STATON v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SULLENA STATON
v.
JEFFERSON HEALTH-ABINGTON,
et al.
:
:
:
:
:
:
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 25-4866
MEMORANDUM
Bartle, J. 	October 15, 2026
Plaintiff Sullena Staton has sued defendants Jefferson
Health-Abington Hospital and Jefferson Health Network
(“Jefferson”) for breach of contract. 	Subject matter
jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.1 	She alleges
that she contracted with defendant to return her placenta to her
after the birth of her son and that Jefferson failed to do so.
She relies on a document entitled “Patient Specimen Release
Form” which she signed on August 22, 2021. 	In her prayer for
relief, plaintiff seeks the award of “compensatory and
consequential damages against [Jefferson] . . . in an amount to
be determined at trial, based on the unique personal, cultural
and spiritual value of Ms. Staton’s placenta.” 	In addition, she
asks the court to “[g]rant such other and further relief as the
Court deems just, equitable, and proper.”
1. 	The court has dismissed related federal claims against the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and its Secretary of Health, Debra
L. Bogan.
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Before the court is the amended motion of Jefferson to
preclude any claim by plaintiff for emotional distress damages
related to the breach of contract claim. 	This motion seeks to
preclude plaintiff from introducing evidence of emotional
distress as part of her damages for her claim of breach of
contract.2 	The pending motion is a motion in limine.3 	Luce v.
United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984).
In Pennsylvania, it is the general rule that emotional
distress damages are not recoverable for breach of contract.
Gallagher v. Upper Darby Twp., 539 A.2d 463, 467 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1988); Rodgers v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 496 A.2d 811, 815
(Pa. Super. 1985); Rittenhouse Regency Affiliates v. Passen, 482
A.2d 1042, 1043 (Pa. Super. 1984).
The parties have cited no case and this court has
found none where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has ever held
that emotional distress damages are recoverable in a breach of
contract action. 	However, in D’Ambrosio, v. Pennsylvania
2. 	One of Jefferson’s is that plaintiff has not pleaded
emotional distress damages. 	The court construes the Second
Amended Complaint of plaintiff as having done so. 	Under Rule
8(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “pleadings must be
construed so as to do justice.” 	Jefferson has not been
prejudiced. 	From the early stage of this lawsuit, it has been
on notice that plaintiff was seeking emotional distress damages.
See Miller v. Philadelphia Geriatric Ctr., 463 F.3d 266 271-2
(3d Cir. 2006).
3. 	Discovery does not close until November 2, 2026. 	By ruling
at this time, the court puts to rest significant disputes over
the scope of discovery on damages.
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National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co., 431 A.2d 966 (1981) the
Court left the door open. 	There, a policyholder sued defendant
for bad faith in denying an insurance claim. 	Id. at 967. 	He
alleged counts in both trespass and assumpsit, that is for
breach of contract, and sought emotional distress and punitive
damages. 	Id. The Court upheld the dismissal of the trespass
count on the ground that the state’s Unfair Insurance Practices
Act enforced by the Insurance Commissioner provided the sole
remedy for unfair and deceptive insurance practices such as
alleged by plaintiff. 	Id. at 970-972. 	In ruling that plaintiff
had an adequate remedy in assumpsit, it noted in a footnote:
The possibility cannot be ruled out that
emotional distress damages may be
recoverable on a contract where, for
example, “the breach is of such a kind that
serious emotional disturbance was a
particularly likely result.” 	Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 367 (Tent. Draft
No. 14, March 1, 1979). 	The present record
falls far short of establishing such a
breach.
Id. at 970 n.5. 	Section 367 was the precursor to Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 353 (A.L.I 1981).
Section 353, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
referenced by a different number in D’Ambrosio, precludes
emotional damages except in very limited circumstances:
Recovery for emotional disturbance will be
excluded unless the breach also caused
bodily harm or the contract or the breach is
of such a kind that serious emotional
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disturbance was a particularly likely
result.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (A.L.I 1981).
The Restatement gives examples in Comment a. of cases
which fit into the second exception. 	They are contracts for the
proper disposition of a dead body, contracts for the carriage of
messages concerning death, and contracts of carriers and
innkeepers with passengers and guests. 	Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 353 cmt. A (A.L.I 1981).
In cases decided since D’Ambrosio, the Commonwealth
Court in Gallagher and the Superior Court in Rittenhouse assumed
that § 353 is part of the law of Pennsylvania, although finding
it inapplicable in those particular cases. 	Gallagher, 539 A.2d
at 467; Rittenhouse 482 A.2d at 1043. 	In Gallagher, the
plaintiff sued a plumbing contractor, among others, for breach
of contract for failing to stop the backup and overflow of her
sewer line onto her property. 	539 A.2d at 464. 	She claimed
emotional distress and was ultimately hospitalized for treatment
for acute paranoid schizophrenia. 	Id. at 465. 	The Court held
that “failure to correctly diagnose a sewage blockage problem is
not particularly likely to result in mental suffering or
emotional distress.” 	Id. at 467 (emphasis in original). 	In
Rittenhouse, a tenant has sought emotional damages in connection
with her landlord’s alleged breach of the lease. 	482 A.2d at
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1042-43. 	The Court explained, in denying such recovery, that
the misconduct alleged was not so extreme in degree as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency. 	Id. at 1043.
