USA v. LAISS

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	:
:
v. 	: 	No. 5:25-cr-00386
:
MATTHEW ALAN LAISS 	:
O P I N I O N
Motion to Dismiss Indictment, ECF No. 18 - Denied
Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. 	January 12, 2026
United States District Judge
I. 	INTRODUCTION
The Government has charged Defendant Matthew Laiss with voter fraud and voting more
than once in a federal election. Laiss brings this Motion to Dismiss the Indictment pursuant to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(1). Laiss contends that a November 7, 2025
Presidential Pardon applies to his alleged conduct in this case.1 For the reasons set forth below,
Laiss’s Motion is denied.
II. 	BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Laiss is charged with voter fraud (52 U.S.C. § 20511(2)(B)–Count One) and voting more
than once in a federal election (52 U.S.C. § 10307(e)–Count Two). See Indictment, ECF No. 1.
The Indictment alleges that Laiss was a registered voter in Pennsylvania between October 2012
and August 2020, when he moved to Florida and registered to vote in Florida. See id. at ¶¶ 1–4.
The Indictment alleges that on October 31, 2020, Laiss submitted a mail-in ballot in
1 	But see footnote 2 infra.
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Pennsylvania casting a vote for the offices of President and Vice President of the United States in
the 2020 Presidential election and signed a declaration that he was qualified to vote from his
former Pennsylvania address. See id. at ¶¶ 5–8. The Indictment alleges that Laiss knew this
declaration to be false and that three days after he submitted the mail-in ballot to vote in
Pennsylvania, he then went to a polling location in Florida and voted a second time for the
offices of President and Vice President of the United States in the 2020 Presidential election. See
id. at ¶¶ 8–9.
B. The Presidential Pardon
On November 7, 2025, United States President Donald J. Trump issued a “full and
unconditional pardon” to “all United States citizens for conduct relating to the advice, creation,
organization, execution, submission, support, voting, activities, participation in, or advocacy for
or of any slate or proposed slate of Presidential electors, whether or not recognized by any State
or State official, in connection with the 2020 Presidential Election,” including, but not limited to,
Rudolph Giuliani and Sidney Powell. Granting Pardons for Certain Offenses Related to the 2020
Presidential Election by the President of the United States of America, 90 Fed. Reg. 51071,
51071 (Nov. 7, 2025) (“the Pardon”).
The Pardon also provides that “[t]he Attorney General, acting through the Pardon
Attorney, shall administer and effectuate the issuance of certificates of pardon to eligible
applicants.” Id. at 51073.
C. Procedural History
The Indictment was filed on September 2, 2025. See ECF No. 1. Laiss was arraigned
and counsel was appointed for Laiss on September 5, 2025. See ECF Nos. 5, 7.
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Laiss filed the present Motion to Dismiss the Indictment pursuant to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 12(b)(1) on November 18, 2025. See Mot., ECF No. 18. Laiss argues that
the Pardon applies to the conduct with which he is charged. See id. at 3. Laiss argues that the
Pardon identifies numerous ways that individuals may get relief from the Pardon, including
“support, voting, . . . or advocacy for or of any slate or proposed slate of Presidential electors.”
Id. Laiss emphasizes the terms “voting” and “any slate or proposed slate of Presidential
electors” in the Pardon and maintains that he engaged in such conduct when he voted twice for
the same Presidential candidate. Id. at 3–4. Laiss argues that “[b]y its plain language, the
[P]ardon extends to Mr. Laiss, and his Motion to Dismiss should therefore be granted.” Id. at 4.
The Government filed its Response in Opposition on November 28, 2025. See Resp.,
ECF No. 23. The Government opposes the merits of Laiss’s argument. See generally id. In
addition, the Government argues that Laiss brings this Motion in the wrong forum. See id. at 7.
The Government asserts that Laiss should have petitioned the Office of the Pardon Attorney for a
certificate of pardon. See id. (citing the Pardon). The Government contends that “Laiss cannot
petition this Court to circumvent the executive agency tasked with issuing pardons and
effectively issue a judicial pardon.” Id.
Laiss filed a Reply on December 5, 2025. See Reply, ECF No. 29. Laiss offers no
argument or legal authority disputing the Government’s contention that this issue is not properly
before the Court. See id. Laiss merely reiterates the merits of his Motion. See id. at 9-11.
Further, Laiss does not state that he applied for a certificate of pardon. Instead, he notes that his
counsel emailed a copy of the Motion to Dismiss the Indictment to the Office of the Pardon
Attorney’s official government email account on November 18, 2025, but had not received a
response. See id. at 10-11 n.2.
