Snyder v. Commissioner of Social Security

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
Plaintiff, Billy Snyder (“Plaintiff” or “Snyder”), challenges the final decision of Defendant, Frank
Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), denying his application for a Period of
Disability (“POD”) and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423, 1381 et seq. (“Act”). 	This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
This case is before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to an automatic referral under
Local Rule 72.2(b) for a Report and Recommendation. For the reasons set forth below, the Magistrate Judge
recommends that the Commissioner’s final decision be AFFIRMED.
I. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In November 2023, Snyder filed an application for POD and DIB, alleging a disability onset date of
November 13, 2022, and claiming he was disabled due to depression, anxiety, agoraphobia, type 2 diabetes,
sleeping all day, problems concentrating, stomach, headache, getting sweaty and hot in public places, and
an inability to get out of his vehicle when in public, crowded events. 	(Transcript (“Tr.”) 27, 95.) 	The
BILLY G. SNYDER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
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CASE NO. 1:25-CV-02470-CAB
JUDGE CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
JONATHAN D. GREENBERG
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
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application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, and Snyder requested a hearing before an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (Id. at 27.)
On November 20, 2024, an ALJ held a hearing, during which Snyder, represented by counsel, and
an impartial vocational expert (“VE”) testified. 	(Id.) 	On December 12, 2024, the ALJ issued a written
decision finding Snyder was not disabled. (Id. at 27-44.) The ALJ’s decision became final on September
19, 2025, when the Appeals Council declined further review. (Id. at 1-6.)
On November 13, 2025, Snyder filed his Complaint to challenge the Commissioner’s final decision.
(Doc. No. 1.) 	The parties have completed briefing in this case. 	(Doc. Nos. 6-7.) 	Snyder asserts the
following assignments of error:
(1) 	The ALJ failed to include even non-severe mental health limitations in the RFC.
(2) 	The ALJ failed to provide a full and fair hearing which impeded on Plaintiff’s due
process rights and inability to ensure full record development.
(Doc. No. 6.)
II. 	EVIDENCE
A. 	Personal and Vocational Evidence
Snyder was born in May 1979 and was 45 years old at the time of his administrative hearing (Tr. 27,
42), making him a “younger” person under Social Security regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(c). He
has a limited education. (Tr. 42.) He has past relevant work as a salvage laborer. (Id.)
B. 	Relevant Medical Evidence1
On January 31, 2023, Snyder saw Israel J. Cajigas, M.D., for follow up regarding his diabetes and
hypertension. (Id. at 358-59.) Snyder reported that he had established care with psychiatry for medication
1 The Court’s recitation of the medical evidence is not intended to be exhaustive and is limited to the
evidence cited in the parties’ Briefs. As Snyder challenges only the ALJ’s mental findings, the Court further
limits its discussion of the evidence to Snyder’s mental impairments.
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management. (Id. at 360.) He endorsed a depressed mood, anhedonia, decreased motivation, and decreased
energy, as well as intermittent anxiety. (Id.) He denied any suicidal or homicidal ideation or self-harming
behavior. (Id.) Snyder told Dr. Cajigas he had been prescribed Lamictal and would be picking it up from
the pharmacy. (Id.) On examination, Dr. Cajigas noted Snyder was nervous/anxious but found a normal
mood, normal behavior, and normal thought content. 	(Id. at 361-62.) 	Dr. Cajigas directed Snyder to
maintain his follow-up appointments with psychiatry and encouraged Snyder to reestablish care for
counseling/therapy. (Id. at 359.)
On March 17, 2023, Snyder sought emergency treatment for nausea, vomiting, and chills for the past
two days. (Id. at 335-36.) Snyder denied any psychiatric or behavioral concerns. (Id. at 336.) Treatment
providers found a normal mood on examination. (Id. at 339.)
On October 26, 2023, Snyder sought emergency treatment for abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting
for the past three days, and reported blood sugar levels over 300. (Id. at 292-93.) Snyder denied confusion
and any psychiatric or behavioral concerns. 	(Id. at 293.) 	On examination, treatment providers found a
normal mood and normal behavior, thought content, and judgment. (Id. at 297.)
On December 1, 2023, Snyder sought emergency treatment for right shoulder pain and denied
confusion and any psychiatric or behavioral concerns. (Id. at 770-71.) On examination, treatment providers
found a normal mood and normal behavior, thought content, and judgment. (Id. at 775.)
On February 16, 2024, Snyder saw Deborah Koricke, Ph.D., for a consultative psychological
examination. (Id. at 738.) Snyder reported seeking disability benefits for his diabetes, anxiety, agoraphobia,
and major depression. (Id. at 739.) He dropped out of high school in his senior year and never obtained a
GED. (Id.) He left his job in 2019 after 10.5 years because his boss refused to give him a raise. (Id.) He
told Dr. Koricke he was not looking for work now because of his medical and psychiatric conditions. (Id.)
Snyder denied any mental health hospitalizations, as well as suicidal and homicidal ideation. (Id.) He also
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denied hearing voices or seeing visions. (Id. at 740.) He reported having seen a psychologist in 2019 and
seeing a counselor at the Nord Center in 2020. (Id.) He recently started seeing a counselor at the Charak
Center. 	(Id.) 	Snyder endorsed sleep difficulties, as well as napping in the afternoon. 	(Id.) 	He told Dr.
Koricke he had anxiety and panic attacks, especially when in public, and he was uncomfortable around
others. (Id.) He took Paxil daily, but he felt that it was insufficient to manage his symptoms. (Id.)
On examination, Dr. Koricke found cooperative and pleasant behavior, appropriate eye contact, and
adequate social skills. (Id. at 741.) Dr. Koricke further found normal speech, a coherent and goal-directed
thought process, “somewhat limited” insight, and “no objective sign of agoraphobia, panic attacks, or
anxiety.” (Id. at 741-42.) Dr. Koricke noted Snyder “did not present as anxious even though he was in an
unusual place alone that he had never been to before.” 	(Id. at 742.) 	Snyder’s diagnoses consisted of
generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder, and unspecified depressive disorder. (Id. at 743.) Dr. Koricke
opined that Snyder could understand, remember, and carry out instructions; he had the ability to return to a
job; he could respond appropriately to others in the workplace; and he could react appropriately in a work
setting. (Id. at 743-44.)
