USA v. O'Neill

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	CASE NO. 3:18 CR 178
Plaintiff,
v. 	JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II
CHARLES BRIAN O’NEILL,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
Defendant. 	ORDER
I NTRODUCTION
Currently pending before the Court is Defendant Charles B. O’Neill’s Motion to Vacate
his guilty plea, conviction, and sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. 176). The
Government opposed (Doc. 179), and O’Neill replied (Doc. 181). O’Neill subsequently filed a
Motion for Final Disposition. (Doc. 182). For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part
Defendant’s Motion to Vacate.
BACKGROUND
On April 11, 2018, a grand jury indicted Defendant for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)
(Sexual Exploitation of a Minor (production)) (Count 1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (Receipt and
Distribution of Child Pornography) (Count 2). (Doc. 8, at 1–2). The district court later severed the
two Counts. (September 18, 2020, Docket Entry). Defendant filed multiple motions to suppress,
only two of which are relevant to his present Motion to Vacate. The first sought to suppress
evidence found in Defendant’s residence and on his person, which primarily included child
pornography and child erotica located on his cell phone. Law enforcement obtained this evidence
through the execution of a search warrant (the “residence warrant”) supported by the affidavit of
Case: 3:18-cr-00178-JRK Doc #: 184 Filed: 01/29/26 1 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

2
Fostoria Police Officer Cory Brian. See Doc. 44. The second motion to suppress targeted evidence,
including recording equipment, a desktop computer, numerous pieces of sexual paraphernalia,
children’s clothing, costumes, and prescription sedatives, collected from a barn owned by
Defendant. (Doc. 68-1, at 4). Law enforcement obtained this evidence after executing a search
warrant (the “barn warrant”) supported by the affidavit of Sergeant Ginnie Barta of the Wood
County Sheriff’s Office. See Doc. 63.
Each motion to suppress similarly argued each affidavit supporting its respective warrant
was (1) insufficient to establish probable cause for a search and (2) based on allegedly false
statements offered by Officer Brian and Sergeant Barta. (Doc. 44, at 2–7; Doc. 63, at 6–11). On
Defendant’s account, these legal deficiencies rendered the evidence resulting therefrom subject to
suppression. The district court1 denied both motions for identical reasons. See Docs. 78, 79. First,
the court found Officer Brian did not knowingly or recklessly include false statements of material
fact in his affidavit. (Doc. 78, at 3–5 (applying the factors from Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154,
155–156 (1978))). Second, the court found the residence warrant, as supported by Officer Brian’s
affidavit, and the subsequent search of Defendant’s home and person fell within the good faith
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s remedial exclusionary rule despite wanting for probable
cause. Id. at 7–11. The court repeated these findings with respect to Sergeant Barta’s affidavit, the
barn warrant, and the subsequent search of Defendant’s barn, and “incorporate[d] . . . by cross-
reference all applicable and pertinent portions of the residential search warrant order” into its ruling
on the barn search. (Doc. 79, at 2).
1. This case was originally assigned to Senior United States District Judge James G. Carr, who
penned the two rulings on the relevant motions to suppress. On April 7, 2021, the case was
reassigned to the undersigned.
Case: 3:18-cr-00178-JRK Doc #: 184 Filed: 01/29/26 2 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

