Cloutier v. Baker et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

PATRICK CLOUTIER,
Plaintiff,

Vv.

DYANN BAKER, in her official
capacity as Finance Director of the
Town of Westerly; THE TOWN OF
WESTERLY; MICHAEL HOBIN,
individually and in his official capacity
as Principal of Westerly High School;
DONNA SWEET, individually and in
her official capacity as Assistant
Principal of Westerly High School; and
KEVIN CRONIN, individually and in
his official capacity as Assistant
Principal of Westerly High School,
Defendants.

C.A. No. 22°427-JJM-PAS

eee ee el ee ee ee aa ae ae ae

ORDER

Patrick Cloutier filed suit against the Town of Westerly and various Westerly
school officials, alleging that they violated his First Amendment and Due Process
rights when they deprived him of the ability to freely express himself and failed to
provide him with notice and an opportunity to be heard before he was terminated.
The individually sued Defendants move to dismiss both counts against them in their
official capacities as redundant to Mr. Cloutier’s claims against the Town. They also
move to dismiss the second Count against them in their individual capacities for

failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

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Procedure. ECF No. 13. The Court agrees with Defendants’ arguments and therefore
GRANTS their motion to dismiss.
I, BACKGROUND
Mr. Cloutier was hired as a substitute teacher at Westerly High School
(“WHS”) in late 2019 and added detention monitor duties in November 2021.
Assistant Principals Donna Sweet and Kevin Cronin called Mr. Cloutier into a
meeting with Principal Michael Hobin to discuss concerns they had regarding his
performance. They brought up for discussion Mr. Cloutier’s student management in
detention, comments he made about COVID-19 and Dr. Anthony Fauci, and his
failure to follow WHS’s disciplinary referral procedure. During the meeting, he
denied making comments about Dr. Fauci but admitted the remaining conduct and
defended his actions. As to the disciplinary action, Mr. Cloutier refused to write a
disciplinary referral for a student who ripped up an “I Choose to Include” t-shirt in
class! because the student “did not use any pejorative words, the student was entitled
to his opinion, the student was only damaging the t-shirt the school had given to him

to keep, and there was no disruption.” At the end of the meeting, Mr. Cloutier was

terminated.?

1“Tn mid to late November of 2021, the high school held an event during school
to promote diversity and inclusion. Attendance was mandatory for the students. The
high school gave the students t-shirts to wear which said ‘I Choose To Include.’ The
students were instructed to wear the t-shirts. One student came into Cloutier’s non-
academic advisory class afterwards, said ‘I choose not to include,’ and ripped up the
t-shirt.” ECF No. 1 at 3, Jf 18-15.

2Mr. Cloutier applied for unemployment with the Rhode Island Department of
Labor and Training; Human Resources Coordinator for the Town responded to the
unemployment claim that he was terminated because he “[dlid not adequately

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Mr. Cloutier filed this suit against the Town of Westerly and Dyann Baker in
her official capacity as Finance Director of Westerly (collectively, the “Town”);
Michael Hobin, individually and in his official capacity as Principal at WHS; Donna
Sweet, individually and in her official capacity as Assistant Principal; and Kevin
Cronin, individually and in his official capacity as Assistant Principal (collectively,
the “Individual Defendants”) making claims for violation of freedom of speech and
association (Count I) and violation of due process (Count II). ECF No. 1. Mr. Cloutier
seeks compensatory and punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and an injunction
ordering Defendants to rehire him as a substitute teacher and detention monitor.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure tests the plausibility of the
claims presented in a plaintiffs complaint. “To avoid dismissal, a complaint must
provide ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Garcia-Catalén v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). At this stage, “the plaintiff need not demonstrate that she is
likely to prevail, but her claim must suggest ‘more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Jd. at 102-03 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009)). The “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Jgbal 556 U.S. at 678

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

provide behavior management,” and noted that he failed to “report or issue discipline
to a disruptive student.”

