Janota v. Love County Board of County Commissioners et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
THE ESTATE OF JAMES DEAN JANOTA,
Plaintiff,
v.
LOVE 	COUNTY 	BOARD 	OF
COMMISSIONERS, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 24-CV-326-FAB-GLJ
OPINION 	AND 	ORDER
BESOSA, Senior District Judge1
Before the Court are four Reports and Recommendations issued
by 	United 	States 	Magistrate 	Judge 	Gerald 	L. 	Jackson. 	(Docket
Nos. 164-167.) 	Together, the magistrate judge recommends granting
all 	the 	Motions 	to 	Dismiss 	(Docket 	Nos. 	111, 	113, 	116, 	137, 	138)
filed by the various defendants in this civil rights and negligence
action 	involving 	the 	death 	of 	Mr. 	James 	Dean 	Janota. 	His 	Estate
(“plaintiff”) 	timely 	filed 	Objections 	to 	each 	Report 	and
Recommendation. 	(Docket Nos. 170-173.) 	The Court will ultimately
adopt 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s 	recommendations, 	however, 	and 	GRANT
all defendants’ Motions to Dismiss.
1 Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 292(d). 	See Docket No. 181.
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BACKGROUND
Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	the 	Love 	County 	Sheriff’s 	office
arrested Mr. Janota on December 3, 2021 in Love County, Oklahoma.
(Docket 	No. 	109 	at 	¶¶ 	25-27.) 	Sheriff 	officers 	noticed 	that
Mr. Janota 	was 	visibly 	intoxicated 	during 	his 	arrest. 	Id.
Mr. Janota was then transported to the Love County Justice Center.
Id. ¶ 28. 	Upon his admission, Mr. Janota and his mother notified
several 	Justice 	Center 	employees, 	including 	detention 	officers
Stefan 	Williams 	and 	Kara 	Hurst, 	and 	Jail 	Administrator 	Crystal
Boyd, that he suffered from alcoholism and that he might experience
withdrawal 	symptoms 	and 	seizures. 	Id. 	¶¶ 	29, 	83. 	Defendants
Williams, 	Hurst, 	and 	Boyd 	were 	also 	“directly 	involved 	in 	Mr.
Janota’s admission and personally observed his condition.” 	Id. ¶
30. 	They did not, however, refer Janota for medical evaluation or
assessment. 	Id. ¶ 32.
At a later unspecified time, Mr. Janota suffered “withdrawal
symptoms” 	and 	suffered 	a 	seizure. 	Id. 	¶ 	33. 	This 	seizure
ultimately caused him to fall and suffer a traumatic head injury.
Id. 	Williams, 	Hurst, 	and 	Boyd 	then 	“personally 	attended” 	to
Mr. Janota, stood him in an upright position and attempted to move
him, 	and 	contacted 	emergency 	services 	to 	transport 	him 	to 	a
hospital. 	Id. ¶¶ 34-36.
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Following Mr. Janota’s injury, Love County Emergency Medical
Services (“EMS”) transported him by ambulance to an emergency room
at Mercy Hospital Ardmore (“Mercy Ardmore”). 	Id. ¶ 37. 	Although
Mr. 	Janota 	suffered 	another 	seizure 	in 	transit 	and 	“rapidly
declin[ed],” 	the 	ambulance 	staff 	did 	not 	turn 	on 	the 	vehicle’s
light or sirens. 	Id. ¶¶ 38-39. 	Upon his arrival at the emergency
room, 	Mercy 	Ardmore 	personnel 	did 	not 	order 	an 	immediate 	head 	CT
scan 	even 	though 	Mr. 	Janota 	had 	“dangerously 	high 	blood 	pressure
and tachycardia.” 	Id. ¶¶ 41-42. 	Consequently, Mr. Janota remained
tachycardic and with high blood pressure for the four hours he was
at the hospital. 	Mercy Ardmore personnel also failed to notice or
diagnose 	abrasions 	that 	were 	indicative 	of 	severe 	brain 	injury.
Id. 	¶¶ 	43-44. 	An 	ambulance 	then 	transported 	Mr. 	Janota 	to 	the
University 	of 	Oklahoma 	Medical 	Center, 	where 	he 	died 	from 	his
injuries in the early morning of December 4, 2021. 	Id. ¶¶ 46-47.
On 	August 	16, 	2023, 	Mr. 	Janota’s 	Estate, 	represented 	by 	his
mother, 	sued 	several 	of 	the 	current 	defendants 	for 	their 	alleged
misconduct 	in 	the 	District 	Court 	of 	Love 	County, 	Oklahoma. 	See
Case 	No. 	CJ-2023-044. 	The 	Estate 	dismissed 	that 	lawsuit 	on
February 	8, 	2024, 	however, 	without 	prosecuting 	the 	case 	or
obtaining a summons to serve on defendants. 	Id. 	It then refiled
this 	case 	in 	this 	Court 	on 	September 	13, 	2024, 	(Docket 	No. 	2,)
pursuant to Oklahoma’s Saving Statute, 12 Okla. Stat. § 100, which
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allows a plaintiff to refile a claim within one year of dismissal
when the claim has otherwise expired under the applicable statute
of limitations. 	(Docket No. 2 at ¶ 19.)