On March 1, 2024, Snyder saw Dr. Cajigas for follow up and denied worsening mood, suicidal or
homicidal ideation, self-harming behaviors, and problems with anxiety or panic. 	(Id. at 753-54.) 	On
examination, Dr. Cajigas found a normal mood, behavior, and thought content. (Id. at 755.)
C. 	State Agency Reports
On March 1, 2024, Valerie Budervic, Psy.D., reviewed the file and opined that Snyder had mild
limitations in his ability to interact with others and adapt or manage himself, and no limitations in his ability
to understand, remember, or apply information and concentrate, persist, or maintain pace. (Id. at 98-99.)
Dr. Budervic opined that:
Given 	totality 	of 	information 	and 	preponderance 	of 	evidence, 	Clmt 	is
reasonably expected to, at most, experience mild limitations across functional
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domains solely due to psych conditions. Clmt’s psych MDI are considered non
severe at this time. The clmt would be able to persist, understand, remember,
and carry out instructions without any substantial issues dealing with stress and
coworkers.
(Id. at 99.)
On April 19, 2024, on reconsideration, Katherine Fernandez, Psy.D., affirmed Dr. Budervic’s
findings. (Id. at 106-07.)
D. 	Hearing Testimony
During the November 20, 2024 hearing, Snyder testified to the following:
• 	He lives with his daughter and his girlfriend. 	(Id. at 59.) 	They have been homeless
since 2020. 	(Id.) 	They have lived with friends or in their car. 	(Id.) 	They bought a
camper and are now staying at his niece’s. (Id.)
• 	He experiences anxiety almost every day. (Id. at 55.) Being in public, being around
people, and stress trigger his anxiety. (Id.) He gets a “fight or flight” feeling when he
is around other people, and he tends to get angry and mad. (Id.) He does not want to
lash out at other people. 	(Id.) 	Through therapy, he now believes childhood trauma
caused his anxiety. (Id. at 55-56.)
• 	He just started seeing a new counselor. (Id. at 56.) It had been two years since he saw
a counselor. 	(Id.) 	He left Nord Center because he did not like how they handled
appointments and scheduling. (Id. at 58.) He tried to find different providers, and he
was homeless and did not have a phone for a while. (Id. at 58-59.)
• 	He suffers from hallucinations. (Id. at 60.) He sees “shadow people” out of the corners
of his eyes. 	(Id.) 	He hears what sounds like children laughing or talking in his ears
when no one is there. (Id.) He hears noises and sounds like something is moving when
it is not. (Id.) This happens on and off throughout the day. (Id.) The only thing he can
do to control it is to go back to sleep and ignore it. (Id.) He experiences these symptoms
six out of seven days a week. (Id.) The more stressed he is, the more it happens. (Id.
at 60-61.) 	His hallucinations have worsened since 2019. 	(Id. at 62.) 	He thinks his
blood sugar “kind of goes” with his hallucinations too, although he is unsure. (Id.)
• 	From 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., he sleeps at least half that time. (Id. at 61.) He sleeps all
day sometimes, especially if he has a migraine. 	(Id.) 	The hallucinations occur
separately from and along with his migraines. (Id.) Migraines make his hallucinations
more intense. (Id.) His therapist prescribed migraine medication. (Id.) He just started
his second week on this medication, and it is too soon to tell if it is helping. (Id.)
• 	His medications make him more drowsy, edgy, and irritated. (Id. at 63.)
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The ALJ found Snyder had past work as a salvage laborer. 	(Id. at 55.) 	The ALJ then posed the
following hypothetical question:
I want you to assume an individual similar to the claimant in age, education,
and work history, who can lift and carry up to 10 pounds frequently, and up to
20 pounds occasionally. 	This person should never climb ladders, ropes, and
scaffolds, can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, can occasionally balance,
stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. 	As you have reviewed this hypothetical
individual, can you tell me whether or not this individual -- obviously, they
can’t return to past work because it was heavy, but can you identify any work
for such a person?
(Id. at 64.)
The VE testified the hypothetical individual would be able to perform representative jobs in the
economy, such as housekeeping cleaner, mail sorter, and merchandise marker. (Id.)
The ALJ modified the hypothetical to add the following environmental limitations: never work in
unprotected heights or operate moving mechanical parts; cannot operate a motor vehicle for commercial
purposes; can frequently be exposed to dust, odors, fumes, pulmonary irritants, and vibration; and can work
in a loud noise environment. (Id. at 65.) The VE testified that the previously identified jobs would remain.
(Id.)
III. 	STANDARD FOR DISABILITY
In order to establish entitlement to DIB under the Act, a claimant must be insured at the time of
disability and must prove an inability to engage “in substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment,” or combination of impairments, that can be expected to “result
in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.130, 404.315, 404.1505(a).
A claimant is entitled to a POD only if the claimant: (1) had a disability; (2) was insured when the
claimant became disabled; and (3) filed while the claimant was disabled or within twelve months of the date
the disability ended. 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(2)(E); 20 C.F.R. § 404.320.
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The Commissioner reaches a determination as to whether a claimant is disabled by way of a five-
stage process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). See also Ealy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 512 (6th
Cir. 2010); Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990). First, the claimant must demonstrate that
they are not currently engaged in “substantial gainful activity” at the time of the disability application. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Second, the claimant must show that they suffer from a “severe impairment” in order
to warrant a finding of disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). A “severe impairment” is one that “significantly
limits . . . physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 	Abbot, 905 F.2d at 923. 	Third, if the
claimant is not performing substantial gainful activity, has a severe impairment that is expected to last for
at least twelve months, and the impairment, or combination of impairments, meets or medically equals a
required listing under 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, the claimant is presumed to be disabled
regardless of age, education, or work experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). 	Fourth, if the claimant’s
impairment or combination of impairments does not prevent the claimant from doing their past relevant
work, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f). For the fifth and final step, even if the
claimant’s impairment does prevent the claimant from doing their past relevant work, if other work exists
in the national economy that the claimant can perform, the claimant is not disabled. 	20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(g), 404.1560(c).
