Smith v. El Reno FCI

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
MICHAEL SMITH, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-25-564-R
)
TIM CARTER, 	)
)
Respondent. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Michael Smith (“Petitioner”), a pro se federal prisoner,1 has filed a
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	(“Petition,” Doc. 1).2
United States District Judge David L. Russell referred the matter to the undersigned
Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C).
(Doc. 4). Respondent filed a Response or Motion to Dismiss Petitioner’s Writ of Habeas
Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	(“Response,” Doc. 10). 	Petitioner did not file a reply.
For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the Petition for habeas
relief be DISMISSED.
1 A pro se litigant’s pleadings are liberally construed “and held to a less stringent standard
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” 	Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th
Cir. 1991); see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). 	But the court
cannot serve as Petitioner’s advocate, creating arguments on his behalf. 	See Yang v.
Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
2 Citations to the parties’ filings and attached exhibits will refer to this Court’s CM/ECF
pagination.
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I. 	Background and Petition
Petitioner is a federal inmate. At the time he filed his Petition, he was confined at
the Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI”) in El Reno, Oklahoma. (Doc. 1, at 1).
Petitioner placed the Petition in the prison mail system on May 21, 2025, raising
four grounds for relief that involve actions taken by his case manager and FCI El Reno.
(Doc. 1, at 6-8). In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that his sentence and program history
indicate that he should receive more than the 120 days in a residential reentry center
(“RRC”) he was given pursuant to the Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-119,
§ 251, 122 Stat. 657, 692 (2008). 	(Id. at 6). 	In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges that his
case manager “lies” to him, prioritizes other inmates, and “retaliates” against him. (Id.) In
Ground Three, Petitioner alleges that FCI El Reno will not provide medication assisted
treatment (“MAT”) for his substance abuse problems “until 90 days from release,” even
though Petitioner “would benefit greatly from” an earlier start date. (Id.) In Ground Four,
Petitioner alleges that FCI El Reno retaliates against him every time he files a grievance
against the institution or its employees, including through disciplinary sanctions or by
curtailing his ability to “do healthy activities, such as hobby work to pass time.” (Id. at 7).
As relief, Petitioner requests many things, including a second review for RRC
placement under the Second Chance Act, to start the MAT program immediately, and for
both FCI El Reno and Petitioner’s case manager to be reprimanded. (Id.)
Respondent contends that Petitioner’s claims are unexhausted and that this Court
lacks jurisdiction to review transfer decisions by the BOP. (Doc. 10, at 4-11). Importantly,
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Respondent also states that Petitioner’s eventual transfer to an RRC would moot at least
some of Petitioner’s claims. (Id. at 8 n.3).
II. 	Analysis
A. 	Ground One of the Petition is Moot Because Petitioner Was Transferred
to an RRC and Appears To Be No Longer in BOP Custody.
“‘Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution extends the judicial power
only to ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies.’” Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pinnacol Assur., 425 F.3d
921, 926 (10th Cir. 2005). 	“To invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, a litigant must
have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely
to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494
U.S. 472, 477 (1990). “[I]t is not enough that a dispute was very much alive when suit was
filed . . . . The parties must continue to have a personal stake in the outcome of the
lawsuit.” 	Id. at 477–78 (citation modified). 	“If, during the pendency of the case,
circumstances change such that the [petitioner’s] legally cognizable interest in a case is
extinguished, the case is moot, and dismissal may be required.” 	Kan. Jud. Rev. v. Stout,
562 F.3d 1240, 1245 (10th Cir. 2009); see also Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of
Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096, 1109 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Mootness is a threshold issue . . . .”)
(citation modified).
In Ground One, Petitioner argues he is entitled to more than 120 days in an RRC
and that FCI El Reno failed to properly compute Petitioner’s RRC eligibility. (Doc. 1, at
6). However, in the Response, Respondent noted that “Petitioner [was] given an October
2025, RRC date” and “[o]nce this transfer occurs, Petitioner’s request [In Ground One]
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will be moot.” (Doc. 10, at 8 n.3). Because Respondent filed the Response shortly before
this planned transfer date, on February 27, 2026, the undersigned ordered Respondent to
inform the Court whether this transfer had occurred. 	(Doc. 11). 	On March 6, 2026,
Respondent informed the Court that Petitioner is now “in RRC [] status” at the Kansas City
Community 	Corrections 	facility. 	(Doc. 	13, 	at 	1). 	Respondent 	also 	advised 	that
“Petitioner’s projected release date with good conduct time is April 15, 2026.” 	(Id.) 	It
appears that as of today’s date, Petitioner has in fact been released. See BOP Register No.
32085-045 (“Not in BOP Custody as of: 4/15/2026”).3 Therefore, Petitioner no longer has
a personal stake in whether the Court orders relief related to this ground. 	See, e.g.,
McIntosh v. English, 2017 WL 2118352, at *4 (D. Kan. May 16, 2017) (RRC transfer
request moot where petitioner “has actually been transferred to the RRC”). 	While an
exception to the mootness doctrine exists where “some ‘collateral consequence’ of the
conviction” is present, the undersigned is not aware of any ongoing injuries Petitioner faces
related to this ground. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998); see also Kirby v. Lappin,
2013 WL 1685839, at *3 (D. Colo. Apr. 18, 2013) (applying Spencer). Petitioner’s Ground
One should be dismissed as moot.
