Cremeans et al v. Taczak et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
NICOLETTE CREMEANS, et al., 	:
:
Plaintiffs, 	: 	Case No. 2:19-cv-02703
:
v. 	: 	Chief Judge Algenon L. Marbley
:
SAMANTHA TACZAK, et al., 	: 	Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers
:
Defendants. 	:
OPINION & ORDER
This matter comes before this Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Clarify and/or Correct, on an
Expedited Basis, Supersedeas Bond Orders 	(ECF Nos. 298, 299), Defendants’ Motion for
Reconsideration and Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion 299 (ECF No. 302), and Defendant’s
Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time (ECF No. 303). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs’
Motion (ECF Nos. 298, 299) and Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration and Opposition to
Plaintiffs’ Motion 299 (ECF No. 302) are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendant’s
Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time (ECF No. 303) is GRANTED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On January 6, 2026, this Court issued an Order granting stay of this litigation during the
parties’ cross appeals to the Sixth Circuit pending Defendants posting of a supersedeas bond. (ECF
No. 289). Pursuant to that Order, on February 6, 2026, Defendants posted Notice of Supersedeas
Bond. (ECF No. 290). Plaintiffs contend that such bond was insufficient because defense counsel
signed the bond but failed to present any evidence of his authority to sign on behalf of the city. In
Plaintiff’s view, because the bond lacked execution by the mayor and lacked certification by the
City Auditor, it was not executed in the manner required by law and was therefore void. (ECF No.
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291 at 3). Further, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ posting of $373,672.55 failed to account for
post-judgment interest that has accrued to date. (Id. at 4).
On March 11, 2026, this Court issued an Order requiring defense counsel, to re-post a
supersedeas bond pursuant to this Court’s Amended Order (ECF No. 296) in the full amount of
the Final Judgement ($15,001.00) plus attorney’s fees ($356,405), costs ($2,266.55), and post-
judgment interest ($1,290.09). (ECF No. 297). Further, this Court directed defense counsel to
secure the signature of the mayor and comply with the steps outlined in Ohio Revised Code
§§733.70, 5705.41(D)(1) to ensure the validity of the supersedeas bond. (Id.).
On March 16, 2026, Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Clarify and/or Correct, on an Expedited
Basis, Supersedeas Bond Orders (ECF Nos. 298, 299) noting that this Court’s calculation of the
bond failed to include post judgment interest on the attorney’s fee awards and does not “reflect the
full post judgment interest on both judgments, computed daily and compounded annually pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §1961(a)–(b).” (ECF No. 299 at 1). On April 6, 2026, Defendants filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of this Court’s March 11, 2026, Order in which they also oppose Plaintiffs’
Motion to Clarify (ECF No. 299). (ECF No. 302). Defendants argue: (1) that neither Ohio Revised
Code §§ 733.70, 5705.41(D)(1) apply to the posting of a supersedeas bond; and (2) this Court
should reject Plaintiffs requests to increase the bond by $51,785.37 to a total of $427,696.93. (Id.
at 6–7, 10).
II. 	ANALYSIS
On April 13, this Court held a telephonic status conference to discuss the pending
motions and concluded that there are three outstanding issues this Court must address: (1)
whether the City Auditor is required to certify the supersedeas bond in order for it to be validly
executed; (2) from which date(s) postjudgment interest accrual should be calculated; and (3) the
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total amount of the supersedeas bond, including postjudgment interest on the damages judgment,
attorney’s fees, and costs.
First, this Court will address the parties’ dispute regarding who is required to sign the
supersedeas bond on behalf of the city in order for it to be validly executed. In this Court’s
March 11, 2026, Order, this Court directed Defendants to secure the signature of the mayor and
comply with the steps outlined in Ohio Revised Code §§ 733.701, 5705.41(D)(1) to ensure the
validity of the supersedeas bond. (ECF No. 297 at 3). Defendants contend that it is not feasible to
comply with this Court’s Order as neither statute applies in the context of a supersedeas bond.
(ECF No. 202 at 5–7). Plaintiffs counter that Defendants are obligated to obtain the signature of
the mayor pursuant to Ohio Revised Code § 733.03 and that the City Auditor must certify the
funds under Ohio Revised Code § 705.41(D)(1). (ECF No. 305 at 2–3).