Here, Snyder was insured on the alleged disability onset date, November 13, 2022, and remained
insured through December 31, 2024, the date last insured (“DLI”). (Tr. 27, 29.) Therefore, in order to be
entitled to POD and DIB, Snyder must establish a continuous twelve-month period of disability commencing
between these dates. 	Any discontinuity in the twelve-month period precludes an entitlement to benefits.
See Mullis v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 991, 994 (6th Cir. 1988); Henry v. Gardner, 381 F.2d 191, 195 (6th Cir.
1967).
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IV. 	SUMMARY OF COMMISSIONER’S DECISION
The ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
1. 	The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through
December 31, 2024.
2. 	The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 13, 2022,
the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.).
3. 	The claimant has the following severe impairments: diabetes mellitus; essential
hypertension; hyperlipidemia; migraine headaches; and obesity (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).
4. 	The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets
or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).
5. 	After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant
has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR
404.1567(b) 	except 	the 	claimant 	can 	never 	climb 	ladders, 	ropes, 	or 	scaffolds;
occasionally climb ramps and stairs; occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and
crawl. He can never work at unprotected heights, around or operate moving mechanical
parts, or operate a motor vehicle for commercial purposes. He can frequently be exposed
to dust, odors, fumes and pulmonary irritants and vibration. He can work in an
environment with up to loud noise levels.
6. 	The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565).
7. 	The claimant was born on May **, 1979 and was 43 years old, which is defined as a
younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset date (20 CFR 404.1563).
8. 	The claimant has a limited education (20 CFR 404.1564).
9. 	Transferability of job skills is not an issue in this case because the claimant’s past
relevant work is unskilled (20 CFR 404.1568).
10. 	Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional
capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that
the claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569 and 404.1569a).
(Tr. 31-43.)
V. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Social Security Act authorizes narrow judicial review of the final decision of the Social Security
Administration (SSA).” 	Reynolds v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 424 F. App’x 411, 414 (6th Cir. 2011).
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Specifically, this Court’s review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported
by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards. See Ealy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
594 F.3d 504, 512 (6th Cir. 2010); White v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 281 (6th Cir. 2009).
Substantial evidence has been defined as “‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance;
it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Rogers
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health and Human
Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). 	In determining whether an ALJ’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence, the Court does not review the evidence de novo, make credibility determinations, or
weigh the evidence. Brainard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989).
Review of the Commissioner’s decision must be based on the record as a whole. Heston v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 535 (6th Cir. 2001). The findings of the Commissioner are not subject to reversal,
however, merely because there exists in the record substantial evidence to support a different conclusion.
Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772-73 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir.
1986)); see also Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 389-90 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Even if the evidence
could also support another conclusion, the decision of the Administrative Law Judge must stand if the
evidence could reasonably support the conclusion reached.”). This is so because there is a “zone of choice”
within which the Commissioner can act, without the fear of court interference. 	Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545
(citing Baker v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984)).
In addition to considering whether the Commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial
evidence, the Court must determine whether proper legal standards were applied. Failure of the
Commissioner to apply the correct legal standards as promulgated by the regulations is grounds for reversal.
See, e.g., White v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 281 (6th Cir. 2009); Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Even if supported by substantial evidence, however, a decision of the
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Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and where that error
prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right.”).
Finally, a district court cannot uphold an ALJ’s decision, even if there “is enough evidence in the
record to support the decision, [where] the reasons given by the trier of fact do not build an accurate and
logical bridge between the evidence and the result.” Fleischer v. Astrue, 774 F. Supp. 2d 875, 877 (N.D.
Ohio 2011) (quoting Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir. 1996)); accord Shrader v. Astrue, No.
11-1300, 2012 WL 5383120, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 1, 2012) (“If relevant evidence is not mentioned, the
Court cannot determine if it was discounted or merely overlooked.”); McHugh v. Astrue, No. 1:10-cv-734,
2011 WL 6130824 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 15, 2011); Gilliam v. Astrue, No. 2:10-CV-017, 2010 WL 2837260
(E.D. Tenn. July 19, 2010); Hook v. Astrue, No. 1:09-cv-1982, 2010 WL 2929562 (N.D. Ohio July 9, 2010).
VI. ANALYSIS
A. First Assignment of Error: RFC
In Snyder’s first assignment of error, he argues that the ALJ failed to include any mental health
limitations in the RFC, even though the ALJ found his mental impairments to be non-severe. (Doc. No. 6
at 5.) Snyder asserts that finding an impairment non-severe “is not the same as a finding of no medically
determinable impairment,” and maintains that the “ALJ failed to properly consider the additional impact of
even non-severe mental health on Plaintiff’s functioning and on the RFC.” (Id. at 5-6.) Snyder maintains
that his mental health struggles, even if mild, “still caused functional limitations on his ability to tolerate
being around others and managing stress and his emotions.” (Id. at 8.) Snyder argues that this is harmful
error, as additional limitations would impact the Step Five finding. (Id.)
The Commissioner responds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Snyder’s
mental health impairments were not severe and the ALJ’s determination not to include any mental health
limitations in the RFC. (Doc. No. 7 at 3.) The Commissioner argues that finding mild limitations in the
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Paragraph B criteria “‘do[es] not automatically mandate specific limitations in the RFC.’” (Id. at 5) (quoting
Phillips v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 3:22-CV-01144, 2023 WL 4078204, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 4,
2023), report and recommendation adopted by 2023 WL 5602726 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 30, 2023)) (additional
citation omitted). The Commissioner maintains that the ALJ considered all of Snyder’s impairments, both
severe and non-severe, in the RFC analysis, and therefore there is no error. (Id. at 5.)
“Before an ALJ can find that an individual is disabled, the ALJ must find that the individual has a
‘severe’ impairment.” Kirkland v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 528 F. App’x 425, 427 (6th Cir. 2013); see also 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). “If the individual has at least one severe impairment, the ALJ will then assess
how much work the individual can still do.” Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). When making
that assessment, “the ALJ must consider limitations and restrictions imposed by all of [the] individual’s
impairments, even those that are not severe.” Kirkland, 528 F. App’x at 427 (citing Fisk v. Astrue, 253 F.
