Bell v. Mahilo et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
MARKUS A. BELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
MEREDITH E. MAHILO, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action 1:26-cv-864
Judge Michael R. Barrett
Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura
ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Markus A. Bell, an Ohio inmate proceeding without the assistance of counsel,
sues several individuals for improper medical and mental health treatment while incarcerated.
(Compl., ECF No. 1-1.) This matter is before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s
Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A to identify cognizable claims and to
recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b)(1)–(2); see also McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997). Having performed the initial screen, the
undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state
a claim on which relief may be granted and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
This matter is also before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2), which is GRANTED. (ECF
No. 1.) Plaintiff must pay the full amount of the Court’s $350 filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
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Plaintiff’s certified trust fund statement reveals that he has $0.00 in his prison account, which is
insufficient to pay the filing fee.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust accounts
(Inmate ID Number A789626) at the Toledo Correctional Institution is DIRECTED to submit to
the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio as an initial partial
payment, 20% of the greater of either the average monthly deposits to the inmate trust account or
the average monthly balance in the inmate trust account, for the six months immediately
preceding the filing of the Complaint.
After full payment of the initial, partial filing fee, the custodian shall submit 20% of the
inmate’s preceding monthly income credited to the account, but only when the amount in the
account exceeds $10.00, until the full fee of $350.00 has been paid to the Clerk of this Court. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).
Checks should be made payable to: Clerk, United States District Court. The checks
should be sent to:
Prisoner Accounts Receivable
260 U.S. Courthouse
85 Marconi Boulevard
Columbus, Ohio 43215
The prisoner’s name and this case number must be included on each check.
It is ORDERED that Plaintiff be allowed to prosecute his action without prepayment of
fees or costs and that judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs
had been prepaid. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and
the prison cashier’s office.
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I. 	STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. 	Failure to State a Claim
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to
“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In
doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are
assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from
filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e):
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,
the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—
* * *
(B) the action or appeal—
(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or]
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. . . .
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte
dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or
upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See
also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (requiring a court to conduct a screening of “a complaint in a civil action
in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity . . . [to] identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion
of the complaint [that is] frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted”).
Further, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the
basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See Hill v.
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Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule
8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual
demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,
727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).
Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading
that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”
is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not
“suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up).
Instead, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up). Facial
plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The
plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the
strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504
(citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612,
614 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient
treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim
asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v.
Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).
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B. 	Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the federal in forma pauperis statute, Courts must sua sponte
dismiss an action upon determining that an in forma pauperis complaint fails to state a claim on
which relief can be granted. Thus, a typical initial screen involves consideration of the merits of
the claims asserted. When the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the asserted claims,
however, it is unnecessary to consider the merits. When the face of the complaint provides no
basis for federal jurisdiction, the Court may dismiss an action as frivolous and for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction under both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(h)(3). Williams v. Cincy Urb. Apts., No. 1:10-cv-153, 2010 WL 883846, at *2 n.1
(S.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2010) (citing Carlock v. Williams, 182 F.3d 916, 1999 WL 454880, at *2 (6th
Cir. June 22, 1999) (table)).
II. 	ANALYSIS
Plaintiff alleges that on July 15, 2025, he was forced to begin taking the drug Zyprexa,
which Plaintiff characterizes as “a deadly psychotropic barbiturate . . . that has caused me
irreversible damage, corporeally and personally.” (Compl. 5, ECF No. 1-1.) Plaintiff further
alleges that in 2022, he was forced onto the Mental Health Caseload because he complained
about staff misconduct. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff asserts that his classification on the Mental Health
Caseload prevents him from being eligible to work certain jobs. (Id.) As relief, Plaintiff seeks
removal from the Mental Health Caseload and an end to the forced administration of Zyprexa.
(Id. at 6.)
