LYLE v. TRANS UNION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RHONDA LYLE 	: 	CIVIL ACTION
:
v. 	: 	NO. 	25-2647
:
TRANS UNION 	:
MEMORANDUM
MURPHY, J. 	May 26, 2026
Rhonda Lyle comes before us with her fourth amended complaint against TransUnion, a
credit reporting agency (CRA). Compared to her prior complaint, which we dismissed on claim
preclusion and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) grounds (DI 49, 50), Ms. Lyle has whittled things down.
She now focuses on allegations that TransUnion has continued to violate the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA) after settling their earlier dispute. Ms. Lyle’s restated complaint against
TransUnion is more focused, but it does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted
under Rule 12(b)(6). Therefore, we grant TransUnion’s motion to dismiss without prejudice.
I. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Our prior memorandum (DI 49) describes the factual background of this case in detail, so
we will not repeat it here. Ms. Lyle reached a settlement agreement with TransUnion on January
7, 2025, which addressed Ms. Lyle’s claims that TransUnion violated the FCRA by failing to: (1)
follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy, in violation of 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681e(b); (2) perform reasonable reinvestigation, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681i; and (3)
provide her with her TransUnion credit file, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681g. No. 24-cv-1831,
ECF 1 at ¶¶ 193-216. We closed this case pursuant to the parties’ joint filing of a stipulated
dismissal with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) and — following
a conference with the parties — determined that the case should remain closed because the
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record indicated that Ms. Lyle settled the matter. No. 24-cv-1831, ECF 22, ECF 29 at 1.
Ms. Lyle then filed a new complaint against TransUnion on May 22, 2025, creating this
second case. DI 1. TransUnion moved to dismiss the matter (DI 9), precipitating numerous
additional filings from the parties (including several styled as an “Amended Complaint”). On
January 8, 2026, we granted TransUnion’s motion to dismiss (1) with prejudice as to Ms. Lyle’s
FCRA claims regarding TransUnion’s alleged conduct prior to the execution of the January 7,
2025 settlement agreement in No. 24-cv-1831; and (2) without prejudice to raising any (a) FCRA
claim regarding TransUnion’s alleged conduct after the settlement agreement’s execution, (b)
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) claim against TransUnion, and (c) common law
fraud and misrepresentation claims against TransUnion. DI 50 at 1. We granted Ms. Lyle leave
to file a fourth amended complaint addressing the claims dismissed without prejudice, providing
that she could plead sufficient facts to overcome the deficiencies described in our accompanying
memorandum. Id. at 1-2; DI 49 at 16-25.
II. 	OPERATIVE AMENDED COMPLAINT
Ms. Lyle took the opportunity to file a fourth amended complaint. DI 51. In it, she
asserts one cause of action against TransUnion: violations of the FCRA under 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1681e(b), 1681i, 1681n, and 1681o. DI 51 at 5-7. She avers that, following the settlement
agreement and dismissal of No. 24-cv-1831, “TransUnion continued to maintain and furnish a
consumer report and credit file on [her].” Id. at ¶ 38. She contends that “TransUnion failed to
follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information
concerning [her,]” in violation of § 1681e(b), despite telling her on August 26, 2025, that “the
issue with [her] credit file was fixed on 4/28/2023.” Id. at ¶¶ 39, 43; DI 52 at 10. In support of
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her claim that TransUnion “continued to report, maintain, or allow the use of inaccurate,
incomplete, or unreliable information concerning [her]” and “failed to conduct reasonable
reinvestigations and corrections” in response to her complaints, Ms. Lyle points to a (1)
September 9, 2024 notice from Synchrony Bank stating that it required additional information to
verify her identity in part due to information provided by TransUnion; and (2) a January 16,
2026 application for a Discover credit card that was denied because the creditor couldn’t reliably
identify her. DI 51 at ¶¶ 40-44. She also highlights a September 9, 2025 “Notice of Data
Incident” that TransUnion sent her, notifying her of a cyber incident involving a third-party
application which compromised her Social Security number and date of birth: according to Ms.
