Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ABNER AMILTON LOPEZ-LOPEZ, 	: 	CIVIL ACTION
Petitioner, 	:
:
v. 	: 	No. 26-cv-7618
:
JAMAL L. JAMISON, et al., 	:
Respondents. 	:
MEMORANDUM
KENNEY, J. 	OCTOBER 16, 2026
Before the Court is Petitioner Abner Amilton Lopez-Lopez’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus (the “Petition”) (ECF No. 1). Petitioner seeks immediate release from detention pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See ECF No. 1 at 3. Respondents oppose any relief. See ECF No. 5. For
the reasons set forth below, the Court will GRANT the Petition (ECF No. 1), and order
Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from detention.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of Guatemala who entered the United States without inspection about
twenty years ago at the age of fifteen years old. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1–2, 8. He has been residing in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, see id. ¶ 8, and Respondents report that “Petitioner does not have a
criminal background.” ECF No. 5 at 6.
On or about September 30, 2026, officers of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) arrested and detained Petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). ECF No. 1 ¶ 3; see also
ECF No. 5 at 3, 6–7. According to the deportation officer’s arrest narrative in Petitioner’s Form
I-213, ICE officers were “conduct[ing] a fugitive enforcement operation to locate” an unnamed
“ICE At-Large Target at 52 Hampden Rd., Upper Darby, Pennsylvania.” 	ECF No. 5-2 at 2.
Around 10:00 a.m. on September 30, 2026, officers “observed a male matching the physical
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description of a separate ICE target exit that target’s last known address at 40 Copley Rd., Upper
Darby, Pennsylvania.” Id. Beyond the fact that the individual was a male, no other identifying
features of either purported target are described. Id. Officers tried “to encounter the male while
he was walking[,]” but before they could make contact with him, he “appeared to recognize the
officers’ presence and fled the immediate area.” Id.
While officers were searching for the male that fled, “officers observed a male believed to
be the same individual running across Chestnut Street toward Glendale Road.” Id. According to
officers, that “male appeared to be breathing heavily and was looking around in a manner
suggesting he was attempting to evade someone or something.” Id. The officers then “encountered
the male near the intersection of Glendale Road and Samson Street.” Id.1 Officers proceeded to
“conduct[] a brief field interview and identified” the individual as Petitioner, Mr. Lopez-Lopez.
Id. Over the course of the interview, “officers determined that [Petitioner] was not the ICE target
who had previously fled from officers.” Id. According to the deportation officer, Petitioner “freely
claimed that he is a citizen of Guatemala and is unlawfully present in the United States.” Id. “An
ICE supervisor was on scene, issued an I-200, and authorized” Petitioner’s arrest. Id. Petitioner
“was placed in hand restraints, searched, placed in a service vehicle, and transported to the
Philadelphia Field Office for processing.” Id.
Once back at the Field Office, Petitioner was then “served” with another “ICE Arrest
Warrant and a Notice to Appear in Immigration Court[,]” and was “detained without bond.” Id.
at 3. 	There are two Form I-200 Warrants dated September 30, 2026 in the record before the
Court—a partly handwritten version and an electronic version, neither of which are time-stamped.
1 The deportation officer’s Declaration states instead that Petitioner “was encountered on Chestnut
Street.” ECF No. 5-4 ¶ 2.
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See ECF No. 5-3 at 1–2. The Warrants differ in a material respect: on the handwritten Warrant,
the immigration officer checked a box which states that the determination of probable cause
regarding removability was “based upon . . . the pendency of ongoing removal proceedings against
the subject[,]” among other reasons; by contrast, the electronic version does not have that particular
box checked. Id.
After Petitioner was detained, the Petition followed. 	See ECF No. 1. 	In his Petition,
Petitioner challenges the legality of his detention and asserts claims for relief pursuant to the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), certain
bond regulations, and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). 	Id. ¶¶ 24–42. 	Respondents
filed a Response Opposing the Petition for Habeas Corpus Writ on October 9, 2026. See ECF No.