3
After denial of his motions to suppress, Defendant entered into a conditional plea
agreement with respect to Count 1 (the production Count) of the indictment. (Doc. 138). The
agreement was conditional on preservation of Defendant’s “right to appeal the denial of his motion
to suppress ([D]oc. 63), which ruling ([D]oc. 79) incorporates by reference certain findings and
orders set forth in other rulings made in this case which Defendant intends to appeal to the extent
said rulings were relied upon in the ruling denying the aforementioned motion.” Id. at 5–6. Again,
the only final ruling of the district court explicitly mentioned in this first plea agreement, as
distinguished from any reasoning employed to reach such ruling, is the ruling as to the barn
warrant. See Doc. 79. This first plea agreement did not expressly preserve Defendant’s ability to
appeal the final ruling of the district court with respect to the legality of the residence warrant and
search.
Over eight months after reaching the first plea agreement, the Parties entered into a second
plea agreement with respect to the sole remaining count in the indictment—Count 2 (the receipt
Count). (Doc. 150). This second agreement contained conditional guilty plea language identical to
that of the prior agreement, with the exception of a hand-written substitution of “Count One” for
“Count Two.” Compare Doc. 138, at 4-5, with Doc. 150, at 4. On September 9, 2022, the Court
sentenced Defendant on both severed Counts according to the agreed upon guideline range in each
plea agreement. See Docs. 155, 164. The Court imposed a sentence of 192 months on Count 1 and
192 months on Count 2, to be served concurrently. (Doc. 155, at 2).
Defendant appealed, challenging the denial of both motions to suppress. See Doc. 159;
United States v. O’Neill, 94 F.4th 531, 536–37 (2024). On appeal, the Sixth Circuit determined
Defendant’s plea agreements “did not reserve the right to appeal the district court’s ruling denying
his motion to suppress the evidence found in the house” and only preserved his right to challenge
Case: 3:18-cr-00178-JRK Doc #: 184 Filed: 01/29/26 3 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

4
the motion to suppress the evidence found in the barn. Id. at 537 (addressing the residence warrant
and resulting search). Rather, the court held Defendant could challenge only the reasoning of the
district court’s order addressing the residence warrant and search to the extent it was incorporated
into the order denying the motion to suppress evidence found in the barn. Id. at 537. Thus,
Defendant was foreclosed from challenging the district court’s ruling with respect to the
suppression of evidence obtained as a direct result of the execution of the residence warrant. Id.
The Sixth Circuit proceeded to focus its substantive Fourth Amendment analysis on
Sergeant Barta’s affidavit, the barn warrant, and the subsequent search of Defendant’s barn,
ultimately determining the district court “correctly applied the good-faith exception and properly
denied O’Neill’s motion to suppress” as “reliance on the warrant to search O’Neill’s barn was
objectively reasonable, and suppression of the fruits of the search would not serve the purposes of
the exclusionary rule.” Id. at 542. In reaching this conclusion, the court considered at least some
of the reasoning included in the district court’s order resolving Defendant’s motion to suppress
evidence obtained from the residence search. See id. at 539 (“The district court did not clearly err
in . . . finding that neither Officer Brian nor Sergeant Barta had knowingly or recklessly included
the reference to the peer-to-peer network in their affidavits.”). Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s ruling on Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found in the barn,
and, due to its waiver determination, did not directly review the district court’s ruling denying
suppression of the evidence found at Defendant’s residence. Id. at 542.
Defendant brought the present Motion pursuant to § 2255 asserting two grounds for relief.
First, Defendant argues his plea, conviction, and sentence for both Counts 1 and 2 must be vacated
due to the involuntary nature of his plea agreement governing each Count. (Doc. 176-1, at 13–17).
Defendant’s second ground alleges the Government breached his plea agreements by advocating
Case: 3:18-cr-00178-JRK Doc #: 184 Filed: 01/29/26 4 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

5
for an above-guidelines sentence at his sentencing hearing. See id. at 18–21; Doc. 181, at 5
(explaining “the only appropriate remedy would be to vacate the sentence and allow [Defendant]
to be sentenced anew under a new Judge”). Neither party requested an evidentiary hearing. The
Court will consider each of Defendant’s grounds in turn.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
To obtain relief under § 2255, a Defendant presently in the custody of the United States
must demonstrate their sentence was “imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States . . . or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Thus, “[a] motion
brought under § 2255 must allege one of three bases as a threshold standard: (1) an error of
constitutional magnitude; (2) a sentence imposed outside the statutory limits; or (3) an error of fact
or law that was so fundamental as to render the entire proceeding invalid.” Weinberger v. United
States, 268 F.3d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185–
86 (1979)).
If the error established is one of constitutional magnitude, the defendant must establish
such error “had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the proceedings” in order to obtain
relief. Watson v. United States, 165 F.3d 486, 488 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson,
507 U.S. 619, 637–38 (1993)). For a non-constitutional error, the defendant must establish a
fundamental defect in the proceeding resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice or an egregious
error that deprived him of the “rudimentary demands of fair procedure.” Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S.
339, 348 (1994) (citation omitted).
Case: 3:18-cr-00178-JRK Doc #: 184 Filed: 01/29/26 5 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

