Healy v. Planned Parenthood of Greater Ohio et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
:
Alicia T. Healy, :
: Case No. 2:22-cv-2074
Plaintiff, :
v.
: Judge Graham
:
Officer Edward Chung, et
al.,
: Magistrate Judge Vascura
:
Defendants. :
OPINION & ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon Plaintiff Alicia Healy’s (“Healy”) motion
for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Doc. 91. Specifically, Healy seeks relief from this Court’s March 31, 2023
Opinion & Order (“March Order”) (doc. 23) dismissing Defendant Planned
Parenthood of Greater Ohio (“PPGOH”) from this case, as well as this Court’s October
31, 2025 Opinion & Order (“October Order”) (doc. 89) granting summary judgment in
favor of Defendants Officer Edward Chung (“Chung”) and the City of Columbus.
Because Healy has shown no basis for relief from judgment, her motion is DENIED.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule 60(b) provides a mechanism by which the Court “may relieve a
party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b). The Rule provides various reasons for which a Court may grant a 60(b)
motion, of which Healy identifies two for the purposes of her motion: first, relief may
be granted on the basis of “newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence,
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could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);”
second, the Court may grant such a motion for “any other reason that justifies relief.”
Id. However, “[a] Rule 60(b) motion must be denied if it is merely an attempt to
relitigate previously decided issues.” Guzman v. Miley, 94 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 1996).
DISCUSSION
Regarding the March Order, Healy argues that the Court was “unduly
dismissive of her legal arguments at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage,” and that evidence
produced in discovery after the March Order would yield a different outcome. Doc. 91,
# 1870. As to the October Order, Healy argues that it is “deeply flawed in both its
factual and legal analyses.” Id. at # 1875.
In the October Order, the Court summarized the relevant factual background
in this case as follows:
This case arises out of a citation for trespassing. On May 1,
2020, Healy, an African American woman, attended a
demonstration outside of the Planned Parenthood Surgical
Center (the “Surgical Center”) in Whitehall, Ohio. Among
a dozen or so demonstrators that day, Healy was a first-
timer. Officer Chung, a member of the Columbus Police
Department, was working special duty as a security detail
for the Surgical Center. While Healy was walking around
the building in a “Jericho Walk,” she entered a grassy area
of the premises belonging to the Surgical Center. An
individual serving as an escort for patients approached
Healy and notified her that she was not allowed on the
grassy area. The escort alerted Officer Chung, who also
observed Healy on the grassy area. Officer Chung
mistakenly believed that Healy was a different African
American woman who had been warned to stay off the
grassy area at a prior demonstration at the Surgical
Center. Officer Chung detained and/or arrested Healy until
he could verify her identity, after which he released her
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with a summons to appear in court on a citation of trespass.
The charges against Healy were eventually dismissed.
Doc. 89, # 1845-46. Healy’s complaint raised three (3) claims for monetary damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show a
deprivation of a Constitutional right caused by a person acting under color of state
law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
I. No Grounds for Relief from the March Order.
In the March Order, the Court dismissed PPGOH as a defendant because
Healy did not allege facts establishing that PPGOH was acting under color of state
law. Doc. 23, # 108. Healy contends that this was error because the Court “took an
unduly restrictive view of both the factual allegations and the law.” Doc. 91, # 1871.
Erasing any doubt as to whether Healy is merely attempting to relitigate an already
decided issue, this section of her motion quotes directly from her memorandum in
opposition to PPGOH’s motion to dismiss which the Court granted. Regardless,
Healy’s arguments are without merit.
Healy sought to include PPGOH as a defendant for these claims under the
theory that PPGOH acted in concert with Defendants Chung and the City of
Columbus when it hired Chung, a Columbus Police Officer, for security. The Court
construed Healy’s complaint to be asserting a claim for civil conspiracy, but because
the word “conspiracy” did not appear anywhere in the complaint, the Court concluded
that Healy had failed to meet Rule 8’s notice pleading standard. Doc. 23, # 107.
Nevertheless, the Court further concluded that even with liberal construction, Healy
fell well short of pleading adequate facts in support of her theory. Id. Healy’s
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argument that the Court was “overly formulaic” in this analysis is not persuasive as
grounds for relief. Doc. 91, # 1872.