“A supersedeas bond is a contract by which a surety obligates itself to pay a final
judgment rendered against its principal under the conditions stated in the bond.” City of San
Antonio, Texas v. Hotels.com, L. P., 593 U.S. 330, 334 (2021) (quoting 13 A Cyclopedia of
Federal Procedure § 62.19 (3d ed. Supp. 2021)) (emphasis added). Additionally, under Ohio law,
supersedeas bonds are treated and interpreted like any other contract. Hall v. Consol.
Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 142 F. App’x 875, 878 (6th Cir. 2005). As such, this Court
reasons that in order to execute the supersedeas bond, all other provisions under Ohio law
regarding a city’s authority to contract shall also apply in the context of supersedeas bonds. As
Plaintiffs correctly acknowledged Ohio case law supports that the authority to execute contracts
rests with the mayor pursuant to Ohio Revised Code § 733.03. Coyne v. Salvatore, 2002-Ohio-
5819, ¶ 80 (8th Dist.) (“The power to execute contracts, although not included in this statute, is
1 Neither party contests that Ohio Revised Code §733.70 is not applicable to this case. This Court’s former direction
instructing Defendant’s to comply with that statute is nullified.
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also not in conflict with the statute and properly belongs to the mayor.”); Union Stock Yards v.
Hillsboro, 2010-Ohio-5975, ¶ 21 (4th Dist.). Despite Defendants contention that Ohio Revised
Code §733.03 does not apply at all, Defendants still concede that they can secure the Mayor’s
signature on the instrument. As such, this Court will require the supersedeas bond to be executed
by the Mayor.
Additionally, Plaintiffs contend that this Court must require the City Auditor to approve
the supersedeas bond pursuant to § 5705.41(D)(1), which provides that no political subdivision
may “make any contract or give any order involving the expenditure of money unless there is
attached thereto a certificate of the fiscal officer of the subdivision that the amount required to
meet the obligation … has been lawfully appropriated for such purpose and is in the treasury or
in process of collection to the credit of an appropriate fund free from any previous
encumbrances.” Ohio Revised Code § 5705.41(D)(1).
As mentioned above, this Court reasons the supersedeas bond is a contract and is to be
treated as such. Accordingly, this Court reaffirms its prior Order for Defendants to comply with
§ 5705.41(D)(1) and obtain a certificate from the appropriate fiscal officer. The purpose of the
statute is to: “(1) to prevent fraud and the reckless expenditure of public funds[;] and (2) to
preclude the creation of any valid obligation against [the government entity] above or beyond the
fund previously provided and at hand for such purpose.” Duke Energy One, Inc. v. Cincinnati
State Tech. & Community College, 2022-Ohio-924, ¶ 24 (1st Dist.) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). As such, Ohio case law supports that the statute applies to any contract made
by a political subdivision and without such certificate any contract formed will be unenforceable.
Id. ¶ 23 (“That statute specifically provides that a contract entered into without the certification is
‘void.’”); City of Toledo v. Corr. Comm. of Northwest Ohio, 2017-Ohio-9149, ¶ 51 (6th Dist.)
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(“The failure to attach a certificate as required by R.C. 5705.41(D)(1) is fatal to the validity of
the contract”). As such, because the posting of the supersedeas bond is a contract made by the
city Ohio Revised Code § 5705.41(D)(1) shall apply.
Next, Plaintiffs contend that post-judgment interest on attorney’s fees shall be included in
the supersedeas bond and interest on the fees began to accrue on December 13, 2024, which is
the date this Court recognized Plaintiffs’ entitlement to fees. (ECF No. 299). Defendants counter
that interest should only be calculated from September 26, 2025, which is the date this Court
actually entered the fee award. (ECF No. 302 at 10). In Defendant’s view, given that fee awards
under Section 1983 are discretionary, and this Court’s December 13, 2024, Order merely
instructed the parties to submit their fee motions, that order did not constitute a ”judgment that
unconditionally entitles the prevailing party to a reasonable attorney fee.” (Id.). This Court finds
Defendants’ arguments to be misguided.