Although Plaintiff lists six Defendants (Meredith E. Mahilo, Jennifer M. Thornsberry,
Psy.D., James C. Lawson, Carlos Cheng, M.D., Kathryn D. Richardson, and M. Mulinex, CNP)
in the “Defendants” section of the Complaint form (id. at 4), these individuals are not mentioned
in the body of the Complaint. And based on the addresses Plaintiff provides for each of them,
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they are or were employed variously at the Correctional Reception Center, Chillicothe
Correctional Institution, Lebanon Correctional Institution, Warren Correctional Institution, or
Toledo Correctional Institution. (Id.) And as Plaintiff does not specify where he was incarcerated
during the relevant incidents in 2022 and 2025, it is impossible to tell which Defendants are
allegedly responsible for which allegedly unlawful acts. As a result, to the extent that Plaintiff
intends to advance individual-capacity claims for damages under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation
of his constitutional rights, then those claims must be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to allege
that any particular Defendant was involved in the administration of Zyprexa or his placement on
the Mental Health Caseload. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit “has
consistently held that damage claims against government officials arising from alleged violations
of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each
defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional right.” Heyward v. Cooper, 88 F.4th 648, 661
(6th Cir. 2023) (quoting Heyne v. Metro. Nashville Pub. Schs., 655 F.3d 556, 564 (6th Cir. 2011)
and Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008)) (emphasis in original). “[C]ategorical
references to ‘Defendants’” do not meet this standard. Marcilis v. Twp. of Redford, 693 F.3d 589,
596–97 (6th Cir. 2012). Nor do allegations that an individual defendant “was present and perhaps
involved in” the plaintiff’s injuries without allegations as to the unconstitutionality of the
individual defendant’s actions. Lanman, 529 F.3d at 684. Here, Plaintiff alleges in the passive
voice only that he “was (forced) onto a deadly psychotropic barbiturate called ‘Zyprexa’” and
that he “was (forced) onto the Mental Health Caseload”; his allegations therefore fail to state an
individual-capacity claim for violation of his constitutional rights under § 1983 against any of the
Defendants.
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To the extent that Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against Defendants under § 1983, those
claims must also be dismissed against all Defendants who are not currently employed at the
Toledo Correctional Institution—Plaintiff’s current place of incarceration. See Kensu v. Haigh,
87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996) (concluding that inmate’s claims for declaratory and injunctive
relief were rendered moot upon inmate’s transfer from the prison about which he complained).
The only Defendant for whom Plaintiff provided a Toledo address is M. Mulinex, CNP. Thus,
Plaintiff may proceed on his claim for injunctive relief under § 1983 against Defendant Mulinex.
But this Court, in the Southern District of Ohio, is not the proper venue for claims against
Toledo-based Defendants arising out of Toledo-based conduct. (See 28 U.S.C. § 1931(b)) (venue
is proper in the judicial district where any defendant resides or where a substantial part of the
events giving rise to the claim occurred). Thus, severance and transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)
of Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims under § 1983 for injunctive relief against Mulinex to the
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division at Toledo, is appropriate.
Further, to the extent that Plaintiff intends to advance state-law claims (such as medical
malpractice or battery), this Court lacks original subject-matter jurisdiction over those claims.
Federal district courts have jurisdiction over state-law claims only as provided by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332, which governs diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S.
500, 501 (2006). For a federal court to have diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(a), complete
diversity of citizenship must exist (which means that each plaintiff must be a citizen of a
different state than each defendant) and the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000.
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). Further, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
requires a pleading to contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s
jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). Thus, “a plaintiff seeking diversity jurisdiction [must] set
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forth the factual basis on which that jurisdiction is predicated.” Farmer v. Fisher, 386 F. App’x
554, 556 (6th Cir. 2010); see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377
(1994) (“[I]t is to be presumed that a cause lies outside [the Court’s] limited jurisdiction, and the
burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.”). But here,
Plaintiff neither alleges that the parties are citizens of different states nor alleges the citizenship
of the parties at all. Nor does Plaintiff allege that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
Plaintiff therefore has not plausibly alleged that § 1332’s diversity of citizenship or amount in
controversy requirements are satisfied and the Court lacks original subject-matter jurisdiction
over any state-law claims.
To the extent that Plaintiff asserts state-law claims against Defendant Mulinex that form
part of the same case or controversy as Plaintiff’s federal injunctive relief claims, however, the
Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
Thus, any state-law claims against Defendant Mulinex should also be severed and transferred to
the Northern District of Ohio.
III. 	DISPOSITION
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED.
In addition, for the reasons above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court (1) sever
and transfer Plaintiff’s official capacity claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 for injunctive relief, and
any related state law claims that form part of the same case or controversy, against Defendant
Mulinex to the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division at Toledo, and
(2) DISMISS Plaintiff’s remaining claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) for
failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
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PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen
(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those
specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with
supporting authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations
to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive
further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report
and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of
the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura
CHELSEY M. VASCURA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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