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“The plausibility inquiry necessitates a two-step pavane.” Garcia-Catalan, 734
F.3d at 103. “First, the court must distinguish ‘the complaint’s factual allegations
(which must be accepted as true) from its conclusory legal allegations (which need
not be credited).” Jd. (quoting Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of P.R., 676 F.3d 220, 224 (1st
Cir. 2012)). “Second, the court must determine whether the factual allegations are
sufficient to support ‘the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Jd. (quoting Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir.
2011)). “In determining whether a complaint crosses the plausibility threshold, ‘the
reviewing court [must] draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Jd.
(alteration in original) (quoting Jgba/, 556 U.S. at 679).
III. DISCUSSION

First, the Individual Defendants move to dismiss all claims brought against
them in their official capacities. Next, the Individual Defendants move to dismiss the
Count II due process claim? against them in their individual capacities on two
grounds: that Mr. Cloutier had no property interest in his employment such that he
cannot allege a violation of due process rights and that qualified immunity precludes
this claim against these employees in their individual capacities.

A. Official-Capacity Claims against the Individuals

Mr. Cloutier argues that he should be able to maintain his claims against the

individuals in their official capacities because he seeks injunctive relief that only the

3 Not subject to the Motion to Dismiss are the two counts against the Town,
and the claims against the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities in

Count I.

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individuals can provide, specifically he asks the Court to order the individuals to
reinstate him to his substitute teaching and detention monitor positions. The
Individual Defendants argue that being named in their official capacities is
superfluous to the claims against the Town.

The Court agrees with the Town. It is well established that “a suit against a
state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather
is a suit against the official’s office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the
State itself.” Will v. Michigan Dep’ of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citations
omitted); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985); Monell v. Dept
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978); Andrade v. Perry, 863 A.2d 1272, 1278
(R.I. 2004). And Mr. Cloutier’s official-capacity claims for injunctive relief are
brought against a// Defendants, including the Town; as such, his claims against the
individuals in their official capacities are redundant as any injunctive relief the Court
may order can be effectuated by the Town.

In response to his argument that the individuals need to stay in the suit
because the Town has denied knowledge of the facts of the case in its answer, have
different counsel, and may argue different defenses from the individuals, the Court
agrees with Defendants that this is not a legal argument, but a logistics one that may
impact discovery but not a decision on a motion to dismiss.4 The Court can grant all

the injunctive relief sought by Mr. Cloutier against the Town. The Court GRANTS

4 The claims against the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities
in Count I remain, therefore the Mr. Cloutier’s logistical concerns are not well
founded.

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Mr. Hobin, Ms. Sweet, and Mr. Cronin’s Motion to Dismiss all claims against them
in their official capacities.

B. Individual Capacity Claims in Count II against the Individuals

In Count II, Mr. Cloutier alleges a violation of due process based on
constitutionally protected interests—a liberty interest in his freedom of speech, a
property interest in his employment as a substitute teacher and/or detention monitor,
and a statutory right to due process under R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-12-6. He brings this
claim against the Town and the Individuals Defendants in their individual capacities.
The Individual Defendants move to dismiss the individual capacity claims against
them.

1. Property interest

The United States Supreme Court has established that “[plrocedural due
process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of
‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
Property interests “are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law—rules or
understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement
to those benefits.” Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). A plaintiff may
also have a property interest in their government employment “created ... not only by

explicit contractual provisions but also by an implied contract or officially sanctioned

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rules of the work place.”5 Cheveras Pacheco v. Rivera Gonzalez, 809 F.2d 125, 127
(1st Cir. 1987) (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972)).

Mr. Cloutier alleges that he had a protected property interest in his
employment as a substitute teacher and detention monitor. He argues that he is a
“teacher” as Rhode Island state law defines it and therefore was entitled to notice and
an opportunity to be heard at the time of his termination under R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-
12-6. Defendants counter that he was a substitute teacher, employed on an at will
basis and so did not have a statutory property interest in his employment.