6
DISCUSSION
Defendant’s First Ground (Voluntariness)
Defendant first argues he is entitled to relief because his decision to enter into each separate
plea agreement did not constitute a “knowing and voluntary” act. (Doc. 176-1, at 13 (first citing
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749, 755 (1970); and then citing United States v. Randolph,
230 F.3d 243, 250–51 (6th Cir. 2000))). Defendant argues his second plea agreement, which
governed the receipt Count, was intended by both him and the Government to preserve his right to
appeal the district court’s ruling on his motion to suppress evidence obtained by execution of the
residence warrant. Id. at 15–16. The Government, after it “went through old archived emails
between the parties after [the present] § 2255 motion was filed,” confirmed the parties had intended
to preserve Defendant’s ability to appeal the district court’s ruling on his motion to suppress
evidence obtained in connection with the residence warrant and search. (Doc. 179, at 15). As
determined by the Sixth Circuit, however, Defendant in fact failed to preserve such a challenge
despite the parties’ intent to the contrary. See O’Neill, 94 F.4th at 537.
Based on the dichotomy between the parties’ intent and the Sixth Circuit’s ruling as to
waiver, the Government partially concedes error. Specifically, it concedes the failure to “preserve
the suppression issues at the residence” despite the parties’ intent to do so, combined with the
mutual misunderstanding as to the effect of the language included in the second plea agreement,
“renders the guilty plea to the [r]eceipt [C]ount—and that [C]ount alone—invalid.” (Doc. 179, at
15). The Government’s concession necessitates vacating Defendant’s guilty plea, conviction, and
sentence as to Count 2. See United States v. Deller, 2024 WL 3540390, at *5 (S.D. Ohio)
(explaining that, where a plea agreement is held invalid under similar circumstances, the proper
remedy is to allow the defendant to “withdraw his plea” and “return[] the parties to the negotiating
Case: 3:18-cr-00178-JRK Doc #: 184 Filed: 01/29/26 6 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

7
table”); United States v. Bernard, 373 F.3d 339, 345 n.7 (3rd Cir. 2004) (“If the provisions of a
plea agreement are accepted by a court, but later found to be invalid, the proper remedy is . . . to
allow the defendant to withdraw the guilty plea and either negotiate a new agreement, or proceed
to trial.”); United States v. Brooks, 78 F.4th 138, 144 (5th Cir. 2023) (explaining that, if a defendant
wishes to challenge the validity of a particular provision of his plea agreement “he must do so
through a § 2255 motion challenging the entire guilty plea. The result, if successful, would be for
all parties to start over”). Defendant wishes to go further, however.
On Defendant’s account, vacatur of the plea agreement governing Count 2, the receipt
Count, alone is an insufficient remedy. (Doc. 176-1, at 16–17). Rather, because the residence
warrant was, chronologically, the first warrant to be executed in this case, Defendant contends the
failure to preserve his challenge to the legality of the search of his residence (and his person)
prevented him from arguing the evidence obtained from the subsequent search of his barn was
similarly subject to suppression. Defendant argues: “Therefore, the probable cause that formed a
basis for the [barn] warrant, and the first Count of conviction, were fruits of the [residence]
warrant. If the [residence] warrant was invalid, they were the fruits of the poisonous tree.” Id. at
17. Inadvertently waiving his ability to challenge the legality of the evidence from his residence
thus deprived Defendant “of a full and meaningful review of the [barn] warrant.” Id.; see also Doc.
181, at 4 (“Because the two [C]ounts are inextricably linked, only an appellate review of both
warrants together would render a complete and just disposition.”). To achieve a full and renewed
review of the barn warrant on appeal, Defendant seeks vacatur of his plea agreement governing
Count 1, the production Count, which preserved only his right to challenge the district court’s
ruling with respect to the barn warrant and search. The Government maintains the conceded error
necessitates vacating Defendant’s guilty plea, conviction, and sentence on Count 2 alone. The
Case: 3:18-cr-00178-JRK Doc #: 184 Filed: 01/29/26 7 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