Plaintiff 	Estate 	has 	amended 	its 	federal 	complaint 	three
times 	since 	then. 	The 	operative 	complaint 	— 	the 	Third 	Amended
Complaint — alleges the following claims:
• 	Against 	officers 	Williams 	and 	Hurst, 	and
administrator Boyd — (1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for
their 	deliberate 	indifference 	to 	Mr. 	Janota’s 	Eighth
and/or Fourteenth Amendment rights, and (2) a wrongful
death claim under Oklahoma law;
• 	Against the Love County Board of County Commissioners,
the 	Love 	County 	Jail 	Trust, 	and 	the 	Love 	County
Sheriff 	in 	his 	official 	capacity 	(“Love 	County
Defendants”) — (1) a section 1983 claim for deliberate
indifference to Mr. Janota’s Eighth and/or Fourteenth
Amendment 	rights, 	(2) 	a 	violation 	of 	his
constitutional 	rights 	pursuant 	to 	Article 	II, 	§ 9 	of
the 	Oklahoma 	Constitution, 	(3) 	a 	negligence 	claim
pursuant 	to 	Oklahoma 	law, 	and 	(4) 	a 	wrongful 	death
claim also pursuant to Oklahoma law;
• 	Against 	the 	Board 	of 	Trustees 	of 	The 	Love 	County
Emergency 	Medical 	Services 	District 	(“EMS 	Board”) 	—
(1) 	a 	section 	1983 	claim 	for 	deliberate 	indifference
to 	Mr. 	Janota’s 	Eighth 	and/or 	Fourteenth 	Amendment
rights, 	(2) 	a 	violation 	of 	his 	constitutional 	rights
pursuant 	to 	Article 	II, 	§ 	9 	of 	the 	Oklahoma
Constitution, 	(3) 	a 	negligence 	claim 	pursuant 	to
Oklahoma law, and (4) a wrongful death claim pursuant
to Oklahoma law; and
• 	Against 	Mercy 	Ardmore 	— 	(1) 	a 	negligence 	claim 	and
(2) 	wrongful 	death 	claim, 	both 	pursuant 	to 	Oklahoma
law.
(Docket No. 109.)
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All of the defendants moved to dismiss the Estate’s claims on
various 	grounds, 	including 	failure 	to 	state 	a 	claim, 	sovereign
immunity, 	and 	untimeliness 	based 	on 	the 	statute 	of 	limitations.
The magistrate judge found, however, that dismissal was warranted
for 	reasons 	other 	than 	the 	statute 	of 	limitations. 	And 	because
the Court may dismiss plaintiff’s claims based on failure to state
a 	claim, 	sovereign 	immunity, 	and 	supplementary 	jurisdiction
grounds, 	the 	Court 	need 	not 	review 	those 	statute 	of 	limitations
issues. 	The Court will explain its reasons for dismissal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
After 	a 	Report 	and 	Recommendation 	has 	been 	issued, 	“a 	party
may 	serve 	and 	file 	specific 	written 	objections 	to 	the 	proposed
findings and recommendations.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 	The Court
“must 	determine 	de 	novo 	any 	part 	of 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s
disposition that has been properly objected to. 	The district judge
may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive
further 	evidence; 	or 	return 	the 	matter 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge
with 	instructions.” 	Id.; 	see 	also 28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	636(b)(1). 	Any
objections 	not 	properly 	raised, 	however, 	are 	waived 	for 	purposes
of review by the Court. 	Klein v. Harper, 777 F.3d 1144, 1147 (10th
Cir. 2015); Silva v. United States, 45 F.4th 1134, 1136 n. 2 (10th
Cir. 	2022). 	An 	objection 	to 	a 	report 	and 	recommendation 	is
properly raised if it is both timely and specific. 	United States
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v. One Parcel of Real Property Known as 2121 E. 30th St., 73 F.3d
1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996). 	An objection is sufficiently specific
if 	it 	“enables 	the 	district 	judge 	to 	focus 	attention 	on 	those
issues — factual and legal — that are at the heart of the parties’
dispute.” 	Id. 	“In the absence of a proper objection, the district
court 	may 	review 	a 	magistrate 	judge’s 	recommendation 	under 	any
standard 	it 	deems 	appropriate.” 	Davis 	v. 	GEO 	Grp. 	Corr., 	Inc.,
No. CIV-16-00462-PRW, 2023 WL 2536727, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 16,
2023) 	(citing 	Summers 	v. 	State 	of 	Utah, 	927 	F.2d 	1165, 	1167-68
(10th Cir. 1991)). 	“Mere regurgitation of original arguments does
not 	trigger 	the 	Court’s 	obligation 	to 	perform 	de 	novo 	review.”
United 	States 	v. 	Kirby, 	No. 	23-CR-026-JFH, 	2023 	WL 	3956685, 	at
*2-3 (E.D. Okla. June 12, 2023).
AUTHORITY AND ANALYSIS
I. 	WILLIAMS, 	HURST, 	AND 	BOYD’S 	MOTIONS 	TO 	DISMISS 	(Docket
Nos. 137-138)
Plaintiff sued officers Williams and Hurst, and administrator
Boyd, 	in 	their 	individual 	capacities 	pursuant 	to 	(1) 	42 	U.S.C.
§ 1983 	for 	their 	deliberate 	indifference 	to 	Mr. 	Janota’s 	Eighth
and/or 	Fourteenth 	Amendment 	rights 	under 	the 	United 	States
Constitution, and (2) a wrongful death claim pursuant to Oklahoma
law, 	see 	Docket 	No. 	109 	at 16-19, 	alleging 	that 	those 	three
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defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs
by failing to:
i. 	refer 	Mr. 	Janota 	for 	an 	adequate 	medical
assessment 	of 	his 	conditions 	prior 	to 	his 	head
injury;
ii. 	supervise Mr. Janota prior to his seizure and
head injury;
iii. provide 	appropriate 	emergency 	care 	once 	they
discovered his head injury; and
iv. 	secure 	and 	move 	him 	safely 	while 	waiting 	for
emergency services to transport him to the hospital
for his head injury.
(Docket 	No. 	109 	at 	6, 	16-17.) 	The 	magistrate 	judge 	concluded,
however, 	that 	plaintiff 	failed 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	pursuant 	to
section 1983 	and 	recommended 	dismissal. 	(Docket 	No. 	164 	at 	28.)
The 	magistrate 	judge 	also 	recommended 	dismissing 	plaintiff’s
wrongful 	death 	claim 	because, 	among 	other 	reasons, 	it 	lacked
specificity under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). 	Id.
Plaintiff 	now 	objects 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s 	Report 	and
Recommendation, arguing that the Third Amended Complaint states a
section 	1983 	claim 	against 	Williams, 	Hurst, 	and 	Boyd. 	(Docket
No. 171.) 	For 	the 	following 	reasons, 	plaintiff’s 	objections 	are
overruled.
A. 	Plaintiff 	fails 	to 	state 	a 	section 	1983 	claim 	against
Williams, Hurst, and Boyd.