Lyle, in combination with TransUnion’s history of mismatching and misreporting her file, this
breach “demonstrates that TransUnion failed to maintain and implement reasonable procedures
and safeguards designed to assure maximum possible accuracy and to prevent foreseeable misuse
and mis[]association of [her] information after January 2025.” DI 51 at ¶¶ 45-46. Ms. Lyle
avers that TransUnion knew or should have known that its continued “identity-matching and file
management” issues “would likely cause [her] further denials of credit, inability to obtain
mainstream financial products, and heightened risk of identity theft[,]” yet it failed to take
reasonable steps to prevent and correct such issues. Id. at ¶ 47. She thus asserts that she has
suffered various damages due to TransUnion’s negligent and/or willful violations of sections
1681e(b) and 1681i.1 Id. at ¶ 48. Ms. Lyle also makes several assertions regarding alleged
1 Ms. Lyle contends that TransUnion’s assertion that her credit file issues were “fixed” as
of April 2023, when she continued to experience credit denials and suffered a data breach from
her TransUnion information, indicates TransUnion’s “willful disregard of [her] rights” or,
alternatively, its negligence under § 1681o. DI 51 at ¶¶ 49-50. And, in her view, the pre-
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conduct that (1) predated the January 2025 settlement agreement;2 or (2) involved counsel for
TransUnion obtaining Ms. Lyle’s legal documents and research without authorization.3
III. 	MOTIONS AT ISSUE
A. 	TransUnion’s motion to strike
TransUnion moves to strike portions of Ms. Lyle’s fourth amended complaint. DI 56. It
argues that the majority of her complaint contains (1) incorrect and damaging assertions
regarding the case and opposing counsel; (2) confidential information from the settlement
agreement; and (3) unsupported allegations regarding issues that we have clearly addressed and
decided. DI 56-1 at 7. TransUnion asserts that striking these redundant, immaterial, scandalous,
and prejudicial portions of the complaint will serve the purposes of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) by
streamlining the issues and thus saving all involved valuable time and expense. Id. It insists that
Ms. Lyle’s allegations respecting improper ECF access, counsel’s misconduct, the prior
settlement, her request for more compensation, and a pattern of bad faith and collusion have no
relation to nor bearing upon her FCRA claim. DI 60 at 4. TransUnion specifically asks us to
settlement and post-settlement conduct illustrates “a continuing pattern of collusion, bad faith,
and misconduct by TransUnion and its counsel.” Id. at ¶ 33.
2 See, e.g., DI 51 at ¶¶ 7-14, 19-20, 33-34, 40.
3 See, e.g., DI 51 at ¶¶ 6, 28-32 (asserting that opposing counsel’s alleged interference
with her ability to make legal filings and the privacy of her legal research demonstrates
“harassment, abuse of the litigation process, [ ] an effort to obstruct justice[,]” and “a pattern of
bad-faith litigation conduct designed to intimidate [her], obstruct her ability to prosecute this
case as a pro se litigant, and reinforce the earlier collusive effort to cut off her claims through an
unauthorized low-value settlement and dismissal with prejudice.”).
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strike paragraphs 6,4 11 and 13,5 16,6 28-32,7 and 33-35.8 DI 56 at 7-12.
Ms. Lyle opposes TransUnion’s motion to strike. DI 58; DI 61-1; DI 61-2; DI 62; DI 62-
4 Paragraph 6 alleges that TransUnion’s counsel obtained legal documents and research
from Ms. Lyle without authorization. DI 51 at ¶ 6. TransUnion asserts this should be stricken
because (1) its counsel is not a party to this action; (2) we previously addressed this issue in our
January 8, 2026 memorandum; and (3) such allegations would not impact the outcome of her
FCRA claim but would prejudice TransUnion. DI 56-1 at 7-8.
