Doe v. Brown University

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
______________________________
)
JANE DOE, 	)
) 	C.A. No. 19-100 WES
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	)
)
BROWN UNIVERSITY, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
______________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, District Judge.
Stemming from Brown University’s (“Brown”) dismissal of Jane
Doe 	(“Jane”), 	this 	case 	is 	before 	the 	Court 	on 	Brown’s 	Motion 	to
Dismiss 	(“Mot. 	to 	Dismiss”), 	ECF 	No. 	12. 	Brown 	moves 	to 	dismiss
Jane’s 	Complaint 	in 	full, 	a 	motion 	the 	Court 	DENIES 	for 	the
following reasons.
I. 	Background
A 	cursory 	review 	of 	the 	relevant 	facts 	follows: 	In 	2011,
Jane 	started 	Brown’s 	exclusive 	eight-year 	program 	in 	pursuit 	of
both an undergraduate and medical degree. 	Compl. ¶¶ 2, 9. 	While
marshaling 	accolades 	and 	maintaining 	an 	impressive 	record 	during
her 	undergraduate 	schooling, 	Jane’s 	record 	began 	to 	blemish 	at
Brown’s medical school, The Warren Alpert Medical School. 	Id. ¶¶
3-4, 	22. 	There, 	Jane 	received 	some 	negative 	professionalism
evaluations 	and 	informal 	criticisms, 	four 	formal 	Professionalism
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Report Forms (“Professionalism Report”)1, and appeared before the
Medical 	Committee 	on 	Academic 	Standing 	and 	Professionalism
(“MCASP”) several times. 	Id. ¶¶ 25, 27, 29, 31-34, 47, 55-57, 60.
While 	she 	completed 	her 	undergraduate 	degree, 	Jane’s 	doctor
diagnosed 	her 	with 	depression 	and 	anxiety 	disorder; 	later, 	in
medical 	school, 	Jane’s 	doctor 	also 	diagnosed 	her 	with 	Attention
Deficit 	Hyperactivity 	Disorder 	(“ADHD”). 	Id. 	¶¶ 	2-6. 	Amid 	her
professionalism 	issues, 	Jane 	pursued 	treatment 	for 	her 	ADHD 	and
engaged — at Brown’s behest — with a learning specialist. 	Id. ¶¶
36, 	40. 	After 	receiving 	a 	neurophysiological 	exam, 	Jane 	sought
medication on her doctor’s recommendation. 	Id. ¶¶ 40, 45.
Jane’s four formal Professionalism Reports may be summarized
as 	follows: 	First, 	Jane’s 	professor 	reported 	she 	displayed
unprofessional 	behavior, 	including 	a 	perceived 	lack 	of 	interest
and other “odd” behavior, id. ¶¶ 29-31; second, Jane’s VA Medicine
Clerkship 	reported 	she 	failed 	to 	timely 	complete 	a 	mandatory 	IT
training, id. ¶ 33; third, the Assistant Dean of Student Affairs,
Dean Jordan White, reported she missed a scheduled meeting, id. ¶
47; 	and 	fourth, 	another 	of 	Jane’s 	professors 	reported 	she 	missed
an 	examination, 	told 	him 	she 	missed 	it 	because 	of 	a 	physical
1 	A 	Professionalism 	Report 	Form 	is 	a 	vehicle 	Brown 	faculty
members 	or 	students 	use 	to 	report 	violations 	of 	Brown’s
professionalism policy. 	Compl. ¶ 29.
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illness, and later revealed she missed it because of a depressive
episode, id. ¶¶ 55-57.
Having 	discussed 	Jane’s 	issues 	before2, 	the 	MCASP 	met 	again
to 	discuss 	Jane’s 	third 	and 	fourth 	Professionalism 	Reports. 	Id.
¶ 	60. 	Ahead 	of 	the 	meeting, 	Dean 	White 	asked 	Jane 	if 	she 	was
selling 	or 	using 	cocaine, 	saying 	this 	may 	explain 	her 	behavior.
Id. 	After Jane denied this, Dean White took her word for it, but
relayed that she would be there for Jane if she admitted it. 	Id.
Dean White did not present this issue to the MCASP. 	Id.
Jane’s 	learning 	specialist 	wrote 	a 	letter 	to 	the 	MCASP
explaining that Jane’s recently diagnosed ADHD might underlie her
behavioral 	issues. 	Id. 	¶¶ 	58, 	61. 	Still, 	the 	MCASP 	voted 	to
dismiss 	Jane 	from 	the 	medical 	school. 	Id. 	¶ 	62. 	Jane 	received
formal notice of her dismissal by letter, which read
[t]he Committee had significant concerns about
the fact that you were dishonest to a faculty
member about your reason for missing the OSCE.
