Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PEDRO ISAAC CATAGNA VEGA, 	: 	CIVIL ACTION
Petitioner, 	:
:
v. 	:
:
JL JAMISON, in his official capacity as 	: 	No. 26-cv-7418
Warden of Federal Detention Center in 	:
Philadelphia, et al., 	:
Respondents. 	:
MEMORANDUM
KENNEY, J. 	OCTOBER 8, 2026
Before the Court is Petitioner Pedro Isaac Catagna Vega’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus (the “Petition”) (ECF No. 1). Petitioner seeks immediate release from detention pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1 at 1. Respondents oppose any relief. See ECF No. 9. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court will GRANT the Petition (ECF No. 1), and order Respondents
to immediately release Petitioner from detention.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of Ecuador, who entered the United States in January 2021. ECF No.
1 ¶¶ 3, 19. Petitioner does not have any “outstanding criminal warrants or convictions[.]” Id. at
2; see also ECF No. 9-2 at 4. 	On September 23, 2026, Petitioner was arrested and detained by
officers of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). 	See ECF No. 1 at 2; see also
ECF No. 9-2 at 3. ICE officers did not have a Form I-200 Warrant for Petitioner’s arrest when
they arrested and took him into custody. See ECF No. 9 at 2 n.1. Instead, a Warrant was generated
and executed after Petitioner was arrested and already in custody, though Respondents represent
that the Warrant was “generated and served” at the scene of arrest. See id. (quoting ECF No. 9-2
at 3). Respondents indicate that Petitioner was a “target[]” of an operation at the time that he was
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arrested. See id. at 4; see also ECF No. 9-2 at 3. The Petition followed. See ECF No. 1. Petitioner
argues that after the Third Circuit’s decision in Buele Morocho v. Warden Philadelphia FDC, Nos.
26-1150 & 26-1454, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 2546223 (3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2026), it is clear that the
authority to detain Petitioner arises from 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which contains certain statutory and
due process protections. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 27–28; id. at 3. Respondents confirm that Petitioner
was detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). See ECF No. 9 at 2.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A federal district court can grant habeas relief when a petitioner is “in custody in violation
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “Habeas is
at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention[,]” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008),
and is “regularly invoked on behalf of noncitizens, particularly in the immigration context.” I.N.S.
v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305 (2001), superseded by statute on other grounds. 	It is Petitioner’s
burden to demonstrate that he is being detained in violation of the Constitution or federal law. See
Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286–87 (1941). In addition, the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution entitles noncitizens to due process of law in immigration and deportation
proceedings. See Serrano-Alberto v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 859 F.3d 208, 211 (3d Cir. 2017) (“The Fifth
Amendment protects the liberty of all persons within our borders, including aliens in immigration
proceedings who are entitled to due process of law—that is, a meaningful opportunity to be
heard—before being deported.”).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner argues that he is being unlawfully detained in violation of the Due Process
Clause, the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), bond regulations, and the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”). ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 21–38. For similar reasons as were recently articulated in
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Tabora-Brizuela v. Mullin, No. 26-7010, 2026 WL 2908095, at *2–5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2026),
and as this Court discussed in Juarez v. Mullin, No. 26-cv-7008, 2026 WL 2981947, at *2–5 (E.D.
Pa. Oct. 5, 2026), the Court finds that Petitioner is being detained in violation of the INA and the
Constitution. 	Accordingly, habeas relief is warranted, and the Court will order Petitioner’s
immediate release.
A. Administrative Exhaustion
Before seeking judicial relief, habeas petitioners “are ordinarily required to exhaust their
administrative remedies.” Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996)
(collecting cases); see also Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Although there
is no statutory exhaustion requirement attached to § 2241, we have consistently applied an
exhaustion requirement to claims brought under § 2241.” (collecting cases)). However, exhaustion
can be excused in circumstances where (1) exhaustion “would be futile[;]” (2) “the actions of the
agency clearly and unambiguously violate statutory or constitutional rights[;]” or (3) “if the
administrative procedure is clearly shown to be inadequate to prevent irreparable injury.” Lyons
v. U.S. Marshals, 840 F.2d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 1988). “[T]he exhaustion doctrine is not supposed
to preclude judicial relief[.]” Id.