The Sixth Circuit has held that pursuant to Section 1961(a), “interest begins to accrue
from the date of the award unconditionally entitling the plaintiff to fees, even though that award
did not quantify the precise sum to which plaintiffs were entitled.” Caffey v. Unum Life Ins. Co.,
302 F.3d 576, 589 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Associated General Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v.
Drabik, 250 F.3d 482, 495 (6th Cir.2001)). Defendants’ contention that this Court’s December
13, 2024, Order merely ordered the parties to submit their fee motions is incorrect. This Court
specified that “[Plaintiffs’ counsel’s] representation contributed to Plaintiffs’ prevailing party
status entitling Plaintiffs to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees.” (ECF No. 225 at 11). As
such, it was on December 13, 2024, that this Court recognized Plaintiff’s entitlement to fees
despite this Court requesting briefing from the parties. This Court holds that Plaintiffs are
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entitled to interest on attorney’s fees running from December 13, 2024, the date Plaintiffs
became unconditionally entitled to such fees.
Finally, this Court must address the total calculation of the supersedeas bond. Plaintiffs
contend this Court’s March 11, 2026, Order failed to include the post-judgment interest which
had already accrued on the $15,001 damage judgment from December 6, 2024, to March 11,
2026, and instead only included the projected post-judgment interest on the damages judgment
for the prospective two-year appeal period. (ECF No. 299 at 3). Defendants argue that this Court
should use its discretion to decline Plaintiffs’ request to increase the bond amount by including
post judgment interest on the attorney fee award. (ECF No. 302 at 8). Defendants contend that
increasing the bond is not “legally required” nor is increasing the bond necessary to “properly
secure the judgment” given that this Court does not dispute Defendants ability to pay and is
requiring bond as part of its discretion. (Id. at 9).
As this Court reasoned in its March 11, 2026, Order, “[c]ourts generally require that the
amount of the bond include the full amount owed under the award, post-judgment interest,
attorney’s fees and costs.” Verhoff v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 2007 WL 4303743, at *3 (N.D.
Ohio Dec. 10, 2007). Post judgement interest should include “a reasonable estimate of the
postjudgment interest that will accrue during the pendency of the appeal.” Jack Henry & Assoc.,
Inc. v. BSC, Inc., 753 F.Supp.2d 665, 673 (E.D. Ky. 2010), aff'd, 487 F. App’x 246 (6th Cir.
2012); see also EB-Bran Productions, Inc. v. Warner Elektra Atlantic, Inc., 2006 WL 1851010,
at *3 (E.D. Mich. July 5, 2006) (including post interest judgment amount in supersedeas based
on estimate that appeal would take 18 months). Additionally, post-judgment interest must be
assessed not only on the damages award, but also on the amount of attorney’s fees. See Vick v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 2006 WL 8431558, *6 (E.D. Mich. June 22, 2006) (“Post-judgment
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interest should be imposed on all money damages including pre-judgment interest and attorney
fees.”).2 This Court additionally notes that the Sixth Circuit has reasoned that “‘the amount of
the bond usually will be set in an amount that will permit satisfaction of the judgment in full,
together with costs, interest, and damages for delay…’” U.S. ex rel. Lefan v. Gen. Elec. Co., 397
F. App’x 144, 151 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting 11 Charles Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay
Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2905 (3d ed.)). As such, this Court uses its discretion to
increase the bond to include postjudgment interest on the fee/cost judgment as it sees fit.
Plaintiffs additionally contend that the bond should have included post judgment interest
on the damages award from December 6, 2024, to March 11, 2026, in addition to the projected
post-judgment interest on that judgment for the prospective two-year appeal period. As such,
Plaintiff contends the proper calculation should account for interest accrued from December 6,
2024, to March 11, 2028, which is two years following this Court’s March 11, 2026, Order setting
the supersedeas bond. This Court disagrees. This Court’s post judgment interest calculation
projects a two-year appeal period from the date of judgment December 6, 2024, and concludes two
years later on December 6, 2026. This Court did not reason that Plaintiffs were entitled to a
projected two-year appeal period from the date of its March 11, 2026, Order nor do Plaintiffs point
to any case law supporting that the projected appeal period is to be calculated from the date of the
court’s order setting the supersedeas bond. This Court relies on precedent within the Sixth Circuit
which holds that interest during the projected appeal period accrues from the date of judgment.