State actors sued in their individual capacities may be
liable pursuant to section 1983 for their deliberate indifference
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to 	a 	pretrial 	detainee’s 	serious 	medical 	needs. 	See 	García 	v.
Salt 	Lake 	Cty., 	768 	F.2d 	303, 	307 	(10th 	Cir. 	1985). 	The 	Tenth
Circuit 	Court 	of 	Appeals 	“recognize[s] 	two 	types 	of 	conduct
constituting deliberate indifference” in those scenarios. 	Sealock
v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1211 (10th Cir. 2000). 	The first type
is 	when 	medical 	professionals 	“fail 	to 	treat 	a 	serious 	medical
condition properly.” 	Id. 	The second type is when prison officials
“prevent an inmate from receiving treatment or deny him access to
medical 	personnel 	capable 	of 	evaluating 	the 	need 	for 	treatment.”
Id.
Plaintiff does not allege that Williams, Hurst, and Boyd
were medical professionals who failed to treat Mr. Janota’s medical
conditions. 	Plaintiff 	instead 	alleges 	that 	Williams, 	Hurst, 	and
Boyd prevented Mr. Janota from receiving treatment or evaluation.
Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	must 	examine 	the 	allegations 	against
Williams, Hurst, and Boyd based on their roles as “gatekeepers” of
Mr. 	Janota’s 	medical 	treatment. 	“The 	inquiry 	under 	a 	gatekeeper
theory 	is 	not 	whether 	the 	prison 	official 	provided 	some 	care 	but
rather 	whether 	they 	fulfilled 	their 	sole 	obligation 	to 	refer 	or
otherwise afford access to medical personnel capable of evaluating
a patient’s treatment needs when such an obligation arises.” 	Lucas
v. 	Turn 	Key 	Health 	Clinics, 	LLC, 	58 	F.4th 	1127, 	1139 	(10th 	Cir.
2023); 	see 	also 	Paugh 	v. 	Uintah 	Cnty., 	47 	F.4th 	1139, 	1154 	(10th
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Case No. 24-CV-326-FAB-GLJ 	9
Cir. 	2022) 	(“[W]hen 	prison 	officials 	prevent 	an 	inmate 	from
receiving treatment or deny him access to medical personnel capable
of 	evaluating 	the 	need 	for 	treatment, 	they 	may 	be 	liable 	for
deliberate 	indifference.”) 	Whether 	a 	jailer 	was 	deliberately
indifferent 	to 	his 	gatekeeping 	obligation 	depends 	on 	“the
objective severity of the harm suffered as well as the subjective
mental state of the defendant with respect to such harms.” 	Prince
v. 	Sheriff 	of 	Carter 	Cnty., 	28 	F.4th 	1033, 	1043–44 	(10th 	Cir.
2022).
A plaintiff can satisfy the objective component based on
a delay in medical care if the delay resulted in substantial harm.
Paugh, 47 F.4th at 1155. 	“The ‘substantial harm’ may be based on
‘an intermediate injury’ . . . [o]r it may be based on the inmate’s
‘ultimate 	harm.’” 	Id. 	(quoting 	Al-Turki 	v. 	Robinson, 	762 	F.3d
1188, 	1193 	(10th 	Cir. 	2014) 	and 	Mata 	v. 	Saiz, 	427 	F.3d 	745, 	751
(10th 	Cir. 	2005)). 	The 	Tenth 	Circuit 	Court 	of 	Appeals 	has
“consistently 	held 	that 	death 	qualifies 	as 	a 	‘substantial 	harm’
that 	satisfies 	the 	objective 	component.” 	Id. 	(listing 	cases).
Here, plaintiff has alleged that Mr. Janota died from a head injury
after 	passing 	out 	from 	a 	seizure. 	The 	three 	officers 	do 	not
challenge this objective component.
Instead, they challenge the subjective component of this
test. 	“To prevail on the subjective component, the prisoner must
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Case No. 24-CV-326-FAB-GLJ 	10
show that the defendants knew he faced a substantial risk of harm
and disregarded that risk, by failing to take reasonable measures
to 	abate 	it.” 	Martínez 	v. 	Beggs, 	563 	F.3d 	1082, 	1089 	(10th 	Cir.
2009) (quotations and citations omitted). 	Whether an official had
the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk may be demonstrated
by inferences from circumstantial evidence or by allegations that
the risk would have been reasonably obvious. 	Id.; see also Paugh,
47 F.4th at 1156.
To satisfy this knowledge requirement, plaintiff alleges
that 	the 	three 	officers 	“personally 	observed” 	Mr. 	Janota’s
conditions. 	(Docket 	No. 	109 	at 	¶¶ 	30, 	88.) 	But 	plaintiff 	does
not 	state 	what 	these 	conditions 	were. 	At 	most, 	plaintiff 	states
that 	Mr. 	Janota 	was 	“visibly 	intoxicated” 	when 	law 	enforcement
arrested 	him. 	Id. 	at 	¶ 	26. 	But 	assuming 	that 	intoxication 	was
the 	condition 	plaintiff 	references, 	“characteristics 	common 	to
many 	intoxicated 	individuals 	do 	not 	present 	an 	obvious 	risk.”
Quintana 	v. 	Santa 	Fe 	Cnty. 	Bd. 	of 	Commissioners, 	973 	F.3d 	1022,
1029 (10th Cir. 2020). 	Accordingly, plaintiff cannot satisfy this
knowledge 	requirement 	by 	pointing 	to 	the 	officers’ 	personal
observations of Mr. Janota’s intoxication.
Relying 	on 	Paugh 	v. 	Uintah 	Cnty., 	47 	F.4th 	1139 	(10th
Cir. 	2022), 	plaintiff 	also 	argues 	that 	the 	three 	officers 	knew
Mr. Janota 	would 	suffer 	serious 	injury 	or 	death 	absent 	medical
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intervention 	because 	Mr. 	Janota 	and 	his 	mother 	told 	each 	of 	them
about 	his 	seizure 	risk. 	See 	Docket 	No. 	109 	at 	¶¶ 	29, 	88; 	Docket
No. 171 at 2. 	In Paugh, a doctor diagnosed a detainee with chronic
alcoholism 	and 	alcohol 	withdrawal. 	47 	F.4th 	at 	1148. 	Although
the 	doctor 	found 	him 	stable 	enough 	for 	incarceration 	in 	jail, 	he
instructed 	the 	jailers 	to 	bring 	the 	detainee 	back 	to 	the 	medical
center 	if 	his 	alcohol 	withdrawal 	conditions 	worsened. 	Id. 	He
also 	told 	them 	what 	symptoms 	to 	look 	out 	for. 	Id. 	But 	despite
these 	clear 	instructions, 	and 	despite 	observing 	his 	withdrawal
symptoms worsen, the jailers did not take him back to the medical
center, and the detainee ultimately died. 	Id. at 1151-52.