Generally, only tenured teachers have a property interest in their job. Barber
v. Exeter-W. Greenwich Sch. Comm., 418 A.2d 18, 19-20 (R.I. 1980) (“A tenured
teacher, who may be dismissed only for good and just cause, G.L. 1956 (1969

Reenactment) § 16-13-3, therefore has a legitimate claim of entitlement to his

5 Mr. Cloutier does not allege or argue that he has a contract with the Town.
While he does argue in his opposition that his property interest in his employment
was based on a reasonable expectation of continued employment, he does not allege
as much in his Complaint. He relies on three “officially sanctioned rules of the
workplace” sources from his Complaint but they do not help him. Two of these
sources—the Westerly School Department website that states that it does not
discriminate based on political affiliation and his assertion that other teachers
discussed their political beliefs at school without being disciplined or fired—relate not
to his due process claim but only to his Count I First Amendment claim. The third
source is an email he received announcing that the Town was using a website called
Aesop, “an automated service that greatly simplifies and streamlines the process of
recording and managing absences and finding substitutes.” ECF No. 1-4. Glossing
over the reference in the email that the Town was using Aesop to find substitutes (of
which he was one), he argues that this email is evidence that his role as a detention
monitor was a regular position that he had a reasonable expectation would continue.
Aside from the undisputed fact that he filled in as a detention monitor for less than
one month at the time of his termination and was primarily a day-to-day substitute
teacher, these allegations are insufficient to invoke a property interest entitled to due

process protections.

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position and may not be deprived of it without due process of law under the
Fourteenth Amendment.”). R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-13-3 provides that a teacher acquires
tenure by completing a probationary period of satisfactory teaching defined as three
annual contracts within five successive school years. “No tenured teacher in
continuous service shall be dismissed except for good and just cause.” Jd. The statute
further provides for notice of dismissal to the teacher and a hearing. Jad.

There is no statute regarding the tenure of substitute teachers or delineating
procedural protections conferred upon substitute teachers. That may be because the
law views them differently.

There is a difference between a substitute teacher and a permanently or

regularly employed teacher. The General Assembly recognized this

difference, and this recognition is to be found in the teachers’ tenure
legislation. Substitutes, be they long term or per diem, may be certified

and at times regularly employed, but in the opinion of the members of

this court they remain tenureless teachers.

Corrigan v. Donilon, 433 A.2d 198, 201-02 (R.I. 1981).

Mr. Cloutier was a substitute teacher at WHS. In arguing that he had a
protected property interest in his employment as a “teacher” according to Rhode
Island state law, Mr. Cloutier relies on Chapter 12, “Rights and Duties of Teachers
Generally,” which defines a teacher as “every person employed as a teacher,
supervisor, principal, or superintendent or assistant superintendent, of schools,
whether employed in schools supported in whole or in part by public funds, or in
colleges, or in public institutions, or in the department of elementary and secondary

education.” R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-12-1. Defendant counters that substitute teachers

are not “teachers” under state law by relying on Chapter 13, “Teacher Tenure Act,”

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which defines a teacher as “every person for whose position a certificate issued by the
department of elementary and secondary education is required by law.” R.I. Gen.
Laws § 16-13-1.

To determine whether “teacher” in either section includes a substitute teacher,
the Court must “examinle] the plain meaning of the statutory language and considerl
] the language in the context of the whole statutory scheme.” Darling’s v. Ford Motor
Co., 825 A.2d 344, 346 (Me. 2003). In so doing, the Court “avoidls] statutory
constructions that create absurd, illogical or inconsistent results,” and will only look
behind the plain language to the legislative history, “if [the Court] find[s] the statute
ambiguous.” Jd. “A statute is ambiguous only if it admits of more than one reasonable
interpretation.” Gen. Motors Corp. v. Darling’s, 444 F.3d 98, 108 (1st Cir. 2006)
(citing In re Thinking Machs. Corp., 67 F.3d 1021, 1025 (1st Cir. 1995)).

