Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SHAVEN BARNES, 	:
Petitioner 	: 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-1535
v. 	: 	(JUDGE MANNION)
JESSICA SAGE, 	:
Respondent 	:
MEMORANDUM
Pending before the Court is Shaven Barnes’s (“Petitioner”) petition for
a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241, (Doc. 1), and motion
to expedite consideration of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, (Doc. 19).
For the reasons stated herein, the petition will be DENIED and the motion to
expedite will be DENIED AS MOOT.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen and native of Jamaica. (Doc. 6-2 at 3). Petitioner
legally entered the United States at New York, NY on or about September 8,
2011, as a temporary visitor and was authorized to remain in the United
States until March 7, 2012. Id. at 5. Petitioner remained in the United States
beyond March 7, 2012, without authorization. Id.
On December 5, 2015, Petitioner was convicted of failing to stop for
police and negligent operation of a motor vehicle. Id. On February 10, 2017,
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Petitioner was convicted of criminal possession weapon-4th degree: intent to
use. Id. On October 7, 2019, Petitioner filed an I-485 adjustment of status.
Id. On March 5, 2020, Petitioner was convicted of reckless driving. Id.
On July 15, 2022, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
agents encountered Petitioner after he was released to his ICE detainer. Id.
The agents issued Petitioner a notice to appear before an immigration judge.
Id. On August 31, 2022, Petitioner was convicted of assault causing bodily
injury or mental illness. Id. That same day, Petitioner appeared for a hearing
before an immigration judge, and the immigration judge granted bond in the
amount of $5,000. Id. Petitioner posted bond and was released from ICE
custody. Id. On August 23, 2023, an immigration judge granted a motion to
dismiss Petitioner’s immigration proceedings. Id.
On July 21, 2025, Petitioner was convicted of disorderly conduct:
flight/violent behavior. Id. On August 17, 2025, Petitioner was arrested for
criminal possession stolen property-5th degree. Id. On September 2, 2025,
ICE agents encountered Petitioner at a G-56 appointment. Id. The agents
took Petitioner into custody due to his recent arrest and concurrence from
the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (“OPLA”). Id. That same day, agents
issued Petitioner a notice to appear before an immigration judge and charged
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him with violating Section 237(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”) for remaining in the United States longer than permitted. (Doc. 6-3).
On September 24, 2025, Petitioner appeared before an immigration
judge and was denied bond based on danger. (Doc. 11-1 at 2-3). On
December 	4, 	2025, 	the 	Board 	of 	Immigration 	Appeals 	(“BIA”) 	denied
Petitioner’s adjustment of status and ordered him removed to Jamaica. (Doc.
6-6). On December 10, 2025, Petitioner’s charge of criminal possession
stolen property-5th degree was dismissed. (Doc. 16-1). Petitioner appealed
the immigration judge’s decision denying his adjustment of status and
ordered of removal to Jamaica on December 31, 2025, and that appeal
remains 	pending. 	(Doc. 	6-7; 	Doc. 	11 	at 	13). 	On 	April 	21, 	2026, 	an
immigration judge denied Petitioner’s request for a custody redetermination
due to danger. (Doc. 6-8; Doc. 11-1 at 3).
On June 5, 2026, Petitioner filed the present petition for habeas
corpus. (Doc. 1). On June 17, 2026, Respondent filed a response to the
petition. (Doc. 6). On July 9, 2026, Petitioner filed a traverse. (Doc. 7).
Following the Court’s July 13, 2026, order for supplemental briefing on
Petitioner’s constitutional claims, (Doc. 8), Respondent filed a supplement
response on July 31, 2026. (Doc. 11). On August 24, 2026, Petitioner filed a
supplemental response. (Doc. 16). The Court ordered the parties to file any
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supplemental briefing by September 4, 2026. (Docs. 17, 18). On October 7,
2026, Petitioner filed a motion to expedite consideration of his petition for writ
of habeas corpus. (Doc. 19). The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is now
ripe for disposition.
II. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner makes two constitutional challenges to the legality of his
ongoing detention. First, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his re-
detention and continued detention in the absence of materially changed
circumstances since his August 2022 bond hearing. (Doc. 16 at 1). Second,
Petitioner challenges his prolonged detention. Id.
a. Jurisdiction
Under 28 U.S.C. §2241, district courts have the authority to grant writs
of habeas corpus where a petitioner is “in custody under or by color of the
authority of the United States . . . in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §2241(c)(1), (3). However, the
Court’s authority to hear noncitizen habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. §2241
is limited is some circumstances. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §1226(e).
b. Exhaustion of administrative remedies
“A petitioner challenging agency action must generally first exhaust
administrative 	remedies; 	however, 	in 	habeas 	proceedings, 	‘exhaustion
exists as a judicially created doctrine applied at the Court’s discretion.’” Vadel
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v. 	Lowe, 	2025 WL 	3772059, 	at 	*3 	(M.D.Pa. 	Dec. 	31, 	2025) 	(quoting
Kashranov v. Jamison, 2025 WL 3188399, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 14, 2025)).
To the extent Petitioner is challenging the constitutionality of the bond
hearings, 	the 	due 	process 	challenge 	is 	properly 	within 	this 	Court’s
jurisdiction. A challenge of the merits would appropriately be made to the
BIA.
c. Lawfulness of Petitioner’s re-detention and subsequent
bond hearings
i. 	Petitioner’s bond hearings
Petitioner was detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1226(a). (Doc. 6 at 2)
(“[Petitioner]’s continued, mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §1226(a) is
lawful.”). §1226(a) allows for the Attorney General to arrest and detain a
noncitizen “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from
the United States.” 8 U.S.C. §1226(a). Pending that decision, the Attorney
General “(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and (2) may release
the alien on . . . bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and
containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or . . . conditional
parole.” 8 U.S.C. §1226(a)(1)-(2). When an alien is detained under §1226(a),
they are entitled to a bond hearing where they can argue why they should be
released from detention pending a final order of removal. See Johnson v.
Guzman-Chavez, 594 U.S. 527 (2021); see also Borbot v. Warden Hudson
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County Correctional Facility, 906 F.3d 274, 277-80 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding
that individuals detained under §1226(a) are entitled to a bond hearing but
not entitled to a second bond hearing after their first has been denied).
Relevant 	here, 	“[t]he 	Attorney 	General’s 	discretionary 	judgment
regarding the application of [§1226] shall not be subject to review. No court
may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under [§1226]
regarding the detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or
denial of bond or parole.” 8 U.S.C. §1226(e); see also White v. Lowe, No.
1:25-CV-2431, 2026 WL 777425 at *3 (Mar. 19, 2026).
Following his re-detention on September 2, 2025, (Doc. 6-2 at 3),
Petitioner was given an initial bond hearing on September 24, 2025. (Doc.
11-1 at 2) (“[C]ourt denied bond on September 24, 2025 . . .”). According to
the unverified transcript for the subsequent April 2026 hearing, Petitioner
was denied bond based on danger. Id. at 3. Petitioner requested a custody
redetermination 	pursuant 	to 	8 	C.F.R. 	§1236, 	and, 	on 	April 	21, 	2026,
Petitioner was again denied bond based on danger. Id. at 5; Doc. 6-8.
Barring any due process violation with the bond hearings, any “relief
the 	[C]ourt 	could 	grant 	would 	require 	the 	[C]ourt 	to 	either 	order 	an
immigration judge to conduct a [third] bond hearing or conduct a [third] bond
hearing on its own. Such a decision would amount to ‘setting aside’ the
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immigration judge’s denial of bond, which is clearly barred by [§1226(e)].”
White, 2026 WL 777425, at *3.
ii. 	Re-detention after prior bond
Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his re-detention after he had
previously been granted bond in August 2022. (Doc. 16 at 1). Under 8 U.S.C.
§1226(b), “[t]he Attorney General at any time may revoke a bond or parole
authorized under subsection (a), rearrest the alien under the original warrant,
and detain the alien.” Petitioner argues that the authority to revoke bond must
still follow due process, and that a due process concern arises when ICE re-
detains a non-citizen that the Government previously determined could be
released 	on 	bond 	without 	showing 	materially 	changed 	circumstances
warranting re-detention. (Doc. 16 at 3).
