Hunsaker v. Miller et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF OREGON
MITCHELL DALTON HUNSAKER,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 2:25-cv-00039-AR
FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATION
JAMIE MILLER, Snake River Correctional
Institution Superintendent, JACOB
WAGNER, Oregon Department of
Corrections Correctional Officer, JOE
CASILLAS, and EZRA HAYNES, in their
individual capacities,
Defendants.
ARMISTEAD, United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff Mitchell Hunsaker is in the custody of the Oregon Department of Corrections
(ODOC). Hunsaker, representing himself, brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights and state law
action against four ODOC employees: Jamie Miller and Jacob Wager in their official capacities;
and Joe Casillas and Ezra Haynes in their individual capacities. Hunsaker alleges that, while he
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was housed at the Snake River Correctional Institution (SRCI) in Ontario, Oregon,1 defendants
Miller, Wagner, Casillas, and Haynes failed to follow and implement SRCI policy to provide
him with a timely decontamination shower after he was exposed to Oleoresin Capsicum (OC)
spray. That failure, Hunsaker alleges, violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment and his right to be free from treatment “with unnecessary rigor” under
Article I, Section 13 of the Oregon Constitution. He also alleges a Fourteenth Amendment
violation, although he does not specify which right defendants violated. Hunsaker seeks $20,000
in damages. (Compl. at 3, 6-7, ECF 1.) Defendants move for summary judgment on Hunsaker’s
claims. (MSJ at 1-2, ECF 16.) For the reasons discussed below, defendants’ motion for summary
judgment should be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
The facts material to defendants’ motion are not in dispute. 2 Hunsaker was housed at
SRCI between December 2022 and October 2024. (MSJ at 4.) In early 2024, Hunsaker was
involved in a fight on his housing unit. To break up that fight, Correctional Officer Wagner
sprayed Hunsaker with OC spray. (Compl. at 6, 15-16.) The next day, Hunsaker filed a
1 	At the time defendants filed their motion, Hunsaker had been transferred to Eastern
Oregon Correctional Institution in Pendleton, Oregon. (MSJ at 1.)
2 	Hunsaker did not respond to defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court will
not grant summary judgment by default. Heinemann v. Satterberg, 731 F.3d 914, 916-17 (9th Cir.
2013). See also F ED. R. C IV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendment (“summary
judgment cannot be granted by default even if there is a complete failure to respond to the
motion”). Yet Hunsaker has not “properly address[ed]” defendants’ factual assertions. FED. R.
C IV. P. 56(e). The court considers those factual assertions “undisputed for purposes of [this]
motion.” Id. at 56(e)(2).
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grievance, contending that after he was sprayed, SRCI staff wrongfully denied him a shower for
four hours. He asserted that that denial was “against policy and protocol” and that SRCI staff
subjected him to “cruel and unusual punishment.” (Main Decl., Ex. 5 at 2, ECF 17-5.)
The SRCI Grievance Office denied Hunsaker’s grievance. According to SRCI, Hunsaker
had
not demonstrated how it qualifies under [OAR] 291-109-0210. You have not
demonstrated misapplication of departmental policies, rules, or other directives,
unprofessional actions of department employees, volunteers, or contractors,
inadequate medical or mental health treatment, sexual abuse or sexual harassment
or excessive use of force by department employees.
(Id. at 1.) Hunsaker did not appeal SRCI’s denial of his grievance. He also did not file any other
grievances about the OC spray incident. (Main Decl. ¶¶ 11-16, ECF 17.)
LEGAL STANDARD
A party is entitled to summary judgment if the “movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
FED. R. C IV. P. 56(a). The moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine
dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). That burden must
still be met when the non-moving party has not opposed the moving party’s motion. Henry v.
Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993).
The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draw
all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor. Clicks Billiards Inc. v. Sixshooters Inc., 251
F.3d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001). Although “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the
evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of
a judge . . . ruling on a motion for summary judgment,” the “mere existence of a scintilla of
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evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position [is] insufficient . . . .” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 255 (1986). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational
trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (simplified).
A court must liberally construe the filings of a pro se plaintiff and afford the plaintiff the
benefit of any reasonable doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). Even so, a
pro se party “should not be treated more favorably than parties with attorneys of record” and are
held to the same standard in responding to a summary judgment motion. Jacobsen v. Filler, 790
F.2d 1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986). “It is not the district court’s job to sift through the record to find
admissible evidence in support of a non-moving party’s case.” Claar v. Burlington N.R.R., 29
F.3d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324).
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment for three reasons. First,
Hunsaker failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Second, the Eleventh Amendment bars Hunsaker’s
claims against Miller and Wagner. Lastly, Hunsaker’s remaining state-law claim should be
adjudicated in state court. (MSJ at 1-2.)
The court agrees. Hunsaker did not exhaust his available administrative remedies. And
even if he did, the Eleventh Amendment bars his claims against Miller and Wagner. Because
Hunsaker’s federal claims must be dismissed, the court should decline to exercise its
supplemental jurisdiction over his remaining state-law claim.