The 	Tenth 	Circuit 	Court 	of 	Appeals 	in 	Paugh 	indicated
that 	the 	doctor’s 	instruction 	— 	combined 	with 	the 	defendants’
observation 	of 	the 	detainee’s 	worsening 	symptoms 	— 	could 	satisfy
the 	subjective 	component’s 	knowledge 	requirement. 	Id. 	at 1158
(“In 	sum, 	given 	Dr. 	Bradbury’s 	instructions, 	a 	reasonable 	jury
could 	find 	that 	it 	would 	have 	been 	‘obvious’ 	to 	any 	reasonable
jail 	official 	that 	Paugh 	needed 	medical 	assistance 	if 	the
Individual Defendants saw Paugh’s condition worsening.”) (emphasis
added). 	And 	because 	there 	was 	sufficient 	evidence 	that 	the
defendants 	had 	observed 	his 	worsening 	conditions, 	the 	Tenth
Circuit 	Court 	of 	Appeals 	held 	that 	those 	defendants 	were 	not
entitled to qualified immunity. 	Id. at 1165.
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In 	other 	words, 	Paugh 	required 	the 	three 	officers 	to
know 	more 	than 	the 	detainee’s 	general 	susceptibility 	to 	alcohol
withdrawal. 	Rather, 	the 	officers 	had 	to 	have 	some 	personal
knowledge about his actual symptoms of withdrawal. 	But plaintiff
did 	not 	allege 	that 	the 	officers 	observed 	any 	of 	the 	withdrawal
symptoms 	Mr. 	Janota 	allegedly 	exhibited 	prior 	to 	his 	seizure.
Furthermore, plaintiff did not allege how often or how seldom the
three 	officers 	monitored 	Mr. Janota; 	whether 	they 	personally
observed 	his 	symptoms; 	or 	whether 	Mr. 	Janota 	told 	the 	officers
that 	he 	was 	experiencing 	withdrawal 	or 	seizure 	symptoms. 	Simply
put, plaintiff fails to allege that the officers knew of any risk
beyond a vague allegation that Mr. Janota could experience alcohol
withdrawal 	symptoms 	at 	some 	point 	in 	the 	future. 	That 	is 	not
sufficient 	to 	satisfy 	the 	subjective 	component’s 	knowledge
requirement.
For 	these 	reasons, 	plaintiff 	fails 	to 	satisfy 	the
subjective 	component 	of 	deliberate 	indifference. 	Accordingly,
plaintiff’s 	section 	1983 	claim 	against 	officers 	Williams, 	Hurst,
and 	Boyd, 	Sheriff’s 	Office 	John 	Does 	1-6, 	and 	Sheriff’s 	Office
Jane Does 1-2 is DISMISSED.
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B. 	Plaintiff’s 	wrongful 	death 	claim 	is 	dismissed 	against
all defendants.
Plaintiff 	also 	alleges 	a 	wrongful 	death 	claim 	against
Williams, 	Hurst, 	and 	Boyd 	based 	on 	12 	Okla. 	Stat. 	§ 	1053. 	Among
other 	reasons, 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	recommended 	dismissing
plaintiff’s 	state 	law 	claims 	because 	it 	lumped 	all 	of 	the
defendants 	together 	without 	identifying 	any 	action 	or 	omission
specific 	to 	each 	individual 	defendant. 	See 	Docket 	No. 	164 	at 	30
(relying 	on 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	8(a)). 	Plaintiff 	did 	not 	object 	to
this finding against any of the defendants, and the Court sees no
reason 	to 	depart 	from 	this 	recommendation. 	Accordingly, 	the
Estate’s wrongful death claim is DISMISSED against all defendants.
II. 	THE 	LOVE 	COUNTY 	DEFENDANTS’ 	MOTION 	TO 	DISMISS 	(Docket
No. 111)
Plaintiff 	also 	asserts 	multiple 	claims 	against 	the 	Love
County 	defendants.2 	These 	are: 	(1) 	a 	section 	1983 	claim 	for
deliberate 	indifference 	to 	Mr. 	Janota’s 	Eighth 	and/or 	Fourteenth
Amendment rights pursuant to the United States Constitution, (2) a
violation 	of 	Mr. 	Janota’s 	constitutional 	rights 	pursuant 	to
Article 2, § 9 of the Oklahoma Constitution, and (3) a negligence
claim 	pursuant 	to 	Oklahoma 	law. 	See 	Docket 	No. 	109. 	To 	support
2 The 	Love 	County 	Board 	of 	Commissioners, 	Love 	County 	Sheriff 	Andy
Cumberledge, and the Love County Jail Trust.
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these claims, plaintiff alleges the Love County defendants failed
to:
i. 	provide 	screening, 	supervision, 	and 	adequate
medical care for Mr. Janota;
ii. 	adequately train and supervise the Sheriff’s staff
and employees and the Love County Justice Center’s
staff and employees; and
iii. 	create 	and 	implement 	adequate 	policies 	and
procedures 	for 	the 	medical 	assessment, 	treatment,
and supervision of individuals in their custody.
(Docket 	No. 	109 	at 	¶ 	84.) 	The 	magistrate 	judge 	ultimately
recommended dismissal of these claims as well. 	(Docket No. 165.)
Over 	plaintiff’s 	objections 	(Docket 	No. 	170,) 	the 	Court 	agrees
that dismissal is warranted, albeit on slightly different grounds
than the magistrate judge.
A. 	Plaintiff’s 	section 	1983 	claim 	against 	the 	Love 	County
defendants is dismissed.