Under the circumstances of this particular case, exhaustion “would be futile” and the
actions of ICE “clearly and unambiguously” violated Petitioner’s statutory and constitutional
rights. 	Id. 	As relevant here, “[a] later bond hearing does not necessarily cure the alleged
constitutional violation that preceded it.” Dos Reis v. McShane, No. 26-3775, 2026 WL 1746649,
at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 2026) (collecting cases). Respondents do not dispute that a Warrant for
Petitioner’s arrest was not generated until after he had already been arrested and placed in custody,
see ECF No. 9 at 2 n.1, so requiring a bond hearing at this posture would be futile in remedying
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Petitioner’s current unlawful detention. 	See Dos Reis, 2026 WL 1746649, at *3; see also
Melendez-Guzman v. Jamison, No. 26-7556, 2026 WL 2983704, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2026)
(“Petitioner alleges that he is currently being deprived of liberty unlawfully, so administrative
processes such as a bond hearing that may become available in the future would be futile in
remedying Petitioner’s alleged present and ongoing constitutional deprivation.”). 	Furthermore,
requiring the Court to defer until a bond hearing is held and an appeal has been heard before the
Board of Immigration Appeals would simply delay adjudication of a “clear[] and unambiguous[]”
violation of Petitioner’s statutory and constitutional rights. 	Lyons, 840 F.2d at 205; see also
Tabora-Brizuela, 2026 WL 2908095, at *5 (“[U]sing an after-the-fact warrant to justify a prior
arrest . . . is statutorily prohibited under the INA.” (quoting Parada Cruz v. Mullin, 837 F. Supp.
3d 404, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 2026))). Accordingly, the Court will excuse exhaustion here.
B. Immigration and Nationality Act
Section 236(a) of the INA provides that “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General,
[a noncitizen] may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be
removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (emphasis added). “The language of this
provision is clear: Section 236(a) ‘requires a warrant for arrest’” and detention. Tabora-Brizuela,
2026 WL 2908095, at *2 (quoting Hernandez v. Blanche, No. 26-6195, 2026 WL 2569475, at *3
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2026) (collecting cases)); see also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 302
(2018) (explaining that Section 1226(a) “authorizes detention [under that section] only ‘[o]n a
warrant issued’ by the Attorney General leading to the alien’s arrest” (quoting 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a))); Sagbay v. Jamison, No. 26-7265, 2026 WL 2875765, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2026)
(“Section 1226(a) is not even triggered unless an arrest warrant is issued. . . . If the alien has not
been arrested on a warrant, then the subsequent provisions giving the Attorney General discretion
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to detain or release the arrested alien are likewise not triggered.” (internal quotations and citation
omitted)); Matter of Q. Li, 29 I. & N. Dec. 66, 69 n.4 (BIA 2025) (“The regulation implementing
DHS’ authority to conduct arrests under section 236(a) authorizes a prospective arrest and
contemplates that the subject of the warrant has not yet been arrested and taken into custody at the
time the warrant is issued.” (citation omitted)).
Respondents concede that ICE did not have a warrant for Petitioner’s arrest at the time that
they arrested him and note that “[t]his case is not factually distinguishable” from this Court’s
decision in Juarez. See ECF No. 9 at 2 n.1. Rather, a Form I-200 Warrant “was generated after
Petitioner was arrested” and in custody, though the Warrant was served at the scene of the arrest.
Id.; see also ECF No. 9-2 at 3. It follows, therefore, that “[o]n its face . . . Section 236(a) does not
provide a basis for the Government to hold Petitioner in custody” because he was not arrested and
detained on a warrant. 	Tabora-Brizuela, 2026 WL 2908095, at *2; see also Sagbay, 2026 WL
2875765, at *5 (same); Melendez-Guzman, 2026 WL 2983704, at *6 (same).
Section 287(a) of the INA gives ICE “limited authority to make warrantless arrests” where
they can demonstrate “‘probable cause’” for the arrest and that the noncitizen “‘is likely to escape
before a warrant can be obtained.’” See Tabora-Brizuela, 2026 WL 2908095, at *2 (first quoting
Lee v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 590 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir. 1979); then quoting 8 U.S.C. §
§ 1357(a)(2)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (explaining that officers have the authority to arrest
a noncitizen “without warrant” if the officer “has reason to believe that the [noncitizen] so arrested
is in the United States in violation of” certain immigration “law[s] or regulation[s] and is likely to
escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest”); 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(ii) (“A warrant of
arrest shall be obtained except when the designated immigration officer has reason to believe that
the person is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.”).