5. The Petition is before the Court.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A federal district court can grant habeas relief when a petitioner is “in custody in violation
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “Habeas is
at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention[,]” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008),
and is “regularly invoked on behalf of noncitizens, particularly in the immigration context.” I.N.S.
v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305 (2001), superseded by statute on other grounds. 	It is Petitioner’s
burden to demonstrate that he is being detained in violation of the Constitution or federal law. See
Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286–87 (1941). In addition, the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution entitles noncitizens to due process of law in immigration and deportation
proceedings. See Serrano-Alberto v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 859 F.3d 208, 211 (3d Cir. 2017) (“The Fifth
Amendment protects the liberty of all persons within our borders, including aliens in immigration
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proceedings who are entitled to due process of law—that is, a meaningful opportunity to be
heard—before being deported.”).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. Administrative Exhaustion
Before seeking judicial relief, habeas petitioners “are ordinarily required to exhaust their
administrative remedies.” Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996)
(collecting cases); see also Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Although there
is no statutory exhaustion requirement attached to § 2241, we have consistently applied an
exhaustion requirement to claims brought under § 2241.” (collecting cases)). However, exhaustion
can be excused in circumstances where (1) exhaustion “would be futile[;]” (2) “the actions of the
agency clearly and unambiguously violate statutory or constitutional rights[;]” or (3) “if the
administrative procedure is clearly shown to be inadequate to prevent irreparable injury.” Lyons
v. U.S. Marshals, 840 F.2d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 1988). “[T]he exhaustion doctrine is not supposed
to preclude judicial relief[.]” Id.
Under the circumstances of this particular case, exhaustion “would be futile” and the
actions of ICE “clearly and unambiguously” violated Petitioner’s statutory rights and implicate
constitutional concerns. Id. As relevant here, courts have found that “[a] later bond hearing does
not necessarily cure the alleged constitutional violation that preceded it.” Dos Reis v. McShane,
No. 26-cv-3775, 2026 WL 1746649, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 2026) (collecting cases). 	As
discussed below, see infra at 7–10, Respondents did not detain Petitioner pursuant to a valid Form
I-200 Warrant, so requiring a bond hearing at this posture would be futile in remedying Petitioner’s
current unlawful and invalid detention. See Dos Reis, 2026 WL 1746649, at *3; see also Melendez-
Guzman v. Jamison, No. 26-cv-7556, 2026 WL 2983704, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2026) (“Petitioner
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alleges that he is currently being deprived of liberty unlawfully, so administrative processes such
as a bond hearing that may become available in the future would be futile in remedying Petitioner’s
alleged present and ongoing constitutional deprivation.”). 	Furthermore, requiring the Court to
defer until a bond hearing is held and an appeal has been heard before the Board of Immigration
Appeals would simply delay adjudication of a “clear[] and unambiguous[]” violation of
Petitioner’s rights. 	Lyons, 840 F.2d at 205; see also Almonte v. Genalo, No. 26-cv-3633, 2026
WL 2983349, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2026) (“It is well-settled that [p]etitioner is not required to
exhaust a process that was deficient from the outset” and where “a petitioner has raised a
substantial constitutional question” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). Accordingly, the
Court will excuse exhaustion here.
B. Lawfulness of Petitioner’s Arrest
“As a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable [noncitizen] to remain present in the
United States[,]” so officers may not arrest an individual “based on nothing more than possible
removability[.]” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 407 (2012). In fact, “[i]f the police stop
someone based on nothing more than possible removability, the usual predicate for an arrest is
absent.” Id.2 Accordingly, the “federal statutory structure instructs when it is appropriate to arrest
[a noncitizen] during the removal process.” Id.