8
Court agrees with the Government. Accordingly, it vacates Defendant’s plea agreement and
conviction with respect to Count 2, the receipt Count, only.
For a plea agreement to comport with the requirements of fundamental due process, it must
be entered into voluntarily and with knowledge of its effects on the defendant’s rights and liberty
interests. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508–509 (1984). While the post-hoc breach of an
otherwise valid plea agreement does not render it retroactively involuntary, see Puckett v. United
States, 556 U.S. 129, 136–138 & n.1 (2009), where “the defendant was not fairly apprised of” the
consequences of his plea agreement may it “be challenged under the Due Process Clause,” Mabry,
467 U.S. at 509 (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971)); see also Brady, 397 U.S. at
755 (explaining a guilty plea entered into “by one fully aware of the direct consequences” of that
plea will be deemed valid unless induced by threats, misrepresentation, or other improper promises
such as bribes).
Defendant fails to establish he was not fully apprised of the direct consequences of his first
plea agreement, which governed Count 1, the production Count. A “direct consequence” as
distinguished from a collateral consequence is typically one that flows definitely, immediately, and
automatically from the plea. See King v. Dutton, 17 F.3d 151, 154–55 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing, inter
alia, United States v. Campusano, 947 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1991) (“The distinction turns on whether
the consequence represents a definite, immediate, and largely automatic effect on the range of a
defendant’s punishment.”) (citation modified)). The list of relevant “direct consequences” also
includes the “actual value of any commitments made to [the defendant] by the court, prosecutor,
or his own counsel.” Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572
n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc)).
Case: 3:18-cr-00178-JRK Doc #: 184 Filed: 01/29/26 8 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

9
At his first change of plea hearing, the Government described the conditional plea language
of the first plea agreement, which preserved Defendant’s limited appellate rights, by stating “this
plea is conditional and the [D]efendant gets the preservation of his right to appeal the denial of his
motion to suppress, that being Document No. 63.” (Doc. 169, at 29). Thus, while Defendant could
directly challenge the Court’s ruling on this motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the
search of his barn, see Doc. 79, he could only appeal prior findings and orders “with regard to” the
ruling on the motion to suppress evidence obtained in the barn and “incorporate[d] by reference”
therein. (Doc. 169, at 29). This description accurately reflects the language of the plea agreement
and the conclusion reached by the Sixth Circuit regarding the scope of Defendant’s appellate
waiver. See Doc. 138, at 4–5; O’Neill, 94 F.4th at 537 (“O’Neill may contest the reasoning
contained in the order denying his motion to suppress evidence found in the house only to the
extent that it was incorporated into and relied upon in the barn ruling.”).
Such a result makes sense, as only evidence obtained in the barn formed the factual basis
for the production Count to which Defendant pleaded guilty as part of this first plea agreement.
See Doc. 138, at 8–9 (describing the factual basis for the guilty plea, which contains descriptions
of evidence found only in Defendant’s barn). Thus, in pleading guilty to the production Count,
there would be little reason for Defendant to need to preserve the ability to challenge the district
court’s ruling as to the admissibility of the evidence found in the residence—evidence that did not
impact the factual basis for the production Count. Rather, the ruling on the residence search would
be relevant to the motion to suppress evidence obtained from the barn and, subsequently, the
production Count, only “to the extent said rulings were relied upon in the ruling denying” the
motion to suppress evidence obtained in the barn. Id. at 4–5. This is the precise conclusion reached
by the Sixth Circuit on direct appeal regarding the scope of the waiver language included in
Case: 3:18-cr-00178-JRK Doc #: 184 Filed: 01/29/26 9 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