5 Paragraphs 11 and 13 allege conduct related to the formation and execution of the
January 2025 settlement agreement. DI 51 at ¶¶ 11, 13. TransUnion asks to strike these
paragraphs because (1) we already concluded that the settlement agreement was properly
executed in our January 8, 2026 memorandum; and (2) such allegations disclose confidential
settlement information, which severely prejudices TransUnion. DI 56-1 at 8-9.
6 Paragraph 16 recounts TransUnion’s August 26, 2025 letter to Ms. Lyle, in which it
asserted that it was unable to provide her with more monetary compensation regarding her credit
file because her “file was fixed on 4/28/2023.” DI 51 at ¶ 16. TransUnion argues that this
should be stricken because Ms. Lyle’s request for further monetary compensation is immaterial
to her FCRA claims. DI 56-1 at 9.
7 Paragraphs 28-32 allege interference by TransUnion’s counsel with her ability to file
legal documents in this matter, as well as with her private legal research. DI 51 at ¶¶ 28-32.
TransUnion urges us to strike these paragraphs because (1) the record shows that TransUnion’s
counsel did not mail Ms. Lyle her “confidential legal research conversation[,]” as such
information was linked in Ms. Lyle’s own filing on this matter’s docket; and (2) these
allegations, as well as her allegations that TransUnion’s counsel interfered with her ECF access,
are “scandalous and impertinent” and prejudicial to TransUnion. DI 56-1 at 9-10.
8 Paragraphs 33-35 allege pre-and-post-settlement conduct that Ms. Lyle asserts
constitutes a “[]pattern of [c]ollusion and [bad] [f]aith[.]” DI 51 at ¶¶ 33-35. TransUnion asks
us to strike these assertions because (1) we already addressed the pre-settlement agreement
issues in our January 8, 2026 memorandum; (2) we addressed her allegations regarding
TransUnion’s counsel’s access and use of Ms. Lyle’s legal communications in our prior
memorandum, and she has not presented additional evidence to rebut our conclusions therein; (3)
her allegations that TransUnion and its attorneys coordinated to minimize her recovery, cut off
her jury-trial rights, and prevent her from obtaining full remedies constitute “scandalous and
false accusations [that] cause severe prejudice to TransUnion and are directly rebutted by” our
order permitting her to amend her complaint; and (4) her claims of TransUnion’s bad faith
conduct are “unsupported by facts, [ ] prejudicial to TransUnion[,] and have no relevance to the
controversy.” DI 56-1 at 11-12.
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1; DI 62-2; DI 62-3; DI 62-4; DI 62-5; DI 62-6; DI 62-7; DI 64. Ms. Lyle asserts that the use of
Rule 12(f) is both disfavored and narrow, and that Rule 12(f) motions are not intended to resolve
factual disputes regarding the truth of allegations. DI 58 at 1. She insists that the challenged
paragraphs in her fourth amended complaint “are not redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous” for Rule 12(f) purposes, and that TransUnion has failed to demonstrate that any of
the challenged allegations lack any “possible relation to the controversy[,]” will confuse the
issues, or will prejudice TransUnion. Id. (citation modified). In her view, the challenged
paragraphs “provide factual context, explain [her] damages, and describe conduct occurring in
connection with this case[,]” so they should remain in her complaint. Id. She argues that her
allegations regarding opposing counsel’s conduct in paragraph 6 of the operative complaint
“relate[] to [her] ability to litigate her FCRA claims, her trust in the process, and her emotional-
distress damages[,]” “explain[] why [she] raised concerns about interference with her filings and
communications[,]” and occurred after the settlement. Id. at 2. Paragraphs 11 and 13, she
insists, concern “necessary background explaining why [she] continued to challenge
[TransUnion]’s reporting and why she pursued a new FCRA action after the dismissal” and