Specifically, Section 236(a) of the INA provides that “[o]n a warrant issued by the
Attorney General, [a noncitizen] may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the
alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (emphasis added); see also
2 If an officer suspects that a noncitizen is “removable, a federal official issues an administrative
document called a ‘Notice to Appear’” (“NTA”). Arizona, 567 U.S. at 407 (first citing 8 U.S.C. §
1229(a); then citing 8 C.F.R. § 239.1(a)). 	The NTA “does not authorize an arrest[;]” rather, it
provides the noncitizen with information about the removal “proceedings, including the time and
date of the removal hearing.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)).
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Juarez v. Mullin, No. 26-cv-7008, 2026 WL 2981947, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2026) (same). “The
language of this provision is clear: Section 236(a) ‘requires a warrant for arrest’” and detention.
Tabora-Brizuela v. Mullin, No. 26-cv-7010, 2026 WL 2908095, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2026)
(quoting Hernandez v. Blanche, No. 26-cv-6195, 2026 WL 2569475, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31,
2026) (collecting cases)); see also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 302 (2018) (explaining
that Section 1226(a) “authorizes detention [under that section] only ‘[o]n a warrant issued’ by the
Attorney General leading to the alien’s arrest” (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a))); Sagbay v. Jamison,
No. 26-cv-7265, 2026 WL 2875765, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2026) (“Section 1226(a) is not even
triggered unless an arrest warrant is issued. . . . If the alien has not been arrested on a warrant, then
the subsequent provisions giving the Attorney General discretion to detain or release the arrested
alien are likewise not triggered.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)). A Form I-200 is the
administrative warrant that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and ICE employ
when arresting noncitizens under Section 1226(a). 	Importantly, the Form I-200 authorizes a
noncitizen’s arrest if it is issued “[a]t the time of issuance of the notice to appear, or at any time
thereafter and up to the time removal proceedings are completed[.]” 	8 C.F.R. § 236.1(b)(1)
(emphasis added).
When these provisions are taken together, they indicate that “DHS may arrest a non-citizen
using a Form I-200 only if the Form I-200 issues at the same time or after DHS issues an NTA.”
Vladimir G. v. Easterwood, No. 26-cv-2971, 2026 WL 1786418, at *2 (D. Minn. June 22, 2026)
(citations omitted); see also Islamuddin A. v. Blanche, No. 26-cv-3340, 2026 WL 2546280, at *3
(D. Minn. Aug. 28, 2026) (“To be valid, then, a Form I-200 warrant must issue at the same time
or after the Department of Homeland Security issues an NTA.” (internal quotations and citations
omitted)). 	This is because “[a] notice to appear” is a “case-initiating document”—“like an
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indictment in a criminal case [or] a complaint in a civil case”—and “serves as the basis for
commencing a grave legal proceeding” against a noncitizen. 	Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S.
155, 163–64 (2021) (citation omitted); see also Loaeza v. Bausch, No. 26-cv-00945, --- F. Supp.
3d ----, 2026 WL 2150155, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. July 27, 2026) (“The Notice to Appear (‘NTA’) is
the immigration version of a charging instrument and begins the removal process.” (internal
quotations and citation omitted)); 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (explaining that noncitizens “shall” be
provided with “written notice” of the “removal proceedings[,]” which is “referred to as a ‘notice
to appear’”).
Here, Respondents have failed to properly follow this sequence. 	Based on the record
before the Court, ICE officers issued a handwritten Form I-200 Warrant at the scene of Petitioner’s
arrest after interviewing him. See ECF No. 5-2 at 2. However, at that time, Petitioner did not have
an existing NTA and they did not issue him one contemporaneously with his arrest. Instead, ICE
officers only generated and served Petitioner with an NTA after he had already been arrested and
detained at its Field Office. Id. at 3.3 District courts across the country have concluded that it is
3 Respondents are not clear in their Response as to the timeline of the events, so the Court focuses
its attention on the documents prepared by ICE officers. Respondents state that ICE “prepared a
handwritten I-200 . . . and served Petitioner before his arrest on September 30, 2026.” ECF No. 5
at 6. Respondents then state that, “[a]t that time, ICE executed and served Petitioner with a Form
I-286 (Notice of Custody Determination), advising that he was being detained for the remainder
of his removal proceedings.” Id. at 6–7. That representation is belied by the record.
