Isijola v. Rhode Island Department of Revenue, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
FEMI E. ISIJOLA,
Plaintiff,
v.
RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF
REVENUE, et al.,
Defendants.
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C.A. No. 23-cv-60-MRD-PAS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Melissa R. DuBose, United States District Judge.
Before the Court is the State Defendants’1 Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). ECF No. 14. The Court has reviewed Mr. Isijola’s
pro se Complaint
and accompanying exhibits along with Mr. Isijola’s Objection to the Motion to
Dismiss. ECF Nos. 1, 19.
This case centers on Mr. Isijola’s contention that the State Defendants violated
his constitutional rights under the Fifth2 and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution when they cancelled his Rhode Island REAL ID driver’s license.
1 The State Defendants are comprised of the Rhode Island Department of
Revenue, Division of Motor Vehicles (the “Rhode Island DMV”), Walter Craddock in
his Official Capacity as the Administrator of the Rhode Island DMV, Matthew
Halstead in his Individual Capacity as Investigator at the Rhode Island DMV, and
Bill 	Madonna 	in 	his 	Individual 	Capacity 	as 	Database 	Management 	Systems
Specialist at the Rhode Island DMV.
2 The Fifth Amendment is applicable to federal actors, and Mr. Isijola has not
alleged that any of the defendants are federal actors. Accordingly, his claims under
the Fifth Amendment fail.
See Neufville v. Coyne-Fague, C.A. No. 20-005-WES, 2021
WL 322686, at * 3 (D.R.I. Feb. 1, 2021).
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ECF No. 1 at 2. This Court must now decide if Mr. Isijola’s claims against the State
Defendants survive, or if they fail to state a claim for which he can be granted relief.
For the reasons explained below, this Court GRANTS the State Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss and DISMISSES Mr. Isijola’s Complaint.3
I. 	BACKGROUND
The following facts are alleged in Mr. Isijola’s Complaint. 	Mr. Isijola is an
African American male and a resident of Woonsocket, Rhode Island. ECF No. 1 ¶ 4.
In describing the administrative travel that he followed in obtaining his Rhode Island
driving credentials,4 he recounts that he received the following: his learner’s permit
on November 15, 2016, his driver’s license on June 2, 2017, and finally, his REAL ID
driver’s license on February 21, 2019.
Id. ¶¶ 11, 13, 16. Mr. Isijola also notes that he
registered his vehicle in Rhode Island.
Id. ¶ 17.
At some point in early 2020, Mr. Isijola received a “Notice of Cancellation of
License or ID” by mail that stated that his Rhode Island license would be cancelled
thirty 	days 	from 	January 	6, 	2020, 	because 	he 	was 	issued 	a 	credential 	in
3 Mr. Isijola’s Objection to the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 19) also includes a
“Request for Three-Judge District Court Pursuant to 28 U.S. Code § 455(a)(b)(1)” (
id.
at 4) and a request that District Judge Smith recuse under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1)
because Judge Smith “excluded every beneficial evidence in the Plaintiff’s favor and
denied that Preliminary Injunction.”
Id. The Court DENIES Mr. Isijola’s request for
a three-judge panel as unsupported and notes that his request for recusal is both
legally and factually unsupported and mooted by the retirement of District Judge
Smith.4 The term “credential” includes both REAL ID and Non-REAL ID licenses,
identification cards and permits.
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Massachusetts.
	Id. ¶ 18; ECF No. 1-2 at 14.5 The Notice states that pursuant to 6
C.F.R. § 37.296 and Rhode Island law, Mr. Isijola is “no longer entitled to a Rhode
Island driver license, learner permit or state identification card.”
	Id. 	The Notice
provides an email address to contact the DMV (DMV.RIHelpdesk@dmv.ri.gov).
	Id.
Mr. Isijola emailed the Rhode Island DMV on January 31, 2020, at the email address
provided, and stated that “he is a Rhode Island resident…and does not have any Real
ID with any jurisdiction…” ECF No. 1 ¶ 21, ECF No. 1-2 at 7. On February 3, 2020,
Mr. Isijola received a response to his email from Defendant Bill Madonna. ECF No.
