AHNERT v. LEHIGH VALLEY HEALTH NETWORK

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
__________________________________________
AMY M. AHNERT, 	:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	Civil No. 5:24-cv-02561-JLS
:
LEHIGH VALLEY HEALTH NETWORK, 	:
Defendant. 	:
__________________________________________
MEMORANDUM
SCHMEHL, J. - /s/ JLS 	OCTOBER 9, 2026
The Court has already ruled that certain discrete acts that occurred prior to May 12, 2023,
including Defendant’s failure to promote Plaintiff to the Position of Chief Cardiologist in 2019, are time-
barred. [ECF 37]. Plaintiff seeks to serve a Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad Testificandum to testify at a
deposition on a non-party to this action, “Grant Cooper, A Diversified Search Company, Healthcare
Practice” (“Cooper”). Plaintiff also demands that Cooper produce certain documents, including all
communications from January 1, 2019 through December 31, 2020 between Cooper and the Defendant
regarding 1) the Chief of Cardiology position; 2) the interview and candidate selection process for the
Chief of Cardiology position; 3) search committee documents regarding the search for such position,
including committee meeting agendas, minutes, notes or determinations; 4) any position that Plaintiff
applied for or sought with Defendant based on communications between Cooper and Plaintiff; 5) the
results or determinations made by Cooper on connection with the search for Defendant’s Chief of
Cardiology position. ECF 79-1, p. 4. Defendant opposes the Plaintiff’s request on the basis that Plaintiff’s
failure to promote to the Chief of Cardiology position claim has already been dismissed from the case and
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the discovery Plaintiff seeks goes way beyond any permissible background information regarding the
failure to promote claim.
Plaintiff first asserts that she is entitled to the requested deposition and production of
documents as background information to provide context to her timely claims.
“[P]rior acts that are not actionable because they are time-barred may still be cited
as background evidence in support of a timely claim.” Titus-Morris v. Banc of Am. Card Servicing Corp.,
512 F. App'x 213, 217 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113
(2002)). Such “background evidence,” may be utilized to “establish[ ] the discriminatory nature of the
timely claims” by showing “motive [or] intent.” Mavrinac v. Emergency Med. Ass'n of Pittsburgh 2007
WL 2908007, at *12 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2007) (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113).
However, as detailed above, Plaintiff seeks to depose Cooper and request production of
documents from Cooper regarding Plaintiff’s time-barred claim of failure to promote her to the Position
of Chief Cardiologist in 2019 as if that claim were still actionable. And Plaintiff’s proposed subpoena
seeks information that far exceeds what is necessary to provide background context.
Plaintiff also argues that she needs the requested information from Cooper in order to
satisfy the subjective and objective requirements for a prima facie case of retaliation. Specifically, Plaintiff
argues that if she can “show [Defendant] was not credible about the promotion procedure, lacked a
credible promotion process, and/or selected a less qualified candidate, then it supports objective
reasonableness of her discrimination complaints about those promotions.” ECF 79, p. 2.
Although a plaintiff in a retaliation case “need not prove the merits of the underlying
discrimination complaint,” she must have “act[ed] under a good faith, reasonable belief that a violation
existed.” Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 344 3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Aman v. Cort Furniture
Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1085 (3d Cir.1996)). This standard requires both a good faith belief and an
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“objectively reasonable belief” that the activity the plaintiff opposed constituted unlawful discrimination
under the relevant statute. Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 322 (3d
Cir.2008) (quoting Moore, 461 F.3d at 341).
Again, Plaintiff may cite or refer to her claim of failure to promote to the role of Chief
Cardiologist to establish she held an “objectively reasonable, good faith belief” that the activities she
opposed constituted unlawful discrimination. For example, she may cite to allegations in her Second
Amended Complaint (“SAC”) that “Dr. Ahnert was one of two final candidates for the position,” SAC at
¶ 30, that “LVHN left the position vacant” after Plaintiff was not selected for the position so that Defendant
could hire a male Chief Cardiologist, SAC at ¶¶ 31, 33, and that “LVHN advised that it would not fill the
role of Chief of Cardiology.” even though Plaintiff “continued to oversee the group.” SAC at ¶ 39.
However, she may not engage in full blown discovery on that claim because it has been dismissed as time-
barred. In any event, the post-discovery record contains plenty of evidence from timely claims from which
a jury can assess whether Plaintiff’s good faith belief that the underlying actions she opposed constitute
unlawful discrimination under Title VII was reasonable.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that she needs the requested deposition and production of
documents from Cooper in order to order to establish pretext for her retaliation claim. See e,g, Carter v.
Three Springs Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635 (11th Cir. 1998). The Court agrees with Defendant
that the pretext standard outlined in Carter is only relevant if the failure to promote claim is itself
actionable. Here, however, the Court has already ruled that the failure to promote claim is time-barred
and, therefore, not actionable. Therefore, Carter is not applicable.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s request to serve a third-party subpoena on Grant
Cooper, A Diversified Search Company, Healthcare Practice is denied.
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