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A. 	PLRA Exhaustion
Under the PLRA, before a prisoner may bring an action related to “prison conditions
under Section 1983 . . . or any other Federal law” the prisoner must exhaust “such administrative
remedies as are available” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Proper exhaustion requires compliance with a
prison’s grievance procedures. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). The PLRA’s exhaustion
provision offers “prison officials a ‘fair opportunity to correct their own errors’ and creates an
administrative record for grievances that eventually become the subject of federal court
complaints.” Reyes v. Smith, 810 F.3d 654, 657 (9th Cir. 2016).
Failure to exhaust under the PLRA is an affirmative defense. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d
1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). The defendant has the burden of “prov[ing] that there was
an available administrative remedy, and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy.”
Id. A remedy is “available” when it is “available as a practical matter; it must be capable of use;
at hand.” Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Albino, 747 F.3d at
1171) (quotation marks omitted). If a defendant makes the initial showing, a plaintiff then must
“come forward with evidence showing that there is something in his particular case that made the
existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.”
Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. Remedies are “effectively unavailable” when they are “ineffective,
unobtainable, unduly prolonged, inadequate, or obviously futile.” Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191
(quoting Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172). “[T]he ultimate burden of proof,” however, “remains with
the defendant.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172.
Defendants argue that Hunsaker did not exhaust his available administrative remedies.
The Oregon Administrative Rules (OARs) dictate how grievances are processed at SRCI. (Main
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Decl. ¶¶ 1, 5.) When an adult-in-custody (AIC) has a complaint, they are first encouraged to
communicate directly with staff. OAR 291-109-0100. If that does not resolve their issue, they
may submit a formal grievance. OAR 291-109-0210(4). AICs receive information on how to
properly submit a grievance in their AIC Orientation Packet and the AIC handbook. Grievance
forms, as well as instructions on the grievance process, are available on each floor. (Main Decl. ¶
6.) If their initial grievance is denied, AICs have two options. They may amend and resubmit
their grievance, OAR 291-109-0225(2), or file an appeal within fourteen days, OAR 291-109-
0230.
Here, Hunsaker neither amended and refiled his initial grievance nor appealed the denial
of his initial grievance. (Main Decl. ¶ 11, 14.) Because he did not exhaust additional and
available administrative remedies, defendants have shown that Hunsaker’s federal claims should
be dismissed.
B. 	Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Even if Hunsaker had properly exhausted his claims, the Eleventh Amendment bars his
claims brought against Miller and Wagner. The Eleventh Amendment grants states and state
agencies immunity from citizen lawsuits in federal court. U.S. C ONST. amend. XI.; see also
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519, U.S. 425, 431 (1997) (explaining that Eleventh Amendment
immunity extends to state and state agencies). State officials acting in their official capacities are
also immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. P.R. Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v.
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 142-46 (1993) (explaining that Eleventh Amendment
immunity extends to state officials acting on behalf of the state); Will v. Mich. Dept. of State
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Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-66 (1989) (explaining that state officials sued in their official capacities
are not “persons” subject to civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
Hunsaker brings claims against Miller and Wagner in their official capacities. As relief,
he seeks $20,000 in damages. Absent unequivocal consent by the state or abrogation by
Congress, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal lawsuits against “the State or its agencies
for all types of relief,” including money damages. Romano v. Bible, 169 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir.
1999) (citing Pennhurst v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Ariz. Students’ Ass’n v. Ariz. Bd.
of Regents, 824 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment bars individuals
from bringing lawsuits against a state for money damages or other retrospective relief . . . .”).
Accordingly, the court must dismiss those claims brought against defendants Miller and Wagner.
C. 	State-law Claim
The court has determined that summary judgment is appropriate as to Hunsaker’s civil
rights claims and official capacity claims against Miller and Wagner. Defendants ask the court to
dismiss Hunsaker’s remaining state-law claim against Casillas and Haynes. That claim, they
contend, should be heard in state court. When a court has “dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction,” the court may decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over
remaining state-law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). This discretionary decision is informed by
“economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Acri v. Varion Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001
(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
Considering those factors, state court better suits this action. See United Mine Workers of
Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before
trial ...... the state claims should be dismissed as well.”). Considering comity, Hunsaker’s Oregon
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constitutional law claim should be adjudicated in state court. And considering convenience and
fairness, the parties will not be prejudiced because trial has not been set. The court should
decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Hunsaker’s remaining state-law claim
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF 16) should be
GRANTED. Hunsaker’s civil rights and state-law claims against defendants should be
DISMISSED without prejudice.
SCHEDULING ORDER
The Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge. Objections, if any,
are due within fourteen days—December 5, 2025. If no objections are filed, the Findings and
Recommendation will go under advisement on that date. If objections are filed, a response is due
within fourteen days. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings
and Recommendation will go under advisement.
DATED: November 21, 2025
JEFF ARMISTEAD
United States Magistrate Judge
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