See McClusky v. Century Bank, FSB, 2014 WL 12748232, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 25, 2014); Lincoln
Elec. Co. v. MPM Techs., Inc., 2009 WL 3246936, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 6, 2009).
2 This Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for Prejudgment Interest in its September 26, 2025, Order. (ECF No. 269).
Accordingly, prejudgment interest will not be factored into the supersedeas bond calculation.
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Even considering that the cross appeals in this case did not occur until well after the final
judgment (See ECF Nos. 271, 274), this Court’s two-year projected appeal period is still sufficient.
Defendants filed their notice of cross appeal in this case on October 27, 2025. (ECF No. 274). The
Sixth Circuit currently takes on average 8.7 months to decide an appeal once the Notice of Appeal
is filed. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2025,
Table 	B-4 	(https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/document/jb_b4_0930.2025.pdf) 	(last
visited Apr. 15, 2026); see also Kaufman v. Knipp, 2024 WL 692691, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 20,
2024) (projecting postjudgment interest based on the Sixth Circuit’s average amount of appeal
time). Thus, the Sixth Circuit’s 8.7 month average return time from October 27, 2025, is still within
this Court’s projected two year appeal period beginning from the date of judgment. This amount
of time is more than sufficient to cover the projected post judgment interest. As such, this Court’s
projected two-year appeal period captures the projected post-judgment interest from the date of
judgment, December 6, 2024, until December 6, 2026, for the damages judgment, and from
December 13, 2024, until December 13, 2026, for the attorney’s fees and cost award.
Next, this Court must address the proper calculations for the supersedeas bond. Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1961(b) interest shall be computed daily to the date of payment and compounded
annually. As such, this Court calculates post-judgment interest on the damages judgment from
the date of the entry of judgment (December 6, 2024), at a rate equal to the weekly average 1-
year constant maturity Treasury yield, as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, for the calendar week preceding (November 29, 2024, at 4.3%). See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1961; Jack Henry & Assocs., 753 F.Supp.2d at 667; Barrett v. Detroit Heading, LLC, 2007 WL
2649714, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 2007).
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As for postjudgment interest on the fee/cost judgment this Court calculates from the date
Plaintiffs became entitled to fees (December 13, 2024), at a rate equal to the weekly average 1-
year constant maturity Treasury yield, for the calendar week preceding (December 6, 2024, at
4.19%). This Court calculates the total supersedeas bond including the damages award, post-
judgment interest on the damages, attorney’s fees and costs, and post judgment interest on the
fee/cost judgment as follows:
Judgment 	Principal Accrual
Date
Rate
(compounded
annually)
Projected
Interest for
two years
from the
date of
judgment
Total
Damages 	$15,001 	12/6/2024 	4.30% 	$1,317.82 	$16, 318.82
Fees/Costs
$358,671.55
($356,405 in
fees +
$2,266.55 in
costs)
12/13/2024 	4.19% 	$30,686.36 	$389,357.91
Total Bond 	$405, 676.73
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Clarify and/or Correct, on an
Expedited Basis, Supersedeas Bond Orders (ECF Nos. 298, 299) and Defendants’ Motion for
Reconsideration re 297 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, Order on Motion to
Stay, 296 Order and Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion 299 (ECF No. 302) are GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part. Defendants’ Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time (ECF No.
303) is GRANTED.
This Court hereby ORDERS defense counsel, within ten (10) days of this Order, to re-
post the supersedeas bond with the Clerk of this Court in the full amount of $405, 676.73. Until
then, this Court AFFIRMS that the current posted bond shall serve as security of the stay until
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the ten (10) day period has elapsed. Further, defense counsel is DIRECTED to secure the
signature of the mayor and obtain a certificate from the appropriate city fiscal officer certifying
the amount of the bond has been lawfully appropriated for such purpose and is free from any
encumbrances in compliance with Ohio Revised Code §5705.41(D)(1) to ensure the validity of
the supersedeas bond. Upon the posting of the supersedeas bond, this Court’s March 11, 2026,
Order (ECF No. 297) shall be VACATED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ALGENON L. MARBLEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATE: April 20, 2026
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