10
Defendant’s plea agreements. See O’Neill, 94 F.4th at 537. This understanding of the provision
would have allowed Defendant to preserve any argument that the barn evidence was fruit of the
poisonous tree, as any determination to the contrary by the district court would necessarily rely on
its determination that the residence evidence was not subject to suppression. Thus, regardless of
the details of the parties’ communications, there is insufficient reason to believe Defendant was
not apprised of the actual, direct consequences of his first guilty plea in light of the Sixth Circuit’s
ruling on direct appeal, as that agreement adequately preserved the argument he now claims
requires vacatur of the production Count plea and conviction.2
To see why, consider the upshot of accepting Defendant’s argument here. Again, Defendant
claims the fact that his first plea agreement, which governed the production Count, did not preserve
the right to challenge the ruling denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained in his residence
renders that plea agreement involuntary. He maintains this position even though the factual basis
for the production Count did not rely on, or even mention, any evidence obtained in the residence.
Further, Defendant did not plead guilty to the receipt Count, which was based on evidence obtained
in the residence, until over eight months after he pleaded guilty to the production Count. Thus,
Defendant’s position would require this Court to conclude: (1) the parties intended to allow
Defendant, in the agreement governing the production Count, to preserve a challenge to the final
2. This analysis would not apply to Defendant’s plea agreement with respect to the receipt Count,
as evidence obtained from the residence warrant and subsequent search formed the factual basis
for that Count. See Doc. 150, at 8. Thus, as it relates to Count 2, the receipt Count, Defendant
would require the ability to challenge the district court’s ruling on his motion to suppress evidence
obtained from the residence search, not just the reasoning contained therein, in order to maintain
an effective avenue to challenge his conviction. Failing to apprise Defendant of the fact that the
conditional plea provision governing his guilty plea to the receipt Count did not allow him to
challenge the final disposition of the district court with respect to the motion to suppress evidence
obtained during the residence search, therefore, would clearly constitute a lack of knowledge of
the relevant “direct consequences” of his plea. Brady, 397 U.S. at 755.
Case: 3:18-cr-00178-JRK Doc #: 184 Filed: 01/29/26 10 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

11
ruling of the district court with respect to evidence entirely unrelated to the factual basis of that
Count, and (2) because the agreement did not do so, and the Court, the Government, and his
counsel did not notify him of this fact, Defendant was not properly apprised of the direct
consequences of his first plea agreement thus rendering it involuntary. This Court will not stretch
so far as to conclude a defendant, for his plea to be constitutionally voluntary, must be notified his
plea agreement does not allow him to challenge the legality of evidence entirely unrelated to the
Count to which he pleads guilty.
Nor would vacating Defendant’s guilty plea, conviction, and sentence to Count 1 for a lack
of voluntariness provide him with the relief he claims to seek. Again, Defendant’s asserted basis
for claiming his first plea was involuntary is that the failure to preserve his challenge to the Court’s
ruling on the suppression of evidence obtained in the residence “deprived him of a full and
meaningful review of the second warrant” and, as a result, the evidence obtained in the barn. (Doc.
176-1, at 17). If the residence search violated the Fourth Amendment, and the evidence obtained
therefrom was thus subject to suppression, Defendant argues Sergeant Bart’s affidavit, the resulting
barn warrant, and evidence obtained from execution of that warrant were all tainted by the initial
illegal search and thus constitute fruit of the poisonous tree. (Doc. 176-1, at 17; Doc. 181, at 4).
Not so.
“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine . . . bars the admissibility of evidence which
police derivatively obtain from an unconstitutional search or seizure.” United States v. Arrington,
440 F. Supp. 3d 719, 730 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (quoting United States v. Pearce, 531 F.3d 374, 381
(6th Cir. 2008)). Generally, the doctrine will mandate the suppression of evidence obtained as a
result of a prior constitutional violation unless such violation “has become so attenuated or has
been interrupted by some intervening circumstances so as to remove the ‘taint’ imposed upon the
Case: 3:18-cr-00178-JRK Doc #: 184 Filed: 01/29/26 11 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