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This Court held oral argument on December 8, 2025. At oral argument, after hearing the
parties’ arguments on the merits of the Motion,2 the Court asked the parties to address whether
this Court has the authority to decide whether the Pardon applies. In response, the Government
relied on the language of the Pardon (that “[t]he Attorney General, acting through the Pardon
Attorney, shall administer and effectuate the issuance of certificates of pardon to eligible
applicants”) and maintained that this Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the present Motion.
The Government contended that Laiss must apply for a certificate of pardon from the Office of
the Pardon Attorney and not merely email a copy of the instant Motion. In turn, Laiss relied on
President’s Trump pardon regarding the events on January 6 and the federal courts which
reviewed the merits of that pardon. See, e.g. United States v. Wilson, No. 25-545, 2025 WL
1009047, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2025); United States v. Kelley, No. 22-118, 2025 WL 757583
(E.D. Tenn. Mar. 10, 2025).
As of the date of this Opinion, no information has been provided to the Court to
document that Laiss has received a certificate of pardon from the Office of the Pardon Attorney.
III. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motion to Dismiss Indictment pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)
“A party may raise by pretrial motion any defense, objection, or request that the court
can determine without a trial on the merits.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(1). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion
may attack any basis “‘capable of determination without a trial of the merits,’3 such as, former
2 	In addition to the arguments briefly mentioned above, the Government argued that even if
the Pardon applies to Laiss, it only applies to Count Two. Laiss did not object to the
Government’s assertion.
3 	The Western District of Pennsylvania, citing the Committee Note, refers to the 1944
Committee Note. In 2014, the language changed from “trial on the general issue” to “trial on the
merits.” Advisory Committee Note to Fed. R. Crim. P. 12 (2014). 	“No change in meaning is
intended.” Id.
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jeopardy, former conviction, immunity, or statute of limitations.” United States v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 408 F. Supp. 450, 457 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (citing Advisory Committee Note to Fed. R. Crim.
P. 12 (1944)). “A defense is thus ‘capable of determination’ if trial of the facts surrounding the
commission of the alleged offense would be of no assistance in determining the validity of the
defense.” United States v. Covington, 395 U.S. 57, 60 (1969).
B. Voter fraud
To convict Laiss on Count One, alleging voter fraud in violation of 52 U.S.C. §
20511(2)(B), the Government must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable
doubt:
(1) That there was an election for federal office;
(2) That the defendant deprived, defrauded, or attempted to deprive or defraud the
residents of a state of a fair and impartially conducted election process by the
procurement, casting, or tabulation of ballots that were known by him to be
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent under the laws of the State in which the
election is held; and
(3) The defendant acted knowingly and willfully.
See 52 U.S.C. § 20511(2)(B); see also United States v. Taylor, 159 F.4th 1136, 1141 (8th
Cir. 2025).
C. Voting more than once in a federal election
To convict Laiss on Count Two, alleging voting more than once in a federal election, in
violation of 52 U.S.C. § 10307(e), the Government must prove the following elements beyond a
reasonable doubt: “1) a candidate for federal office must be on the ballot; 2) the defendant must
vote more than once for a candidate; and 3) the defendant must so vote knowingly, willfully and
expressly for the purpose of having [his] vote count more than once.” United States v. Salisbury,
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983 F.2d 1369, 1377 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Hogue, 812 F.2d 1568, 1576 (11th
Cir. 1987)); see also United States v. Slone, 411 F.3d 643, 647–48 (6th Cir. 2005).4
D. Presidential pardon power
The United States Constitution bestows on the President the sole “Power to grant
Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.”
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.5 The President typically “relies on the Department of Justice—
specifically the Attorney General and Office of the Pardon Attorney—to administer the pardon
process.” See Andrews v. Warden, 958 F.3d 1072, 1078 (11th Cir. 2020); see also Office of the
Pardon Att’y, About the Office, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (May 27, 2025),
https://www.justice.gov/pardon/about-office; 28 C.F.R. §§ 1.1–1.11.6
A pardon’s text generally covers its review. See Andrews, 958 F.3d at 1078 (giving
deference to the Bureau of Prisons’ interpretation of President Obama’s executive grant of
clemency for Andrews that reduced his sentence of imprisonment); see also Scalia &
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts § 2 56 (2012) (“The words of a
governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text
means.”). “So long as the language of a pardon is clear and unambiguous, courts interpret the
pardon according to its plain and ordinary meaning.” Wilson, 2025 WL 1009047, at *4 (citing In
re Greathouse, 10 F. Cas. 1057, 1061 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1864)). When the language of a pardon is
4 	These cases were predicated on 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(e)(1), which has since been transferred
to 52 U.S.C. § 10307(e).
