USA v. Jose Montes, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
JOSE MONTES,
Defendant.
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C.R. No. 1:20-cr-00106-MSM-LDA
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Mary S. McElroy, United States District Judge.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On May 12, 2021, defendant Jose Montes (“Montes”) entered guilty pleas to
eleven federal felonies, three counts of conspiracy to engage in the interstate
transportation of stolen property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and eight counts of
interstate transportation of stolen property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. Pursuant
to a binding plea agreement, the parties agreed that a sentence of 60 months was
appropriate and left open the appropriate period of supervised release. Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11(c)(1)(C). 	On August 3, 2021, the Court sentenced Mr. Montes to the agreed
upon 60 months of imprisonment, which was below the sentence called for by the
guidelines, to be followed by three years of supervised release. 	(ECF No. 106.)
Approximately midway through his term of supervised release, Mr. Montes now files
concurrently a motion to appoint counsel and a motion seeking to terminate his
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supervised release. (ECF No. 201.) The Government objects to his motion. (ECF No.
202.)
In postconviction proceedings, defendants have no automatic right to counsel.
Pennsylvania v. Finely, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). 	“The appointment of counsel for
postconviction matters instead rests within the discretion of the court.”
United States
v. Tilley, No. 1:19-CR-00086-LEW, 2023 WL 183867, at *1 (D. Me. Jan. 13, 2023)
(citing
Dirring v. United States, 353 F.2d 519, 520 (1st Cir. 1965)). 	To determine
whether appointment of counsel is appropriate, courts often look to whether the
defendant has “a fair likelihood of success” on his claim.
	See United States v. Mala,
7 F.3d 1058, 1063–64 (1st Cir. 1993);
see also United States v. Talmer, No. 2:20-CR-
00084-JAW-2, 2025 WL 81390, at *35 (D. Me. Jan. 13, 2025). The Government does
not believe appointment of counsel is necessary when Mr. Montes “has already filed
the motion for early termination” but “does not oppose appointment of counsel.” (ECF
No. 202 at 1 n.1.) The motion for early termination of supervision was filed and the
arguments in favor of termination are clearly articulated by the defendant. For the
reasons 	discussed 	below, 	there 	are 	no 	circumstances 	that 	would 	warrant 	the
appointment of counsel.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
After a defendant has served one year of ordered supervised release, a court
may terminate the remaining period of supervision and discharge the defendant from
supervision if, after examining the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B),
(a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(6), and (a)(7), “it is satisfied that such action is
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warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice.” 	18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1).
III. 	DISCUSSION
In support of this Motion, Mr. Montes cites his compliance with the conditions
of probation, such as participating in a mental health program and working, as well
as other steps he has taken to improve his life. 	(ECF No. 201.) 	The Government
responds that Mr. Montes has merely complied with the terms and conditions of
supervised release, which is generally not grounds for early termination.
See United
States v. Sanchez-Ramos, No. CR-96-001, 2025 WL 3013133, at *2 (D.P.R. Oct. 28,
2025).
The Court has considered the parties’ submissions and the relevant factors set
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). While the Court commends the defendant for complying
with the conditions of his supervision, compliance and being a law-abiding citizen is
what is expected of all supervisees. 	Standing alone, compliance does not warrant
early 	termination.
	See 	United States 	v. 	Seger, 	1:98-cr-00065-JAW, 	2014 WL
5473020, at *7 (D. Me. Oct. 27, 2014).
The Court is required to consider most of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a), including “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant,” the need “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct,” and to provide the defendant with “needed vocational training” and
“medical care.” 	18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B–D). 	Mr. Montes’ criminal history
consists of charges of theft and robbery, including arrests during an earlier period of
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probation. 	The government has an interest in protection of the public and the
continued deterrence of Mr. Montes from commission of criminal acts. 	That public
includes many victims adversely impacted by Mr. Montes’ conduct in the conspiracy
in this case.
Mr. Montes argues that early termination would assist him in continuing to
build stability, expand his opportunities within the trucking industry, and support
his responsibilities at home. 	(ECF No. 201.) 	He does not explain why or how
termination of supervision would provide these benefits.
	See Sanchez-Ramos, 2025
WL 3013133, at *5 (denying motion where it was unclear how early termination
would enable defendant to achieve stated purpose). Moreover, Mr. Montes’ progress
during his period of supervision arguably counsels in favor of continuing supervision
to meet its purpose of rehabilitation.
United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000)
(“Congress intended supervised release to assist individuals in their transition to
community life. Supervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends.”) 	Clearly supervised
release has helped Mr. Montes and will continue to help him with his rehabilitation.
As noted by his attorney at sentencing, Mr. Montes is a talented individual who has
an “excellent chance of rehabilitation.” 	(ECF No. 128 at 26.) 	Supervision provides
structure that allows those talents to be realized, and rehabilitation completed.
The Court is not convinced that the defendant has shown that a reduction of
his term of supervision is warranted and is in the interest of justice.
	See United
States v. Woods, 23-cr-0038-MSM-LDA, 2024 WL 81307, at *1 (D.R.I. Jan. 8, 2024).
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For these reasons the defendant’s Request for Early Termination of Supervised
Release and his Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 201) are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
Mary S. McElroy
United States District Judge
May 26, 2026
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