12
evidence by the original illegality.” Id. (quoting United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471 (1980)).
Nor 	will 	courts 	suppress 	“evidence 	that 	would 	have 	been 	discovered 	even 	without 	the
unconstitutional source” or evidence acquired “from a separate, independent source.” Utah v.
Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 238 (2016).
Even where none of these three direct exceptions to the doctrine apply, the “good faith”
exception to the exclusionary rule continues to operate with force. See United States v. McClain,
444 F.3d 556, 564–566 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing, inter alia, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919
(1984)). The “good faith” exception maintains the exclusionary rule does not apply to “evidence
obtained by an officer who conducts a search in reasonable reliance on a search warrant that was
issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, but is ultimately found to be unsupported by probable
cause or otherwise defective.” Id. (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 918).
In McClain, officers initially conducted a warrantless search of a residence after
speculating it was in the process of being robbed. Id. at 560. While inside the home, officers viewed
equipment necessary to run a marijuana grow operation, though none of the officers “saw any
marijuana in the house or observed any illegal activity.” Id. After these observations, officers
placed the residence under surveillance and ultimately determined the residence housed a
marijuana grow operation. Id. Officers obtained a search warrant for the residence. Id. The affidavit
supporting such warrant “explicitly relied in part on evidence obtained during the initial
warrantless search” of the residence. The Sixth Circuit determined this initial warrantless search
violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, meaning the affidavit and warrant on which
the officers relied to conduct the second search of the residence were themselves fruit of the
poisonous tree. Id. at 565.
Case: 3:18-cr-00178-JRK Doc #: 184 Filed: 01/29/26 12 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

13
In such a scenario, the McClain court determined the good faith exception should
nonetheless apply where the “facts surrounding the initial Fourth Amendment violation were ‘close
enough to the line of validity to make the officer’s belief in the validity of the [subsequent] warrant
objectively reasonable.’” Id. at 566 (quoting United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1419 (8th Cir.
1989)). Thus, even where the initial search of the residence violated the Fourth Amendment, and
the subsequent search warrant relied on evidence obtained as a result of that unlawful search, where
“the officers who sought and executed the search warrant[] acted with good faith” the exception
to the exclusionary rule applies. Id.
On direct appeal in this case, the Sixth Circuit determined the search of Defendant’s barn
was subject to the good faith exception under Leon. See O’Neill, 94 F.4th at 542. Barta’s affidavit
relied at least in part on evidence obtained from the residence search, including “an immense
collection of images . . . of nude or partially nude young boys” found on Defendant’s devices. Id.
at 541. Sergeant Barta’s affidavit went further, however, describing items O’Neill’s son observed
in the barn such as “‘a computer tower with monitor, computer discs, blank and used discs,
vibrators and other sex toys, condoms, and children’s clothing and “costumes,”’ as well as
‘approximately fifteen firearms.’” Id. Taken together, these allegations left the Sixth Circuit with
“no doubt that Sergeant Barta’s affidavit contained enough factual material to support a good-faith
belief that probable cause existed.” Id. (quoting Doc. 68-1, at 2). The question is thus whether,
even if Defendant, on a second direct appeal following vacatur of his plea agreement governing
the receipt Count, overturns the district court’s ruling and successfully secures suppression of the
evidence obtained from the residence search, there would be grounds to disturb the Sixth Circuit’s
prior ruling as to the barn search. The answer is no.
Case: 3:18-cr-00178-JRK Doc #: 184 Filed: 01/29/26 13 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