1 ¶ 20. 	Mr. Madonna’s email informed Mr. Isijola that his Rhode Island REAL ID
was subject to cancellation because he “established residency in Massachusetts and
was issued a Massachusetts Driver’s License.” ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 15. Mr. Isijola “pleaded
that his issued State of Rhode Island REAL ID Driver’s License should not be
cancelled as he has only one REAL ID Driver’s License in Rhode Island and not in
any other jurisdictions.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 23; ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 16. Mr. Madonna responded
the 	same 	day 	and 	advised 	Mr. 	Isijola 	that 	he 	would 	need 	to 	surrender 	his
Massachusetts license in order to maintain a valid Rhode Island credential. ECF No.
1-1 at ¶ 17. Mr. Isijola then went to the Rhode Island DMV on February 5, 2020, to
5 The Notice is an attachment to the Complaint and is quoted throughout the
Complaint. On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “when the factual allegations
of a complaint are intertwined with and depend on a document of undisputed
authenticity, the document ‘merges into the pleadings.’”
	Half Moon Ventures, LLC
v. Energy Dev. Partners, LLC, No. CV 18-685-JJM-PAS, 2019 WL 2176308, at *3
(D.R.I. May 20, 2019) (quoting
Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Constellation Energy
Commodities Group, Inc., 526 F. Supp. 2d 260, 268 (D.R.I. 2007)).
6 6 C.F.R. § 37.29 prohibits an individual from holding more than one REAL
ID card or more than one driver’s license.
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seek assistance. 	ECF No. 1 ¶ 24. 	Mr. Isijola did not indicate the result of his
February 5, 2020 visit to the Rhode Island DMV, but he states that he discovered on
February 14, 2020 that his REAL ID Driver’s license had been placed in inactive
status.
Id. ¶ 25; ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 20.
On February 28, 2020 Mr. Isijola returned to the DMV to inquire about the
status of his license and was advised that he needed to obtain a driving record from
the Registry of Motor Vehicles in Massachusetts. ECF No. 1 ¶ 26; ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 21.
He emailed Mr. Madonna again on March 2, 2020, reiterating that “he does not live
anywhere 	except 	in 	Rhode 	Island” 	and 	that 	he 	has 	“not 	physically 	been” 	in
Massachusetts for two years. ECF No. 1 ¶ 28. He returned to the DMV on March 12,
2020, and met with Defendant Matthew Halstead. 	Mr. Isijola told Mr. Halstead that
he had been a Rhode Island resident for the “entire duration of time” between June
2, 2017, and March 2020.
Id. ¶¶ 30, 31. He alleges he was promised a response from
Mr. Halstead but he did not receive one.
Id. ¶ 32.7
7 In 2023, Mr. Isijola also filed two lawsuits in the District of Massachusetts
(
Isijola v. US Telecommunications, Inc et al., 4:23-cv-40080-MRG, and
Isijola v.
Grasso et. al., 4:23-cv-40156-MRG) and one lawsuit in the District of New Hampshire
(
Isijola v. NH Department of Safety, et al., 1:23-cv-00385-SM-TSM). 	Although the
claims asserted in these cases are distinct from the claims asserted here, the cases
are significant in that each contains factual allegations concerning Mr. Isijola’s loss
of his driver’s licenses in Rhode Island, as well as his loss of driver’s licenses in
Massachusetts and New Hampshire during this same relevant period of time.
Additionally, 	Mr. 	Isijola 	filed 	state 	court 	actions 	in 	Massachusetts 	and 	New
Hampshire concerning the same events.
These federal and state court cases are relevant because Mr. Isijola’s sworn
statements in the present case contradict his sworn statements in those cases. 	The
District Court in Massachusetts noted that the Plaintiff’s “recounting of the events is
controverted by facts in state legal proceedings brought by Isijola himself to challenge
his license revocation that is the starting point of this action.”
	See D. Mass Docket
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Count I of Mr. Isijola’s Complaint asserts that his constitutional right to due
process was violated because he was not afforded a hearing in connection with the
cancellation of his Rhode Island REAL ID Driver’s License.
Id. ¶¶ 35, 46-62. Count
II of his Complaint alleges that as a member of a protected class, his right to equal
protection was violated in connection with the cancellation of his Rhode Island REAL
ID Driver’s License.