Petitioner 	points 	to 	W.A.C 	v. 	Rokosky 	where 	a 	non-citizen 	was
released after, in part, the Government conceded the non-citizen was not a
danger 	to 	the 	community 	and 	could 	neither 	“point 	to 	any 	changed
circumstances other than a change in administration and a travel document
they procured after terminating his supervision and re-detaining him” nor
“identif[y] any intervening criminal conduct” after the prior decision to release
the non-citizen under supervision. 1:26-cv-03419, Doc. 26 at 12-13 (D.N.J.
May 18, 2026). Unlike W.A.C., Petitioner has two additional incidents in his
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criminal history that occurred after he was released on bond in August 2022.
(Doc. 6-2 at 5).
While Petitioner challenges the reliability and accuracy of the evidence
detailing those additional criminal incidents and whether those incidents
should be considered materially changed circumstances, (Doc. 16 at 3-8),
those determinations are in the purview of the immigration judge and the
bond hearing is not reviewable by this Court as long as the bond hearing was
fundamentally fair. See Ghanem, 2022 WL 574624 at *2 (finding that the
petitioner’s arguments that an IJ relied on unreliable and inadmissible
evidence constituted “evidentiary quibbles [that] fail to demonstrate that the
government deprived [the petitioner] of a fundamentally fair bond hearing,
which is all that the District Court required[.]”). The Court notes that IJ
Addicott’s determination at the April 2026 bond hearing was appealable to
the 	BIA. 	8 	C.F.R. 	§§1003.1(b)(7), 	1003.19(f). 	To 	the extent 	Petitioner
disagreed with reliability and accuracy of the I-213 as evidence of Petitioner’s
criminal history, Petitioner should have appealed to the BIA.
iii. 	Fairness of Petitioner’s bond hearing
While the Court cannot review an IJ’s decision, an exception exists
which 	allows 	the 	Court 	to 	“review 	whether 	the 	bond 	hearing 	was
fundamentally unfair.” Ghanem v. Warden Essex Cnty. Corr. Facility, 2022
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WL 574624, *2 (3d Cir. 2022); see also 8 U.S.C. §1226(e) (“no court may set
aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section
regarding the detention of any alien or the revocation or denial of bond or
parole”); see also White v. Lowe, 2025 WL 3187511, *2 (M.D.Pa. Nov. 14,
2025) (“The Third Circuit has repeatedly recognized that this language
means what it says: courts may not reverse an administrative decision
denying bond in an immigration proceeding[.]” (citing Borbot v. Warden
Hudson Cnty. Corr. Facility, 906 F.3d 274, 279 (3d Cir. 2018)).
“In a fundamentally fair bond hearing, due process has three essential
elements: ‘An alien: (1) must be entitled to factfinding based on a record
produced before the decisionmaker and disclosed to him or her; (2) must be
allowed to make arguments on his or her own behalf; and (3) has the right to
an individualized determination of his [or her] interests.’” Id.
Here, the April 2026 bond hearing satisfied each of the fairness factors.
A review of the unverified hearing transcript shows that the IJ reviewed the
evidentiary record including the previous recording from the prior bond
hearing, heard arguments from both parties, and determined that Petitioner
is a danger to the community and that there was not a material change in
circumstances since the last hearing. (Doc. 11-1). Thus, the bond hearing
complied with the due process requirements for a bond hearing.
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d. Lawfulness of Petitioner’s prolonged detention
Petitioner 	argues 	that 	his 	detention 	has 	become 	unreasonably
prolonged. (Doc. 16 at 9-10). The Third Circuit, in Borbot, left open the
possibility that “despite an initial bond hearing, detention under §1226(a)
might become unreasonably prolonged, whether by virtue of government
delay or some other cause,” and therefore permit a habeas corpus claim
alleging violation of a petitioner’s due process rights. 906 F.3d at 280.