14
For the good faith inquiry under Leon and McClain, it matters not whether Defendant is
ultimately successful in arguing the fruits of the residence search, despite being supported by a
search warrant, must be suppressed. The ultimate question remains whether, at the time the officers
searched the barn, they acted in objectively reasonable reliance on the barn warrant. Cf. United
States v. Schuttpelz, 467 F. App’x 349, 353 (6th Cir. 2012) (explaining the applicability of the
exclusionary rule turns on whether officers acted in objectively reasonable reliance on the law as
it existed at the time of the challenged arrest). Here, much like in McClain, the “facts surrounding
the initial” residence search, were “close enough to the line of validity” such that Sergeant Barta’s
decision to include the fruits of the search in a subsequent affidavit, as well as the officer’s reliance
on the barn warrant stemming from that affidavit, was objectively reasonable. See McClain, 444
F.3d at 565–66. The residence search was supported by a facially valid warrant which lacked for
probable cause chiefly due to the “judge’s, not the affiant’s, unawareness” of the relevant probable
cause standard. (Doc. 78, at 10–11 (discussing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) and its
holding that mere nudity is itself insufficient to support probable cause in this context)).
Defendant offers no explanation for how a post-hoc ruling in his favor on the legality of
the residence search would impact the objective reasonability of the officers’ reliance on the barn
warrant at the time of the barn search. It is particularly difficult to imagine how it might in light of
the Sixth Circuit’s clarification on initial direct appeal that, while Defendant may have waived his
right to challenge the outcome of the district court’s ruling on the motion to suppress the residence
evidence, the court was free to consider the facts and reasoning of the residence ruling to the extent
relied on in the district court’s ruling on the legality of the barn search. O’Neill, 94 F.4th at 537.
That is, revisiting on collateral review the legal question of whether the residence search fell within
Leon’s good faith exception would have had little to no bearing on the O’Neill court’s Leon analysis
Case: 3:18-cr-00178-JRK Doc #: 184 Filed: 01/29/26 14 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

15
with respect to the barn search, as the O’Neill court was already free to consider the facts and
reasoning surrounding the prior residence search, including whether such search was “sufficiently
close to the line of validity” for further reliance on its fruits in Sergeant Barta’s affidavit to be
objectively reasonable. McClain, 444 F.3d at 565 (quoting Fletcher, 91 F.3d at 52).
Thus, any error with respect to the voluntariness of the first plea agreement’s conditional
waiver provision did not create “a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the proceedings,”
as Defendant, in effect, received a full review of the validity of the search of his barn on direct
appeal. Watson, 165 F.3d at 488 (citing Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637–38). Even if Defendant were to
successfully challenge on appeal the ruling as to the residence evidence following vacatur of his
plea agreement for the receipt Count, the Court finds there would be no sufficient grounds on
which to disturb the Sixth Circuit’s determination that the subsequent barn search was conducted
in good faith under Leon. The evidence obtained from that search would therefore not be subject
to exclusion, and the factual basis for Defendant’s plea and conviction as to Count 1, the production
Count, would remain undisturbed. Thus, Defendant’s first ground necessitates vacating his
sentence, conviction, and guilty plea as to Count 2, the receipt Count, only.
Defendant’s Second Ground (Breach)
In his second and final ground for relief, Defendant asserts the Government breached his
plea agreements by advocating for an upward departure from the applicable guidelines range at
Defendant’s sentencing hearing. (Doc. 176, at 5; Doc. 176-1, at 18–21). Because the Court finds
Defendant’s second plea agreement, along with the conviction and sentence associated with Count
2, must be vacated as a result of the Government’s concession of error, only Defendant’s first plea
agreement remains in dispute. This first agreement, however, directly contemplated the events
Defendant now protests. See Doc. 138, at 6 (“[T]he parties understand and agree that there is no
Case: 3:18-cr-00178-JRK Doc #: 184 Filed: 01/29/26 15 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

16
agreement as to the ultimate sentence or prison term, other than the agreement to recommend
concurrent prison terms on Count One and Count Two. The parties also understand and agree that
each side may advocate for the prison term that it feels is appropriate, subject to the statutory
mandatory minimum and maximum, even if doing so involves a sentence outside of the Sentencing
Guideline range as calculated in paragraph 19 and even if doing so involves a variance or
departure.”) (emphasis added).
At his first change of plea hearing, the Government made clear the plea agreement would
allow each party, not just the Government, to advocate at sentencing for a term of imprisonment
“it feels is appropriate . . . even if doing so involves a sentence outside of the sentencing guideline
range.” (Doc. 169, at 31). The Court asked Defendant whether the Government’s account of the
plea agreement’s contents comported with his own understanding of the parties’ agreement. Id. at
46. Defendant, under oath, replied in the affirmative. Id. The Court further clarified Defendant was
not guaranteed to receive a sentence within a certain guidelines range, and that, while a sentence
more severe than expected may “be a basis under certain circumstances to take an appeal if it’s
outside the guideline calculation or above the statutory maximum . . . it will never be a basis to
come back and withdraw your guilty plea.” Id. at 47. Again, Defendant stated he understood. Id.
Defendant’s appeal to other portions of his plea agreement indicating the Government
reserved merely the right to “speak” at sentencing is unpersuasive. (Doc. 176-1, at 20). In effect,
Defendant argues the parties’ agreement to a particular offense level calculation, guideline range,
and that “no other sentencing factors would apply” means there was “nothing in the plea agreement
that would lead a reasonable Defendant to believe that he had stipulated to a guideline provision”
that had no bearing on his ultimate sentence. Id. To accept this argument, however, would be to
place Defendant’s present explanation of his personal interpretation of his plea agreement in
Case: 3:18-cr-00178-JRK Doc #: 184 Filed: 01/29/26 16 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

