1:25-cv-00029•Summers v. State of Oregon
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Page 1 – FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON ROBERT CODY SUMMERS, Case No. 1:25-cv-00029-JR Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION v. STATE OF OREGON, Respondent. RUSSO, Magistrate Judge: Petitioner, an adult on post-prison supervision, brings this 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus action challenging his 2016 Klamath County convictions for one count each of sexual abuse in the first degree, burglary in the second degree, sexual abuse in the second degree, and criminal trespass in the second degree. For the reasons that follow, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be DENIED. BACKGROUND On October 3, 2016, a Klamath County grand jury indicted petitioner on one count each of sexual abuse in the first degree, burglary in the second degree, sexual abuse in the third Case 1:25-cv-00029-JR Document 18 Filed 12/05/25 Page 1 of 6
Page 2 – FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION degree, and criminal trespass in the second degree. Respondent’s Exhibits, ECF No. 16 (“Resp. Exh.”), No. 102. The case proceeded to a bench trial where the trial judge found petitioner guilty of all charges. Resp. Exh. 103, pp. 117-118. The trial judge sentenced petitioner to a total of 120 months of imprisonment, following by a term of post-prison supervision. Petitioner filed a direct appeal, but the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review. State v. Summers, 292 Or. App. 896, rev. denied, 363 Or. 744 (2018). The Oregon Supreme Court’s order denying review was dated October 25, 2018. Resp. Exh. 114. Petitioner did not seek a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court. On April 12, 2019, petitioner filed a state petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”). Resp. Exh. 118. Following an evidentiary hearing, the state PCR trial court denied relief. Resp. Exh. 136. Petitioner appealed, but once again the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review. Summers v. Causey, 322 Or. App. 562, rev. denied, 370 Or. 694 (2022). The Oregon Supreme Court order denying review was dated December 29, 2022. Resp. Exh. 143. On January 6, 2025, petitioner filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court. Petition, ECF No. 2. This Court initially required petitioner to show cause in writing why the petition should not be summarily dismissed, but upon receipt of petitioner’s response, the Court withdrew the order to show cause and ordered the petition served upon respondent. Orders, ECF Nos. 11, 12. Respondent argues the petition should be denied as untimely. Petitioner was given the opportunity to file a brief in support of his petition and was advised that if he did not do so, the petition would be taken under advisement on the record before the Court. Order, ECF No. 17. Petitioner did not file a brief in support of his petition. Case 1:25-cv-00029-JR Document 18 Filed 12/05/25 Page 2 of 6
Page 3 – FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION DISCUSSION The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) provides for a one-year statute of limitations to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Under the statute, the one-year period begins to run from the date the judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review “or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The one-year limitation period is statutorily tolled while a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). A state post-conviction application remains “pending” until the application has achieved final resolution in the state’s post-conviction procedures. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220 (2002). Equitable tolling is also available to toll the one-year statute of limitations applicable to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus cases. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). A litigant seeking to invoke equitable tolling must establish: (1) they have been pursuing their rights diligently; and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance prevented them from timely filing their petition. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). The “‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control [must] make it impossible to file a petition on time.’” Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Brambles v. Duncan, 330 F.3d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003)). A petitioner who fails to file a timely petition due to his own lack of diligence is not entitled to equitable tolling. Tillema v. Long, 253 F.3d 494, 504 (9th Cir. 2001). “The habeas corpus applicant bears the burden of showing that this ‘extraordinary exclusion’ should apply to him.” Ostrowski v. Kelly, 639 F.Supp.3d 1084, 1087 (2022) (citing Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002)). Case 1:25-cv-00029-JR Document 18 Filed 12/05/25 Page 3 of 6
Page 4 – FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION Here, as noted, the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision denying review in petitioner’s direct appeal became final on October 25, 2018. Resp. Exh. 114. Petitioner had 90 days within which to seek a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, but he declined to do so. U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 13.1. Thus, petitioner’s conviction became “final” for the purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A) on January 23, 2019. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 150 (2012) (explaining that a conviction becomes “final” for purposes of § 2244(d)(a)(A) “when the time for pursuing direct review in [the Supreme Court], or in state court, expires”). Petitioner filed his state PCR petition on April 12, 2019, which triggered the statutory tolling period provided under § 2244(d)(2).1 Resp. Exh. 118. At that point, 79 days of the federal limitation period had accrued. Following proceedings in the PCR trial court and the Oregon Court of Appeals, the Oregon Supreme Court denied review on December 29, 2022. Resp. Exh. 143. The time to file a petition for reconsideration with the Oregon Supreme Court elapsed 14 days later, on January 12, 2023. See Or. R. App. P. 9.25(1). At that point, petitioner’s state PCR proceeding “cease[d] to be pending.” See Melville v. Shinn, 68 F.4th 1154 (9th Cir. 2023) (the petitioner’s state post-conviction action was “pending” for § 2244(d)’s purposes until the petitioner “properly and timely” could have moved for reconsideration of the Arizona Court of Appeals decision); see also Cartwright v. Oregon Board of Parole and Post- Prison Supervision, No. 3:22-cv-01510-AA, 2023 WL 662450, at *1 (D. Or. Oct. 12, 2023) (“Recently, the Ninth Circuit held that a state application for post-conviction relief is no longer 1 State law determines when a petition has been “properly filed” in state court. Orpiada v. McDaniel, 750 F.3d 1086, 1089 (9th Cir. 2014). If state law rejects the mailbox rule, statutory tolling does not begin until the court receives the filing for collateral review. Id. Oregon has rejected the mailbox rule. See Baldeagle v. Lampert, 185 Or. App. 326, 330-32 (2002); see also Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or. 72, 81 (1997). As such, the tolling period under § 2244(d)(2) commences on the date the PCR petition is actually filed in state court. Case 1:25-cv-00029-JR Document 18 Filed 12/05/25 Page 4 of 6
Page 5 – FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION ‘pending’ when ‘no other state avenues for relief remain open,’ rather than the date on which the state court issues final judgment or mandate”) (quoting Melville, 68 F.4th at 1160-61). Petitioner filed his petition in this Court on January 6, 2025.2 Between the time petitioner’s state PCR proceeding became final and the date he initiated his habeas case in this case, an additional 725 days accrued. In sum, a total of 804 days accrued before petitioner filed his petition in this Court, far more than the one-year limitation period provided under § 2244(d). Moreover, petitioner has provided no basis upon which the limitation period could be deemed equitably tolled. Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus should be denied as untimely. CONCLUSION For these reasons, the Court should DENY the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and enter a judgment of DISMISSAL. A certificate of appealability should be denied as petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment or appealable order. 2 Pursuant to the mailbox rule, a pro se petitioner’s habeas petition is deemed filed “at the time . . . [it is] delivered . . . to the prison authorities for forwarding to the court clerk.” Hernndez v. Spearman, 764 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2014) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988). Petitioner did not, however, include a signature date on his petition, so the Court deems the petition filed as of the date it was entered in the Court’s record. See Beasley v. McDowell, 2021 WL 22451, at *1 n.2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2021) (where no signature date appeared on petition, actual court filing date was employed to calculate timeliness of habeas petition). Case 1:25-cv-00029-JR Document 18 Filed 12/05/25 Page 5 of 6
Page 6 – FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION The parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the court. Thereafter, the parties shall have until fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge will be considered as a waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the factual issues and will constitute waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order judgment entered pursuant to this recommendation. DATED this day of December 2025. Jolie A. Russo United States Magistrate Judge 5th /s/ Jolie A. Russo Case 1:25-cv-00029-JR Document 18 Filed 12/05/25 Page 6 of 6
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