App’x 580, 583 (6th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523; Pompa
v Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 73 F. App’x 801, 803 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Under the regulations, once the ALJ
determines that a claimant has at least one severe impairment, the ALJ must consider all impairments, severe
and non-severe, in the remaining steps.”); Draine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:22-cv-1370, 2024 WL
1014030, at *16 (N.D. Ohio March 8, 2024) (citing Pompa). If the ALJ considers all the individual’s
impairments, the “failure to find additional severe impairments ... does not constitute reversible error.”
Kirkland, 528 F. App’x at 427 (citing Fisk, 253 F. App’x at 583) (brackets and internal quotation marks
omitted). See also Garris v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:11-cv-2538, 2013 WL 3990754, at *7 (N.D. Ohio
Aug. 2, 2013) (“Any failure to identify other impairments, or combinations of impairments, as severe in
step two is harmless error and ‘legally irrelevant.’”).
The RFC determination sets out an individual’s work-related abilities despite his or her limitations.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). A claimant’s RFC is not a medical opinion, but an administrative
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determination reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). An ALJ “will not give any
special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner.” See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(d)(3). As such, the ALJ bears the responsibility for assessing a claimant’s RFC based on all the
relevant evidence (20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c)) and must consider all of a claimant’s medically determinable
impairments, both individually and in combination. See SSR 96–8p, 1996 WL 374184 (SSA July 2, 1996).
“In rendering his RFC decision, the ALJ must give some indication of the evidence upon which he is relying,
and he may not ignore evidence that does not support his decision, especially when that evidence, if
accepted, would change his analysis.” Fleischer, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 880 (citing Bryan v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 383 F. App’x 140, 148 (3d Cir. 2010) (“The ALJ has an obligation to ‘consider all evidence before
him’ when he ‘mak[es] a residual functional capacity determination,’ and must also ‘mention or refute [...]
contradictory, objective medical evidence’ presented to him.”)). See also SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at
*7 (SSA July 2, 1996) (“The RFC assessment must always consider and address medical source opinions.
If the RFC assessment conflicts with an opinion from a medical source, the adjudicator must explain why
the opinion was not adopted.”)). While the RFC is for the ALJ to determine, the claimant bears the burden
of establishing the impairments that determine her RFC. See Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 391
(6th Cir. 1999).
It is well-established there is no requirement that the ALJ discuss each piece of evidence or limitation
considered. See, e.g., Conner v. Comm’r, 658 F. App’x 248, 254 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Thacker v. Comm’r,
99 F. App’x 661, 665 (6th Cir. May 21, 2004) (finding an ALJ need not discuss every piece of evidence in
the record); Arthur v. Colvin, No. 3:16CV765, 2017 WL 784563, at *14 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2017) (accord).
However, courts have not hesitated to remand where an ALJ selectively includes only those portions of the
medical evidence that places a claimant in a capable light and fails to acknowledge evidence that potentially
supports a finding of disability. See e.g., Gentry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 741 F.3d 708, 724 (6th Cir. 2014)
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(reversing where the ALJ “cherry-picked select portions of the record” rather than doing a proper analysis);
Germany–Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 313 F. App’x 771, 777 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding error where the
ALJ was “selective in parsing the various medical reports”). See also Ackles v. Colvin, No. 3:14cv00249,
2015 WL 1757474, at *6 (S.D. Ohio April 17, 2015) (“The ALJ did not mention this objective evidence and
erred by selectively including only the portions of the medical evidence that placed Plaintiff in a capable
light.”); Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:11-CV-2313, 2013 WL 943874, at *6 (N.D. Ohio March 11,
2013) (“It is generally recognized that an ALJ ‘may not cherry-pick facts to support a finding of non-
disability while ignoring evidence that points to a disability finding.’”); Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 2:16-cv-172, 2016 WL 7208783, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 13, 2016) (“This Court has not hesitated to
remand cases where the ALJ engaged in a very selective review of the record and significantly
mischaracterized the treatment notes.”).
At Step Two, the ALJ found several of Snyder’s impairments to be severe, including diabetes
mellitus and migraines, but found his mental impairments to be non-severe:
When the claimant filed his applications for a period of disability, disability
insurance benefits, and supplemental security income benefits, in addition to
the severe impairments cited above, the claimant testified that several mental
impairments and symptoms of mental impairments limit his ability to work. He
said 	that 	his 	ability 	to 	work 	is 	compromised 	by 	depression, 	anxiety,
agoraphobia and symptoms of sleeping all day, finding it hard to concentrate,
being unable to get out of his vehicle when in public places and experiencing
“stomch (sic), headache, sweaty, and hot” when in public places (Exhibit B1E).
The claimant testified that one of the primary reasons he is unable to work is
because he is unable to go out in public due to anxiety. He stated he believes
symptoms of his mental impairments cause spikes in his blood sugar,
contributing to poor control of diabetes. He said that he experiences anxiety
almost every day. The claimant said that being around other people causes him
to develop a “fight or flight” reaction that makes him angry and he avoids these
situations because he does not want to act out against others. He attributed an
increase in his symptoms to a new awareness of childhood trauma. He said that
he had had a hard time establishing a reliable relationship with a therapist and
had been without mental health treatment services for two years. During his
hearing testimony, he explained that when he had attempted to set up
appointments at the Nord Center, a staff person who was supposed to be treating
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him told him that she was trying to take care of numerous individuals and could
not always see him when he wanted. The claimant said that the last time that he
had presented his case for disability, the Nord Center had failed to respond to a
request for information. He reported that he had tried to set up appointments
there and they did not call him back. However, he also said that they told him
they would not schedule appointments for him because he had missed
appointments. He said that he then tried to establish with a different mental
health counseling agency, Charak, and was seen there for sessions. He further
explained that it took him some time to reestablish with that agency because of
homelessness and the fact that he didn’t have a telephone. (Hearing testimony).
Because the available treatment records did not contain sufficient evidence to
evaluate the claimant’s allegations regarding his mental impairment, the state
agency arranged for him to have a psychological consultative examination by
Deborah Koricke, PhD on February 16, 2024 (Exhibit B2F). In addition to the
report from this examination, the claimant’s statements both in his hearing
testimony and in evidence found throughout the record about his daily activities
and how his mental impairments affect his functioning were considered when
making the findings below.