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The Government has not put forth adequate factual findings suggesting that ICE had the
legal authority to proceed with a warrantless arrest of Petitioner. Although the Form I-213 that
ICE officers filled out after Petitioner’s arrest indicates that when they pulled Petitioner over on
September 23, 2026, he was the target of an enforcement operation, it is not clear in the record
before the Court why Petitioner was a target. See ECF No. 9-2 at 3. Moreover, if Petitioner was
an active target of the operation, that begs the question as to why ICE officers did not already have
a warrant in hand when carrying out the operation and stopping Petitioner, which further begs the
question as to whether there was any basis for probable cause. “Information that [an] officer learns
after an arrest cannot justify a warrantless arrest, as an officer cannot form a belief about probable
cause based on information they do not know.” Tabora-Brizuela, 2026 WL 2908095, at *2 (citing
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102–04 (1959)). 	Nor is there any indication in the arrest
narrative that the ICE officers had “reason to believe” that Petitioner was “likely to escape before
a warrant [could] be obtained for his arrest[.]” 	8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2). 	Rather, the Form I-213
indicates that Petitioner stopped when ICE officers activated their emergency lights, and there is
no suggestion that he attempted to flee. ECF No. 9-2 at 3. Thus, the record before the Court does
not support a finding that Section 1357(a)(2) provides a basis for Petitioner’s arrest and detention.
See Melendez-Guzman, 2026 WL 2983704, at *6; Juarez, 2026 WL 2981947, at *3.
As the Tabora-Brizuela Court emphasized, “[p]ost-hoc warrant practice is by any measure
‘constitutionally problematic[,]’” and permitting “the Government to launder an unlawful arrest
through a post-hoc warrant would greenlight authorities to make baseless arrests and conjure a
reason to hold them later.” 2026 WL 2908095, at *5 (quoting Parada Cruz v. Mullin, 837 F. Supp.
3d 404, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 2026)); see also Ramirez Ovando v. Noem, 810 F. Supp. 3d 1209, 1226 (D.
Colo. 2025) (finding that “the post hoc warrants” that were issued “had no legal effect”).
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Accordingly, for these reasons, Petitioner’s detention pursuant to a warrantless arrest violates the
INA, which is “grounds for habeas relief.” Tabora-Brizuela, 2026 WL 2908095, at *3; see also
Melendez-Guzman, 2026 WL 2983704, at *6 (“[B]ecause Petitioner’s detention did not occur
either ‘[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General’ or with ‘reason to believe that [Petitioner] .
. . [was] likely to escape before a warrant [could] be obtained for his arrest,’ it was unlawful under
both § 1226(a) and § 1357(a)(2), in addition to violating procedural due process”); Juarez, 2026
WL 2981947, at *3 (same); Sagbay, 2026 WL 2875765, at *5 (same).1
C. Due Process Clause
In addition, Petitioner argues that his detention violates his procedural due process rights.2
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.” 	U.S. Const. amend. V. 	“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all
‘persons’ within the United States, including [noncitizens], whether their presence here is lawful,
unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” 	Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (collecting
cases). 	To determine if Government action violates procedural due process, courts weigh the
following factors as set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge: (1) “the private interest that will be affected
by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;”
and 	(3) 	“the Government’s 	interest, 	including 	the function 	involved 	and 	the 	fiscal 	and
1 Respondents argue that “Petitioner does not argue the legality of his arrest in his Petition.” ECF
No. 9 at 2 n.1. Not so. Petitioner presents various arguments throughout his Petition as to why
his arrest and detention are unlawful. Although Petitioner did not initially raise the issue of being
subject to a warrantless arrest, that issue has now been placed affirmatively before the Court. See
id.