At the meeting, the Committee reviewed all of
the professionalism forms that had been filed
about 	you, 	letters 	to 	you 	from 	me 	about
previous 	actions 	of 	MCASP, 	and 	a 	review 	of
your statement that included your explanations
as to the previous and latest professionalism
issues. 	After 	careful 	deliberation, 	the
Committee voted to dismiss you from the Alpert
Medical School.
Id. ¶ 63.
2 	Jane appeared before the MCASP for professionalism concerns
on other occasions. 	See infra p. 2.
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Jane 	appealed 	her 	dismissal, 	attending 	yet 	another 	MSCAP
meeting. 	Id. 	¶¶ 	66-71. 	Her 	learning 	specialist 	again 	submitted
a 	letter 	on 	her 	behalf, 	as 	did 	her 	diagnosing 	doctor 	and 	her
treating 	physician. 	Id. 	¶¶ 	68-70. 	Jane 	alleges 	that 	at 	this
meeting she was asked problematic questions, including: 	“How long
have 	you 	been 	lying 	in 	your 	medical 	career 	and 	have 	you 	lied 	in
the 	past 	to 	get 	away 	with 	things?”; 	“Why 	did 	you 	think 	making 	up
a 	detailed 	lie 	was 	a 	good 	idea? 	How 	do 	we 	know 	you 	haven’t 	done
it in the past? 	How do you know you won’t do it in the future?”;
and “You understand that mental illness isn’t an excuse for lying.
You 	agree 	with 	that, 	right?” 	Id. 	¶ 	71. 	The 	MCASP 	denied 	Jane’s
appeal, upholding her dismissal. 	Id. ¶ 72.
Jane’s 	dismissal 	is 	at 	the 	root 	of 	her 	allegations 	against
Brown. 	She brings six claims: (1) Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 	12182; 	(2) 	Section 	504 	of 	the 	Rehabilitation 	Act 	of 	1973, 	29
U.S.C. 	§ 	794; 	(3) 	Rhode 	Island 	Civil 	Rights 	Act 	(“RICRA”), 	R.I.
Gen. 	Laws 	§ 	42-112-1; 	(4) 	Intentional 	Infliction 	of 	Emotional
Distress; 	(5) 	Breach 	of 	Contract; 	and 	(6) 	Breach 	of 	the 	Implied
Covenant 	of 	Good 	Faith 	and 	Fair 	Dealing. 	Brown 	moves 	to 	dismiss
each.
II. 	Standard of Review
In 	deciding 	the 	present 	motion, 	the 	Court 	must 	answer
“whether—taking the facts pled in the Complaint as true and making
all 	reasonable 	inferences 	in 	favor 	of 	the 	plaintiff—[she] 	has
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stated 	a 	claim 	that 	is 	‘plausible 	on 	its 	face.’” 	Doe 	v. 	Brown
Univ., 166 F. Supp. 3d 177, 184 (D.R.I. 2016) (quoting Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 	556 	U.S. 	662, 	678 	(U.S. 	2009)). 	In 	doing 	so, 	the 	Court
must 	“differentiate 	between 	the 	complaint’s 	factual 	allegations
(which 	must 	be 	accepted 	as 	true) 	from 	its 	conclusory 	legal
allegations 	(which 	need 	not 	be 	credited)”, 	and 	then 	“determine
whether 	the 	factual 	allegations 	are 	sufficient 	to 	support 	the
reasonable 	inference 	that 	the 	defendant 	is 	liable 	for 	the
misconduct alleged.” 	Id. (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
III. Discussion
A. 	Discrimination Claims
Analyzing the first three claims in tandem3, the Court holds
that 	Jane 	has 	stated 	plausible 	claims 	for 	relief. 	Pursuing 	two
theories of liability, Jane claims Brown dismissed her (1) because
of 	her 	disability; 	and 	(2) 	without 	providing 	her 	reasonable
accommodations. 	See 	Compl. 	¶¶ 	79-81. 	None 	of 	Brown’s 	arguments
in response warrants dismissal.
First, a review of Jane’s Complaint debunks Brown’s argument
that 	it 	dismissed 	her 	for 	conduct 	violations 	(and 	not 	because 	of
3 	The parties agree that the analysis under these causes of
action mirror each other where the requirements of Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act and RICRA are “parallel” to and “interpreted
substantially 	identically” 	to 	those 	of 	the 	ADA. 	Bercovitch 	v.
Baldwin 	Sch., 	Inc., 	133 	F.3d 	141, 	152 	n.13 	(1st 	Cir. 	1998); 	see
also Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 31 n.4 (1st Cir. 1996)).