The magistrate judge determined that some of plaintiff’s
allegations — such as failing to adequately screen, supervise, and
provide adequate medical care to Mr. Janota — sought to punish the
Love County defendants for their employees’ misconduct. 	See Docket
No. 	165 	at 	11. 	But, 	as 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	correctly 	pointed
out, 	“municipalities 	are 	responsible 	only 	for 	their 	own 	illegal
acts 	and 	are 	not 	vicariously 	liable 	under 	§ 	1983 	for 	their
employees’ 	actions.” 	George 	v. 	Beaver 	Cnty. 	Bd. 	of 	Comm’rs, 	32
F.4th 	1246, 	1253 	(10th 	Cir. 	2022) 	(quotations 	and 	citations
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omitted); 	see 	Monell 	v. 	Dep’t 	of 	Soc. 	Servs., 	436 	U.S. 	658, 	691
(1978). 	Accordingly, 	plaintiff 	cannot 	state 	a 	claim 	against 	the
Love County defendants based on vicarious liability.
Nevertheless, claims against a municipality can survive
dismissal if the plaintiff alleges a “failure to adequately train
or 	supervise 	employees, 	so 	long 	as 	that 	failure 	results 	from
deliberate 	indifference 	to 	the 	injuries 	that 	may 	be 	caused.”
Waller 	v. 	City 	& 	Cty. 	of 	Denver, 	932 	F.3d 	1277, 	1283 	(10th 	Cir.
2019). 	Failure to adopt a policy or custom can form the basis of
section 1983 liability as well. 	See Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d
1299, 	1308 	(10th 	Cir. 	1998). 	Because 	plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	the
Love County defendants failed to train or supervise their employees
and 	adopt 	an 	adequate 	policy, 	the 	Court 	will 	examine 	the
sufficiency of both theories.
1. 	Failure to Train or Supervise
To 	survive 	dismissal, 	plaintiff 	must 	allege:
(1) the 	existence 	of 	a 	policy 	or 	custom 	involving 	deficient
training 	or 	supervision; 	(2) 	the 	policy 	or 	custom’s 	causation 	of
an 	injury, 	and 	(3) 	the 	adoption 	of 	a 	policy 	or 	custom 	with
deliberate 	indifference. 	See 	Lance 	v. 	Morris, 	985 	F.3d 	787, 	800
(10th 	Cir. 	2021) 	(discussing 	the 	elements 	of 	failure 	to 	train);
see 	also 	Zommer 	v. 	Bd. 	of 	Cnty. 	Comm’rs 	for 	Jefferson 	Cnty.
Colorado, 	30 	F.4th 	1181, 	1189 	(10th 	Cir. 	2022) 	(applying 	Monell
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standard 	to 	failure 	to 	train 	and 	failure 	to 	supervise 	claims).
Plaintiff 	cannot 	simply 	allege 	that 	there 	were 	“general
deficiencies” 	in 	the 	training 	program 	or 	supervision. 	López 	v.
LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756, 760 (10th Cir. 1999), abrogated in part on
other 	grounds, 	Brown 	v. 	Flowers, 	974 	F.3d 	1178, 	1182 	(10th 	Cir.
2020). 	Rather, plaintiff “must identify a specific deficiency” in
the 	training 	program 	“closely 	related” 	to 	Mr. 	Janota’s 	ultimate
injury. 	Id.; 	see 	also 	City 	of 	Canton, 	Ohio 	v. 	Harris, 	489 	U.S.
378, 391 (1989).
Plaintiff does not indicate, however, what specific
training 	or 	supervision 	the 	Love 	County 	defendants 	failed 	to
provide. 	Nor 	does 	plaintiff 	say 	how 	the 	Love 	County 	defendants’
failure 	to 	train 	or 	supervise 	their 	employees 	actually 	caused
Mr. Janota’s 	injuries 	or 	that 	their 	omissions 	stemmed 	from 	their
deliberate 	indifference. 	And 	although 	the 	Court 	only 	considers
the 	allegations 	in 	plaintiff’s 	Third 	Amended 	Complaint,
Plaintiff’s 	Objection 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s 	Report 	and
Recommendation 	also 	fails 	to 	allege 	any 	specific 	deficiency 	or
causal 	link 	to 	Mr. 	Janota’s 	injuries. 	See 	Docket 	No. 	170 	at 	3.
Accordingly, 	plaintiff 	fails 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	against 	the 	Love
County defendants based on a failure to train or supervise theory.
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2. 	Failure to Adopt a Municipal Policy
Plaintiff 	also 	alleges 	that 	the 	Love 	County
defendants failed to have adequate policies in place regarding the
“medical assessment, treatment, and supervision of individuals in
their custody.” 	(Docket No. 109 at ¶ 84.) 	Among other elements,
plaintiff must allege that the Love County defendants had “actual
or constructive notice” that their failure to adopt those policies
was substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation,
and 	that 	they 	“consciously 	or 	deliberately 	cho[se] 	to 	disregard
the risk of harm.” 	N.E.L. v. Douglas Cnty., Colorado, 740 F. App’x
920, 	933 	(10th 	Cir. 	2018). 	But 	the 	Third 	Amended 	Complaint 	does
not allege that defendants had actual or constructive notice that
their 	failure 	to 	adopt 	such 	a 	policy 	would 	result 	in 	a
constitutional violation. 	Nor does plaintiff allege that the Love
County 	defendants 	consciously 	or 	deliberately 	chose 	to 	disregard
this 	risk. 	Thus, 	plaintiff 	also 	fails 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	against
the 	Love 	County 	defendants 	based 	on 	a 	failure 	to 	adopt 	adequate
medical policies theory.
For the reasons explained above, plaintiff fails to
state 	a 	section 	1983 	claim 	against 	the 	Love 	County 	defendants.
Accordingly, 	the 	Estate’s 	claims 	against 	the 	Love 	County
defendants are DISMISSED.
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B. 	Plaintiff’s 	state 	law 	claims 	against 	the 	Love 	County
defendants are dismissed.
