Brownfield v. Cherokee County School District No. 35 et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
OSCAR BROWNFIELD, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-21-312-GLJ
)
CHEROKEE COUNTY SCHOOL 	)
DISTRICT NO. 35, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is the sua sponte order of the Court for Plaintiff to show cause as
to why sanctions should not be assessed for the filing of a document containing false or
misleading information and citations [Dkt. 180]. On March 17, 2026, a hearing was held
on the show cause order and Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and
Integrated Brief [Dkt. 158]. See Docket No. 183. For the reasons stated below, the Court
finds that an order of sanctions against Plaintiff under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 is appropriate.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Oscar Brownfield filed this action against Defendants Independent School
District No. 35 a/k/a Tahlequah Public Schools (“TPS”) and various individuals in their
individual and official capacities arising out of his experiences with the school district as a
volunteer youth wrestling coach and substitute teacher. Plaintiff alleged claims under Title
IX, Title VII, and the First Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The only remaining
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claim is Plaintiff’s claim of Title IX retaliation against TPS related to his removal from the
youth wrestling coach position and from the substitute teaching lists. See Docket No. 181.1
On November 20, 2025, Plaintiff filed his Motion for Sanctions Under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 11 and Integrated Brief (“Sanctions Motion”). 	See Docket No. 158. 	Plaintiff’s
Sanctions Motion asserted that various Defendants and their counsel violated Fed. R. Civ.
P. 11(b)(3) by presenting factual contentions in their Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt.
144] that lacked evidentiary support and were known to be false when filed. 	In their
response to the Sanctions Motion, Defendant identified multiple case citations that either
did not exist, commonly referred to as fictitious citations or hallucinations, or did not stand
for the legal proposition for which it was cited. See Docket No. 161, pp. 10-13. In their
response, Defendants further sought sanctions against Plaintiff in the amount of their
attorney’s fees and costs for responding to the Sanctions Motion. Id., pp. 7-8.2
After reviewing the Sanctions Motion and concurring with Defendants’ concern
over multiple case citations, the undersigned entered the Order that Plaintiff show cause as
to why sanctions should not be assessed for the filing of a document containing false or
misleading information and citations and set a hearing for March 17, 2026. 	See Docket
No. 180. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed his Response to Minute Order and Pre-Hearing Brief
Regarding Citations in Dockt No. 158 in which he acknowledged and admitted using
Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) to assist in organizing legal research for his Sanctions Motion
1 On March 5, 2026, the Court dismissed all other claims and the remaining defendants except for
TPS. See Docket No. 181.
2 On March 17, 2026, Plaintiff’s Sanctions Motion was denied. See Docket No. 184.
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and not double-checking every citation in such motion. 	See Docket No. 182. 	Although
acknowledging problems with some of the authorities he cited, Plaintiffs continued to argue
sanctions against Defendant were supported by the factual record. 	Id. 	Plaintiff further
informed the Court that the Sanctions Motion is the only pleading in which he used AI for
legal citations and that he recently completed a two-month AI program offered by Johns
Hopkins 	University, 	which 	covered 	topics 	such 	as 	AI 	hallucinations 	and 	ethical
considerations. Id. Plaintiff also committed to not using AI for any further matter before
this Court. Id.
In addition to the show cause order, the Court also ordered Defendants' counsel to
appear at the March 17, 2026 hearing and be prepared with an affidavit presenting itemized
fees and costs related to responding to Plaintiff's Sanctions Motion. 	At the hearing,
Defendant presented the affidavit of Kent B. Rainey, counsel for Defendants, in which he
set out that Defendants incurred a total of $7,032.00 in attorney’s fees responding to the
Sanctions Motion. See Docket No. 183, Defendant’s Hearing Ex. 1.
II. 	ANALYSIS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 provides, inter alia, that “[b]y presenting to the
court a pleading, written motion, or other paper . . . an attorney or unrepresented party
certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after
an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances[ ] . . . the claims, defenses, and other legal
contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending,
modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b),
(b)(2) (emphasis added). 	At its core, an attorney or an unrepresented party who signs a
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legal document certifies that they have “read the document, [have] conducted a reasonable
inquiry into the facts and the law and [are] satisfied that the document is well grounded in
both, and is acting without any improper motive.” Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic
Commc’ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 542 (1991). “The central purpose of Rule 11 is to
deter baseless filings in district court[.]” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384,
393 (1990). A failure to comply with such obligations may result in a sanction. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 11(c).