As reflected in the arrest narrative, ICE officers encountered Petitioner at 10:00 a.m. See ECF No.
5-2 at 2. They “conducted a brief field interview” before arresting him, and there is no indication
that he was served with any documentation at the scene beyond the Form I-200 Warrant. Id.; see
also ECF No. 5-4 ¶ 4 (“Supervisory Deportation Officer Damon Brown was present at the
encounter, authorized the arrest and issued a hand-written I 200 to Mr. Lopez-Lopez and advised
him that he was being arrested.”). Petitioner’s signed Notice of Custody Determination is time-
stamped at 12:48 p.m. on September 30, 2026—over two hours after the encounter. See ECF No.
5-1 at 1. The Notice of Custody Determination is also electronically filled out and has a redacted
“A-File Number[,]” which further suggests that it was completed at the Field Office. 	Id. 	By
contrast, the handwritten Form I-200 contains only a “TBD” for “File No.” See ECF No. 5-3 at 2.
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unlawful for ICE officers to arrest and detain a noncitizen on a Form I-200 warrant and
subsequently generate an NTA; warrants issued under those circumstances are deemed invalid.
See, e.g., Loaeza, 2026 WL 2150155, at *1 (“[W]ithout a valid NTA in place, removal proceedings
are not pending, and [r]espondents have no authority to make an arrest or effectuate detention
pursuant to § 1226(a).”); Martinez-Salamanca v. Baltazar, No. 26-cv-2410, 2026 WL 2083209, at
*3 (D. Colo. July 20, 2026) (finding that a “Form I-200 warrant was invalid” where it was issued
before an NTA was issued, so petitioner was arrested “in contravention of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)”);
Vladimir G., 2026 WL 1786418, at *3 (concluding that a “Form I-200 warrant was plainly invalid”
when issued before an NTA was generated and thus finding that petitioner’s “arrest was effected
without a required warrant”); Aguilar Torres v. Hardin, No. 26-cv-1480, 2026 WL 1353242, at *1
(M.D. Fla. May 15, 2026) (“I-200 warrants issued without a contemporaneous or previously issued
notice to appear are invalid.”); Yeleshev v. Larocco, No. 26-cv-2294, 2026 WL 1353806, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. May 14, 2026) (“The warrant’s execution cannot precede the NTA—that is, ICE cannot
arrest the individual pursuant to an I-200 before an NTA has issued. 	But here, the arrest was
effectuated before the NTA was created. That flaw renders the warrant and the arrest invalid.”).
Today, this Court joins in those holdings and finds that the handwritten Form I-200 Warrant that
was issued at the scene of Petitioner’s arrest before he was in removal proceedings is invalid.
Accordingly, Respondents arrested Petitioner without the statutory authority to do so and
unlawfully detained him in violation of the INA.
Furthermore, the handwritten Form I-200 Warrant contains false information. 	See ECF
No. 5-3 at 2. At least three out of four boxes that purportedly support the immigration officer’s
Accordingly, the record does not support Respondents’ contention that Petitioner was provided
with a Form I-286 at the same time as his arrest.
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determination of “probable cause” for Petitioner’s arrest appear to have been erroneously checked
when the handwritten Form I-200 Warrant was issued. 	See id.4 The immigration officer states
that he “determined that there is probable cause to believe that [Petitioner] is removable from the
United States . . . based upon:” (1) “the execution of a charging document to initiate removal
proceedings against the subject;” (2) “the pendency of ongoing removal proceedings against the
subject;” (3) “biometric confirmation of the subject’s identity and a records check of federal
databases that affirmatively indicate, . . . that the subject either lacks immigration status or
notwithstanding such status is removable under U.S. immigration law;” and (4) “statements made
voluntarily by the subject to an immigration officer and/or other reliable evidence that
affirmatively indicate the subject either lacks immigration status or notwithstanding such status is
removable under U.S. immigration law.” Id.