explain her “state of mind, reliance, [] damages, [and] [] loss of confidence in [TransUnion] and
in the legal process.” Id. Ms. Lyle also offers to redact the numerical amount of the settlement,
rather than strike these paragraphs in their entirety, if we deem the disclosure of this information
improper. Id. As for paragraph 16, Ms. Lyle avers that TransUnion’s August 26, 2025 response
indicating that her file was fixed in 2023 “shows [TransUnion]’s position on the status of [her]
credit file after the settlement and that [she] notified [TransUnion] of continuing problems which
[TransUnion] refused to remedy[,]” such that these allegations are directly relevant to her claims
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for damages related to TransUnion’s failure to utilize reasonable procedures, conduct reasonable
reinvestigations, and willfulness. Id. Ms. Lyle contends that her allegations in paragraphs 28-32
are relevant because “they explain irregularities and delays on the docket during this case,
support [her] claim that her ability to vindicate her FCRA rights was hindered, and describe
additional emotional distress and mistrust caused by the alleged conduct.” Id. She further avers
that paragraphs 33-35 go to her “theory that [TransUnion] and its counsel repeatedly acted to
minimize her recovery and obstruct her efforts to obtain full FCRA remedies” resulting in a
“pattern [that] is relevant to willfulness and punitive damages under the FCRA and to the
credibility of [TransUnion]’s assertion that it corrected the errors and complied with its duties.”9
Id. at 3. To the extent that we find any specific paragraph to be “overly detailed or
inappropriate,” Ms. Lyle suggests “targeted editing or redaction” rather “than striking broad
swaths of her complaint that help explain her theory of harm.” DI 62-7 at 1; DI 64 at 3.
B. 	TransUnion’s motion to dismiss
TransUnion once more seeks dismissal of Ms. Lyle’s claims, this time with prejudice. DI
57. It argues that dismissal is warranted because Ms. Lyle’s fourth amended complaint (1)
utilizes pre-settlement conduct in support of her post-settlement FCRA claims; (2) fails to plead
sufficient facts for a post-settlement FCRA claim; (3) contains claims regarding the handling of
her personal information and a data breach, which do not establish an FCRA claim; and (4)
makes unfounded allegations of collusion in reaching the settlement agreement between her
former counsel and TransUnion, which we already addressed, as well as continued baseless
9 In Ms. Lyle’s view, our prior determination that the settlement agreement was
enforceable does not preclude her “from alleging how she experienced that process or from
alleging subsequent bad‑faith conduct that occurred after the settlement date.” Id.
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allegations regarding the conduct of TransUnion’s counsel. DI 57-1 at 6-8, 10-17. TransUnion
emphasizes that Ms. Lyle’s recitations of the basic elements of her FCRA claims do not save her
case from dismissal. DI 60 at 2. It also contends that Ms. Lyle lacks Article III standing because
she has not established that she suffered a concrete injury, noting the lack of allegations that “any
adverse credit decisions were substantially based on the alleged inaccurate information” or that
she experienced credit denials or less favorable treatment due to TransUnion’s allegedly
inaccurate reporting. DI 57-1 at 16-17. And it insists that Ms. Lyle has not pled sufficient facts
to demonstrate her entitlement to damages. Id. at 17. TransUnion urges us to dismiss this case
with prejudice, asserting that Ms. Lyle (1) pleads “plainly improper” allegations against
TransUnion that are unrelated to her FCRA claim; (2) could not feasibly “manipulate the facts to
state a claim under the FCRA or any other law”; and (3) lacks standing for any FCRA claim. Id.
at 11, 18. Finally, it requests an award for the fees and costs incurred in this case. Id. at 18-19.