Because the Borbot court declined to decide “when, if ever, the Due Process
Clause might entitle an alien detained under §1226(a) to a new bond
hearing,” (id.) that language “has led to conflicting decisions within this Circuit
as to whether an individual may be entitled to a second bond hearing sooner
than the roughly two-year timeframe analyzed in Borbot.” Blade, v. Lowe,
No. 4:26-CV-02188, 2026 WL 2984996, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2026).
The Third Circuit identified a “nonexhaustive list of four factors” in
German Santos to determine whether continued detention has become
unreasonable for due process purposes. 965 F.3d 203, 211-13 (3d Cir.
2020). In doing so, the Court recognizes that “[r]easonableness is a highly
fact-specific 	inquiry.” 	Id. 	at 	210 	(citation 	and 	internal 	quotation 	marks
omitted). The “nonexhaustive list of four factors” for consideration are: (1)
“the duration of detention”; (2) “whether the detention is likely to continue”;
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(3) “the reasons for the delay”; and (4) “whether the alien’s conditions of
confinement are meaningfully different from criminal punishment.” Id. at 211
(citation, internal quotation marks, and alteration omitted).
As 	explained 	below, 	after 	considering 	these 	factors, 	the 	Court
concludes 	that 	Petitioner’s 	continued 	detention 	has 	not 	become
unreasonable such that Petitioner’s detention warrants a new bond hearing.
i. 	Duration of detention
Petitioner has received two bond hearings since his detention in
September 2025, with his second bond hearing less than six months ago on
April 21, 2026. (Doc. 6-8). Under these circumstances, this factor weighs
against relief.
ii. 	Likelihood of continued detention
Petitioner argues that his immigration case is on appeal and the
“duration of future detention is uncertain.” (Doc. 16 at 10). On the other hand,
Respondent asserts that this factor “relies on unhelpful hypothesizing of
future events” and, therefore, “improperly requires litigants to argue to this
Court the merits of their position at the administrative level.” (Doc. 11 at 13).
Petitioner’s BIA appeal remains pending and there will be a delay of
undefined duration. Under the circumstances, however, granting Petitioner
relief would result in a new bond hearing and Petitioner’s most recent bond
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hearing was less than six months ago. Accordingly, this second factor weighs
against relief.
iii. 	Reasons for delay
There does not appear to be any unreasonable delay in the case due
to actions by either party. The Court finds that the third factor is neutral.
iv. 	Conditions of confinement
Finally, the Court finds that Petitioner’s conditions of confinement are
not meaningfully different from criminal punishment. See Alvarado v. Sage,
3:26-CV-680, 2026 WL 1497185 at *3 (M.D.Pa. May 28, 2026) (“A federal
prison is a federal prison.”). Petitioner is currently detained at FCI Lewisburg,
which is a medium-security federal prison. Id.; (Doc. 1 at 2). Respondents
argue that “[a]lthough [Petitioner] is detained, he is not confined to his cell
for twenty-three hours a day nor has he identified other punitive conditions
of confinement.” (Doc. 11 at 14).
The Court is unpersuaded by this argument. A petitioner obviously
need not be detained under such extremely punitive conditions as twenty-
three hours a day in one’s cell for their confinement to be akin to criminal
punishment. The mere fact that Petitioner, a civil immigration detainee, is
housed in a criminal facility among criminals suffices to show that his
conditions 	of 	confinement 	do 	not 	meaningfully 	differ 	from 	criminal
punishment. Further, Petitioner argues that his “[m]ovement is restricted,” he
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“does not have regular outdoor access,” and does not “have phone or library
access as a civil detainee should have.” (Doc. 1 at 9). Where, as here, “civil
detention under [§1226(a)] looks penal, that tilts the scales toward finding
the detention unreasonable.” German Santos, 965 F.3d at 211.
Thus, upon weighing the German Santos factors, the Court finds that
Petitioner’s detention, while concerning, has not become unreasonable.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2241, (Doc. 1), will be DENIED and the motion to
expedite (Doc. 19) will be DENIED AS MOOT. An appropriate order shall
follow.
s/ Malachy E. Mannion
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
DATE: October 13, 2026
26-1535-01
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