Atwood v. Ponca City City of et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
JENNIFER LYNN ATWOOD,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF PONCA CITY, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. CIV-25-1521-D
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Jennifer Lynn Atwood’s Emergency Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order [Doc. No. 11]. Plaintiff requests the Court enter an
emergency temporary restraining order (“TRO”) requiring Defendants to restore the
electric and water utilities to her residence and halt her eviction proceedings before
Defendants have been given an opportunity to respond. Id. Plaintiff alleges that her Motion
is not ex parte as she provided notice to Defendants of her lawsuit and her Motion the day
before she filed her Motion. [Doc. Nos. 11-2, 11-3].
On December 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for emergency TRO requesting the
same relief that she seeks here and for similar reasons that she asserts here, but had not
provided prior notice to Defendants. [Doc. No. 3]. On December 19, 2025, the Court denied
Plaintiff’s motion, in relevant part, because she had “not clearly shown that an immediate
and irreparable injury [would] occur before Defendants [could] be heard in opposition,”
and did not “include[] specific facts clearly showing that an adverse action [was] imminent
or would cause irreparable harm.” [Doc. No. 7].
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Construing Plaintiff’s Motion liberally, the Court finds that she has raised two
arguments that she did not raise in her prior motion.1 Compare [Doc. No. 3] with [Doc. No.
11]. Indeed, she asserts that because she has provided notice of the lawsuit and the instant
Motion to Defendants the deficiencies in her prior motion [Doc. No. 3] have been cured.
[Doc. No. 11]. Further, she asserts that she will suffer immediate and irreparable harm if
the Court does not enter a TRO stopping her imminent eviction. [Doc. No. 11].
Although Plaintiff purportedly provided prior notice of her Motion to Defendants,
she requests that an emergency TRO be entered before Defendants have had an opportunity
to respond. A motion for an emergency TRO that requests the Court rule before a defendant
is given an opportunity to respond has the same effect as an ex parte TRO, and thus, is held
to the same exacting standard in Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). See Overhead Sols., Inc. v. A1
Garage Door Servs., L.L.C., Civil Action No. 19-cv-01741-PAB-NYW, 2021 WL 707721,
at *1 (D. Colo. Jan. 28, 2021) (finding that a motion for an emergency TRO that requests
the Court rule before the defendant is given an opportunity to respond has the same effect
as an ex parte TRO, and thus, is held to the same standard in Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)).
Accordingly, except for Plaintiff’s arguments regarding her alleged imminent
eviction, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s instant Motion seeks the same relief previously
denied by the Court in its December 19, 2025 order. [Doc. No. 7]. Moreover, the Court
finds that Plaintiff presents no new facts of consequence, arguments, or legal authority that
would warrant a different outcome. Rather than restate its analysis and conclusions set forth
1 Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, her filings are construed liberally. Hall v. Bellmon, 935
F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). But, the Court will not act as her advocate. Id.
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in its December 19, 2025 order [Doc. No. 7], the Court adopts and incorporates its
reasoning and conclusions here.
Regarding Plaintiff’s alleged imminent eviction, the Court finds that a TRO
stopping the eviction is also not warranted because Plaintiff has not and likely cannot
establish “a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.” Dine Citizens Against Ruining
Our Envir. v. Jewell, 839 F.3d 1276, 1281 (quoting Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1111
(10th Cir. 2002)). Indeed, the eviction arises from her landlord’s forcible entry and detainer
action in Depperschmidt v. Atwood, SC-2025-898 (Kay Cnty. Dist. Ct., Okla. Jan. 20, 2026)
(“State Matter”). 2 In the State Matter, her landlord was granted possession of the premises
and Plaintiff was ordered to vacate the premises. However, Plaintiff has not named her
landlord as a party in this lawsuit.3 Regardless, the Court is likely barred from intervening
in the forcible entry and detainer action pursuant to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2283, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and the Younger doctrine. See Sadler v. Bank of N.Y.
Mellon, No. 17-cv-02962-MSK-KLM, 2018 WL 1531687, at **2-3 (D. Colo. Mar. 29,
2018).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion [Doc. No. 11] is DENIED.
2 The Court takes judicial notice of Depperschmidt v. Atwood, SC-2025-898 (Kay Cnty.
Dist. Ct., Okla. Jan. 20, 2026). See United States v. Ahidley, 486 F.3d 1184, 1192 n.5 (10th
Cir. 2007) (courts have “discretion to take judicial notice of publicly-filed records . . .
concerning matters that bear directly upon the disposition of the case at hand.”).
3 Moreover, the Court has doubts as to whether Plaintiff has asserted any viable cause of
action against any Defendant that would pertain to the eviction.
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IT IS SO ORDERED this 23 rd day of January, 2026.
TIMOTHY D. DeGIUSTI
Chief United States District Judge
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