5 	The parties do not dispute President Trump’s Article II pardon power.
6 	“A person seeking executive clemency by pardon, reprieve, commutation of sentence, or
remission of fine shall execute a formal petition.” 28 C.F.R. § 1.1. “The petition shall
be addressed to the President of the United States and shall be submitted to the Pardon Attorney,
Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20530.” Id. “Petitions and other required forms may be
obtained from the Pardon Attorney.” Id. “Each petition for executive clemency should include
the information required in the form prescribed by the Attorney General.” Id.
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plain, “the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.” Wilson, 2025 WL
1009047, at *4 (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)).
IV. 	ANALYSIS
Before addressing the merits of Laiss’s argument that the Indictment should be dismissed
because the Pardon applies to him, this Court must first determine whether it has jurisdiction to
consider Laiss’s argument. Regarding jurisdiction, the terms of the Pardon are clear and
unambiguous. The Pardon provides that “[t]he Attorney General, acting through the Pardon
Attorney,” shall issue certificates of pardon to “eligible applicants.” See 90 Fed. Reg. at 51073
(emphasis added). The Pardon provides the Office of the Pardon Attorney, not the courts, with
the authority to issue pardons. Additionally, the Pardon is only available to “applicants,” which
emphasizes the need for individuals to apply to the Office of the Pardon Attorney for certificates
of pardon. The Pardon Attorney can then determine whether the individuals are “eligible” for a
certificate of pardon—a decision initially to be made by the Pardon Attorney, not the courts.
This language is clear; therefore, this Court defers to and enforces the plain text of the Pardon.
See Wilson, 2025 WL 1009047, at *4 (citing Andrews, 958 F.3d at 1078) (explaining that courts
enforce Presidential pardons according to their plain text so long as they are clear and
unambiguous).
Laiss does not offer a contrary reading of the plain text of the Pardon. Rather, in support
of his argument that this Court has jurisdiction to consider the Pardon in the first instance, Laiss
cites to cases applying President Trump’s pardon regarding the events occurring at or near the
United States Capitol on January 6, 2021 (“the January 20, 2025 pardon”). See generally Wilson,
2025 WL 1009047; Kelley, 2025 WL 757583. Laiss argues that because those courts reviewed
whether the January 20, 2025 pardon covered other offenses, this Court can hear his Motion.
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Significantly, however, the January 20, 2025 pardon does not refer to the Pardon
Attorney, suggest that the Pardon Attorney is responsible for determining eligibility, or require
individuals to apply for certificates of pardon. See Granting Pardons and Commutation of
Sentences for Certain Offenses Relating to the Events at or Near the United States Capitol on
January 6, 2021, 90 Fed. Reg. 8331, 8331 (Jan. 20, 2025). That pardon provided that “[t]he
Attorney General shall administer and effectuate the immediate issuance of certificates of pardon
to all individuals.” Id. (emphasis added). Since the January 20, 2025 pardon directed the
Attorney General (not the Pardon Attorney) to immediately issue pardons (eliminating the need
for individuals to apply for certificates of pardon and for the Pardon Attorney to determine
eligibility) to all individuals, the January 20, 2025 pardon and cases applying the same are
distinguished from this case. In fact, the absence of any language in the January 20, 2025 pardon
referring to the “Pardon Attorney” and to “eligible applicants” shows that President Trump knew
that he could eliminate the pardon process, which he imposed in the instant Pardon.
No information has been provided to the Court to document that Laiss applied to the
Office of the Pardon Attorney, or that he received a certificate of pardon. Based on the plain text
of the November 7, 2025 Pardon, this Court is without jurisdiction to determine whether the
Pardon applies to Laiss’s charged conduct, as would warrant dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1). The
Motion to Dismiss the Indictment is denied.
V. 	CONCLUSION
Upon review of the Motion to Dismiss the Indictment and the responses, this Court finds
that Laiss has not yet applied to the Office of the Pardon Attorney, or received a certificate of
pardon, which the plain language of the Pardon requires him to do. This Court is thus without
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jurisdiction to decide the present Motion. This Court denies Laiss’s Motion to Dismiss the
Indictment.
A separate order follows.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Joseph F. Leeson, Jr.
JOSEPH F. LEESON, JR.
United States District Judge
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