Determining whether sanctions are warranted involves two steps. 	Adamson v.
Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 672 (10th Cir. 1988). 	The “court first must find that a pleading
violates Rule 11.” 	Collins v. Daniels, 916 F.3d 1302, 1319 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting
Adamson, 855 F.2d at 672). 	“At this step, the person signing the pleading’s conduct is
evaluated “under a standard of objective reasonableness—whether a reasonable attorney
admitted to practice before the district court would file such a document.” 	Id. at 1320
(quoting Predator Int’l, Inc. v. Gamo Outdoor USA, Inc., 793 F.3d 1177, 1182 (10th Cir.
2015)). 	See also Grays v. Blackhawk Acquisitions, LLC, 2024 WL 3179541, at *1 (D.
Colo. June 26, 2024) (The issue is whether counsel’s or a pro se party’s conduct was
reasonable under the circumstances of the case) (citing Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109
F.3d 288, 293 (6th Cir. 1997)).
Second, if the conduct violates Rule 11, a court then imposes an appropriate
sanction. 	Adamson, 855 F.2d at 672. 	Pro se parties are subject to Rule 11 and potential
sanctions thereunder. See, e.g., Chumpitaz-Morales v. Bondi, 2026 WL 382144, at *4 (10th
Cir. Feb. 11, 2026) (finding the pro se parties’ brief misrepresents the holdings of several
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cases and the court may sanction parties who make such misrepresentations); Harris v.
Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 2025 WL 1310122, at *2 (D. Colo. May 6, 2025)
(“The use of fictitious quotes or cases in filings may subject a party, including a pro se
party, to sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 as “pro se litigants are
subject to Rule 11 just as attorneys are.”) (quoting Rasmussen v. Burnett, 2025 WL 808364,
at *3 (D. Colo. March 12, 2025)). Courts have “significant discretion in determining what
sanctions, if any, should be imposed for a violation[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b), (c) advisory
committee note to 1993 amendment.
Finally, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court liberally construes his
pleadings. See Green v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915, 917 (10th Cir. 1992) (requiring courts to
liberally construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th
Cir. 1991) (a court construes a pro se party’s pleadings liberally and holds them “to a less
stringent standard than [that applied to] formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”). Although
pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than ones drafted by lawyers, a pro se
litigant must “‘follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.’” Garrett v.
Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Nielsen v.
Price, 17 F.3d 1276, 1277 (10th Cir. 1994)).
A. Plaintiff’s Conduct Violates Rule 11(b)
In their response, Defendants identify eight cases cited in Plaintiff’s Sanctions
Motion that either do not exist, did not stand for the legal proposition for which it was
cited, do not contain the quoted language, held the opposite of the holding represented by
Plaintiff, or has facts and/or an outcome contrary to those represented by Plaintiff. 	See
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Docket No. 161, pp. 11-13. 	Plaintiff does not challenge or dispute the inaccuracy of the
case citations identified by Defendants. Indeed, Plaintiff concedes he used a generative AI
tool to assist in legal research for the Sanctions Motion and did not check those citations
for accuracy. See Docket No. 182.
“Federal courts increasingly confront filings prepared with the assistance of
generative artificial intelligence. While such tools can enhance efficiency, they also create
a new professional hazard, synthetic authority presented as precedent.” Mattox v. Product
Innovations Research, LLC, 807 F.Supp.3d 1341, 1347 (E.D. Okla. 2025). As the use of
AI in legal representation has increased, so have incidences of fictitious or inaccurate
citations resulting from such AI tools. Presentation of inaccurate authorities in pleadings
resulting from AI subject to the signing party to sanctions. 	See, e.g., Hill v. Oklahoma,
2025 WL 1840659, at *4 (W.D. Okla. July 3, 2025) (“[C]ourts have increasingly found the
imposition of sanctions proper in response to an attorney's conduct in citing ‘fake cases’
that 	are 	‘hallucinations’ 	generated 	by 	an 	artificial 	intelligence 	platform.”) 	(citing
Wadsworth v. Walmart, 348 F.R.D. 489, 495-496 (D. Wyo. 2025) (citing fake cases in a
signed motion violated Rule 11(b)(2) and subjected attorneys to imposition of monetary
sanctions); Bunce v. Visual Technology Innovations, Inc., 2025 WL 662398 at *1 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 27, 2025) (imposing sanctions where the attorney filed two separate motions that cited
two cases that could not be located “on any legal research tool . . . .”); Ramirez v. Humala,
2025 WL 1384161 at * 1 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2025) (collecting cases finding “the
submission of nonexistent case citations in filings to the court to constitute sanctionable
conduct” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2)). 	Plaintiff admits he did not check the case
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citations generated by AI and, thus, he did not conduct a reasonable inquiry into the law
submitted in his Sanctions Motion. 	Therefore, the Court finds the Plaintiff’s submission
of a pleading containing fictitious cases and inaccurate cases references warrants sanctions.
