Shaik v. Williams et al.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
ZAK SHAIK, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-24-253-JFH-GLJ
)
JAMES A. WILLIAMS, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER
Plaintiff, Zak Shaik, proceeding pro se, filed this action on July 19, 2024. Docket
No. 2. On October 1, 2024, the Court referred this case to the undersigned Magistrate Judge
for all further proceedings in accordance with jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. Docket No. 23. Before the Court now is Plaintiff’s Motion for Service
of Process by U.S. Marshals Service [Docket No. 60]. For the reasons set forth below, the
motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this civil rights action on July 19, 2024, on behalf of himself and Baari
Ardmore Housing, LLC, against Defendants James A. Williams, Okie Plumbin, LLC,
Rebecca Johnson, Johnson Law Firm, PLLC, Mark Melton in his individual and official
capacity, Murray County, and John Does alleging, inter alia, civil rights violations. Docket
No. 1, at p. 1. Plaintiff was granted in Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) status on July 22, 2024, and
on December 20, 2024, his IFP status was revoked. Docket Nos. 5 & 29. Plaintiff appealed
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the decision to revoke his IFP status, and on September 17, 2025, the appeal was denied as
moot in light of Plaintiff’s voluntary payment of the filing fee. Docket Nos. 46 & 47.
On October 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint against Defendants
James A. Williams, Rebecca Johnson, Collins Zorn & Wagner, PLLC, and “certain John
Doe County officials.” Docket No. 52, at p. 1. The Amended Complaint removed Baari
Ardmore Housing, LLC, as a Plaintiff and Johnson Law Firm, PLLC, Mark Melton in his
individual or official capacity, Murray County, Oklahoma, and Okie Plumbin, LLC as
defendants. See Docket No. 52. On November 17, 2025, summons were issued as to the
remaining Defendants. In light of the appeal of Claimant’s IFP status, the Court found
Plaintiff’s had until January 7, 2026, to serve Defendants. Docket No. 53. On February 2,
2026, the Court Ordered Plaintiff to show cause as to why this action should not be
dismissed for his failure to timely serve the Defendants. Docket No. 58. Plaintiff now
moves to have service effectuated by the U.S. Marshals Service (“USMS”) or, in the
alternative, for an extension of time to serve Defendants.
ANALYSIS
Service by U.S. Marshal Service. Generally, “[t]he plaintiff is responsible for having
the summons and complaint served within the time allowed by Rule 4(m) and must furnish
the necessary copies to the person who makes service.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1). However,
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) provides that “[a]t the plaintiff’s request, the court may order that
service by made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal or by a person specially
appointed by the Court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). Where Plaintiff is not proceeding in forma
pauperis, “the decision whether to order the U.S. Marshal to serve the Summons and
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Complaint is left to the sound discretion of the Court.” Freeman v. Raytheon Techs. Corp.,
2022 WL 1984163, at *2 (D. Colo. June 6, 2022) (quoting Palmer v. City & Cnty. of
Denver, 2019 WL 1118025, at *2 (D. Colo. Jan 8, 2019)). “[P]laintiff is expected first to
seek service by private means whenever feasible rather than impose the burden on the
Marshals Service[, and] . . . court orders directing service by marshal should not be issued
unless they really are necessary.” Amendments to Fed. R. of Civ. Proc., Advisory
Committee Notes, 93 F.R.D. 225, 262 (1981). As such, plaintiffs are responsible “to first
‘seek service by private means whenever feasible rather than impose the burden on the
Marshal’s service.’” York v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2008 WL 2410416, at *2 (D. Colo.
June 11, 2008) (quoting 93 F.R.D. at 262).
Here, Plaintiff is not proceeding in forma pauperis and does not provide any valid
reason as to why the Court should order service on his behalf. Plaintiff indicates good cause
exists to order the USMS to effectuate service because his previous service attempt, via a
private process server not licensed in Oklahoma, was unsuccessful. The Court, however,
does not find this demonstrates the requisite necessity for service by the USMS as Plaintiff
fails to explain why he cannot retain a process server that is able to serve the defendants in
this matter. See Towers v. Abott, 2025 WL 1114201, at *3 (D. Kan. Apr. 15, 2025) (“In
sum, Towers is not proceeding in forma pauperis and does not provide any valid reason
why the court should order service on her behalf. To be clear, the court appreciates that it
may be onerous to effectuate service of process on all of the defendants in this action given
their sheer number. However, that is a result of her own choice to bring this case against
so many defendants. And while it is certainly her prerogative to do so, it is not a valid
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justification to shift the burden to the USMS or the court to effectuate service of process
on defendants.”); Bellinsky v. Galan, 2023 WL 12130692, at *2 (D. Colo. Dec. 20, 2023)
(“The Motion gives the Court no reason to conclude that the involvement of the USMS is
‘really necessary’ to effectuate service[.]”); Ovalle v. Fresno Bee Newspapers, 2009 WL
398094, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb 12, 2009). As such, Plaintiff’s Motion for Service of Process
by U.S. Marshals Service [Docket No. 60] is DENIED in this respect.
Extension of Time to Serve. Alternatively, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant him
an extension of time to serve Defendants. Here, Plaintiff fails to show good cause for his
failure to serve Defendants within the time limit prescribed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
Nonetheless, the Court grants Plaintiff a permissive extension of sixty days from the date
of this Order, or until April 27, 2026, to effectuate proper service under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.
Espinoza v. U.S., 52 F.3d 838, 841 (10th Cir. 1995) (“The plain language of Rule 4(m),
however, broadens the district court’s discretion by allowing it to extend the time for
service even when the plaintiff has not shown good cause.”).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Service of Process by U.S. Marshals Service
[Docket No. 60] is GRANTED IN PART to the extent it requests Plaintiff be granted an
extension of time to serve Defendants and DENIED IN PART to the extent it requests
service by the USMS. Thus, Plaintiff has until Monday, April 27, 2026, to serve
Defendants.
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IT IS SO ORDERED this 26th day of February, 2026.
GERALD L. JACKSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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