Healy next argues that new evidence emerged in discovery which establishes
that PPGOH and Chung were working in concert. For example, citing Chung’s
deposition testimony, Healy points out that PPGOH “gave him no specific guidelines
for security, and most of his guidance came from another City Police Officer who had
previously provided security for PPGOH.” Doc. 91, # 1873. Healy refers to deposition
testimony from PPGOH employees Cierra Damons and Sarah Anway to further
support this point; i.e., that “there were no specific instructions to the police about
what to do in the event a protestor entered [PPGOH] property.” Id. at # 1874.
So, does a civil conspiracy arise among independent parties who do not discuss
or coordinate their actions with one another? Unsurprisingly, Healy cites no
authority which answers this question in her favor. As the Court explained in its
March Order, “A civil conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to
injure another by unlawful action.” Doc. 23, # 107 (quoting Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d
935, 944-45 (6th Cir. 1985). Anway’s deposition testimony that she did not discuss
how to handle trespassers because she “trusted the police officers to do their jobs,” as
quoted by Healy in her motion, does not establish the concerted action necessary to
find that PPGOH acted under color of law. See doc. 91, # 1874 (quoting doc. 68-1, #
1051).
Finally, Healy asserts that “Chung’s conduct throughout the Healy ordeal was
the conduct of a police officer, not the conduct of a private security guard.” Id.
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(emphasis original). But the Court already assumed, in the March Order, that Chung
was acting under color of state law. See doc. 23, # 106, n.2. Healy does not establish
how Chung’s conduct as a police officer imputed color-of-state-law status to a private
organization that did not coordinate with him regarding that conduct.
II. No Grounds for Relief from the October Order.
In the October Order, the Court denied Healy’s motion for summary judgment
and granted summary judgment to Chung and the City of Columbus on Healy’s three
(3) claims. As to her claim against the City of Columbus, commonly referred to as a
Monell claim, the Court found that summary judgment was warranted for the City of
Columbus because the factual record clearly refuted Healy’s theory of liability. As to
Healy’s Fourth Amendment claim, the Court concluded that genuine disputes of
material fact precluded a determination as to whether Healy’s Fourth Amendment
rights were violated, but that, at worst, Chung’s actions fell within qualified
immunity’s “ample room for mistaken judgments.” Doc. 89, # 1859 (quoting Johnson
v. Moseley, 790 F.3d 649, 653 (6th Cir. 2015). In the instant motion, Healy only
challenges the Court’s conclusions as to her Fourth amendment claim, largely
rehashing her summary judgment position and otherwise raising arguments more
appropriate for appeal.
A. Fourth Amendment Claim.
i. Unlawful Detention.
As noted above, the Court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment
on the issue of whether Chung violated Healy’s Fourth Amendment right to be free
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of unreasonable seizure. After considering the evidence in the record, the Court
determined that summary judgment was inappropriate in either direction due to
unresolved questions of fact. In general, the questions of fact pertained to the
information available to Chung when he detained Healy and whether that
information constituted reasonable suspicion to justify detention or probable cause to
justify an arrest.
For example, though Healy asserts it is “undisputed” that she promptly left
the grassy area after being warned by patient escort Carolyn Heck that she was
trespassing, Heck’s deposition testimony offers a conflicting account, indicating that
Healy was lingering and/or re-entered the grassy area, beyond what the video
evidence shows.1 See doc. 70-1, # 1191. This is a classic example of conflicting witness
accounts requiring the credibility assessment of a fact-finding jury.
Healy, on the other hand, describes Heck’s testimony as “a Big Lie that lured
the Court into concluding Officer Chung faced conflicting stories at the scene.” Doc.
91, # 1879. Therefore, Healy argues, the Court’s conclusions on the Fourth
Amendment claim “should be revisited, because no ‘reasonable mind’ could believe
the fantasy that Heck injected into this case.” Id. at # 1880. The Court thoroughly
1 Additionally, Chung testified that he personally saw Healy on the grass after Heck notified
him that she was trespassing. Doc. 79-1, # 1756. This occurred after Heck warned Healy that
she was trespassing on the grass. Id. Therefore, Healy must have remained in the grassy
area long enough for Heck to traverse the parking lot and notify Chung, or she re-entered the
grassy area after having been warned by Heck that she was trespassing. The video
evidence—all clips appearing to be recorded on phones by others demonstrating with Healy
that day—contains a gap between the warning from Heck and Chung’s seizure of Healy.