Ms. Lyle opposes TransUnion’s motion to dismiss. DI 58; DI 61-1; DI 61-2; DI 62; DI
62-1; DI 62-2; DI 62-3; DI 62-4; DI 62-5; DI 62-6; DI 64. She insists that her fourth amended
complaint asserts FCRA claims “based solely on TransUnion’s post-settlement conduct and uses
the prior case as background.” DI 58 at 1. Ms. Lyle argues that her allegations, accepted as true,
state a plausible claim for FCRA relief — pointing to her allegations that, after the settlement
agreement, TransUnion (1) continued reporting inaccurate information regarding Ms. Lyle, (2)
failed to conduct reasonable reinvestigations after receiving notice of such issues, and (3) failed
to correct these errors, resulting in emotional distress and ongoing credit harm to Ms. Lyle. Id.
She asserts that, following the January 2025 settlement, TransUnion reported that it could not
identify her, and that this prevented her “from having an accurate credit report in [her] own
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name.” DI 61-1 at 1. But she acknowledges that she “did not send [TransUnion] a new written
dispute about this after the settlement, in part because [she] had already been through years of
disputes and litigation about them marking [her] as deceased and then promising that [her] file
was fixed.” Id.; DI 62-4 at 1. However, she asserts that, though “she may not have labeled this
as ‘inaccuracy’ using legal terms, [ ] the substance is that [TransUnion]’s reporting about her
identity and file status remained wrong after it represented that her report had been corrected.”
DI 62-3 at 1. She also notes that she sought to correct her allegations regarding the denial for the
Discover card “by asking [us] to remove that particular allegation while maintaining her other
post-settlement FCRA claims[,]” DI 62-1 at 1, but she maintains that “[t]he inability of
[TransUnion] to ‘identify’ [her] for purposes of providing a proper credit report is itself a
continued manifestation of the same underlying problem that led to the prior litigation and
settlement[,]” DI 62-3 at 1, DI 62-4 at 1. This, she maintains, has resulted in her continued
inability to obtain and utilize correct credit information, anxiety and distress, and obstacles in
seeking credit and housing. DI 62-6 at 1; DI 64 at 3. Ms. Lyle asks that, to the extent that we
conclude that further factual detail is needed respecting TransUnion’s post-settlement
communications and duties, we permit her the opportunity to clarify such facts rather than
dismiss her claims with prejudice. DI 62-4 at 1.
IV. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	Motions to strike
Rule 12(f) permits us to strike from a pleading any insufficient defenses or “redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). As courts in our district
have recognized, “motions to strike generally are disfavored.” DeLa Cruz v. Piccari Press, 521
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F. Supp. 2d 424, 428 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (citation omitted). The movant must show that the
allegations to be stricken “have no possible relation to the controversy and may cause prejudice
to one of the parties” or would “confuse the issues.” Id. at 428-29 (citations omitted). We
decide motions to strike solely on the basis of the pleadings, utilizing the “drastic remedy” of
striking a pleading “sparingly” and “only when required for the purposes of justice.” Id. at 428-
29 (citations omitted). Our disposition of motions to strike under Rule 12(f) rests within our
“considerable discretion.” Id. at 428 (citation omitted).
B. 	Rule 12(b)(6) challenges
A party may seek dismissal of an action against it by asserting that the complaint failed to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Upon reviewing a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, we shall only consider “the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint,
matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant’s claims
are based upon these documents.” Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 2016)
(citation omitted). We also must “accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after construing them in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant.” Id. (citation omitted). Though conclusory allegations do not
receive the same presumption of truth, “outlandish allegations” will receive this presumption
provided that they do not resemble a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a [claim] or other
legal conclusion.” Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation
modified); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation modified) (citations
omitted). “[T]he clearest indication that an allegation is conclusory and unworthy of weight in
analyzing the sufficiency of a complaint is that it embodies a legal point.” Connelly, 809 F.3d at
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790 (citation omitted). But some allegations that do not state ultimate legal conclusions may be
“nevertheless so threadbare or speculative that they fail to cross the line between the conclusory
and the factual[.]” Id. (citation omitted).