In contrast, the Superior Court in Rodgers, decided
before Gallagher but after Rittenhouse, stated that § 353 has
not been adopted in Pennsylvania. 	496 A.2d at 815. 	It cited
the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Robert N. C.
Nix in Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital, 453 A.2d 974,
979-80 (Pa. 1982) in which he stated that he was mindful that
§ 353 has not been adopted but added that “the possibility
exists that certain circumstances may warrant a recovery for
emotional distress under [a contract] claim.”4 	The plaintiff in
Rodgers had sued Nationwide, his insurer, and its inhouse lawyer
for allowing a default judgment to be entered against him in an
automobile accident case in which he had been sued. 	496 A.2d at
812. 	Plaintiff claimed that the default judgment not only
damaged his credit but caused great humiliation, embarrassment
4. 	In Mason, plaintiff sued defendant and her physician in
trespass for negligence and in assumpsit for breach of express
and implied warranties in connection with a failed sterilization
operation. 	453 A.2d. at 975-76. 	Plaintiff subsequently became
pregnant and gave birth to a child. 	Id. 	She sought her medical
expenses and loss wages, damages for pain and suffering during
the prenatal and postnatal periods and damages for emotional
distress and expenses for raising the child until the age of
maturity. 	Id. 	The Court held that the financial and emotional
costs of raising a healthy child are not compensable. 	Id. 	Such
damages would be against public policy. 	Id.
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and emotional distress. 	Id. 	The Court further opined that even
if § 353 had been adopted, it could not be concluded in that
case that emotional disturbance was a particularly likely
result. 	Id. at 815-16. 	See also Fennell v. Nationwide Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 603 A.2d 1064, 1068 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
Our Court of Appeals has also recognized that
emotional distress damages are ordinarily not allowed under
Pennsylvania law in breach of contract actions, absent physical
injury or impact. 	Nicholas v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 227
F.3d 133, 147 (3d Cir. 2000). 	There, a professor sued
Pennsylvania State university , his employer, for terminating
him. 	Id. at 136. 	Among other claims, he sued for breach of
contract and sought damages for mental anguish as a result of
his depression allegedly caused by the breach. Id. at 146-47.
The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not err in
excluding this evidence. 	Id.
As this court is applying Pennsylvania’s substantive
law, it must predict how the Commonwealth’s highest court would
decide the issue at hand. 	Berrier v. Simplicity Mfg., Inc., 563
F.3d 38, 45-46 (3d Cir. 2009). 	It must take into account
relevant precedent, dicta and other reliable data. 	Id. 	In this
court’s view, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would follow the
general rule that emotional damages are not recoverable in
contract cases. 	It has not adopted § 353, and it is extremely
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unlikely that it would do so at this time and apply § 353 to the
facts advanced here. 	Plaintiff did not suffer any bodily harm,
and the alleged contract does not fit within any of the other
examples described in Comment a. to § 353 of the Restatement.
While contracts for the proper disposition of dead bodies allow
for distress damages under § 353, plaintiff concedes that she
“does not equate a placenta with a decedent’s remains.” 	See
Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to the Jefferson Defendants’
Amended Motion to Preclude Claim for Emotional Distress Damages,
p. 6 (Doc. #59).
In opposing to the pending motion, plaintiff stresses
her allegations that her placenta had personal, cultural, and
spiritual value to her and that she suffered emotional distress
when it was not returned to her. 	Even if true, her subjective
reaction to the alleged breach of contract is not relevant to
the issue before the court. 	In Pennsylvania, emotional distress
damages are generally not recoverable in a breach of contract
action. 	Whether emotional distress damages would ever be
recoverable would depend on the type of contract or breach
alleged, not on the plaintiff’s emotional or mental state. 	The
standard set forth in § 353 is an objective one. 	No case
suggests that the application of § 353 or the allowance of
emotional distress damages would be decided based on the effect
of the breach on the particular plaintiff without regard to the
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type of contract or breach involved. 	Otherwise, the floodgates
would be open to emotional distress damages in virtually every
breach of contract action. 	In Gallagher for example, the
plaintiff alleged the breach of contract caused hospitalization
for schizophrenia and in Nicholas the breach allegedly caused
plaintiff’s depression. 	Gallagher, 539 A.2d at 465; Nicholas,
227 F.3d at 146-47. 	In both, the right to emotional distress
damages was rejected.
The court concludes that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court would deny plaintiff the right to recover emotional
distress damages in this action. 	It would not deem the breach
of a contract to return a placenta, generally considered to be
medical waste,5 to be an exception to the general rule on
contract damages.
Accordingly, the court will grant the motion of
Jefferson to preclude plaintiff from claiming emotional distress
damages.
5. 	See 28 Pa. Code §§ 147.74 and 501.84 (2026).
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