There is one documented behavioral health consultation which occurred a few
months prior to the claimant’s alleged onset date for the current claims. The
claimant’s primary care provider referred the claimant for this evaluation. The
clinician, Amber Hill, PhD noted that the claimant had 22 behavioral healthcare
appointments documented in the past but this was the first evaluation for a new
episode of care, because it had been more than a year since his last appointment.
The claimant reported that he had been going to the Door Center but they left
him “hanging,” and he had run out of medications. Mental status observations
were 	normal 	including 	full 	orientation, 	intact 	attention 	and 	memory, 	a
cooperative attitude, and intact thought processes. The clinician did observe that
the claimant appeared to have depressed affect and endorsed concerns regarding
poor concentration and attention (Exhibit B1F/105-106).
In making this finding, the undersigned has considered the broad areas of
mental functioning set out in the disability regulations for evaluating mental
disorders and in the Listing of Impairments (20 CFR, Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1). These four broad functional areas are known as the “paragraph
B” criteria and are part of the process known as the psychiatric review
technique. The undersigned agrees with the findings of the state agency
psychological consultants who reviewed the evidence at the initial and
reconsideration levels of the claim. They each explained that they were not
adopting the psychiatric review technique findings from the decision of the
Administrative Law Judge for the prior claim filed by the claimant because
there was additional evidence regarding the claimant’s treatment for mental
impairments, including a psychological consultative examination report. The
Administrative Law Judge found for the prior claim that the claimant’s mental
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impairments are severe, cause limitation, and he included a mental residual
functional capacity finding (Exhibit B1A/10).
The undersigned finds persuasive the explanation of the state agency medical
consultants about their findings at the claimant has no more than mild limitation
in any area of functioning. However, their rationale that they were not adopting
the findings from the prior decision under the Drummond ruling is no longer
appropriate, as that ruling has been rescinded. Under the requirements of AR
24-1(6), the findings of severe mental impairments and limitations associated
with them in the decision for the prior claim have been considered; however,
the current evidence no longer supports a finding of severe mental impairments.
Based on the fresh review of the undersigned, the findings from the initial and
reconsideration level of claim about the claimant’s functioning in each of these
areas of mental functioning are adopted and explained below.
“Paragraph B” assessment
The 	first 	functional 	area 	is 	understanding, 	remembering 	or 	applying
information. In this area, the claimant has no limitation. At the psychological
consultative examination the claimant attended in February 2024, he was able
to 	recall 	details 	about 	his 	upbringing, 	education, 	past 	work, 	and
medical/behavioral health history. He reported that he had attended school until
partway through his senior year when he dropped out. He said that he left school
to go to work and had never obtained a GED. He reported being able to maintain
his schedule of taking medications by injection and orally to treat diabetes,
hyperlipidemia, and depression. He also reported that he was able to cook
meals, clean the house, and do laundry. Dr. Koricke offered the opinion that the
claimant would be able to manage benefits if they were awarded. She reported
that the claimant “answered very well” questions that had to do with abstract
thinking. His general fund of knowledge was fair. Dr. Koricke opined that the
claimant “appears able to understand, remember, and carry out instructions
from a mental health viewpoint.” (Exhibit B2F). Primary care and emergency
room treatment records show that the claimant is able to answer questions and
describe his symptoms. He indicates understanding of medical instruction.
There are no concerns expressed by any of the clinicians who have treated the
claimant that he lacks comprehension. He is able to check his own blood sugar
intake injectable medication. There is no evidence of limitation in this area.
The next functional area is interacting with others. In this area, the claimant has
mild limitation. The claimant reported at the psychological consultative
examination that he was anxious because he was out in public; however, Dr.
Koricke did not observe any objective signs of agoraphobia, panic attacks or
anxiety. He reported that he lives with his girlfriend and her 13-year-old
daughter. Dr. Koricke noted that the claimant was pleasant and cooperative
during his appointment with her and she opined that he is “able to respond
appropriately to authorities and to others and gets along adequately in the
community.” (Exhibit B2F). The claimant himself testified that he has a fear of
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going out in public. However, the claimant attends medical appointments and
has gone to the emergency department on his own. He is cooperative during
treatment appointments and there is no mention that he expresses fearfulness or
has complained about symptoms of agoraphobia, aside from the mental health
evaluation discussed above in August 2022 (Exhibit B1F/106). There is no
mention in treatment records of irritability with family members or others in the
community. The record support no more than a finding of mild limitation of
this area.
The third functional area is concentrating, persisting or maintaining pace. In
this area, the claimant has no limitation. The claimant testified that he sleeps
for at least half of the day. He told Dr. Koricke at the psychological consultative
examination that when he has to work physically, he becomes very tired.
However, he reported that he also spends time watching television and listening
to the radio. During the examination, the claimant was able to perform
adequately on tasks designed to assess his ability to concentrate, including a
serial-7 subtraction task. He remained focused during the clinical interview and
did not display any signs of distraction. In this area, Dr. Koricke opined that the
claimant is “seen as having the ability to return to a job, ideally a desk type job
where he does not have to exert himself physically to work as he reports that it
is very difficult for him to do.” She added that “in terms of the specific work
abilities appears to be about average.” (Exhibit B2F). The claimant reported a
concern regarding his ability to pay attention and concentrate at the mental
health evaluation he had in August 2022, prior to his alleged onset date;
however, the clinician judged him to have intact attention and concentration.
There is no mention other treatment records of the claimant being distracted or
having a difficult time attending to conversations. There is no support in the
record for a finding of limitation in this area.
The fourth functional area is adapting or managing oneself. In this area, the
claimant has mild limitation. When the claimant saw Dr. Koricke, he reported
significant subjective feelings of depression, anxiety and agoraphobia and said
that he did not believe his psychotropic medication was effective in reducing
symptoms. He reported panic attacks. He denied hearing voices or seeing visual
hallucinations. He said that he has a difficult time initiating sleep at night and
awakens numerous times during sleep. Dr. Koricke noted that the claimant was
dressed appropriately and appeared to have adequate hygiene. In this final area,
Dr. 	Koricke 	expressed 	the 	opinion 	that 	the 	claimant 	“is 	able 	to 	react
appropriately in the work setting.” (Exhibit B2F). In his hearing testimony, the
claimant endorsed similar symptoms, and focused mostly on having a difficult
time tolerating being in public places. He had similar complaints when he saw
a psychologist for a behavioral health evaluation August 2022 (Exhibit
B1F/106). In contrast, virtually all of the mental status observations of the
claimant at primary care appointments contain normal findings (Exhibit
B1F/12, 84; B3F/9, 14). These records also show that the claimant remains
cognizant of his parenting responsibilities and is able to resolve problems
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independently. Taking the claimant’s subjective complaints into account, the
claimant has mild limitation in his ability to adapt and manage himself.
