Murillo v. Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
RENE AVILA MURILLO,
Petitioner,
v.
ACTING DIRECTOR OF U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, et al.
Respondents.
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) 	Case No. CIV-26-112-PRW
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ORDER
Before this Court are Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 1) and
Motion for Final Adjudication (Dkt. 14). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS
Petitioner’s 	Motion for Final Adjudication 	and DENIES the remaining 	claims 	in the
Petition.
Background
This case is one of many habeas petitions filed by an alien detainee challenging the
legal basis for his detention. Petitioner entered the United States in approximately 	2003
and lived in the United States continuously for more than two decades.1 On November 11,
2022, Petitioner 	was issued a Notice to Appear and charged as removable 	under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) as an alien present in the United States who has
not been admitted 	or paroled.2 On August 13, 2025, Petitioner 	was arrested 	by local
1 Pet. (Dkt. 1), at 2-3.
2 Notice to Appear (Dkt. 7-1).
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authorities 	in Dallas, Texas, and then transferred 	to the custody of Immigration 	and
Customs 	Enforcement 	shortly 	thereafter. 	An 	Immigration 	Judge 	ordered 	Petitioner
removed on January 5, 2026. Petitioner 	timely appealed that decision to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA), and that administrative appeal remains pending.3
In his Petition, Petitioner challenges his ongoing detention under the INA and the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Petitioner’s INA claim alleges that he was
entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, but that he has been improperly classified
under § 1225, which mandates detention. The due process claim alleges that Petitioner ’s
detention has “extended for a significant period without lawful authority or progress toward
resolution,” and that his “prolonged detention…confirms 	that [his] custody has become
punitive and unconstitutional.”4
On July 13, 2026, this Court issued an Order (Dkt. 13) resolving Petitioner’s INA
claim by granting the Petition in part and directing Respondents to provide Petitioner with
an individualized bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). On July 24, 2026, Petitioner filed
the instant Motion (Dkt. 14), advising the Court that an Immigration 	Judge denied him
bond and requesting adjudication of the remaining constitutional claims in the Petition.
Respondents argue that the remaining claims are moot and, alternatively, that they fail on
the merits.
3 Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev., Automated Case Info.: Case Info. for A-240-139-466, U.S.
Dep’t of Just., https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation (last visited Oct. 6, 2026);
Notice of Appeal (Dkt. 7-5).
4 Pet. (Dkt. 1), at 3-5.
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Legal Analysis
I. 	Mootness
The Court concludes that Petitioner’s 	substantive 	due process 	challenge to the
length of his detention was not entirely mooted by the prior Order resolving Petitioner ’s
INA claim. Respondents argue that there is no reason to consider the constitutional claims
in the Petition, citing Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association5 for the
proposition 	that “[i]f 	no additional relief [beyond the statutory 	claim is] warranted, a
constitutional decision [is] unnecessary and therefore inappropriate.”6
Respondents conflate mootness with the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. Lyng
does not stand for the proposition that a court may never decide a constitutional claim after
ruling on a statutory claim. Rather, Lyng instructs that a court should resolve statutory
claims first and reach constitutional questions only if “a decision on [the constitutional]
question could have entitled [the plaintiffs] to relief beyond that to which they were entitled
on their statutory claims.”7
Here, the Court complied with Lyng in the first instance by granting Petitioner relief
on his statutory claim and leaving his due process claims unaddressed. Petitioner 	then
received 	his statutorily 	required bond hearing, 	was denied release from custody, 	and
expressly 	does not contest 	the procedural 	adequacy 	of that hearing.8 	To the 	extent
5 485 U.S. 439, 445-46 (1988).
6 Resp. to Mot. for Adjudication (Dkt. 15), at 1.
7 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 446.
8 Mot. for Adjudication (Dkt. 14), at 3.
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Petitioner’s 	due process claim was premised 	on the lack of an individualized 	custody
determination, 	that procedural 	claim 	has indeed 	been mooted 	by his 	bond hearing.
However, to the extent Petitioner 	contends 	that his prolonged 	detention 	has become
substantively unconstitutional—which would entitle him to immediate release rather than
a mere bond hearing—his claim seeks relief beyond what the statute provided. Because
that constitutional question is now squarely and solely before the Court, it is necessary to
address it on the merits.