B. Sanctions
For the second step, the court imposes sanctions. 	Adamson, 855 F.2d at 672. 	A
finding of subjective bad faith is not required to impose sanctions. Burkhart ex rel. Meeks
v. Kinsley Bank, 804 F.2d 588, 589–90 (10th Cir. 1986). “Rule 11 sanctions are meant to
serve several purposes, including (1) deterring future litigation abuse, (2) punishing present
litigation abuse, (3) compensating victims of litigation abuse, and (4) streamlining court
dockets and facilitating case management.” 	White v. Gen. Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675,
683 (10th Cir. 1990); King v. Fleming, 899 F.3d 1140, 1148 (10th Cir. 2018) (“The court
must consider the purposes to be served by the imposition of sanctions and so limit its
sanctions ‘to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by
others similarly situated.’”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4)). 	An appropriate sanction
should be the least severe sanction to adequately deter and punish. White, 908 F.2d at 684
(citing Doering v. Union Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 195 (3d Cir.
1988); Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 466–67 (4th Cir. 1987)).
Acknowledging his use of AI assisted legal research in the Sanctions Motion,
Plaintiff took the affirmative remedial step of completing a two-month AI program costing
$1,800 that covered AI hallucinations and ethical issues prior to the show cause hearing.
See Docket No. 182. 	Plaintiff further pledged not to use any generative AI tool in any
future 	matter 	before 	this 	Court. 	Id. 	While 	the 	Court 	commends 	Plaintiff 	for
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acknowledging his use of AI and taking responsibility for the inaccurate citations resulting
therefrom, the Court must still consider the White factors in assessing an appropriate
sanction. 	The saliant factors under the circumstances of this case are punishing present
litigation abuse and compensating the victims of the litigation abuse. 	Id. 	Of note,
Defendants’ counsel spent time searching for and analyzing the authorities cited in the
Sanctions Motion. Although not broken down specifically in Mr. Rainey’s affidavit, it is
reasonable to conclude that Defendant’s attorneys incurred time attempting to locate the
authorities cited and reviewing those cases for the propositions for which Plaintiff cited
them. See Docket No. 183, Defendant’s Hearing Ex. 1. It is unclear, however, how much
of the $7,032.00 in attorney’s fees incurred in responding to the Sanctions Motion was
incurred exclusively because of the fictitious or inaccurate citations generated by AI.
Therefore, the Court declines to sanction Plaintiff for the full amount of the Defendant’s
claimed attorney’s fees incurred for responding to the Sanctions Motion. Instead, Plaintiff
is sanctioned $500 for his failure to comply with and meet his obligations under Fed. R. of
Civ. P. 11(b) in submitting a pleading with fictitious and inaccurate citations. 	This
represents approximately two hours of Ms. Albers billable hourly rate in researching and
identifying such citations. 	Furthermore, this amount serves as both punishment for the
presentation of such citations and compensates Defendant for legal expenses resulting
therefrom. In conjunction with Plaintiff’s representation of himself pro se in this matter,
his candor and proactive remedial measures, and his pledge not to make further use of AI
in this case, the Court believes this sanction is appropriate as the least severe sanction to
adequately deter and punish Plaintiff’s conduct. Plaintiff is admonished, however, that any
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future filing of any improper pleading or other Rule 11 violation will likely result in a much
more severe sanction.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court hereby sanctions Plaintiff Oscar Brownfield pursuant to
Rule 11 in the amount of $500 and further orders that he shall pay such amount to
Defendant Independent School District No. 35 of Cherokee County a/k/a Tahlequah Public
Schools by delivery to Defendant’s counsel within thirty days of this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 19th day of March, 2026.
_____________________________________
GERALD L. JACKSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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