USA v. Westfield

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. CR-26-15-RAW
)
CALVIN RAY WESTFIELD, )
)
)
)
Defendant. )
ORDER
Before the court is the objection of the defendant (#46) to the
Report and Recommendation (#40) of the United States Magistrate Judge.
The government has responded to the objection (#47). The Magistrate
Judge recommended that the defendant’s motion to suppress be denied.
The recommendation will be adopted.
Under Rule 59(b)(1) F.R.Cr.P., the district court may refer
suppression motions to a Magistrate Judge for a recommended disposition.
In considering an objection, the district court must conduct de novo review
and “may accept, reject, or modify the recommendation, receive further
evidence, or resubmit the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.” Rule 59(b)(3). The undersigned has reviewed the record.
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See Gee v. Estes, 829 F.2d 1005, 1008-09 (10th Cir.1987); Griego v.
Padilla, 64 F.3d 580, 584 (10th Cir.1995).
The factual background is set forth in the Report and
Recommendation, and the parties’ briefing. The dispatcher at the Hugo
Police Department received a call from the manager of a storage unit
facility. The manager stated that Calvin Westfield (whom she identified
by name) had a gun at the facility and that the manager believed he was
a convicted felon.1 She stated that at one point defendant appeared to
walk toward the facility office while carrying the gun, but had then turned
around and gone back toward his storage unit. Hugo police officers
arrived and defendant was ultimately arrested. Inside the storage unit,
police found a rifle, a handgun, and (within the weapons themselves)
ammunition. Defendant is charged in this court with violation of 18 U.S.C.
§922(g)(1).
Defendant’s motion (#28) noted that counsel had not yet had the
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses but argued based on information
available that the officers only learned defendant’s identity and status as
a felon because they arrested him in the absence of probable cause. He
1The dispatcher did not relay to any officer the manager’s belief that defendant was a convicted
felon.
2
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argued in the alternative that the officers only learned defendant’s identity
and status as a felon because they stopped him for an investigatory
detention in the absence of reasonable suspicion. In response (#35), the
government argued that the officers had probable cause for an arrest. It
argued in turn that the seizure of the firearms and ammunition was proper
under the “plain view” doctrine.
In the evidentiary hearing itself, Officer Jenkins testified that (upon
hearing defendant’s name) Jenkins knew defendant was a convicted felon
based upon previous contact. (See #43 at 41-42). Jenkins testified he
believed he told his partner that defendant was a felon. (Id. at 42 ll.22-
23).2 This testimony rendered difficult defense counsel’s original
argument regarding the collective knowledge doctrine, and the argument
in the objection in this regard shifts primarily to credibility.
The Report and Recommendation concluded that the officers initially
lacked probable cause for an arrest, but that they did have reasonable
2Defendant’s motion also addressed the “collective knowledge doctrine.” Under the “horizontal
knowledge doctrine,” a number of individual officers have pieces of the probable cause or reasonable
suspicion puzzle, but no single officer has sufficient information to justify a search or stop. See United States
v. Latorre, 893 F.3d 744, 753 (10th Cir.2018). Under the “vertical collective knowledge doctrine,” an arrest
or stop is justified when an officer having probable cause or reasonable suspicion instructs another officer
to act, even without communicating all of the information necessary to justify the action. Id. The Magistrate
Judge found that Officer Jenkins’ knowledge implicated and satisfied the doctrine in its “vertical” aspect.
(See #40 at 11).
3
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suspicion.3 “The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures. But police officers may, under Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968), perform investigatory stops and frisk persons they
reasonably suspect have committed a crime.” United States v. Sherwood,
2025 WL 752342, *1 (10th Cir.2025). To be “reasonable” a police officer’s
investigatory stop must be “justified at its inception,” and the “officer’s
actions must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place.” United States v. Daniels, 101
F.4th 770, 776 (10th Cir.2024). The undersigned finds that the analysis
of the Magistrate Judge is correct and independently finds there are not
sufficient grounds to find the witnesses lack credibility such as would
warrant a de novo evidentiary hearing. Officer Jenkins testified he did not
write a report of the incident because he “forgot” to do so. (#43 at 58-
59). This is unfortunate, but the record does not reflect evidence calling
into question Officer Jenkins’ claim of knowledge. Also, the asserted
inconsistencies between Officer Jenkins’ testimony and Officer Spalding’s
testimony seem relatively minor here.
3The government has not filed its own objection regarding the existence or nonexistence of probable
cause.
4
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Defendant again asserts that there was not reasonable suspicion for
a Terry stop. The undersigned finds the Magistrate Judge’s analysis is
correct. Alternatively, the fact that defendant walked toward the storage
facility officer holding a firearm and it was perceived as a threat by the
storage facility manager arguably gave rise to reasonable suspicion of
disturbing the peace. (See #43 at 31-32; #40 at 15-16)
Finally, defendant argues that he had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his storage unit and the officers’ actions of entering the storage
unit without a warrant violated defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Once more, the undersigned subscribes to the thorough analysis of the
Magistrate Judge that the firearms were in plain view and lawfully seized.
It is the order of the court that the objection of the defendant (#46)
to the Report and Recommendation is overruled. The Report and
Recommendation (as supplemented herein) is affirmed and adopted as the
order of the court. The motion of the defendant to suppress (#28) is
hereby denied.
ORDERED THIS 29thDAY OF MAY, 2026.
______________________________________
RONALD A. WHITE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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