Gonzalez v. Comanche County Facilities Authority et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
JOSEPH GONZALEZ, as the
Personal Representative of the
Estate of Tshante Gonzalez,
Deceased,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE COMANCHE COUNTY
FACILITIES AUTHORITY
et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. CIV-24-1022-D
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Joseph Gonzalez filed suit on behalf of his deceased wife,
Tshante Gonzalez (Ms. Gonzalez), who was a pretrial detainee in the custody
of the City of Lawton and the Comanche County Facilities Authority (CCFA)
before her death by “septic shock with multiorgan failure from a MRSA
(methicillin resistant staphylococcus aureus) pneumonia infection.” Doc. 1, at
4, 19-20.1 His remaining claims are against Defendant CCFA, operator of the
Comanche 	County 	Detention 	Center 	(CCDC) 	in 	Lawton, 	Oklahoma; 	and
William Hobbs, who served as the Administrator of the CCDC at the time of
1 	Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation
and pagination. Except for capitalization, quotations are verbatim unless
otherwise indicated.
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Ms. Gonzalez’s detainment. See id. at 5; see also Docs. 76, 81-83.2 Plaintiff
asserts violations of the Fourteenth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against both Defendants. Doc. 1, at 60-63, 66-69. Plaintiff also asserts a
negligence claim against CCFA under Oklahoma law. Id. at 63-66.
Chief United States District Judge Timothy D. DeGiusti referred this
matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for proceedings consistent with
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C). Doc. 4. Plaintiff moves for partial summary
judgment against CCFA on the scope of its immunity under the Oklahoma
Governmental Tort Claims Act (OGTCA). Doc. 71. CCFA responded, Doc. 72,
and Plaintiff replied, Doc. 73. Plaintiff also filed a notice of supplemental
authority. Doc. 75. The matter is now at issue. The Court should agree with
Plaintiff and find that CCFA is not immune from suit for Plaintiff’s negligence
claim. Whether CCFA acted with negligence as Plaintiff alleges is an issue for
another day.
2 	Judgment has been entered against “Defendants City of Lawton, Brandy
Kirkpatrick-Benton, James Smith, and any and all John/Jane Doe Defendants
to the extent they are alleged to be or have been employees of the City of
Lawton at the relevant time period.” Doc. 83, at 1; Doc. 76.
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I. 	Undisputed Material Facts.3
Ms. Gonzalez was incarcerated at the CCDC from May 3 to May 4, 2023.
Doc. 71, at 2; Doc. 72, at 1. CCFA is a public trust which operates the CCDC.
Doc. 71, at 2; Doc. 72, at 1. “Comanche County is . . . the sole beneficiary of the
CCFA[.]” Doc. 71, at 2; see Doc. 72, at 2.
Since 2003, CCFA has housed federal inmates and detainees at the
CCDC 	under 	an 	Intergovernmental 	Agreement 	with 	the 	United 	States
Marshals Service. Doc. 71, at 2-3; Doc. 72, at 2. CCFA also “houses . . .
inmates/detainees with holds placed on them from other states at the CCDC”
and has agreements with the Comanche Nation Tribe of Oklahoma and the
United States Army Garrison (Fort Sill) to house “inmates/detainees brought
by the Tribe” and “military inmates/detainees.” Doc. 71, at 3; see Doc. 72, at 2.
II. 	Standard of review.
Defendant CCFA objects to the Court’s consideration of Plaintiff’s motion
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 as “adjudication of purely legal issues of statutory
applicability . . . are simply not contemplated or authorized under Rule 56(a).”
Doc. 72, at 2-5.
3 	The undersigned writes the undisputed material facts in the present
tense for simplicity, but the parties agree that they were true “at the time of
[Ms. Gonzalez’s] detention and at the time this lawsuit was filed.” Doc. 71, at
2; Doc. 72, at 1-2.
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Contrary to CCFA’s argument, “[s]tatutory interpretation is a matter of
law appropriate for resolution on summary judgment.” Thomas v. Metro. Life
Ins. Co., 631 F.3d 1153, 1160 (10th Cir. 2011); Lucas v. Turn Key Health
Clinics, LLC, 58 F.4th 1127, 1148 (10th Cir. 2023) (“The proper route in this
instance without further guidance from Oklahoma courts is to determine the
OGTCA’s applicability to private corporations — and their employees — that
contract with the state to provide medical services at the summary judgment
stage 	if 	the 	factual 	record 	is 	sufficiently 	developed 	and 	the 	facts 	are
uncontroverted.”); see, e.g., Fogel v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 728 F. Supp. 3d 1171,
1180 (D. Colo. 2024) (“Courts routinely enter partial summary judgment in
favor of plaintiffs when they satisfy their burden with respect to liability but
not damages.”); Kaiser v. At The Beach, Inc., 2010 WL 5114729, at *9, 14 (N.D.