Both chapters that the parties rely on cover different aspects of the teaching
profession. The Rhode Island Supreme Court has counseled that statutes that relate
“to the same subject matter should be considered together so that they will
harmonize with each other and be consistent with their general objective scope.”
Such v. State, 950 A.2d 1150, 1156 (R.I. 2008) (quoting State ex rel. Webb v.
Cianci, 591 A.2d 1193, 1203 (R.I. 1991)). They “are considered to be in pari materia,
which stands for the simple proposition that ‘statutes on the same subject ... are,
when enacted by the same jurisdiction, to be read in relation to each other.” Such,
950 A.2d at 1156 (citing Horn v. S. Union Co., 927 A.2d 292, 294 n.5 (R.I. 2007).

Because these two statutes relate to the same subject matter, the Court will read

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them together to discern whether a substitute teacher is entitled to the same
protections as a tenured, probationary, or contractual teacher.

The chapter that Mr. Cloutier presses, R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-12-1, enumerates
other educator roles in the schools but does not mention substitute teachers in the
definition—essentially it states that a teacher is “every person employed as a teacher”
and Mr. Cloutier asserts that this broad definition necessarily includes substitute
teachers. While the language itself is not ambiguous, it does employ circular
reasoning that is unhelpful for this purpose—a definition that uses the word itself in
the definition does nothing to clarify the subject. R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-13-1, however,
defines a teacher as someone who is required by law to be certified to teach. Reading
both statutes together, the Court finds that a day-to-day substitute teacher who is
not required to be certified by the Rhode Island Department of Education is not a
“teacher” according to state law. Because Mr. Cloutier is not certified to teach, he is
not a “teacher” according to the Rhode Island education statutes and thus is not
entitled to notice and a hearing under R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-12-6. Therefore, he has
failed to state a claim that Defendants deprived him of a constitutional property
interest. His due process claim (Count II) against Defendants in their individual
capacities is DISMISSED.

2. Liberty interest
Mr. Cloutier also alleges that he had a liberty interest in his freedom of speech
that required Defendants to provide him with due process. As an initial matter, the

Individual Defendants have not moved to dismiss Mr. Cloutier’s First Amendment

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claim so Count I will endure beyond this order. And the Court finds his First
Amendment violation allegations in the context of his Fourteenth Amendment claim
against them are duplicative of his allegations in Count I. See Wilson v. Moreau, 440
F. Supp. 2d 81, 100-101 (D.R.I. 2006) (precluding due process claim as duplicative of
First Amendment claim). Moreover, “[bloth the U.S. Supreme Court and the First
Circuit Court of Appeals have unequivocally and repeatedly rejected claims premised
on the Fourteenth Amendment when protection is specifically available under other
constitutional provisions.” Peria-Pena v. Figueroa*Sancha, 866 F. Supp. 2d 81, 90
(D.P.R. 2012) (citing cases); see also Cty. Sand & Gravel Co. v. Town of S. Kingstown,
160 F.3d 834, 835 (1st Cir.1998) (“When a specific provision of the Constitution
protects individuals against a particular kind of [misconduct] by government actors,
individuals seeking redress ... must assert their claims under that particular
constitutional rubric instead of invoking the more generalized notion of substantive
due process.”). Because Mr. Cloutier’s speech and association claim falls squarely
under the First Amendment and his Count I claim, the Court declines to endorse
those allegations made in Count IT.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS Mr. Hobin, Ms. Sweet, and Mr. Cronin’s Motion to
Dismiss. All claims against them in their official capacities are DISMISSED. The
individual capacity claims against them in Count II are also DISMISSED. ECF
No. 13. The lawsuit continues against the Town (both counts) and against the

Individual Defendants, in their individual capacities only (Count I only).

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,
IT IS SO/ORDERED

ri

John J. McConnell, Jr.
Chief Judge
United States District Court

June 27, 2023

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