With respect to the first two determinations, the record reflects that Petitioner did not have
an existing “charging document” when the handwritten Form I-200 Warrant was issued, nor were
there any “ongoing removal proceedings” involving Petitioner. Id. To the contrary, as discussed
above, Petitioner was not issued an NTA until after he had already been arrested and detained by
ICE officers on September 30, 2026. See ECF No. 5-2 at 3 (noting that Petitioner “was served an
ICE Arrest Warrant and a Notice to Appear in Immigration Court” after he was detained); see also
ECF No. 5 at 6 (stating that Petitioner “entered the United States without inspection on an unknown
date and place, approximately twenty years ago”); ECF No. 1 ¶ 2 (explaining that Petitioner “did
not encounter” Government agents when he originally crossed the border at the age of fifteen).
4 The Court also notes that the immigration officer handwrote information into fillable spaces on
the Form I-200 Warrant, but the boxes that indicate the alleged basis for probable cause to arrest
Petitioner appear to have been checked electronically, which suggests that they were already
predetermined before ICE officers ever approached Petitioner. ECF No. 5-3 at 2.
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The Court presumes this factual error is in part why ICE officers subsequently issued a second,
electronic version of the Form I-200 Warrant that, notably, omits a check for the box associated
with “the pendency of ongoing removal proceedings against the subject.” ECF No. 5-3 at 1.
With respect to the third determination, the arrest narrative does not reflect that ICE officers
conducted any “biometric confirmation of [Petitioner’s] identity” or “a records check of federal
databases” at the scene of his arrest. Id. at 2. Instead, to the extent that either of those steps were
completed, they appear to have been done only after Petitioner was detained and processed at
ICE’s Field Office. 	See ECF No. 5-2 at 2–3. 	Moreover, the records that ICE officers checked
returned “[n]egative result[s]” for Petitioner. 	See id. at 2. 	As at least one other court has
commented, it is “undeniably false” to “represent[] as true in the warrant[] that ‘biometric
confirmation [and] records check of federal databases affirmatively indicate’ that the petitioner
lacked immigration status” when those records checks return negative results. Almonte, 2026 WL
2983349, at *10; see also id. at *9 (“The claim that database queries checks could ‘positively
identify’ petitioner appears spurious as, without any immigration record, petitioner would not
appear in any ICE database from which he could be positively identified.”). As in Almonte, the
deportation officer thus issued an arrest warrant that contains false information and inaccurately
“stat[es] that [P]etitioner’s information was part of the system when it was not and indicat[es] that
he could be biometrically identified even though they had not collected the information to make a
positive match” when they arrested him. Id. at *10.
For these reasons, the Court finds that the handwritten Form I-200 Warrant that
Respondents used to arrest Petitioner is invalid, which renders his arrest and detention invalid. See
Yeleshev, 2026 WL 1353806, at *4 (“That flaw [in the timing of the issuance of the NTA] renders
the warrant and the arrest invalid.”); Loaeza, 2026 WL 2150155, at *2 (“Because removal
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proceedings were not pending against [the petitioner] when he was arrested on May 8 under the
purported authority of § 1226(a), [r]espondents had no statutory authority to make the arrest or to
detain him under that provision.”); Vladimir G., 2026 WL 1786418, at *3 (finding that a petitioner
was 	arrested 	“pursuant 	to 	an 	invalid 	warrant[,]” 	which 	rendered 	his 	arrest 	“unlawful”).
Accordingly, Petitioner is being unlawfully detained in violation of the INA, which is “grounds
for habeas relief.” Tabora-Brizuela, 2026 WL 2908095, at *3.
