DORADO PUTT PR, LLC

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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
IN RE
DORADO PUTT PR, LLC
Debtor
CASE NO. 25-04894 (ESL)
CHAPTER 11
OPINION AND ORDER
This case is before the court upon the Motion for Stay Pending Appeal Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8007 filed by the Debtor (“Motion for Stay”, dkt. #194)
requesting stay of the Opinion and Order dismissing case (dkt. #174). Also before the court is the
Objection to Debtor’s Motion for Stay Pending Appeal Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 8007 filed by Promethean Fund IV, LP (“Promethean”) (“Objection”, dkt. #199).
Factual and Procedural Background
1. 	On June 22, 2026, the court issued an Opinion and Order (dkt. #174)1 granting the
Motion to (I) Dismiss Chapter 11 Case or, in the Alternative[,] (II) Lift the Automatic Stay filed
by Promethean on November 17, 2025 (“Motion to Dismiss”, dkt. #31). In pertinent part, the
Opinion and Order reads as follows:
The court concludes that Promethean has established prima facie that the Debtor
filed this bankruptcy petition in bad faith, which constitutes “cause” for dismissal
under 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1). The court further concludes that the Debtor’s lack of
financial distress constitutes an abuse of the bankruptcy process which may not be
cured or justified under 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(2)’s exceptions to dismissal. As noted
above, bankruptcy must seek to preserve or create some value that would otherwise
be lost outside of bankruptcy. Dismissal, and not conversion, is in the best interest
of the estate. The court finds and concludes that the bankruptcy petition was filed
to protect the Gadamses’ assets rather than those of the Debtor, effectively reducing
the case to a two-party dispute.
For the reasons stated herein, the Motion to Dismiss (dkt. #31) is GRANTED and
the case is hereby dismissed. Consequently, the court need not decide whether
enforcement of or relief from the automatic stay is appropriate.
1 Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to such terms in the
Opinion and Order.
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dkt. #174, pp. 32-33, lines 24-8.
2. 	On June 23, 2026, Promethean requested the appointment of an arbitrator and a
hearing date in the arbitration proceeding. See dkt. #194, p. 3 (“[O]n June 23, 2026—just one day
after the Dismissal Order—Promethean wrote to JAMS requesting expedited appointment of an
arbitrator and an immediate hearing date.”).
3. 	On July 6, 2026, the Debtor filed a Notice of Appeal (dkt. #179) of the Opinion
and Order to the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit, and on July 20,
2026, a Designation of Items to be Included in the Record on Appeal and Statement of Issues on
Appeal (dkt. 190). See Dorado Putt PR, LLC v. Promethean Fund IV, LP (In re Dorado Putt PR,
LLC), BAP No. 26-26.
4. 	On August 3, 2026, the Debtor filed the Motion for Stay (dkt. #194) arguing that
the court made several errors that present substantial questions for appellate review, and that
Debtor risks immediate enforcement actions that could moot the appeal or substantially
undermine the value of any reversal. The harm faced includes permanent loss of the right to
reorganize under Chapter 11, including the automatic stay, the exclusive right to propose a plan,
and the ability to discharge debts; immediate termination of the automatic stay and resumption of
Promethean’s arbitration—which Promethean resumed on June 23, 2026, demanding an
expedited hearing; permanent loss of the right to reject the LPA under 11 U.S.C. § 365, which
would have limited Promethean’s claim to rejection damages and enabled the Debtor to pay all
creditors, including Promethean, in full; and mootness of the appeal. See dkt. #194, p. 21. Debtor
argues that the harm to Promethean from a stay pending appeal is minimal and temporal because
Promethean will continue in the same position pending the resolution of the appeal, and that
public interest favors meaningful appellate review. The Debtor also requests that a no bond or a
nominal bond of $1,000 be ordered under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8007(e).
5. 	On August 18, 2026, Promethean filed the Opposition (dkt. #199) arguing that
Debtor has failed to carry its burden for extraordinary relief by failing to demonstrate a likelihood
of success on the merits or that it will suffer irreparable harm absent a stay. They argue that
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because Debtor is a non-operating entity with no employees, no revenue, and minimal cash,
Promethean’s continued prosecution of its rights against the Debtor (and the Gadamses) in
arbitration will not result in any business disruption. Promethean argues that the Gadamses’
conduct after entry of the Opinion and Order confirms this: rather than seeking an immediate stay
of the Opinion and Order, they Gadamses (in their individual capacities) sued Promethean in the
Puerto Rico Court of First Instance, Bayamon Superior Court, and sought a temporary restraining
order stopping Promethean from pursuing them—not the Debtor—in the arbitration, which was
denied. Promethean also argues that Puttshack’s financial condition has deteriorated since the
filing of the bankruptcy petition, and that the Debtor will have the opportunity to dispute the
capital call in the context of the arbitration proceeding.