Plaintiff Estate also filed two state law claims against
the 	Love 	County 	defendants. 	These 	are 	(1) 	a 	violation 	of
Article II, § 9 of the Oklahoma Constitution, and (2) a negligence
claim. 	See Docket No. 109 at 8-11, 15-16. 	Both claims essentially
contain 	the 	same 	allegations 	— 	that 	the 	Love 	County 	defendants
failed 	to 	provide 	adequate 	medical 	care 	to 	Mr. 	Janota, 	failed 	to
train and supervise their employees, and failed to adopt adequate
policies to protect their inmates. 	Id. 	The Love County defendants
are, however, immune to both claims pursuant to Oklahoma law.3
The 	Oklahoma 	Governmental 	Torts 	Claims 	Act 	(“GTCA”)
immunizes “the state, its political subdivisions, and all of their
employees 	acting 	within 	the 	scope 	of 	their 	employment” 	from
liability for torts. 	51 Okla. Stat. § 152.1(A). 	The GTCA defines
a 	“tort” 	as 	“a 	legal 	wrong, 	independent 	of 	contract, 	involving
3 In his Report and Recommendation, the magistrate judge did not examine
whether these claims could survive a motion to dismiss. 	Instead, if the
Court dismissed all of plaintiff’s federal claims, the magistrate judge
recommended that the Court decline supplemental jurisdiction over these
state law claims. 	(Docket No. 165 at 13.) 	Plaintiff objected to this
recommendation, 	arguing 	that 	declining 	to 	exercise 	supplemental
jurisdiction 	would 	affect 	an 	outright 	denial 	of 	these 	claims 	because
they 	have 	likely 	expired 	under 	the 	statute 	of 	limitations 	and 	that
Oklahoma’s 	Savings 	Statute 	is 	unavailable. 	(Docket 	No. 	170 	at 	5.)
Accordingly, 	plaintiff 	urges 	the 	Court 	to 	retain 	supplemental
jurisdiction 	over 	its 	state 	law 	claims. 	Although 	the 	Love 	County
defendants 	have 	sovereign 	immunity, 	the 	Court 	would 	also 	decline
supplemental 	jurisdiction 	for 	the 	reasons 	explained 	later 	in 	this
Opinion.
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Case No. 24-CV-326-FAB-GLJ 	19
violation 	of 	a 	duty 	imposed 	by 	general 	law, 	statute, 	the
Constitution of the State of Oklahoma, or otherwise, resulting in
a 	loss 	to 	any 	person 	. 	. 	. 	as 	the 	proximate 	result 	of 	an 	act 	or
omission 	of 	a 	political 	subdivision 	or 	the 	state 	or 	an 	employee
acting within the scope of employment.” 	51 Okla. Stat. § 152(17).
Thus, 	“the 	State’s 	immunity 	from 	suit 	extend[s] 	even 	to 	torts
arising 	from 	alleged 	deprivations 	of 	constitutional 	rights.”
Barrios v. Haskell Cnty. Pub. Facilities Auth., 432 P.3d 233, 238
(Okla. 2018).
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has explicitly held that the
GTCA immunizes a municipality from an inmate’s claim for denial of
medical 	care 	based 	on 	Article 	II, 	§§ 	7 	and 	9 	of 	the 	Oklahoma
Constitution. 	Barrios, 432 P.3d at 239 (“[B]ecause the Legislature
invoked the State’s sovereign immunity as to constitutional torts
via 	the 	GTCA, 	Sections 	7 	and 	9 	of 	Article 	II 	of 	the 	Oklahoma
Constitution 	do 	not 	allow 	an 	inmate 	to 	bring 	a 	tort 	claim 	for
denial of medical care.”). 	Accordingly, the Love County defendants
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Case No. 24-CV-326-FAB-GLJ 	20
are immune to claims based on denial of medical care to Mr. Janota.
See Docket No. 109 at ¶¶ 60(a-e, h, j), 84(a-c).4
The 	GTCA 	also 	immunizes 	municipalities 	from 	torts
arising from the “[p]rovision, equipping, operation or maintenance
of 	any 	prison, 	jail 	or 	correctional 	facility.” 	51 	Okla. 	Stat.
§ 152(25). 	The 	Oklahoma 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	clarified 	that 	this
provision
withhold[s] 	the 	waiver 	of 	sovereign 	immunity 	for 	any
loss 	or 	injury, 	whether 	to 	an 	inmate 	or 	other 	person,
resulting 	from 	the 	operational 	level 	acts 	required 	to
furnish 	the 	services 	of 	a 	penal 	institution, 	including
the 	construction 	and 	repair 	of 	the 	facility; 	the
security 	of 	the 	facility; 	the 	employment 	of 	personnel;
the utilities and furnishings of the facility; the food,
clothing, 	items 	for 	hygiene 	and 	other 	basic 	personal
items 	needed 	by 	inmates 	or 	other 	persons; 	the
educational, 	rehabilitative, 	communicational,
recreational 	and 	medical 	and 	health 	services 	or 	any
other service provided for inmates or other persons; the
assignment of an inmate to a facility or a cell; and the
release of an inmate; with the single exception of loss
to persons not in custody caused by an accident involving
a 	motor 	vehicle 	operated 	by 	the 	Department 	of
Corrections.
Medina 	v. 	State, 	871 	P.2d 	1379, 	1384 	n. 	13 	(Okla. 	1993).
Accordingly, 	claims 	for 	“negligent 	hiring, 	training, 	supervision
4 “Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court distinguished Barrios in Payne v.
Kerns [, 467 P.3d 659 (Okla. 2020)], by finding a private right of action
under Section 9, that holding is limited to the cause of action having
accrued 	before 	the 	Oklahoma 	legislature’s 	amendment 	to 	the 	Oklahoma
Governmental 	Tort 	Claims 	Act 	became 	effective 	in 	2014, 	which 	extended
immunity to alleged deprivations of constitutional rights.” 	Gill v. GEO
Grp., 	Inc., 	No. 	CIV-23-332-PRW, 	2024 	WL 	1390904, 	at 	*4 	(W.D. 	Okla.
Mar. 31, 2024).