To survive dismissal, a plaintiff’s complaint must also state a “plausible claim for relief.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Whether the complaint achieves this plausibility standard is a context-
specific question; to answer it, we must utilize our common sense and judicial experience. Id.
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not show[n] — that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. (citation modified) (citation omitted).
Finally, we must construe complaints filed by pro se litigants liberally. Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam); Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted). Even still, to survive dismissal, pro se litigants must plead sufficient facts
supporting their claims. Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted). As we have done throughout the course of this case, we have endeavored to
give Ms. Lyle every chance to fully state her claims and arguments in response to those raised by
TransUnion.
C. 	FCRA claims
The Fair Credit Reporting Act seeks “to protect consumers from the transmission of
inaccurate information about them, and to establish credit reporting practices that utilize
accurate, relevant, and current information in a confidential and responsible manner.” Cortez v.
Trans Union, LLC, 617 F.3d 688, 706 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Sections 1681n and
1681o enable an individual to bring a private suit for damages against a CRA who willfully or
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negligently fails to comply with specific duties it owes to consumers under the FCRA. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1681n, 1681o; Seamans v. Temple Univ., 744 F.3d 853, 859-60 (3d Cir. 2014). When
preparing a consumer report, § 1681e(b) of the FCRA requires a CRA to “follow reasonable
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual
about whom the report relates.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b); Bibbs v. Trans Union LLC, 43 F.4th 331,
342 (3d Cir. 2022). To establish a prima facie § 1681e(b) claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the “CRA prepared a report containing inaccurate information[.]” Bibbs, 43 F.4th at 342-43
(citation modified) (citation omitted). “[T]echnically correct” information may still be
inaccurate if, by omission, it creates “a materially misleading impression.” Id. at 343 (citation
modified).
Under 15 U.S.C. § 1681i,10 CRAs promptly must reinvestigate any information in a
consumer’s file disputed by the consumer and either (1) record the current status of the disputed
information, or (2) delete that information. Cortez, 617 F.3d at 712 (citation omitted). In Cortez,
the Third Circuit explained that the plaintiff had to establish that TransUnion had a duty to
reinvestigate a dispute pursuant to § 1681i and that, if it had conducted a reasonable
10 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A) provides:
[I]f the completeness or accuracy of any item of information contained in a consumer’s
file at a consumer reporting agency is disputed by the consumer and the consumer
notifies the agency directly, or indirectly through a reseller, of such dispute, the agency
shall, free of charge, conduct a reasonable reinvestigation to determine whether the
disputed information is inaccurate and record the current status of the disputed
information, or delete the item from the file in accordance with paragraph (5), before the
end of the 30-day period beginning on the date on which the agency receives the notice of
the dispute from the consumer or reseller.
Id.
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investigation, it would have discovered a discrepancy. Id. at 712-13. “[A] reasonable
reinvestigation must mean more than simply including public documents in a consumer report or
making only a cursory investigation into the reliability of information that is reported to potential
creditors.” Id. at 713 (citation omitted). But to trigger this duty to reinvestigate, the consumer
first must inform the CRA that she disputes the information. Id. at 714 (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681i(a)(1)). And after conducting the reinvestigation, the CRA promptly must notify the
consumer, in writing, of the reinvestigation’s results. Id. at 714 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(6)).
If the reinvestigation did not resolve her complaint, she must then file a statement of dispute with
the CRA under § 1681i(b). Id. at 714-15 (citations omitted). Under § 1681i(a)(5)(C), CRAs
must maintain procedures to prevent information which has been deleted due to its inaccuracy or
misleading nature from reappearing. Id. at 713 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(5)(C)).