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her 	disability). 	See 	Driscoll 	v. 	Bryant 	Univ., 	393 	F. 	Supp. 	3d
153, 	159 	(D.R.I. 	2019) 	(explaining 	that 	a 	plaintiff 	must 	prove
“(1) [she] has a disability as defined by the statutes, (2) [she]
was otherwise qualified for the program, (3) the statutes apply to
[Brown], 	and 	(4) 	[Brown] 	discriminated 	against 	[her] 	as 	an
individual 	with 	a 	disability 	(for 	example, 	failing 	to 	provide 	a
reasonable accommodation)”) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted). 	Jane alleges that all her at-issue behavior stems from
her 	disability, 	blurring 	the 	line 	between 	conduct 	issues 	and
disability-related 	issues. 	See, 	e.g., 	Compl. 	¶¶ 	53-57 	(alleging
she missed her exam because she was in the middle of a depressive
episode 	and 	withdrawing 	from 	her 	ADHD 	medication). 	The 	Court
agrees 	with 	Jane 	that 	her 	behavior 	cannot 	be 	readily
compartmentalized, especially at this early stage.
Next, 	Brown’s 	argument 	that 	Jane 	only 	requested 	a
“retroactive” 	accommodation 	at 	her 	final 	MCASP 	hearing 	is
unpersuasive 	where 	it 	incorrectly 	characterizes 	her 	allegations.
See Saad v. Hexagon Metrology, Inc., C.A. No. 17-202-JJM-LDA, 2019
WL 2929624, at *3 (D.R.I. July 8, 2019) (noting that a “failure to
offer an accommodation is an essential element of an accommodation
claim[.]”). 	Jane 	pleaded 	that, 	although 	initially 	resisting 	a
proposal to take a year off, she succumbed the next day, agreeing
in mid-May to take a year off starting in October 2018. 	Compl. ¶¶
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52, 55. 	Jane therefore sufficiently pleaded that she requested a
prospective accommodation.
Last, 	the 	Court’s 	rejection 	of 	Brown’s 	argument 	that 	it
dismissed 	Jane 	purely 	for 	conduct 	reasons 	guts 	Brown’s 	final
argument that Jane failed to plead she was otherwise qualified for
the program.4 	See Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 932 F.2d 19,
22 	(1st 	Cir. 	1991) 	(“An 	otherwise 	qualified 	person 	is 	one 	who 	is
able 	to 	meet 	all 	of 	a 	program’s 	requirements 	in 	spite 	of 	his
handicap.” 	(quoting 	Se. 	Cmty. 	Coll. 	v. 	Davis, 	442 	U.S. 	397, 	406
(1979))). 	Jane 	plausibly 	pleaded 	she 	was 	otherwise 	qualified,
especially 	because 	reasonable 	accommodations 	can 	render 	an
otherwise 	unqualified 	student 	qualified. 	See 	Driscoll, 	393 	F.
Supp. 	3d 	at 	159 	(“When 	determining 	if 	a 	plaintiff 	is 	otherwise
qualified, 	‘it 	is 	necessary 	to 	take 	into 	account 	the 	extent 	to
which 	reasonable 	accommodations 	that 	will 	satisfy 	the 	legitimate
interests 	of 	both 	the 	school 	and 	the 	student 	are 	(or 	are 	not)
available 	and, 	if 	such 	accommodations 	exist, 	the 	extent 	to 	which
the 	institution 	explored 	those 	alternatives.’” 	(quoting 	Wynne 	v.
4 	The parties dispute whether “otherwise qualified” applies
to 	all 	Title 	III 	claims. 	This 	distinction 	is 	of 	no 	consequence.
Bercovitch, 	133 	F.3d 	at 	154 	(“We 	find 	little 	difference 	in 	this
distinction, 	because 	many 	of 	the 	issues 	that 	arise 	in 	the
‘qualified’ analysis, also arise in the context of the ‘reasonable
modifications’ or ‘undue burden’ analysis. 	That is, if more than
reasonable 	modifications 	are 	required 	of 	an 	institution 	in 	order
to accommodate an individual, then that individual is not qualified
for the program.”).
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Tufts 	Univ. 	Sch. 	of 	Med., 	976 	F.2d 	791, 	792 	(1st 	Cir. 	1992))).
Jane 	also 	plausibly 	pleaded 	that 	Brown 	treated 	her 	differently
than 	other 	students. 	See 	Compl. 	¶ 	32 	(alleging 	Jane 	received 	a
Professionalism 	Warning 	after 	her 	first 	Professionalism 	Report);
id. 	¶ 	33 	(alleging 	Jane 	received 	a 	Professionalism 	Report 	while
others 	did 	not). 	Jane 	is 	entitled 	to 	discovery 	on 	these 	issues
and Brown’s motion is therefore premature.