The state agency psychological consultants relied to a large extent on Dr.
Koricke’s report and the opinions expressed there in to find that the claimant
no longer has the severe mental impairments which were found in the decision
for the prior claim. Their conclusion is reasonable and persuasive because this
report is not contradicted by any of the available medical evidence. The
undersigned adopts these findings, as no additional evidence was submitted
after the reconsideration determination which suggests significant limitations
associated with a mental impairment.
The primary basis for this finding is that while the claimant’s primary care
provider advised him several times to follow up with psychiatry and establish a
counseling relationship, his own and other treatment providers mental status
observations are consistently unremarkable (Exhibits B1F/12, 43, 61, 84;
B3F/9, 14, 30). In addition to the normal mental status findings at the claimant’s
medical appointments and in Dr. Koricke’s report, there is no mention in the
record of the visual and auditory hallucinations which the claimant testified he
experiences. The claimant also testified that he does not go out in public very
often; however, the record reflects numerous face-to-face appointments with
his primary care provider and at least two with a Physician’s Assistant
specializing in endocrinology.
Because the claimant’s medically determinable mental impairments cause no
more than “mild” limitation in any of the functional areas and the evidence does
not otherwise indicate that there is more than a minimal limitation in the
claimant’s ability to do basic work activities, they are nonsevere (20 CFR
404.1520a(d)(1)).
(Tr. 31-34) (emphasis in original).
In the RFC analysis, the ALJ further found as follows:
First, as explained above, the claimant focused to a great degree in his hearing
testimony on his mental health impairments being a barrier to work; however,
virtually all of the primary care and hospital encounters document normal
mental status findings (Exhibits B1F/12, 43, 50, 61, 84, 92; B3F/9, 14, 30). . . .
* * *
In this case, after reviewing the findings in the prior decision and the evidence
cited therein, the undersigned finds that there is no change in the claimant’s
residual functional capacity, except that the evidence no longer supports the
claimant’s allegations regarding limitations associated with mental impairment.
. . .
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(Id. at 41.)
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC findings. The ALJ considered Snyder’s mental health
impairments in the RFC analysis, and therefore any Step Two error is harmless. Furthermore, as this Court
has recognized, a “[c]laimant’s mild limitations do not automatically mandate specific limitations in the
RFC. See, e.g., Little v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:14-cv-532, 2015 WL 5000253, at *13–14 (S.D. Ohio
Aug. 24, 2015) (finding no error where ALJ did not include RFC limitations to address findings of mild
mental limitations); Caudill v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:16-CV-818, 2017 WL 3587217, at *5 (S.D. Ohio
Aug. 21, 2017) (finding that mild mental impairment does not require inclusion of mental limitations in
RFC); Walker v. Astrue, No. 3:11-cv-142, 2012 WL 3187862, at *4–5 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 3, 2012) (finding
that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that the claimant’s mental impairments were
mild enough not to warrant specific RFC limitations).” Phillips, 2023 WL 4078204, at *6.
Though Snyder cites evidence that could support his allegations, “[t]he findings of the Commissioner
are not subject to reversal merely because there exists in the record substantial evidence to support a different
conclusion.” Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). “This is so because
there is a ‘zone of choice’ within which the Commissioner can act, without the fear of court interference.”
Id. at 773 (citations omitted). Judicial review is limited to “whether there is substantial evidence in the
record to support the administrative law judge’s findings of fact and whether the correct legal standards
were applied.” Elam ex rel. Golay v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 348 F.3d 124, 125 (6th Cir. 2003); Castello v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 5:09 CV 2569, 2011 WL 610590 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 10, 2011).
For all the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the Court reject Snyder’s RFC argument.
B. Second Assignment of Error: Full and Fair Hearing
In Snyder’s second assignment of error, he argues that the ALJ failed to ensure he received a full
and fair hearing under SSR 13-1p and HA 01330.002 by “limiting [his] ability to testify and denying a
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requested supplemental hearing.” 	(Doc. No. 6 at 8.) 	Snyder asserts that the ALJ’s limitation of his
testimony to 15 minutes “did not allow him the opportunity to fully present testimony and provide relevant
information.” (Id.) Snyder maintains:
Additionally during testimony, Plaintiff noted receiving treatment for his
mental health and migraines, evidence missing from the record evidence. (Tr.
59, 61). The ALJ interrupted Plaintiff’s testimony to move on to take vocational
expert testimony. (Tr. 51, 64). The ALJ did not inquire nor allow Plaintiff
representative to inquire as to where Plaintiff was seeking mental health and if
it was new and previously unknown treatment, request the records.
(Id. at 9.) Snyder argues that the ALJ’s “failure to inquire, or allow inquiry, into new and material missing
treatment records is harmful error and one which warrants remand.” (Id.)
The Commissioner responds that this Court recently “directly addressed and rejected this precise
argument.” (Doc. No. 7 at 6) (citing Scott v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 1:23-cv-01765-BMB, 2024
WL 3678788 (N.D. Ohio July 15, 2024), report and recommendation adopted by 2024 WL 3675802 (N.D.
Ohio Aug. 6, 2024)). The Commissioner argues that, like Scott, the ALJ “stated at the outset of the hearing
that she was ‘allotting 45 minutes’” for Snyder’s hearing, 15 minutes of which was to cover Snyder’s health
issues. (Doc. No. 7 at 7.) The Commissioner maintains that Snyder “testified extensively at his hearing,”
and therefore the ALJ did not err in “reasonably limiting” Snyder’s time to testify. (Id.) The Commissioner
asserts that Snyder’s argument that the ALJ erred in failing to order a supplemental hearing should also be
rejected, as Snyder fails to discuss the applicable HALLEX provisions or argue that he meets the requisite
criteria; therefore, he fails to show a supplemental hearing was appropriate. (Id. at 7-8.)
