant’s motion for compassionate release.
III. 	MOTION UNDER AMENDMENT 821
To the extent Melendez-Perez’s filing can also be construed as seeking a sentence reduction
under Amendment 821 to the federal sentencing guidelines, the request is without merit. The Court
employs a two-step approach to deciding whether to reduce a sentence based on a retroactive
amendment to the federal sentencing guidelines. First, the Court must consider the scope of the
reduction authorized by the amendment, and then it must consider whether such a reduction is
warranted based on the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S.
817, 826, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 177 L. Ed. 2d 271 (2010) (citing § 3582(c)(2)).
Part A of Amendment 821, which now appears in the guidelines at § 4A1.1(e), limits the
criminal history impact of “status points,” decreasing them by 1 point for individuals with 7 or
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more criminal history points and eliminating status points for those with 6 or fewer criminal history
points. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e). The Amendment was given retroactive effect, provided that any
order reducing a term of imprisonment based on retroactive application of Amendment 821 have
an effective date of February 1, 2024, or later. See § 1B1.10(e)(2) (Nov. 1, 2023).
At the time of sentencing, the Court determined Melendez-Perez’s base offense level to be
28. (See also Doc. No. 440, at 8 ¶ 34.) The Court, however, also determined Melendez-Perez to be
a career offender, making his base level offense 32. (Doc. No. 493, at 12, 16–19.) A three-level
deduction was applied for acceptance of responsibility, making the total offense level 29. (Id. at
18.) Melendez-Perez had prior convictions for domestic violence, abduction, assault, unlawful
restraint, passing bad checks, escape, assault, kidnapping, trafficking in drugs, possession of
controlled substances, and obstructing official business, which collectively scored 15 criminal
history points. (See also Doc. No. 440, at 10–17 ¶¶ 46, 49–50, 53–54, 57–58, 60, 63.) Because
Melendez-Perez committed the instant offenses while he was on community control for drug
trafficking in state court, he received two additional “status points” under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d).
(See also id. at 17 ¶ 64.) With a total of 17 criminal history points, the guidelines dictated that he
was a criminal history category VI. (Doc. No. 493, at 19; see also Doc. No. 440, at 17 ¶ 65.) He
was a criminal history category VI for the additional reason that he was determined to be a career
offender under the guidelines. (Doc. No. 493, at 19; see also Doc. 440, at 17 ¶ 66.) The advisory
guideline range at offense level 29, criminal history category VI was 151 to 188 months. (Doc.
No. 493, at 19.) The Court imposed a within guidelines sentence of 163 months. (Doc. No. 470.)
Under Part A of Amendment 821, Melendez-Perez’s criminal history score is reduced by
one to 16, which still corresponds to a criminal history category VI. His criminal history category
also remains at VI by virtue of his status as a career offender. Given that his criminal history score
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and criminal history category remain unchanged, his amended guidelines range is still 151 to 188
months. Because his guidelines range is undisturbed, Melendez-Perez is ineligible for a reduction
under Part A of Amendment 821. See United States v. Cook, 870 F.3d 464, 470 (6th Cir. 2017)
(recognizing that Sixth Circuit “precedent clearly establishes that a defendant is not eligible for a
sentence reduction when the defendant’s initial sentence was based on his or her status as a career
offender” (citation omitted)); see, e.g., United States v. Braden, 643 F. App’x 531, 535 (6th Cir.
2016) (holding that defendant, a career offender, was not eligible for a sentence reduction because
the relevant amendment did not lower his applicable guideline range (citations omitted)).
Because the amended guidelines concerning status points would not have affected the
calculation of Melendez-Perez’s sentence, he is ineligible for a reduction based on Part A of
Amendment 821 concerning “status points.”4 And even if he had been eligible for relief under
either prong of Amendment 821, the Court, for reasons already discussed, would have denied relief
at the second step when evaluating the sentencing factors at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), as it would have
determined that the relevant sentencing factors do not justify reducing defendant’s sentence.
Melendez-Perez’s motion to reduce his sentence under Amendment 821 is also denied.
4 Melendez-Perez also does not qualify for relief under Part B of Amendment 821 relating to “zero point” offenders
as, even under the Amendment, Melendez-Perez has 16 criminal history points. See U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1(a)(1)
(disqualifying an offender with any criminal history points).
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion (Doc. No. 629) for compassionate release
and for a sentence reduction under Amendment 821 to the federal sentencing guidelines is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 10, 2026
HONORABLE SARA LIOI
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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