HANUSCAK v. TEMPLE UNIVERSITY et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JEFFREY HANUSCAK,
Plaintiff,
v.
TEMPLE UNIVERSITY, et al.,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 2:26-cv-3404-MMB
Baylson, J. 	October 8, 2026
MEMORANDUM RE: MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Jeffrey Hanuscak, a pro se litigant, filed a complaint in this Court on May 11,
2026, against Defendants Temple University – Of The Commonwealth System of Higher
Education (“Temple” or the “University”), Temple President John Fry, and Temple Professor
Mark Salzer, Ph.D. (collectively, “Defendants”). ECF 1 (“Compl.”). Plaintiff brings a claim under
Section 1983 alleging violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Inclusion Act of
1977. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on August 24, 2026. ECF 13 (“Mot.”). Plaintiff filed
a Response on August 28, 2026. ECF 14. For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend.
I. 	FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS / BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings a claim under Section 1983, alleging violation of Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and the Inclusion Act of 1977.1 Compl. at 1. The Complaint was brought by
plaintiff Jeffrey Hanuscak and names Temple University, Temple President John Fry, and Temple
Professor Mark Salzer as defendants. Id. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the claims against
them based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. See Mot.
1 This Court has not identified an “Inclusion Act of 1977.” Regulations implementing Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act were enacted in 1977, so this Court will assume that Plaintiff is referring to the Rehabilitation Act
and will drop further references to the Inclusion Act.
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Plaintiff complains of grievances stemming from an alleged surgery he had at Temple in
2014. Compl. at 6. Plaintiff alleges that he was taken by ambulance into “gunshot surgery,” where
the University implanted a “device” into him. Id. at 6. Plaintiff alleges that the device is a “brain
reader” to both “try to get the government and people functioning properly” and to address national
security threats using the University’s research. 	Id. at 7–8. 	Plaintiff alleges that the device
“thumbs or pokes [him] all over the place almost 24/7” and “seems to cause some health
condition’s [sic] like swelling of the legs and feet and urine issues.” Id. at 7–8.
Plaintiff states that he has a disability in the form of a “birth injury” and has struggled to
obtain adequate employment. Id. at 13. He describes that, after being unable to get a job providing
pay commensurate with what he believes he should earn, he contacted Defendant Fry about
compensation for the “research”—the research he alleges Temple is engaging in via the “device”—
that Plaintiff did not consent to. Id. at 14.
Plaintiff also describes run-ins with law enforcement and the court system, including what
he alleges as three (3) false arrests. Id. at 8. In one instance involving the Defendants, Plaintiff
alleges that a detective “tr[ied] to force ME [sic] to stop trying to settle with Temple and John
Anderson Fry.” Id. He stated that the detective had a conflict of interest and did not have probable
cause to arrest him, as Plaintiff was “trying to . . . get a settlement and explain w h y [sic] the
research was illegal and why [he is] owed the money.” 	Id. at 9. 	Plaintiff describes another
encounter with the court system, which he states “got [him] to leave PA and take a summary
disorderly conduct charge with un [sic] reporting 3 months of probation” for “asking another gym
member to please shut the hell . . . up and be considerate to other gym members.” Id. at 10. This
encounter does not appear to involve or relate to any of the named Defendants. 	See id. at 10.
Plaintiff does not discuss the third “false arrest.”
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Plaintiff seeks $300,000. 	Id. at 18. 	Plaintiff’s Complaint does not ask for damages—
instead he wants this Court to “order Temple University to pay up 300 thousand dollar’s [sic] to
settle this dispute.” Id. (emphasis added). Plaintiff believes he is entitled to compensation from a
“500 grand Elder Abuse initiative the Mayor Jim Kenny [sic] listed,” to which Plaintiff believes
the former “Mayor of Philadelphia mentioned was to be [his].” Id. at 17.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Complaint is “not intended to bring forth any viable
causes of action” and instead “is being used as a vehicle to further continue a longstanding history
of physical threats, harassment, and intimidation towards President Fry and Temple officials,”
which resulted in Plaintiff’s arrest in August of 2025.2 Mot. at 4. 	Defendants ask the Court to
dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (1) under the substantiality doctrine, as they allege that Plaintiff’s
claims amount to fantastic scenarios that are devoid of any arguable factual basis; or (2) due to
failure to state a claim if Plaintiff’s claims are construed as medical malpractice, medical battery,
as arising under Section 1983, or as false arrest. Mot. at 6. Plaintiff does not reply to Defendants’
responses specifically but states that he “regrets not asking for the 500 grand including a [sic]
attorney fee for himself.” ECF 14 at 1.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must include sufficient facts
in the complaint that, accepted as true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A complaint is insufficient if it suggests only
the “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Plausibility
requires “enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of the
2 Plaintiff was allegedly ordered not to contact Temple University or any of its employees at this time. Mot. at 7.
Plaintiff was incarcerated beginning in August 2025, until he was found incompetent to stand trial and his case was
dismissed without prejudice in January 2026. Id. at 8. Defendants assert that Plaintiff resumed sending harassing
mails and voicemails after his release last August. Id.