In the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ explained that, after the hearing, Snyder’s counsel had objected to
the limitation on his testimony and requested a supplemental hearing. (Tr. 28.) The ALJ denied Snyder’s
request for a supplemental hearing as follows:
In addition, after the hearing, Ms. Sanders submitted a letter of protest, stating
that she and her client had not been granted a sufficient amount of time to fully
present his case. She stated that there were additional material facts that should
be addressed and requested a supplemental hearing. This request is denied. At
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the outset of the hearing, the undersigned explained to both the claimant and his
representative that the hearing would consist of three segments, each lasting
approximately 15 minutes. One of those segments would involve claimant
testimony regarding his allegations. The transcript of the hearing shows that the
claimant gave testimony regarding how his impairments affect him from 9:16
AM until 9:31 AM. Moreover, the claimant’s representative had ample time
between when the hearing was scheduled and the hearing itself to prepare a
written brief highlighting case facts and making arguments on the claimant’s
behalf. Therefore, the request for supplemental hearing is denied.
(Id.)
In Scott, this Court discussed a similar due process argument and explained as follows:
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment establishes that no deprivation
of life, liberty, or property will occur without notice and an opportunity for a
fair hearing. Flatford v. Chater, 93 F.3d 1296, 1303 (6th Cir. 1996). Because
social security claimants have a property benefit for which they hope to qualify,
this element is readily satisfied. Id. at 1304; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (“The interest of an individual in continued receipt of
[social security benefits] is a statutorily created ‘property’ interest protected by
the Fifth Amendment.”). To prevail on a due process claim, the claimant must
establish that the United States attempts to deprive her of a protected
interest. Flatford, 93 F.3d at 1303-04. Due process also requires a Social
Security hearing to be “full and fair,” id. at 1305 (citing Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 400-01 (1971)), meaning that claimants should be given a
“meaningful opportunity to present their case.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349.
To the extent that Ms. Scott relies on HALLEX to establish a due process
violation, this argument is unavailing. Although HALLEX describes policies
ALJs should follow when conducting hearings and reviewing a claimant’s case,
HALLEX’s procedural guidance is not binding on this court. Bowie v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 539 F.3d 395, 399 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Robberts v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., No. 2:18-cv-541, 2019 WL 4023549, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 26,
2019) (“Importantly, HALLEX is an internal guidance tool that does not have
the force of law...Indeed, HALLEX does not impose judicially enforceable
duties on either the ALJ or this Court.”); Alilovic v. Astrue, No. 1:12-cv-323,
2012 WL 5611077, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 15, 2012) (HALLEX “is not
published in either the Federal Register or the Code of [Federal Regulations]
and does not have the force of law.”) And procedural due process rights do not
arise from HALLEX violations alone. See Eboch v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
5:12-cv-649, 2012 WL 7809080, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 13, 2012), report and
recommendation 	adopted, 2013 	WL 	1284353 	(N.D. 	Ohio 	Mar. 	27,
2014) (“[A]gency procedures set forth in HALLEX may embody, but do
not create federal due process rights for claimants.”) (emphasis in original); see
also Lawrence v. Colvin, No. 3:13-032-DCR, 2014 WL 640990, at *4 (E.D. Ky.
Feb. 18, 2014), aff’d sub nom. Lawrence v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 591 F. App’x
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470 	(6th 	Cir. 	2015) (collecting 	cases). 	Indeed, 	“[n]o 	circuit 	has 	held
that...HALLEX 	creates constitutional 	rights because, 	of 	course, 	only 	the
Constitution, not an agency’s rules or procedures, is the source of such
rights.” Dukes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:10-cv-436, 2011 WL 4374557, at
*9 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 19, 2011) (quoting Davenport v. Astrue, 417 F. App’x
544, 547-48 (7th Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original)).
But Ms. Scott appears to intertwine her argument that her procedural due
process rights were violated with her argument that she was denied a “full and
fair” hearing because the ALJ refused to allow her counsel to continue his
examination regarding her migraine headaches and/or schedule a supplemental
hearing so that she could provide testimony on this issue. (See ECF No. 6,
PageID#1379.) Specifically, she argues that the ALJ’s actions “deprived [her]
of presenting a complete picture of how her impairments affected her ability to
engage in substantial gainful activity on a full-time and sustained basis.” (Id. at
PageID#1380.)
The Sixth Circuit has held that the ALJ bears the burden to fully develop the
record, and the failure to do so may deny the claimant a full and fair
hearing. Lashley v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 708 F.2d 1048, 1052 (6th
Cir. 1982). There is, however, no bright-line test to determine if an ALJ has met
the duty to develop the record fully it must be determined on a case-by-case
basis. Id. at 1052; see also Young v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:20-CV-01152-
DAC, 2021 WL 3190826, at *8 (N.D. Ohio July 28, 2021).
Ms. Scott cites no authority for the proposition that an ALJ violates due
process principles merely because the ALJ placed limits on her testimony.
(See ECF No. 6, PageID#1379 (asserting that the ALJ had “arbitrarily allotted
15 minutes for testimony”)). Due process is not a “technical conception with a
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.” Mathews, 424 U.S.
at 334 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
Rather, “[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as
the particular situation demands.” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 481, (1972)). A plaintiff does not have an absolute right to present
unlimited 	evidence; 	she 	is 	subject 	to 	the 	due 	process 	concept 	of
reasonableness. Liu v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 13 F.3d 1175, 1177 (8th
Cir.1994)see also N.L.R.B. v. Midwestern Pers. Servs., Inc., 508, F.3d 418, 427
(7th Cir.2007) (finding that ALJ did not unreasonably restrict cumulative
testimony). In the social security context, it is appropriate for an ALJ to
reasonably limit a plaintiff’s testimony or evidence. See Pate v. Astrue, No.
H-08-249, 2009 WL 4825206, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2009) (finding that any
limits imposed by the ALJ were reasonable and did not infringe on plaintiff's
due process rights because the record showed that counsel could question
plaintiff and VE).