Moreover, Respondents cannot fall back on their authority to detain a noncitizen without a
warrant under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2). 	Section 1357(a)(2) gives ICE “limited authority to make
warrantless arrests.” Id. at *2 (first citing 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2); then citing Arizona, 567 U.S. at
408). An officer is authorized to arrest a noncitizen “without [a] warrant” if the officer “has reason
to believe that the [noncitizen] so arrested is in the United States in violation of” certain
immigration “law[s] or regulation[s] and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for
his arrest[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2); see also 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(ii) (“A warrant of arrest shall
be obtained except when the designated immigration officer has reason to believe that the person
is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.”). 	Courts have interpreted the “reason to
believe” language “as equivalent to ‘probable cause.’” Tabora-Brizuela, 2026 WL 2908095, at *2
(quoting Lee v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 590 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir. 1979)). The analysis
of probable cause “turns on what the arresting officer knew at the time they took the individual
into custody.” Id. (citing Ramirez Ovando v. Noem, 810 F. Supp. 3d 1209, 1231 (D. Colo. 2025)).
Here, there is no indication in the record that ICE officers had “reason to believe” that
Petitioner was “likely to escape before a warrant [could] be obtained for his arrest[.]” 8 U.S.C. §
1357(a)(2). Indeed, “[d]uring the interview” of Petitioner at the scene of his arrest, ICE officers
“determined that [Petitioner] was not the ICE target who had previously fled from officers.” ECF
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No. 5-2 at 2. Moreover, the fact that ICE officers issued a Form I-200 Warrant for Petitioner’s
arrest at the scene further confirms that they did not intend to proceed with a warrantless arrest
pursuant to Section 1357(a)(2). See ECF No. 5-3 at 2. Section 1357(a)(2) thus does not provide
a basis for Petitioner’s arrest and detention either.
The Court notes that it is starting to see a troubling pattern of individuals being
“mistakenly” identified as targets by ICE and investigated without reasonable suspicion merely
for being in proximity to other unnamed, ambiguous targets. Almonte, 2026 WL 2983349, at *1;
see also id. at *8 & n.7 (“ICE’s narrative justifying arrests because of misidentification of the
arrestee as a ‘target’ of an ICE operation has an inglorious history.” (collecting cases)); Alfaro v.
Mullin, 831 F. Supp. 3d 177, 180 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. 2026) (noting that “[t]his [misidentification]
rationale has become so commonplace in cases involving ICE enforcement efforts that such
testimony must be examined carefully” (collecting cases)); cf. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91
(1979) (explaining that “a person’s mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal
activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search [or seize] that person”).
Whether ICE officers intended to do so or not, their actions here are indicative of racial profiling
of an individual who happened to be “breathing heavily” near a target. ECF No. 5-2 at 2. This
Court has previously commented that Respondents are taking a “make-it-up-as-we-go” approach
to immigration enforcement and are “leaving others to backfill whatever was missed after the
action [has] already been taken.” Martinez v. Jamison, No. 26-cv-00718, 2026 WL 700335, at *4
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2026). That statement continues to ring true here.
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C. Remedy
Respondents have violated the INA, and Petitioner is, therefore, being held “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).5 A federal
court adjudicating a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is authorized to “dispose of the matter as
law and justice require[,]” see id. § 2243, and has “equitable discretion to decide whether to issue
the writ or to provide a remedy.” 	Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. 255, 289 (2021) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring). 	“The traditional function of the writ of habeas corpus is to secure release from
unlawful executive detention.” Hope v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir.
2020) (citing Munaf, 553 U.S. at 693). Immediate release from detention is warranted in this case
as a remedy. 	See Loaeza, 2026 WL 2150155, at *2 (ordering immediate release from custody
where a petitioner was unlawfully arrested under § 1226(a) on an invalid warrant); Vladimir G.,
2026 WL 1786418, at *3 (same) (collecting cases); Yeleshev, 2026 WL 1353806, at *8 (same).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant the Petition (ECF No. 1), and order
Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from detention and to certify their compliance with
the Court’s Order. An appropriate Order will follow.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Chad F. Kenney
CHAD F. KENNEY, JUDGE
5 The Court need not address Petitioner’s arguments that his arrest and detention violate the Due
Process Clause, certain bond regulations, and the APA, as this Petition can be decided on other
grounds.
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