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and 	retention 	are 	[also] 	subject 	to 	dismissal 	pursuant 	to 	§
155(25), 	because 	they 	all 	result 	from 	operation 	of 	a 	jail 	or
correctional 	facility.” 	Chrisman 	v. 	Bd. 	of 	Cnty. 	Comm’rs 	of
Oklahoma Cnty., No. 17-CV-1309, 2018 WL 4291761, at *9 (W.D. Okla.
Sept. 	7, 	2018); 	see 	also 	Flurry 	v. 	Bd. 	of 	Cnty. 	Comm’rs, 	No. 	15-
CV-90, 	2015 	WL 	1542373, 	at 	*5 	(W.D. 	Okla. 	Apr. 	7, 	2015).
Accordingly, 	the 	Love 	County 	defendants 	are 	immune 	to 	state 	law
claims based on their failure to train or supervise their employees
as well. 	See Docket No. 109 at ¶¶ 60(f, h, j), 84(d-e).
Finally, 	municipal 	operators 	of 	jails 	are 	immune 	from
torts 	arising 	from 	their 	“failures 	to 	enforce 	institutional
policies,” “discretionary functions [that] are limited to policy-
making or planning level actions,” and “operational level actions
by 	state 	officers 	or 	employees 	at 	a 	penal 	institution.” 	Medina,
871 P.2d at 1383-84 (citing 51 Okla. Stat. §§ 155(4), 155(5), and
(25) in its previous form). 	In other words, they are immune from
failing to adopt rules, regulations, or written policies pursuant
to Oklahoma law. 	See Pack v. Jim, No. 24-CV-42, 2025 WL 2214564,
at 	*10 	(N.D. 	Okla. 	July 	1, 	2025). 	Accordingly, 	the 	Love 	County
defendants are immune to claims based on their failure to adopt or
“carry out” unidentified policies and procedures, too. 	See Docket
No. 109 at ¶¶ 60(f-h, j), 84(f).
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For these reasons, the Love County defendants are immune
from plaintiff’s state law claims, and the state law claims against
them must also be DISMISSED.
III. THE EMS BOARD’S MOTION TO DISMISS (Docket No. 113)
Following his injury at the jail, plaintiff alleges that Love
County EMS transported Mr. Janota by ambulance to Mercy Ardmore’s
emergency 	room. 	(Docket 	No. 	109 	at 	¶ 	37.) 	Mr. 	Janota 	suffered
another 	seizure 	in 	transit. 	Id. 	¶ 	38. 	“Despite 	Mr. 	Janota’s
rapidly 	declining 	status,” 	however, 	Love 	County 	EMS 	did 	not 	turn
on 	the 	ambulance’s 	light 	or 	sirens. 	Id. 	¶ 	39. 	Based 	on 	these
facts, 	plaintiff 	asserts 	the 	following 	claims 	against 	the 	Love
County 	EMS’s 	Board 	of 	Trustees: 	(1) 	a 	section 	1983 	claim 	for
deliberate 	indifference 	to 	Mr. 	Janota’s 	Eighth 	and/or 	Fourteenth
Amendment rights pursuant to the United States Constitution, (2) a
violation of his rights pursuant to Article II, § 9 of the Oklahoma
Constitution, and (3) a negligence claim pursuant to Oklahoma law.
See 	Docket 	No. 	109 	at 12-14. 	Dismissal 	of 	these 	claims 	is
warranted as well.
A. 	Plaintiff 	fails 	to 	state 	a 	section 	1983 	claim 	against
the EMS Board.
Plaintiff is suing an entity — the Love County EMS Board
of 	Trustees 	— 	not 	a 	Board 	member, 	a 	Board 	employee, 	or 	even 	the
ambulance 	driver 	transporting 	Mr. 	Janota. 	Therefore, 	regardless
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Case No. 24-CV-326-FAB-GLJ 	23
of whether the EMS Board is a medical contractor acting under color
of state law or a municipality, the EMS Board cannot be liable for
its employee’s misconduct based on vicarious liability. 	See Lucas
v. 	Turn 	Key 	Health 	Clinics, 	LLC, 	58 	F.4th 	1127, 	1144 	(10th 	Cir.
2023). 	Instead, 	plaintiff 	must 	allege 	(1) an 	official 	policy 	or
custom, or a systemic failure of medical policies and procedures,
(2) causation, and (3) deliberate indifference. 	Id. at 1145. 	But
plaintiff 	does 	not 	mention 	any 	official 	policy 	or 	custom
promulgated by the EMS Board, nor does it allege systemic failures
of the Board’s medical policies and procedures. 	Because plaintiff
fails 	to 	allege 	a 	section 	1983 	claim 	against 	the 	EMS 	Board, 	this
claim is also DISMISSED.
B. 	The 	Court 	declines 	supplemental 	jurisdiction 	over
plaintiff’s remaining state law claims.
At 	this 	point, 	there 	are 	no 	federal 	law 	claims 	left 	in
this lawsuit. 	Therefore, the Court must decide whether to exercise
supplemental 	jurisdiction 	over 	plaintiff’s 	remaining 	state 	law
claims. 	Plaintiff 	urges 	this 	Court 	to 	do 	so, 	arguing 	that 	its
claims 	have 	likely 	expired 	under 	the 	statute 	of 	limitations 	and
that 	it 	cannot 	save 	them 	based 	on 	12 	Okla. 	Stat. 	§ 	100. 	(Docket
Nos. 170 at 5; 172 at 3.)
“When all federal claims have been dismissed, the court
may, and usually should, decline to exercise jurisdiction over any
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Case No. 24-CV-326-FAB-GLJ 	24
remaining 	state 	claims.” 	Koch 	v. 	Del 	City, 	660 	F.3d 	1228, 	1248
(10th Cir. 2011); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (stating that a
district 	court 	may 	decline 	to 	exercise 	supplemental 	jurisdiction
over 	state-law 	claims 	if 	“the 	district 	has 	dismissed 	all 	claims
over 	which 	it 	has 	original 	jurisdiction”). 	Nevertheless, 	a
district 	court 	has 	discretion 	to 	adjudicate 	the 	merits 	of 	the
state-law 	claims 	when 	“the 	values 	of 	judicial 	economy,
convenience, 	fairness, 	and 	comity” 	indicate 	that 	retaining
jurisdiction 	over 	the 	state-law 	claims 	would 	be 	appropriate.