A CRA may be liable for negligent noncompliance with the FCRA if “(1) inaccurate
information was included in a consumer’s credit report; (2) the inaccuracy was due to
defendant’s failure to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy; (3)
the consumer suffered injury; and (4) the consumer’s injury was caused by the inclusion of the
inaccurate entry.” Bibbs, 43 F.4th at 342 (citation omitted). Conversely, a CRA willfully
violates the FCRA if the CRA knowingly violates the FCRA or acts with reckless disregard of its
FCRA obligations respecting the consumer. Fuges v. Southwest Fin. Servs., Ltd., 707 F.3d 241,
248 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation modified). The CRA acts with reckless disregard if its action (1) is a
violation of the FCRA pursuant to a reasonable reading of the statute; and (2) shows that the
CRA “ran a risk of violating the law [that was] substantially greater than the risk associated with
a reading that was merely careless.” Id. at 248-49 (citation modified) (citation omitted). To be
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reckless, the CRA’s actions must be objectively unreasonable when viewed against the clearly
established legal rules at the time of its conduct. Id. at 249 (citation omitted).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	We dismiss without prejudice Ms. Lyle’s FCRA claims against TransUnion because
they are insufficiently pled under Rule 12(b)(6)
Ms. Lyle has not pled facts sufficient to state a claim for relief under the FCRA. To state
a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b), Ms. Lyle must demonstrate that TransUnion “prepared a
report containing inaccurate information[.]” Bibbs, 43 F.4th at 342-43 (citation modified)
(citation omitted); see 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). Sections 1681n and 1681o pertain to a CRA’s
willful or negligent failure to comply with specific duties owed to consumers under the FCRA.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o; Seamans, 744 F.3d at 859-60. To prevail under these sections, Ms.
Lyle must establish either that TransUnion (1) failed to follow reasonable procedures to ensure
the maximum possible accuracy of its reported information, resulting in inaccurate information
about her; or (2) knowingly violated the FCRA or otherwise acted with reckless disregard of its
FCRA obligations toward her. Bibbs, 43 F.4th at 342, 342 n.16; Fuges, 707 F.3d at 248.
Here, Ms. Lyle does not plead sufficient facts to demonstrate that TransUnion “prepared
a report containing inaccurate information.” Bibbs, 43 F.4th at 342-43 (citation modified)
(citation omitted). Taken together, Ms. Lyle’s allegations regarding these claims consist of the
following: (1) TransUnion maintained and furnished a consumer report and credit file on her
after the settlement agreement; (2) TransUnion continued to report, allow the use of, or maintain
unreliable or inaccurate information regarding her; and (3) TransUnion could not identify her as
a consumer after the settlement agreement, resulting in her inability to have a usable credit file.
DI 51 at ¶¶ 38, 40-44; DI 62-3. Her support for these allegations includes (1) a September 9,
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2024 notice from Synchrony Bank (which predates the settlement agreement); (2) a January 16,
2026 application for a Discover credit card that was denied due to the creditor’s inability to
reliably identify her (which does not name TransUnion, is not attached to the complaint, and is
abandoned in Ms. Lyle’s subsequent filings, see DI 62-1 at 1); and (3) a September 9, 2025
notice of a data breach involving a third-party application. Id. at ¶¶ 40-46. Ms. Lyle has not
pled any specific information respecting how TransUnion purportedly violated, or continues to
violate, the FCRA following the settlement’s execution. She does not state what the alleged
inaccuracies in her TransUnion credit report are, the reason given for its purported inability to
identify her, nor when such issues occurred. She does not point to any specific post-settlement
credit report from TransUnion after the settlement. She does not provide any specific examples
of credit denials or other negative consequences tied to alleged misreporting from TransUnion —
there is no information regarding what entities denied her credit or other related applications,
when they did so, or for what reasons. And her exhibits do not indicate that TransUnion
committed post-settlement FCRA violations. We thus conclude that Ms. Lyle has not provided
sufficient facts to establish that TransUnion “prepared a report containing inaccurate
information” or that it negligently or willfully violated the FCRA after the settlement
agreement’s execution. These claims are dismissed without prejudice.