Okla. Dec. 9, 2010) (analyzing plaintiffs’ Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
statutory exemption argument under Rule 56); cf. 10B W RIGHT & M ILLER ’S
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2734 (4th ed.) (“A motion for summary
judgment . . . . may be made by [a] plaintiff to test a defense’s sufficiency.”).
Accordingly, the undersigned analyzes Plaintiff’s motion pursuant to Rule 56.
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that “might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty
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Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine if the facts and
evidence are such 	that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party. Id. All facts and reasonable inferences must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id. at 255. The inquiry is whether the
facts and evidence identified by the parties present “a sufficient disagreement
to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party
must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251-52.
III. 	The OGTCA Does Not Immunize CCFA from Plaintiff’s State-Law
Negligence Claim.
Plaintiff 	asserts 	a 	negligence 	claim 	under 	Oklahoma 	law 	against
Defendant CCFA. Doc. 1, at 63-66. The OGTCA provides “the exclusive remedy
for an injured plaintiff to recover against a governmental entity in tort” under
Oklahoma law. Tuffy’s, Inc. v. City of Okla. City, 212 P.3d 1158, 1163 (Okla.
2009). Generally, the OGTCA provides immunity from tort claims against
“[t]he state, its political subdivisions, and all of their employees acting within
the scope of their employment . . . [,]” including a “claim [which] results from
. . . [p]rovision, equipping, operation or maintenance of any prison, jail or
correctional facility.” OKLA . STAT . tit. 51, §§ 152.1(A), 155(25). But the OGTCA
does contain a limited waiver for the state and its political subdivisions “to the
extent and in the manner provided” in the Act. OKLA . STAT . tit. 51, § 152.1(B).
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Relevant to Plaintiff’s motion is OKLA . S TAT . tit. 51, § 153.1:
Nothing in the [OGTCA] shall be construed as allowing an action
or recovery against this state, against any city, town or county that
is the sole beneficiary of a public trust, or against any employee of
this state or any city, town or county of this state due to the
housing 	of 	federal 	inmates 	or 	inmates 	from 	another 	state 	in
facilities owned or operated by private prison contractors. If a
public trust that has as its sole beneficiary a city, town or county
has a facility that houses federal inmates or inmates from another
state, the immunity provided for in the [OGTCA] shall not apply
to that trust.
Here, the parties do not dispute that CCFA is a public trust that has Comanche
County as its sole beneficiary and that CCFA operates a facility that houses
federal inmates or inmates from another state. Doc. 71, at 2-3; Doc. 72, at 1-2.
Under the clear language of the statute, therefore, the OGTCA affords no
immunity to CCFA for Plaintiff’s state-law negligence claim. See Jones v.
Comanche Cnty. Facilities Auth., No. CIV-25-385-PRW, 2026 WL 660452, at
*2 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 9, 2026) (“CCFA battles the plain text of the statute.
Plaintiff has pleaded that CCFA is a public trust which houses federal inmates,
and that Comanche County is the trust’s sole beneficiary.”); Bonilla v. Gerlach,
No. CIV 23-1060-R, 2024 WL 457172, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 6, 2024) (“Plaintiff
has alleged that the GCCJA is a public trust, that it houses federal inmates,
and that it has a county as its sole beneficiary. Under those circumstances, §
153.1 provides that ‘the immunity provided for in the [OGTCA] shall not apply
to that trust.’”). The undersigned recommends that the Court reject CCFA’s
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arguments 	related 	to 	legislative 	intent 	as 	“courts 	in 	this 	District 	have
previously rejected similar iterations of CCFA’s argument.” Jones, 2026 WL
660452, at *2 (citing Bonilla, 2024 	WL 457172, at *2). Accordingly, the
undersigned recommends that the Court grant Plaintiff’s motion, and hold that
CCFA is not immune from suit on Count Three of the complaint.
IV. 	Recommendation and notice of right to object.
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the Court
grant Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment, Doc. 71.
The undersigned advises the parties of their right to file an objection to
this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court on or before
April 29, 2026, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b)(2). The undersigned further advises the parties that the failure to
make a timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives the right
to appellate review of both factual and legal questions contained herein. See
Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation does not terminate the referral to the
undersigned Magistrate Judge in this matter.
ENTERED this 15th day of April, 2026.
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