Carnegie-Mellon 	Univ. 	v. 	Cohill, 	484 	U.S. 	343, 	349-50 	(1988).
“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated
before 	trial, 	[however,] 	the 	balance 	of 	factors 	to 	be 	considered
under 	the 	pendent 	jurisdiction 	doctrine 	. 	. 	. 	will 	point 	toward
declining 	to 	exercise 	jurisdiction 	over 	the 	remaining 	state-law
claims.” 	Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350 n. 7.
The 	Court 	is 	sympathetic 	towards 	plaintiff’s
predicament. 	The Court cannot say, however, that its predicament
is unfair. 	Indeed, plaintiff originally filed this lawsuit in the
District Court of Love County on August 16, 2023. 	See Case No. CJ-
2023-044. 	It 	then 	dismissed 	that 	lawsuit 	on 	February 	8, 	2024,
without prosecuting the case or even obtaining summons to serve on
defendants. 	Id. 	It 	then 	refiled 	the 	case 	in 	this 	Court 	on
September 13, 	2024, 	and 	added 	the 	EMS 	Board 	as 	a 	defendant.
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(Docket 	No. 	2.) 	By 	doing 	so, 	the 	Estate 	filed 	that 	Complaint
pursuant to Oklahoma’s Saving Statute, 12 Okla. Stat. § 100, which
allows a plaintiff to refile a claim within one year of dismissal
when the claim has otherwise expired under the applicable statute
of 	limitations. 	But 	section 	100 	“operates 	to 	save 	an 	action 	for
only 	one 	refiling 	after 	the 	statute 	of 	limitations 	has 	run.”
Pointer 	v. 	W. 	Heights 	Indep. 	Sch. 	Dist., 	919 	P.2d 	5, 	6 	(Okla.
1996).
In 	other 	words, 	plaintiff 	risked 	its 	last 	shot 	at
litigation 	by 	filing 	this 	action 	in 	federal 	court 	pursuant 	to
Oklahoma’s Savings Statute. 	Had the Estate refiled its claims in
state court, and had they been removed to federal court, the Court
could have simply declined supplemental jurisdiction and remanded
the 	state 	claims 	back 	to 	state 	court. 	Instead, 	plaintiff 	put
itself 	in 	this 	predicament. 	Accordingly, 	concerns 	of 	fairness
weigh against the Estate.
Concerns 	of 	judicial 	efficiency 	and 	fairness 	to 	the
other 	parties 	also 	weigh 	against 	the 	Estate. 	Indeed, 	plaintiff
has 	filed 	four 	complaints 	against 	the 	EMS 	Board 	(Docket 	Nos. 	2,
37, 85, 109) and five complaints against various other defendants.
The 	EMS 	Board 	has 	consequently 	filed 	three 	motions 	to 	dismiss
(Docket Nos. 59, 90, 113,) as have multiple defendants. 	Therefore,
not 	only 	have 	the 	repeated 	amendments 	backlogged 	the 	Court, 	but
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they 	have 	also 	deprived 	the 	defendants 	of 	any 	finality. 	In 	any
event, 	there 	is 	substantial 	dispute 	on 	whether 	plaintiff 	even
provided 	timely 	notice 	to 	the 	EMS 	Board 	as 	required 	by 	the 	GTCA.
See 	Docket 	No. 	166 	at 	16. 	Although 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	and 	the
Court 	do 	not 	opine 	on 	the 	success 	of 	those 	arguments, 	there 	is 	a
danger that the Court and the parties will spend significant time
and 	resources 	on 	this 	issue, 	only 	for 	the 	result 	to 	be 	the 	same.
Accordingly, 	there 	are 	no 	compelling 	reasons 	for 	retaining
jurisdiction. 	Plaintiff’s state law claims against the EMS Board
are DISMISSED.
IV. 	MERCY ARDMORE’S MOTION TO DISMISS (Docket No. 116)
Plaintiff 	has 	one 	remaining 	claim 	— 	a 	state 	law 	negligence
claim 	against 	Mercy 	Ardmore. 	(Docket 	No. 	109 	at 	11.) 	The 	Court
adopts 	its 	previous 	reasoning, 	and 	declines 	to 	exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over this claim. 	This claim is therefore
also DISMISSED.
V. 	POSSIBILITY OF AMENDMENT
The 	magistrate 	judge 	recommended 	denying 	leave 	to 	amend
because plaintiff has essentially amended its complaint four times
across 	her 	federal 	and 	state 	cases. 	See 	Docket 	Nos. 	164 	at 	30;
165 	at 	14. 	Plaintiff 	failed 	to 	object 	to 	this 	recommendation 	or
otherwise request leave to amend. 	See Docket Nos. 170, 171. 	The
Court sees no legal error in the magistrate judge’s recommendation.
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Indeed, 	a 	court 	may 	refuse 	leave 	to 	amend 	“on 	a 	showing 	of 	undue
delay, undue prejudice to the opposing party, bad faith or dilatory
motive, 	failure 	to 	cure 	deficiencies 	by 	amendments 	previously
allowed, 	or 	futility 	of 	amendment.” 	Duncan 	v. 	Manager, 	Dep’t 	of
Safety, 	City 	and 	Cnty. 	of 	Denver, 	397 	F.3d 	1300, 	1315 	(10th 	Cir.
2005) 	(internal 	quotation 	marks 	omitted). 	As 	previously
explained, several of these factors are present, including delay,
prejudice 	to 	the 	defendants, 	and 	repeated 	failures 	to 	cure
deficiencies 	by 	amendments 	previously 	allowed. 	Accordingly, 	the
Court will not allow the Estate to amend its Complaint again.
CONCLUSION
For all of the above reasons, the Court ADOPTS the magistrate
judge’s 	recommendations 	contained 	in 	Docket 	Nos. 	164-167.
Accordingly, defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Docket Nos. 111, 113,
116, 	137, 	138) 	are 	GRANTED, 	and 	all 	of 	plaintiff’s 	claims 	are
DISMISSED with prejudice.
Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
This case is now closed for statistical purposes.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, April 15, 2026.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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