Ms. Lyle also does not state a claim for relief under § 1681i. To prevail on a
§ 1681i(a)(1) claim, Ms. Lyle must establish that (1) she informed TransUnion that she disputed
information in her credit report; (2) TransUnion had a duty to reinvestigate the dispute; and (3)
TransUnion would have discovered a discrepancy if it had conducted a reasonable investigation.
Cortez, 617 F.3d at 712-714; see 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1). Ms. Lyle concedes that she “did not
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send [TransUnion] a new written dispute about this after the settlement, in part because [she] had
already been through years of disputes and litigation about them marking [her] as deceased and
then promising that [her] file was fixed.” DI 61-1 at 1; DI 62-4 at 1. And there is no allegation
that she otherwise informed TransUnion that she disputed specific information in her credit
report. Again, she does not point to any specific inaccuracy in her credit report at all. We thus
must conclude that Ms. Lyle has not sufficiently pled a claim under § 1681i(a)(1) because she
has not established that TransUnion had a duty to reinvestigate a dispute and that, upon
conducting a reasonable investigation, it would have discovered a discrepancy in her credit
report. Cortez, 617 F.3d at 712-13. This lack of specificity — regarding, for example, any
incorrect or misleading information in her credit report or file, or TransUnion’s procedures (or
lack thereof) for ensuring accurate information — also requires dismissal of her claim that
TransUnion has failed to maintain procedures to prevent the re-emergence of previously deleted
inaccurate or misleading information in her file. Id. at 713; see 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(5)(C). And
Ms. Lyle’s recitation of the elements of the FCRA do not save her complaint from dismissal.
Connelly, 809 F.3d at 789. Ms. Lyle’s claims under § 1681i are dismissed with prejudice.
B. 	We deny as moot TransUnion’s motion to strike
Because we grant TransUnion’s motion to dismiss in full, we need not address
TransUnion’s motion to strike (DI 56). TransUnion’s motion to strike is dismissed as moot.11
11 Though we do not address TransUnion’s motion to strike in this memorandum, we
caution Ms. Lyle against including allegations that we have already deemed irrelevant in any
subsequent filings — such as those regarding ECF interference and access to her legal research
by TransUnion’s counsel, as well as the pre-settlement conduct of her attorneys and TransUnion
— in any subsequent filings. As we previously determined, Ms. Lyle’s pre-settlement FCRA
claims against TransUnion are barred by claim preclusion, so she may not re-raise them here.
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However, in our accompanying order and consistent with our prior order striking Ms. Lyle’s
attachment of the confidential settlement agreement between her and TransUnion (DI 27), we
will strike from the record any reference to the settlement amount in the agreement.
V. 	CONCLUSION
Ms. Lyle’s FCRA claims are insufficiently pled under Rule 12(b)(6), as she has not
demonstrated that TransUnion (1) prepared a report which contained inaccurate information; (2)
willfully or negligently failed to comply with specific duties owed to consumers under the
FCRA; or (3) failed to comply with any duty to reinvestigate a dispute, where such
reinvestigation would have resulted in the discovery of a discrepancy in her report. We therefore
grant, without prejudice, TransUnion’s motion to dismiss her fourth amended complaint. We
appreciate that Ms. Lyle has had several opportunities to state a claim, but we will leave the door
open and dismiss without prejudice one final time. TransUnion’s motion to strike portions of
Ms. Lyle’s fourth amended complaint is denied as moot. However, we will strike Ms. Lyle’s
reference in her fourth amended complaint to the settlement amount achieved in the January
2025 settlement. An appropriate order accompanies this memorandum.
See DI 50 at 1. Finally, respecting Ms. Lyle’s allegation that TransUnion’s counsel gained
unauthorized access to her legal research conducted on Cetient Legal Research AI because
counsel allegedly sent her a copy of that research, we note that this very research is accessible
through Ms. Lyle’s own filing (see DI 11) by clicking the hyperlink at the bottom of each page.
This allegation is thus not only immaterial to Ms. Lyle’s FCRA claims, but it is also baseless.
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