B. 	Contract-Based Claims
Nor do any of Brown’s attacks on Jane’s contract-based claims
justify dismissal. 	These claims derive from what Jane submits are
two 	enforceable 	contracts: 	the 	Discrimination 	and 	Harassment
Policy 	and 	the 	Medical 	Student 	Handbook. 	See 	Compl. 	¶ 	100; 	see
also 	Doe 	v. 	Brown 	Univ., 	943 	F.3d 	61, 	67 	(1st 	Cir. 	2019) 	(“Under
Rhode Island law, the relationship between a student and a private
university 	is 	based 	in 	contract.”); 	Driscoll, 	393 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at
157-58 (appreciating that student-school contracts are unique, and
strict adherence to contract law is not required).
Reminiscent of its earlier argument, Brown argues that it did
not dismiss Jane because of professionalism concerns (which would
trigger 	a 	procedure 	outlined 	in 	the 	Medical 	Student 	Handbook).
Rather, 	Brown 	asserts 	that 	it 	dismissed 	Jane 	because 	of 	her
egregious 	behavior 	(i.e., 	lying 	to 	her 	professor), 	bypassing
certain procedural steps. 	Brown again overplays its hand at this
early 	stage. 	As 	excerpted 	in 	the 	Complaint, 	Jane’s 	dismissal
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letter does not pinpoint one reason for her dismissal. 	See Compl.
¶ 63. 	Instead, it discusses concerns about Jane’s dishonesty, but
also 	references 	a 	review 	of 	all 	Jane’s 	professionalism
infractions. 	Id.
Finding 	none 	of 	Brown’s 	other 	arguments 	— 	including 	those
related 	to 	its 	Discrimination 	and 	Harassment 	Policy 	— 	persuasive
at this stage, the Court denies Brown’s motion. 	Jane’s claim that
Brown breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
survives 	by 	association. 	Id. 	¶¶ 	107, 	109, 	110; 	see 	Doe 	v. 	Brown
Univ., 327 F. Supp. 3d 397, 418 (D.R.I. 2018).
C. 	Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Finally, although a close call, the Court also denies Brown’s
motion 	as 	to 	Jane’s 	claim 	of 	intentional 	infliction 	of 	emotional
distress (“IIED”). 	Here, Jane must plausibly allege Brown engaged
in 	extreme 	and 	outrageous 	conduct 	that 	is 	“so 	outrageous 	in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
bounds 	of 	decency, 	and 	to 	be 	regarded 	as 	atrocious, 	and 	utterly
intolerable 	in 	a 	civilized 	community.” 	Doe, 	327 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at
414 	(quoting 	Hoffman 	v. 	Davenport-Metcalf, 	851 	A.2d 	1083, 	1090
(R.I. 	2004)). 	Jane 	alleges 	Brown 	expelled 	her 	without 	providing
reasonable 	accommodations 	or 	making 	reasonable 	modifications 	for
her 	disability; 	required 	her 	to 	answer 	disrespectful 	and 	mocking
questions 	about 	her 	mental 	illness; 	told 	her 	that 	mental 	illness
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is 	not 	an 	excuse 	for 	lying; 	and 	asked 	her 	if 	she 	was 	a 	cocaine
dealer and user. 	Compl. ¶ 96.
Making 	all 	reasonable 	inferences 	in 	Jane’s 	favor, 	the 	Court
concludes that Jane has pleaded facts rising to this high standard,
especially 	those 	facts 	arising 	from 	Brown’s 	questioning 	of 	Jane.
See 	Compl. 	¶ 	60; 	see 	also 	Doe, 	327 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	414 	(declining
to 	dismiss 	claim 	of 	IIED 	where 	Brown 	allegedly 	engaged 	in 	a
“pattern 	or 	practice 	of 	gender-biased 	and/or 	racially 	motivated
actions toward [the plaintiff]”) (internal citation omitted). 	The
Court is also satisfied that Jane has pleaded facts to support the
remaining elements of IIED. 	See Norton v. McOsker, 407 F.3d 501,
510 	(1st 	Cir. 	2005) 	(summarizing 	that 	a 	claim 	of 	IIED 	required
proving 	intentional 	or 	reckless 	disregard 	of 	probability 	of
causing emotional distress; extreme and outrageous conduct; causal
connection 	between 	wrongful 	conduct 	and 	emotional 	distress; 	and
severe 	emotional 	distress); 	see 	also 	Vallinoto 	v. 	DiSandro, 	688
A.2d 	830, 	839 	(R.I. 	1997) 	(recognizing 	that, 	in 	Rhode 	Island, 	a
plaintiff 	must 	also 	prove 	physical 	symptomatology). 	While 	Brown
claims 	Jane 	does 	not 	plausibly 	allege 	Brown 	acted 	either
intentionally or recklessly, the Court disagrees.
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IV. 	Conclusion
The Court thus DENIES Brown’s Motion to Dismiss.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
William E. Smith
District Judge
Date: March 11, 2020
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