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explained why that is not the case in the October Order. See doc. 89, # 1853-58.
Healy’s arguments for relief from this conclusion are not persuasive.
ii. Qualified Immunity.
In a section of her motion titled “Quality Immunity,” Healy seeks relief from
the Court’s conclusion that Chung was entitled to qualified immunity. Doc. 91,
# 1880. Specifically, Healy takes issue with the Court’s discussion of three relevant
cases: State v. Barksdale, 2 Ohio St. 3d 126, 443 N.E.2d 501 (1983), Skovgard v.
Pedro, 448 F. App'x 538 (6th Cir. 2011), and Logsdon v. Hains 492 F.3d 334, 343 (6th
Cir. 2007).
1. Barksdale.
Healy claims the Court’s analysis of Barksdale is “befuddling because it is
unnecessarily nuanced, addresses issues Healy never advanced, and even doubts
whether [the surgical center] was ‘open to the public.’” Doc. 91, # 1880. She contends
that “the Barksdale privilege… protect[s] even the most unwelcome customers until
they are asked to leave,” and that Chung was incompetent for not knowing such “an
amazingly simple concept.” Id. at # 1881. But, as the Court thoroughly explained in
the October Order, Chung understood that trespass only follows sufficient notice to
the trespasser that they are not permitted to enter or remain on the premises. See
doc. 89, # 1852. And Chung had numerous reasons to believe that Healy had sufficient
notice, as the Court also explained in the October Order. Id. at # 1854-58. Healy’s
befuddlement is no grounds for relief under Rule 60(b).
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2. Skovgard and Logsdon.
Healy next takes issue with the Court’s discussion of two Sixth Circuit cases
dealing with similar, but not identical facts. In Skovgard v. Pedro, 448 F. App'x 538
(6th Cir. 2011), two antiabortion protestors were arrested based on the arresting
officers’ mistaken belief that they were on clinic property, when in fact they were on
public property. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the officers had no duty to investigate
property boundaries when they had reasonably trustworthy information about them,
even if it was ultimately erroneous. Id. at 546-47. In Logsdon v. Hains 492 F.3d 334
(6th Cir. 2007), a man demonstrating outside of an abortion clinic was arrested (on
public property) for criminal trespass after he had entered the clinic parking lot to
retrieve his antiabortion sign which a member of the clinic had removed from a
neighboring fence. The Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court’s dismissal of the
plaintiff-demonstrator’s ensuing § 1983 action because “officers initially assessing
probable cause to arrest may not off-handedly disregard potentially exculpatory
information made readily available by witnesses on the scene.” Id. at 343. The Court
discussed both cases in its October Order, ultimately concluding that Skovgard was
the better guide due to Chung having personally witnessed Healy on the Surgical
Center’s property. See doc. 89, # 1860-61.
Healy argues that Logsdon is the more apt case because she contends that
Chung failed to consider the potentially exculpatory information shouted to him by
the other demonstrators (e.g., that Healy had never visited the Surgical Center
before, and thus was unaware of the property boundaries). The Court addressed this
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argument in the October Order as well. Id. Chung’s personal observation of Healy on
the Surgical Center property distinguishes him from the officer in Logsdon, who
relied entirely on a report of trespassing communicated via telephone, and
disregarded other available sources of information. Furthermore, Chung’s effort to
identify Healy—an effort which she purposefully resisted (see doc. 82, # 1795)—was
the appropriate means of investigating the potentially exculpatory information.
Again, Healy has raised no grounds warranting relief from judgment on this issue.
iii. Qualified Immunity not Barred by Factual Disputes.
As a final point, Healy argues that the Court should not have concluded that
Chung was entitled to qualified immunity upon a body of disputed facts. This, too,
was specifically addressed in the October Order. See doc. 89, # 1858-59. In short, while
the body of evidence presents issues in need of a fact finder, the world of reasonable
possibilities contained therein does not include one in which Chung would have
understood himself to be acting unlawfully by detaining Healy.
CONCLUSION
Because Healy has identified no grounds justifying relief from this Court’s
Orders pursuant to Rule 60(b), Healy’s motion is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James L. Graham
JAMES L. GRAHAM
United States District Judge
DATE: October 16, 2026
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