17
conflict with his sworn testimony stating he understood the Government could advocate for a
sentence it felt appropriate, including one outside the guidelines range. (Doc. 169, at 31). Doing
so, in turn, would violate the strong presumption of verity to which “[s]olemn declarations in open
court” are entitled. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). The Court thus finds Defendant
“is bound by his statements in response to [the] court’s inquiry,” Baker v. United States, 781 F.2d
85, 90 (1986) (quoting Moore v. Estelle, 526 F.2d 690, 696–97), and cannot complain of breach
where the Government followed the precise letter of the plea agreements.
Remedy
As explained above, the Government concedes error as to the voluntariness of Defendant’s
second plea agreement, which governed his guilty plea to Count 2, the receipt Count. Where a plea
agreement is defective, the proper remedy is to void the agreement and send the parties back to the
negotiating table. Accordingly, the Court vacates its acceptance of Defendant’s plea agreement, as
well as his sentence and conviction as to Count 2 of the indictment. The Court need not vacate its
acceptance of Defendant’s plea agreement and its judgment of conviction as to Count 1. The Court
finds Defendant has failed to show his first plea agreement fails for a lack of knowledge or
voluntariness. Even if he could, any such error did not result in a substantial and injurious effect
or influence on the proceedings sufficient to warrant relief under § 2255.
Nevertheless, the Court finds it proper to vacate Defendant’s sentence as to both Counts 1
and 2. The Court sentenced Defendant to 192 months as to Count 1 and Count 2, to be served
concurrently with one another. (Doc. 155, at 2). The Court imposed the same sentence on each
Count of conviction despite the receipt Count carrying with it a higher total offense level under
the parties’ agreement than did the production Count. Compare Doc. 138, at 7; with Doc. 150, at
6. Further, the Court explained at sentencing it had decided to “vary[] upward from the calculation
Case: 3:18-cr-00178-JRK Doc #: 184 Filed: 01/29/26 17 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>

18
. . in the plea agreements” and impose a sentence carrying a “total of 192 months” imprisonment.
(Doc. 164, at 43). Such explanation indicates the two separate sentences formed a single
“disposition in which the sentences on the various counts form part of an overall plan” or
“sentencing package.” United States v. Mainville, 9 F. App’x 431, 436 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting
United States v. Townsend, 178 F,3d 558, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). Under this sentencing package
doctrine, where one or more counts of conviction are vacated following a successful § 2255
motion, the court may “reevaluate the entire aggregate sentence.” Pasquarille v. United States,
130 F.3d 1220, 1222 (6th Cir. 1997). Thus, the Court will vacate Defendant’s sentence as to both
Counts 1 and 2 and will resentence Defendant following a final resolution by trial or plea on Count
2.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is
ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Vacate be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED IN
PART AND DENIED IN PART; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall be returned to pretrial status as to Count 2 of
the Indictment and post-conviction/pre-sentence status as to Count 1 of the Indictment, with
counsel to be appointed.
s/ James R. Knepp II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: January 29, 2026
Case: 3:18-cr-00178-JRK Doc #: 184 Filed: 01/29/26 18 of 18. PageID #: <pageID>