Michael B. Siddle

3:26-bk-30636Ohsb31 mars 2026

Texte intégral

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
In re:
Michael B. Siddle,
Debtor.
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Case No. 26-30636
Chapter 7
Judge Crist
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. 5), WITHOUT PREJUDICE
On March 26, 2026, Michael B. Siddle a/k/a Barry Siddle (the “Debtor”), by and through
his counsel, Randal A. Harvey (“Debtor’s Counsel”), filed a voluntary chapter 7 petition (Doc. 1)
accompanied by his schedules, statement of financial affairs, and related documents.
On March 27, 2026, Debtor’s Counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5) (the “Motion to
Dismiss”),1 requesting dismissal of this case under “11 U.S.C. § 1307(b),” asserting that “this case
has not been converted under § 706, 1112, or 1208 of Title 11 of the U.S. Code” and “that the
1 Debtor’s Counsel left voicemail messages for the Court’s staff to advise the Court that the Debtor had not completed
the credit briefing required by 11 U.S.C. § 109(h) prior to filing his case, but Counsel did not recognize this deficiency
until after he had already begun filing the Debtor’s case. Debtor’s Counsel indicated he would seek to dismiss the
Debtor’s case for this reason.
This document has been electronically entered in the records of the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 31, 2026
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Debtor has an absolute right to dismiss, pursuant to In [r]e Sanders, 100 B.R. 338 (S.D. OH
1989).”2 Mot. to Dismiss.
The problem is that 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b) does not apply in a chapter 7 case 3 and there is no
absolute right to dismiss a chapter 7 case under the applicable statute, which is § 707(a) and which
states that “[t]he court may dismiss a case under this chapter only after notice and a hearing and
only for cause . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (emphasis added). This might not ultimately make a
difference – we cannot know at the moment – but it does require that Debtor follow the proper
procedure to file a motion to dismiss on notice to parties with an opportunity to object in
accordance with the Local Bankruptcy Rules and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. The
present Motion to Dismiss does not do this and therefore cannot be granted.
The Debtor’s Motion to Dismiss does not include a memorandum in support as required
by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9013-1(a), is not accompanied by the mandatory twenty-one (21) day
notice required by LBR 9013-1(b) 4 and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2002(a)(4),5 and
does not cite to legal authority for granting a motion to dismiss a chapter 7 case. Most notably, the
Motion to Dismiss does not allege cause for dismissal under 11 U.S.C. § 707(a). Unlike a chapter
13 debtor, a chapter 7 debtor does not have an absolute right to voluntarily dismiss their case and
bears the burden of showing cause for any such dismissal. See Sicherman v. Cohara (In re
Cohara), 324 B.R. 24, 27 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2005) (stating “[t]he Debtor does not have an absolute
2 In In re Sanders, 100 B.R. 338, 341 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989), a decision by Bankruptcy Judge William A. Clark, the
Court found that a previously filed motion to dismiss a chapter 13 case took precedence over a subsequently filed
motion to convert filed by the Chapter 13 Trustee. But see Skandis v. Moyer (In re Skandis), 648 B.R. 918, 924 (B.A.P.
6th Cir. 2023) (finding chapter 13 debtor did not have an absolute right to dismiss under § 1307 once an order
converting the case had been entered). The essential legal principle of Sanders, a Debtor’s absolute right to dismiss a
chapter 13 case under § 1307(b), has been adopted by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Smith v. U.S. Bank N.A. (In
re Smith), 999 F.3d 452, 455-56 (6th Cir. 2021).
3 The Court further notes that Sanders stands for the proposition that a debtor’s motion to voluntarily dismiss a chapter
13 case, filed under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b), is not subject to a bad-faith exception. However, § 1307 and Sanders have
no application when a debtor seeks to dismiss a chapter 7 case.
4 General Order 12-4 excepts a debtor’s motion to dismiss his or her chapter 13 case, in so far as the case has not been
previously converted from another chapter, from the noticing requirements of LBR 9013-1. A motion to dismiss a
chapter 7 case is not covered by this exception.
5 Bankruptcy Rule 2002(a)(4) requires a 21-day notice by mail of “a hearing on a motion to dismiss a Chapter 7, 11,
or 12 case . . . –unless the hearing is under § 707(a)(3) or § 707(b) or is on a motion to dismiss the case for failure to
pay the filing fee[.]” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002(a)(4). None of those exceptions apply in this circumstance.
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right to dismiss a chapter 7 petition” (citing Bartee v. Ainsworth (In re Bartee), 317 B.R. 362, 366
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004)).
For these reasons, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED, without prejudice to Debtor
filing another motion to dismiss in accordance with the requirements set forth in this Order.6
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Copies to:
All Creditors and Parties in Interest Plus
Edward H. Cahill, Office of the US Trustee, 170 North High Street, Suite 200, Columbus, OH
43215-2417 (Assistant United States Trustee)
Nathan A. Wheatley, Office of the US Trustee, 170 North High Street, Suite 200, Columbus, OH
43215-2417 (Counsel for the United States Trustee)
6 Ultimately, if the Debtor did not complete the credit counseling briefing prior to filing this chapter 7 bankruptcy,
then this case will most likely be dismissed because he is ineligible pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1), unless either
exigent circumstances or inability to complete are established under § 109(h)(3) or (4). As of yet, however, no credit
counseling certificate has been filed.
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