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allegations claimed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. A claim does not meet this standard if the factual
allegations fail to “nudge[ the] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id. at 547.
Pro se plaintiffs are afforded liberal construction of their pleadings. See Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972) (per curiam). “Courts are more forgiving of pro se litigants for filing
relatively unorganized . . . complaints.” Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir. 2019).
Even if “inartfully pleaded,” a complaint can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it
appears “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.” Wilson v. Shupp, No. 11-3238, 2014 WL 1490635, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 15, 2014) (Baylson, J.) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). 	However,
“[w]hile a court must liberally construe the allegations and ‘apply the applicable law, irrespective
of whether the pro se litigant mentioned it be [sic] name,’ this does not require the court to act as
an advocate to identify any possible claim that the facts alleged could potentially support.” Doe
v. Allegheny Cnty. Hous. Auth., No. 23-1105, 2024 WL 379959, at *3 (3d Cir. Feb. 1, 2024)
(citations omitted). 	The Court should not rewrite pleadings “to include claims that were never
presented, nor must the Court ‘explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff[.]’”
Freeman v. Allentown Sch. Dist., No. 22-3518, 2022 WL 17583641, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2022)
(Leeson, J.) (citing Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985)).
Even when liberally construing pro se pleadings, federal courts may nonetheless dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if a plaintiff’s allegations are “so
attenuated and insubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit,” Allen v. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t
Emps. AFL-CIO, 276 F. App’x 197, 199 (3d Cir. 2008), such that the allegations “make out
‘fantastic scenarios’ that ‘lack[] any arguable factual basis.’” 	Aranovsky v. Temple Univ., No.
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25-6797, 2026 WL 2209786, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 2026) (Costello, J.) (citing DeGrazia v. FBI,
316 F. App’x 172, 173 (3d Cir. 2009)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Plaintiff explicitly brings a Section 1983 action for violation of Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and “the Inclusion Act of 1977” and states that he was falsely arrested. Compl.
at 6. Otherwise, it is difficult to decipher from the face of the Complaint what causes of action
Plaintiff brings. 3 While the Court is expected to apply the applicable law even if a plaintiff does
not mention it by name, it is not a court’s job to “identify any possible claim that the facts alleged
could potentially support.” Doe, 2024 WL 379959, at *3. If Plaintiff amends his complaint, he
must include factual allegations supporting each claim against each Defendant and may not
reassert claims that are dismissed with prejudice. See Bradley v. City of Phila., No. 25-4753, 2026
WL 84722, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2026) (Perez, J.).
A. Claims Arising from the Alleged Device
A federal court may dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule
12(b)(1) when a complaint’s allegations “are so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely
devoid of merit, . . . wholly insubstantial, . . . obviously frivolous, [or] plainly unsubstantial.”
DeGrazia, 316 F. App’x at 173 (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536–37 (1974) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). Courts do not have jurisdiction over claims that are based
on “fantastic scenarios lacking any arguable factual basis.” Allen, 276 F. App’x at 199.
Here, any claims Plaintiff brings that arise out of his allegation that during a surgery at
Temple University in 2014, Temple implanted a device into his brain, must be dismissed as lacking
3 Defendants identified potential medical malpractice and medical indifference claims. Mot. at 12. The Court can
also discern a potential malicious prosecution claim. See Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2013) (stating
that the Court should “apply the relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name it.” (citing Mala
v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244–45 (3d Cir. )). Each of these will be briefly discussed.
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any factual basis under the substantiality doctrine. 	Plaintiff claims that the implanted device
controls him and was turned on by the “Philadelphia FBI” because former-Mayor Jim Kenney was
“pissed” that Plaintiff sought money from an “elder abuse” initiative for his injuries. Compl. at
6–7. These allegations amount to the kind of “fantastic scenarios” that are regularly dismissed in
this jurisdiction. See, e.g., Aranovsky, 2026 WL 2209786, at *4; see also Mina v. Chester Cnty.,
No. 14-6261, 2015 WL 6550543 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2015) (Smith, J.). The Court lacks the power
to hear “far-reaching conspiracy theories,” Aranovsky, 2026 WL 2209786, at *5, and therefore
will DISMISS with prejudice all claims arising out of allegations about an implanted device,
including Section 504 claims, medical malpractice, and medical battery claims, to the extent those
claims rely on such allegations.
B. Section 1983
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim for violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, to the
extent that it is unrelated to allegations about the implanted device, fails as well. To successfully
bring a claim under Section 1983, Plaintiff must show that 1) Defendants acted under color of state
law, and 2) as a result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff suffered a denial of Constitutional or certain
statutory rights. See Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Section 1983 does
not, by its own terms, create substantive rights; it provides only remedies for deprivations of rights
established elsewhere in the Constitution or federal laws.”).
