DANIELS v. SANTARELLI et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KIMBERLY DANIELS, 	:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 26-CV-7155
:
LETITIA SANTARELLI, et al., 	:
Defendants. 	:
ORDER
AND NOW, this 16th day of October 2026, upon consideration of pro se Plaintiff
Kimberly Daniels’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 1), Complaint
(ECF No. 2), and Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction (ECF No. 3), it is ORDERED that:
1. 	Leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915.
2. 	The Complaint is DEEMED filed.
3. 	For the reasons explained in the Court’s accompanying Memorandum, the
Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
4. 	Daniels’s Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction (ECF No. 3) is DENIED.
5. 	Daniels may file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this
Order in the event she can cure the defects the Court has identified in her claims. Any amended
complaint must identify all defendants in the caption of the amended complaint in addition to
identifying them in the body of the amended complaint and shall state the basis for Daniels’s
claims against each defendant. The amended complaint shall be a complete document that does
not rely on the initial Complaint, or other papers filed in this case to state a claim. When
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drafting her amended complaint, Daniels should be mindful of the Court’s reasons for dismissing
the claims in her Complaint as explained in the Court’s Memorandum.
6. 	Upon the filing of an amended complaint, the Clerk shall not make service until
so ORDERED by the Court.
7. 	The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Daniels a blank copy of this Court’s
current standard form to be used by a self-represented litigant filing a civil action bearing the
above-captioned civil action number. Daniels may use this form to file her amended complaint if
she chooses to do so.
8. 	If Daniels does not wish to file an amended complaint and instead intends to stand
on her Complaint as originally pled, she may file a notice with the Court within thirty (30) days
of the date of this Order stating that intent, at which time the Court will issue a final order
dismissing the case. Any such notice should be titled “Notice to Stand on Complaint,” and shall
include the civil action number for this case. See Weber v. McGrogan, 939 F.3d 232, 241 (3d
Cir. 2019) (“If the plaintiff does not desire to amend, [s]he may file an appropriate notice with
the district court asserting h[er] intent to stand on the complaint, at which time an order to
dismiss the action would be appropriate.” (quoting Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951
n.1 (3d Cir. 1976))); In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 703–04 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding
“that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed with prejudice the otherwise
viable claims . . . following plaintiffs’ decision not to replead those claims” when the district
court “expressly warned plaintiffs that failure to replead the remaining claims . . . would result in
the dismissal of those claims”).
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9. 	If Daniels fails to file any response to this Order, the Court will conclude that
Daniels intends to stand on her Complaint and will issue a final order dismissing this case. 1 See
Weber, 939 F.3d at 239-40 (explaining that a plaintiff’s intent to stand on his complaint may be
inferred from inaction after issuance of an order directing her to take action to cure a defective
complaint).
BY THE COURT:
MARY KAY COSTELLO, J.
1 The six-factor test announced in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d
863 (3d Cir. 1984), is inapplicable to dismissal orders based on a plaintiff’s intention to stand on
her amended complaint. See Weber, 939 F.3d at 241 & n.11 (treating the “stand on the
complaint” doctrine as distinct from dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for
failure to comply with a court order, which require assessment of the Poulis factors); see also
Elansari v. Altria, 799 F. App’x 107, 108 n.1 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam). Indeed, an analysis
under Poulis is not required when a plaintiff willfully abandons the case or makes adjudication
impossible, as would be the case when a plaintiff opts not to amend her complaint, leaving the
case without an operative pleading. See, e.g., Dickens v. Danberg, 700 F. App’x 116, 118 (3d
Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Where a plaintiff’s conduct clearly indicates that [s]he willfully intends
to abandon the case, or where the plaintiff's behavior is so contumacious as to make adjudication
of the case impossible, a balancing of the Poulis factors is not necessary.”); Baker v. Accounts
Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 292 F.R.D. 171, 175 (D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]he Court need not engage in an
analysis of the six Poulis factors in cases where a party willfully abandons her case or otherwise
makes adjudication of the matter impossible.” (citing cases)).
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