Applicable Law and Discussion
A. 	Stay Pending Appeal Standard
“A motion for stay pending appeal is governed by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8007. The allowance
of a motion for stay pending appeal is discretionary.” In re MJS Las Croabas Props., 2015
Bankr.LEXIS 1159 at *4, 2015 WL 1651085 at *2 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2015). Courts consider a
traditional four-part standard applicable to preliminary injunctions: “(1) whether the applicant has
made a strong showing of success on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably
harmed absent injunctive relief; (3) whether issuance of the stay will injure other parties; and (4)
where the public interest lies.” See Acevedo–García v. Vera–Monroig, 296 F.3d 13, 16, fn. 3 (1st
Cir. 2002), citing Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776–777 (1987).
“A motion for stay pending appeal is an extraordinary remedy and requires a substantial
showing on the part of the movant. In order to grant the motion for stay pending appeal all four
prongs must be satisfied. Failure to meet the four prongs dooms the motion.” In re MEDSCI
Diagnostics, Inc., 2011 WL 280866 at *3, 2011 Bankr.LEXIS 283 at *8 (Bankr.D.P.R.2011)
(citations omitted). “Failure to satisfy even one of those requirements justifies denial of the stay.”
Gail v. New Eng. Gas Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102678 at *38, 2008 WL 5245331 at *9 (D.R.I.
2008), citing In re Power Recovery Sys. Inc., 950 F.2d 798, 804 n. 31 (1st Cir. 1991). These
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factors are weighed according to the unique circumstances of each case to ensure a just result.
See Palazzetti Imp./Exp., Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6558 at *7, 2002 WL 562654 at *2
(S.D.N.Y. 2001). In conducting this analysis, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the first two
factors are the “most critical”. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009). Of those factors, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has established that “ ‘[t]he sine qua non [of the stay
pending appeal standard] is whether the [movants] are likely to succeed on the merits,’ ” Acevedo-
Garcia, 296 F.3d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 2002), quoting Weaver v. Henderson, 984 F.2d 11, 12 (1st Cir.
1993), and that, accordingly, “ ‘[w]hat matters ... is not the raw amount of irreparable harm [a]
party might conceivably suffer, but rather the risk of such harm in light of the party’s chance of
success on the merits[.]’ ” P.R. Hosp. Supply, Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 426 F.3d 503, 507,
n. 1 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting the Massachusetts standard for issuing a preliminary injunction,
which “closely tracks the federal standard”). Although the degree of likelihood of success is not
determinative, it must be balanced with the hardships caused to the parties if the injunction is not
granted. If the movant's showing of probable success on the merits is uncertain, they may be
entitled to a preliminary injunction if they demonstrate a strong probability that they will be
injured if the court fails to act. See Wright, Miller & Kane, 11A Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 2948.3 (2nd ed., 2014). To establish irreparable harm, the movant does not need to show that
the injunctive relief will be fatal to the business, only that its legal remedies are inadequate. See
Ross–Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., 102 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1996).
B. 	Discussion
The Debtor has not met its burden. First, the Debtor has not demonstrated a likelihood of
success on the merits. The Opinion and Order is thorough and applies an exhaustive
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. Use of the term “prima facie” in the conclusion does
not alter the application of the correct legal standard, especially where, as here, applicable law
requires that Promethean (as movant) establish prima facie that the petition was filed in bad faith
before the burden shifts to the Debtor. Promethean satisfied that initial burden. The Debtor’s
arguments and evidence in support, including Mr. Gadams’ own testimony, failed to rebut
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Promethean’s prima facie showing or establish that the case was filed in good faith. Ultimately,
the evidence overwhelmingly supported the finding that the case was filed in bad faith under the
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. The Debtor’s arguments to the contrary do not warrant
a different conclusion. Success on the merits is thus unsupported and unlikely.
Second, the Debtor had not demonstrated that it will suffer irreparably harm absent a stay.
The Opinion and Order was entered on June 22, 2026; the Debtor filed the notice of appeal on
July 6, 2026, but did not move for a stay until August 3, 2026. This delay undermines the Debtor’s
assertion that immediate and irreparable harm is likely. If the Debtor truly believes there is a risk
of irreparable harm, especially where the automatic stay is no longer in effect, thereby giving
Promethean the opportunity to resume the arbitration, and for the Gadamses (in their individual
capacities) to seek emergency relief in the state court, the Debtor would not and should not have
waited as long as it did. Moreover, the Debtor’s asserted harm is speculative and premature. At
this stage of the arbitration proceeding, there is no order requiring payment. The Debtor has no
ongoing operations, revenue, or employees; has the ability to meet its current expenses; and, is
not in imminent or immediate financial distress because its assets exceed its liabilities. Further,
the Debtor has the ability to address any capital call or other payment obligation in the arbitration
proceeding. The record therefore does not establish that the Debtor will suffer irreparable harm
absent a stay.
Because the Debtor has failed to establish either a likelihood of success on the merits or
irreparable harm, it has failed to satisfy the first two (2) prongs of the four-part standard applicable
to preliminary injunctions. The court need not go any further with its analysis, and declines to
address the Debtor’s request not to post a bond.
Conclusion
In view of the foregoing, the Motion for Stay (dkt. #194) is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 25th day of August 2026.
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