Courts have held that an ALJ may place reasonable limitations on
testimony if the claimant was afforded at least some opportunity to provide
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testimony on the disputed issues. For example, in Chase D. v. Kijakazi, the
ALJ stated at the outset that the hearing would be limited to “30-40 minutes,”
and the plaintiff challenged this limitation on appeal to the U.S. District Court
for the District of Minnesota. No. 20-cv-1292 (ADM) (TNL), 2022 WL
479357, at *6-7 (D. Minn. Jan. 31, 2022), report and recommendation
adopted, 2022 WL 484986 (D. Minn. Feb. 16, 2022). The Chase D. court held
that the requirements of due process had been satisfied by a single, 38-minute
hearing; the opportunity to request a second, supplemental hearing; and the
opportunity to “submit a closing statement to the ALJ in writing.” Id. at *8.
In Carolyn K. v. Kijakazi, an ALJ likewise imposed time limitations at the
outset of a hearing, and the plaintiff also challenged the limitation on appeal,
arguing that she had been “forced to shorten her own testimony.” No. 20-cv-
1394 (NEB) (LIB), 2022 WL 543076, at *8 (D. Minn. Jan. 31, 2022), report
and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 542418 (D. Minn. Feb. 23, 2022).
The Carolyn K. court held that the plaintiff provided substantial testimony to
develop a full and fair record within the 41-minute hearing because the plaintiff
“testif[ied] about her subjective complaints, how her symptoms prevented her
from 	working, 	her 	past 	employment 	and 	the 	activities 	she 	performed
therein.” Id. at *7. And in Pate v. Astrue, No. H-08-249, 2009 WL 4825206, at
*9 (S.D Tex. Dec. 8, 2009), the district court found that the ALJ did not violate
claimant’s procedural due process rights when limiting testimony because the
claimant’s counsel did not object to the time limitation; the record showed that
claimant’s counsel questioned her “at some length about her impairments,
limitations, and difficulties in school”; and the claimant had not “alleged or
shown that counsel was unable to present certain testimony or evidence or that
the ALJ’s consideration of [the claimant's] impairments was hindered by
counsel's inability to question the claimant at more length.”
Here, the ALJ explained that the hearing would be 45 minutes in length, with
15 minutes allotted to the claimant’s testimony. (Tr. 55.) While Ms. Scott’s
counsel elicited testimony from Ms. Scott, the testimony primarily related to
Ms. Scott’s mental impairments – not her migraines. (See generally Tr. 62-66.)
And the ALJ denied Ms. Scott’s counsel’s requests to conduct further
questioning about her migraine headaches or to schedule a supplemental
hearing on this issue.(Tr. 67-68.)
Unlike Chase D., Carolyn K., and Pate, the limitations imposed by the ALJ
here were not reasonable because the ALJ did not allow Ms. Scott a fair
opportunity to testify regarding her subjective complaints related to her
migraine headaches and how these symptoms prevented her from working. In
addition, unlike the counsel in Pate, Ms. Scott’s counsel objected to the ALJ's
time 	limitation 	and 	requested 	a 	supplemental 	hearing, 	which 	the 	ALJ
denied. See (Tr. 67 (counsel disagreeing with ALJ’s denial of supplemental
hearing request, stating that he was “going to have to appeal if [there was an]
unfavorable decision,” and asserting that claimant’s testimony dealt with her
mental health impairments, not her migraines)). Moreover, Ms. Scott can show
prejudice resulting from the ALJ’s actions because, as discussed above, the
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ALJ’s determination that Ms. Scott’s migraines did not satisfy Listing 11.02 is
not supported by substantial evidence. Cf. Karst Robbins Coal Co. v. Dir., Off.
of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 969 F.3d 316, 329 (6th Cir. 2020) (“[A] party
must show that it was prejudiced in order to succeed on a due process claim.”).
Thus, I recommend remand so that the ALJ may afford Ms. Scott a full and fair
hearing with a reasonable opportunity to testify about her migraine headaches.
2024 WL 3678788, at **17-19 (emphasis added).
A review of the hearing transcript reveals the ALJ afforded Snyder a full and fair hearing. Snyder
spent most of the time allotted to his medical issues testifying to his mental health impairments, symptoms,
and treatment. (Tr. 55-63.) Unlike Scott, Snyder’s counsel did not object to the time limitation at the hearing
nor argue at the hearing that Snyder had not had an opportunity to fully testify regarding his mental health
and migraine symptoms and how they prevented him from working. (Id. at 48-69.) Contrary to Snyder’s
argument, the ALJ did not interrupt counsel’s questioning of Snyder during his testimony regarding his
mental health treatment and any gaps; rather, the ALJ moved on to the VE’s testimony after Snyder’s
testimony regarding his diabetes medication and side effects. (Id. at 63-64.) Indeed, the hearing transcript
shows Snyder testified that he had recently started seeing a counselor at “Sharrock” and the reasons for his
two-year gap in seeing a counselor. (Id. at 57-59.) Unlike Scott, the ALJ’s time limitations did not prevent
Snyder from testifying to his migraine headaches either; he testified to the frequency of his migraine
headaches, his symptoms, and his treatment. (Id. at 61-62.) Rather, Snyder’s testimony was sufficient for
the ALJ to determine the extent of Snyder’s mental and physical limitations and Snyder fails to show that
he was prejudiced by the time limit on his testimony or the denial of a supplemental hearing. See Carolyn
K., 2022 WL 543076, at *7 (“Plaintiff's testimony was sufficient to determine the extent of Plaintiff’s
physical limitations, as required, for a proper RFC determination.”); Chase D., 2022 WL 479357, at *8 (“In
sum, Plaintiff has not shown that the length of his hearing, nor the denial of his request for a supplemental
hearing, demonstrate he was prejudiced or treated unfairly by the ALJs [sic] development of the record.”)
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For all the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the Court reject Snyder’s due process
argument.
VII. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Commissioner’s final
decision be AFFIRMED.
Date: October 15, 2026 	s/ Jonathan Greenberg
Jonathan D. Greenberg
United States Magistrate Judge
OBJECTIONS
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Courts
within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this document. Failure to file objections
within the specified time may forfeit the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 	Berkshire v.
Beauvais, 928 F.3d 520, 530-31 (6th Cir. 2019).
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