Not all violations of federal statutes are actionable under Section 1983. See A.W. v. Jersey
City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 794 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194
(1984)). To sustain a Section 1983 action for the violation of a right granted by statute, “a plaintiff
must demonstrate that the federal statute creates an individually enforceable right in the class of
beneficiaries to which he belongs.” 	See A.W., 486 F.3d at 801 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Gonzaga
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Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002)). If a statute creates a comprehensive enforcement scheme
incompatible with individual enforcement, courts have inferred that no individually enforceable
right exists. See A.W., 486 F.3d at 801 (citing Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113,
120 (2005)). The Third Circuit has held that, because Section 504’s remedial scheme was meant
to supplant Section 1983, Section 1983 is not an available remedy for such a claim. See A.W.,
486 F.3d at 806 (holding that Section 1983 “is not available to provide a remedy” for Section 504
violations). 	Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim alleging violation of Section 504 is therefore
DISMISSED with prejudice.
Plaintiff also discusses false arrest. Compl. at 8. While Plaintiff does not state as much,
the Court presumes this claim is brought pursuant to Section 1983. See Johnson v. Hitesman, No.
25-1422, 2026 WL 1047093, at *n.123 (M.D. Pa. April 17, 2026). To successfully allege a Section
1983 claim for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment, Plaintiff must assert that (1) he was
arrested, and (2) that the arrest was made without probable cause. See James v. City of Wilkes-
Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012).
As to his first arrest, Plaintiff alleges no facts that suggest the officers who arrested him
lacked probable cause. 	See Compl. 	Plaintiff simply states that “because [the officer] had no
probable cause all I was trying to do was get a settlement and explain w h y [sic] the research was
illegal and why I’m owed the money.” Compl. at 9. Courts cannot credit bare “legal assertions .
. . couched as a factual allegation.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.
1997). Plaintiff must bring forth facts that, taken as true, form a plausible basis that the officers
lacked probable cause. 	Plaintiff does not do so here. 	As to the second arrest involving an
altercation at the gym that Plaintiff alleges occurred in Montgomery County, Plaintiff alleges no
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facts to suggest that Defendants were involved in any way. See Compl. Any claims alleging false
arrest are therefore DISMISSED with leave to amend.4
To plead a claim for malicious prosecution, Plaintiff must allege that (1) the Defendants
initiated a criminal proceeding, (2) the proceeding ended in the Plaintiff’s favor, (3) the proceeding
was initiated without probable cause, (4) the Defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other
than bringing the Plaintiff to justice, and (5) the Plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty consistent
with seizure. 	See McKenna v. City of Phila., 582 F.3d 447, 461 (3d Cir. 2009). 	A malicious
prosecution claim fails for the same reasons as a false arrest claim and is therefore DISMISSED
with leave to amend.
C. The Rehabilitation Act
The Rehabilitation Act serves to “secure the rights of individuals with disabilities to
independence and full inclusion in American society.” Berardelli v. Allied Servs. Inst. Of Rehab.
Med., 900 F.3d 104, 109–10 (3d Cir. 2018). Section 504 prohibits “recipients of ‘federal financial
assistance,’” from discriminating against disabled individuals, including by denying access to
services, programs, or activities. 	See Montanez v. Price, 154 F.4th 127, 143–44 (3d Cir. 2025)
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)). A program or activity under Section 504 includes the operations of a
college or university. 	See Datto v. Harrison, 664 F. Supp. 2d 472, 493 (E.D. Pa. 2009)
(McLaughlin, J.). Plaintiffs may bring a claim under Section 504 alleging disparate treatment or
impact, refusal to provide reasonable accommodation, hostile environment, or retaliation. 	See
Ams. with Disabilities: Prac. & Compliance Manual § 1:227 (2026).
4 A state law claim for false arrest fails for the same reasons, since Pennsylvania and federal false arrest claims are
“co-extensive” as to proof and damages. See Russoli v. Salisbury Twp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 821, 869 (E.D. Pa. 2000)
(Van Antwerpen, J.).
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Under Section 504, only recipients of federal financial assistance are subject to suit. See
Montanez, 154 F.4th at 145. 	Individually named defendants who do not receive federal funds,
therefore, are not liable under Section 504. Id. Plaintiff named Defendants John Fry and Mark
Salzer as defendants in this action. Compl. at 1. Both Defendants are individuals. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claims against them will be DISMISSED with prejudice.
As to Temple University, Plaintiff must state a plausible claim for unequal treatment. Here,
Plaintiff alleges no facts that suggest Defendant treated Plaintiff differently or denied him access
in any way. 	While Plaintiff does state that he has struggled to obtain adequate employment,
Plaintiff does not allege Defendant is the cause of those troubles. 	Therefore, Plaintiff’s
Rehabilitation Act claims against Defendant Temple are DISMISSED with leave to amend.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice as to all claims relating to the alleged device,
as well as all Section 1983 claims alleging violation of the Rehabilitation Act, and all standalone
Rehabilitation Act claims against Defendants Fry and Salzer. Any claims alleging false arrest or
malicious prosecution, and any standalone Rehabilitation Act claims against Defendant Temple
University, are DISMISSED with leave to amend.
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