B. 	Petitioner’s Remaining Grounds Are Not Cognizable in Habeas.
“Federal 	law 	opens 	two 	main 	avenues 	to 	relief 	on 	complaints 	related 	to
imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus and a complaint under . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983”
or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
3 https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc (last visited Apr. 19, 2026).
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(1971). Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (internal citations omitted). A
habeas petition is appropriate when a prisoner seeks to challenge the legality of his or her
custody under the Constitution or federal law. Palma-Salazar v. Davis, 677 F.3d 1031,
1035 (10th Cir. 2012). A habeas petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, as
Petitioner has styled his petition, is “cognizable if it attacks the execution of a prisoner’s
sentence as it affects the fact or duration of the prisoner’s confinement.” Ortiz v. Scibana,
No. CIV-06-834-M, 2006 WL 3096689, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 31, 2006) (citing Overturf
v. Massie, 385 F.3d 1276, 1278 (10th Cir. 2004)). Matters most often challenged in § 2241
petitions include the deprivation of good-time credits and other disciplinary decisions that
affect the duration of a prisoner’s confinement. McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 115 F.3d
809, 811 (10th Cir. 1997). Claims attacking the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement are
not cognizable under a § 2241 petition but must instead be brought pursuant to § 1983 or
Bivens. Id.; Palma-Salazar, 677 F.3d at 1035.
Petitioner’s remaining allegations, liberally construed, relate either to alleged
retaliatory actions by FCI El Reno and its employees, in Grounds Two and Four, or to the
institution’s decision not to provide MAT to Petitioner, in Ground Three. (Doc. 1, at 6-7).
However, none of these grounds are cognizable in habeas because none relate to the
execution of Petitioner’s sentence as it affects the fact or duration of his confinement.
First, retaliation claims like Petitioner’s are not cognizable in habeas. A court in the
Western District of Oklahoma has previously concluded “that a retaliation claim is not
properly raised in a § 2241 proceeding” unless the alleged retaliatory action involves a
modification to the petitioner’s duration of confinement. 	Thomas v. Miller, No. CIV-10-
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110-W, 2010 WL 2975423, at *3-4 (W.D. Okla. June 22, 2010) (collecting cases), adopted,
2010 WL 2975421 (W.D. Okla. July 27, 2010). On appeal, the Tenth Circuit determined
that the district court’s conclusion was “not reasonably subject to debate.” 	Thomas v.
Miller, 413 F. App’x 22, 23 (10th Cir. 2011). Here, Petitioner’s retaliation allegations do
not relate to the duration of his confinement, and the undersigned therefore agrees with
Thomas that Petitioner cannot raise his retaliation claims under § 2241. Grounds Two and
Four should be dismissed.
Similarly, Petitioner’s MAT claim also must fail because it “challenge[s] how
prison officials . . . are treating his” drug abuse disorder, and not “how prison officials . . .
are carrying out or putting into effect his federal sentence.” 	Paige v. Johnson, 2022 WL
2292004, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 24, 2022); see also Tyler v. Napier, 2026 WL 543899, at *1
(D.S.C. Jan. 21, 2026) (court lacked jurisdiction “[w]here a federal prisoner sought
injunctive relief of placement in the MAT program”); Balcazar v. Ricokol, 2025 WL
2299367, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 10, 2025) (“Petitioner does not challenge his conviction,
sentence, or the duration of his confinement. Instead, he challenges the alleged deliberate
indifference of the prison medical staff regarding his treatment needs and the screening for
the 	MAT 	program. 	Accordingly, 	Petitioner’s 	claims 	are 	not 	cognizable 	in
federal habeas.”).
The undersigned does not recommend converting Petitioner’s habeas petition to a
civil rights complaint.
Although this Court has discretion to construe a mislabeled habeas petition
as a civil rights complaint, it should not do so because “there are pitfalls of
different kinds for prisoners using the wrong vehicle,” “especially since the
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enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (PLRA) and the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of the same year.”
Bunn v. Conley, 309 F.3d 1002, 1007 (7th Cir. 2002). Among other
requirements, the PLRA imposes a high filing fee and limits on the number
of actions a prisoner may file in forma pauperis, that is, without prepayment
of fees and costs. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914 & 1915.
Rean v. FNU LNU, No. CIV-23-537-J, 2023 WL 5269675, at *3 (W.D. Okla. July 14,
2023), adopted, 2023 WL 5254737 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 15, 2023). 	Given the “pitfalls”
associated with converting a prisoner’s habeas petition into a civil rights complaint, along
with Petitioner’s recent transfer to an RRC, the undersigned will not construe the Petition
as a civil rights complaint.
III. 	Recommended Ruling and Notice of Right to Object
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned recommends that the Petition for
a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED.
The 	court 	advises 	Petitioner 	of 	his 	right 	to 	object 	to 	this 	Report 	and
Recommendation by May 11, 2026, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(2). The court further advises Petitioner that failure to make timely objection to this
report and recommendation waives his right to appellate review of both factual and legal
issues contained herein. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues and terminates the referral
to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the captioned matter.
ENTERED this 20th day of April, 2026.
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