II. 	The Merits
The Petition alleges that “Petitioner’s detention has extended for a significant period
without…progress toward resolution” and that his “[p]rolonged detention…confirms 	that
custody has become punitive and unconstitutional.”9 	Petitioner’s Reply (Dkt. 8-1, at 12-
13) further argues that “[c]ivil detention that continues for…extended periods raises serious
constitutional concerns,” relying on Zadvydas v. Davis.10
In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court addressed post-removal-order 	detention governed
by 8 U.S.C. § 1231 and held that the statute implicitly 	limits an alien’s detention “to a
period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.”11
The Court explained that the indefinite detention of aliens subject to a final removal order
who are unlikely 	to be removed 	in the reasonably 	foreseeable 	future 	raises 	“serious
constitutional concerns” because it “no longer bear[s] a reasonable relation to the purpose
9 Pet. (Dkt. 1), at 4.
10 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
11 Id. at 689-91.
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for 	which 	the 	individual 	[was] 	committed.”12 	The 	Court 	adopted 	a 	six-month
“presumptively reasonable” period of post-removal-order detention, though it did not hold
that detention lasting longer than six months is automatically 	unconstitutional.13 “To the
contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”14 After the initial
six-month period expires, the alien must provide “good reason to believe that” detention is
unreasonable,15 	but “what counts as the reasonably 	foreseeable 	future” shrinks as the
period of confinement grows.16
Subsequently, 	in 	Demore 	v. 	Kim,17 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	addressed 	the
constitutionality of pre-removal-order detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, which governs the
detention of aliens while their removal proceedings remain pending. Upholding mandatory
detention 	under § 1226(c) against a Fifth Amendment challenge, the Court held that
“[d]etention 	during removal proceedings 	is a constitutionally 	permissible 	part of that
process” because it “necessarily serves the purpose of preventing deportable…aliens from
fleeing prior to or during their removal proceedings, thus increasing the chance that, if
ordered 	removed, 	the 	aliens 	will 	be 	successfully 	removed.”18 	Crucially, 	the 	Court
12 Id. at 682, 690 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)..
13 Id. at 701.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
17 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
18 Id. at 528, 531.
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distinguished 	Zadvydas on two grounds: first, detention 	pending removal proceedings
directly serves the valid immigration purpose of preventing flight; and second, unlike the
potentially 	permanent detention 	in Zadvydas, detention 	under § 1226 has “a definite
termination point”—the conclusion of the removal proceedings.19
As this Court’s prior Order (Dkt. 13) established, Petitioner’s detention is governed
by § 1226(a). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B), a deportation order from an Immigration
Judge 	“become[s] 	final 	upon 	the 	earlier 	of…(i) 	a 	determination 	by 	the 	Board 	of
Immigration Appeals affirming such order; or (ii) the expiration of the period in which the
alien is permitted 	to seek review of such order by the Board of Immigration Appeals.”
Although Petitioner was ordered removed on January 5, 2026, he appealed the Immigration
Judge’s decision, and that appeal is still pending.20 Consequently, Petitioner 	is not yet
subject to a final order of removal, and his detention remains governed by § 1226(a).
The Zadvydas six-month framework governing post-removal-order detention under
§ 1231 cannot be reflexively imported into the materially different context of pre-removal-
order detention under § 1226. Under Demore, Petitioner’s ongoing detention during active
administrative 	proceedings has a definite termination 	point and remains constitutionally
permissible 	because it serves the legitimate 	purpose of ensuring 	his presence 	for his
19 Id. at 528–29; see also Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1311 (10th Cir. 2004)
(noting that detention during active review proceedings has a definite end point and is
constitutionally permissible under Demore).
20 Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev., Automated Case Info.: Case Info. for A-240-139-466, U.S.
Dep’t of Just., https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation (last visited Oct. 6, 2026);
Notice of Appeal (Dkt. 7-5).
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removal proceedings. Indeed, the constitutional footing of Petitioner’s detention is even
stronger than in Demore: whereas Demore upheld mandatory detention without a bond
hearing under § 1226(c), Petitioner 	is detained under § 1226(a) and has already been
afforded an individualized bond hearing—the adequacy of which he does not challenge—
where an Immigration Judge determined that his continued detention is warranted.
Moreover, even if Zadvydas or a similar prolonged-detention 	framework applied
here, Petitioner has not demonstrated that his detention has become indefinite or punitive.
During Petitioner’s fourteen-month 	detention, his proceedings have moved forward at a
reasonable pace: he received a merits decision from an Immigration 	Judge regarding his
removability within five months of his arrest, as well as an individualized bond hearing.
There is also no indication that Petitioner’s pending BIA appeal, which has been pending
for less than nine months, will not be resolved in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Accordingly, Petitioner’s Motion for Final Adjudication (Dkt. 14) is GRANTED.
The Petition (Dkt. 1) is DENIED as to the remaining claims. All other pending motions
are DENIED AS MOOT. A separate final judgment will issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 14th day of October 2026.
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