2 The Court need not address whether Petitioner’s detention violates bond regulations or the APA.
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administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 424
U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
The first Mathews factor weighs strongly in Petitioner’s favor. He has a private interest
“in being free from physical detention” and “‘[i]t is clear that commitment for any purpose
constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.’” 	Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529–30 (2004) (plurality opinion) (quoting Jones v. United States, 463
U.S. 354, 361 (1983)); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (explaining that being free from physical
detention “lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects”). 	Since
Respondents have detained Petitioner under Section 1226(a), he “is owed the process due under
that statute[,]” which did not occur here as discussed above. Tabora-Brizuela, 2026 WL 2908095,
at *3 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
The second Mathews factor also weighs in Petitioner’s favor. There is a significant “risk
of an erroneous deprivation” when ICE acts to detain an individual under Section 1226(a) without
first determining whether there is a legitimate reason for doing so or sufficient time to secure a
warrant, and without complying with applicable statutory and administrative regulations. 	See
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; see also Tabora-Brizuela, 2026 WL 2908095, at *4 (“[T]he risk of
erroneous deprivation is significant when officers act without forethought and deliberation.”);
Torres Guevara v. Warden of Fed. Det. Ctr. Phila., No. 26-7077, 2026 WL 2838542, at *4 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 22, 2026) (“There is a high risk of erroneous deprivation where the government
physically detains a person without identifying a valid reason to do so.”); Yeleshev v. Larocco, No.
26-CV-2294, 2026 WL 1353806, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 14, 2026) (“[W]hen someone is arrested
first, and the reasons located later, there is an inevitable pressure to ‘justify’ or find some legal
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basis for removal proceedings, which heightens the risk of error and in other cases, something far
worse.”).
With respect to the third Mathews factor, the Court acknowledges that Respondents have
a valid interest in enforcing immigration laws and protecting the public from danger. However, at
the same time, Respondents and ICE also have an interest in and an obligation to abide by the rule
of law and follow applicable statutory provisions and regulations when carrying out their official
duties. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); id. § 1357(a); 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(ii). Requiring compliance
with these provisions certainly “does not amount to a detrimental ‘burden’” on Respondents.
Tabora-Brizuela, 2026 WL 2908095, at *4. Indeed, “the mere fact that the [G]overnment has the
authority to detain someone does not mean that it may do so in any manner it chooses, without
affording due process.” Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 157 (W.D.N.Y. 2025) (citation
omitted); see also Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974) (explaining that when “the rights of
individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures”); Marshall
v. Lansing, 839 F.2d 933, 943 (3d Cir. 1988) (explaining that “principles of due process require an
agency to follow its own regulations, which have the force of law”); Montilla v. I.N.S., 926 F.2d
162, 164 (2d Cir. 1991) (“The notion of fair play animating [the Fifth] [A]mendment precludes an
agency from promulgating a regulation affecting individual liberty or interest, which the rule-
maker may then with impunity ignore or disregard as it sees fit.”). Accordingly, this factor, too,
weighs in Petitioner’s favor.
On balance, the Court finds that the Mathews factors weigh in favor of a determination that
Petitioner’s warrantless arrest and detention have resulted in a violation of his procedural due
process rights, which is an additional ground for habeas relief. 	See Tabora-Brizuela, 2026 WL
2908095, at *4; Juarez, 2026 WL 2981947, at *5.
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D. Remedy
Respondents have violated both the INA and Petitioner’s procedural due process rights.
Accordingly, Petitioner is being held “in custody in violation of the Constitution [and] laws . . . of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A federal court adjudicating a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus is authorized to “dispose of the matter as law and justice require[,]” see id. § 2243,
and has “equitable discretion to decide whether to issue the writ or to provide a remedy.” Edwards
v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. 255, 289 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). “The traditional function of the
writ of habeas corpus is to secure release from unlawful executive detention.” Hope v. Warden
York Cnty. Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Munaf, 553 U.S. at 693). As in Tabora-
Brizuela, immediate release from detention is also warranted in this case. 2026 WL 2908095, at
*5; see also Sagbay, 2026 WL 2875765, at *5–6 (ordering immediate release of a petitioner where
he was arrested and detained “without an administrative warrant”); Melendez-Guzman, 2026 WL
2983704, at *7 (same); Juarez, 2026 WL 2981947, at *5 (same). 	This “remedy aligns with
numerous cases releasing habeas petitioners held in custody following procedural due process
violations.” Funes v. Francis, 810 F. Supp. 3d 472, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (collecting cases).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant the Petition (ECF No. 1), and order
Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from detention and to certify their compliance with
the Court’s Order. An appropriate Order will follow.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Chad F. Kenney
CHAD F. KENNEY, JUDGE
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