	Id. ¶¶ 63-76. Mr. Isijola sought injunctive relief including that
Mr. Craddock “reinstate and make active” his driver’s license, and he sought to
recover monetary damages. ECF No. 1 at 19. 	District Judge Smith held a chambers
conference on February 16, 2023. 	Following the conference, the Court denied the
Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	for 	Preliminary 	Injunction, 	finding 	that 	Mr. 	Isijola 	did 	not
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of either of his claims.
	See Text
Order dated 2/28/2023.
4:23-cv-40156-MRG ECF No. 114. 	The Court elaborated that “statements in his
Amended Complaint in this case regarding his license revocation are patently
false….”
	Id. at 6. The Court also stated that Mr. Isijola’s “lack of candidness before
the Court is only the latest instance of a pattern of contumacious conduct previously
highlighted… .”
Id.
This Court takes judicial notice of the proceedings in these other courts
because they “have relevance to the matters at hand.”
	Kowalski v. Gagne, 914 F.2d
299, 305 (1st Cir. 1990). While the Court opts not to parse Mr. Isijola’s other factual
assertions, there are inconsistencies between his allegations here and those in the
other cases. The Plaintiff is reminded that his filings in this Court are subject to Fed.
R. Civ. P 11(b), which requires that a
pro se party certify that to the best of his
“knowledge, information and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances: the factual contentions have evidentiary support…” 	While a less
stringent 	standard is 	applied to
	pro 	se 	pleadings, “a 	court may consider the
wrongdoer’s history.”
Obert v. Republic W. Ins. Co., 264 F. Supp. 2d 106, 123 (D.R.I.
2003).
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The State Defendants filed the present Motion to Dismiss on March 7, 2023,
and Mr. Isijola filed his Objection to that Motion on March 20, 2023. The Motion to
Dismiss, however, was stayed while Mr. Isijola sought relief before the First Circuit
Court of Appeals regarding his Motion for Preliminary Injunction. ECF No. 23. On
August 12, 2025, the Court of Appeals affirmed this Court’s denials of Mr. Isijola’s
requests for preliminary injunctive relief and reconsideration, and the Mandate was
issued on February 2, 2026. ECF No. 35. The Motion to Dismiss is now ripe.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(b)(6) requires that a plaintiff plead a claim “with enough factual detail
to make the asserted claim plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). 	A claim meets this standard when the plaintiff “pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”
	Id. 	The federal pleading standard thus “requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.”
	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Accordingly, the
Court “will not accept a complainant’s unsupported conclusions or interpretations of
law.”
Wash. Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar. Found., 993 F.2d 962, 971 (1st Cir. 1993).
The plaintiff is
pro se and his Complaint is therefore measured against a more
lenient standard of pleading.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (
per curiam).
See also Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 43 (1st Cir. 2000) (“courts hold pro se pleadings
to less demanding standards than those drafted by lawyers”). Nevertheless, a
pro se
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complainant must still allege facts to support a plausible claim.
	Sanchez v. Brown
Univ., No. 1:23-cv-343-JJM-PAS, 2023 WL 6460146, at *1 (D.R.I. Oct. 4, 2023).
III. 	DISCUSSION
The State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 14) sets forth several
grounds for dismissal including that the Defendants named in their official capacities
are not subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that the Defendants named in their
individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity, and that the Complaint fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
In Mr. Isijola’s Objection to the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 19) he repeats many of
the arguments made in support of his Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and asserts
that the State Defendants “never provided a procedure for requesting a hearing.”
ECF No. 19-1 at 23. For the reasons explained below, the facts and claims set forth
in Mr. Isijola’s Complaint clearly fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted,
and dismissal of this case is required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
A. 	The Due Process Claim
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution declares that
no state may deprive a person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
It is well-established that a licensee is entitled to procedural due process in
connection with the loss of a driver’s license.
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971);
Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 (1977).
Even when due process is required, however, the Court is mindful that due
process is a flexible concept, and that the process that is required to satisfy the Due
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Process Clause varies from case to case.
	Aurelio v. Rhode Island Dep’t of Admin.,
Div. of Motor Vehicles, 985 F. Supp. 48, 57 (D.R.I. 1997). In determining what process
is due, “courts weigh ‘three distinct factors’: (1) ‘the private interest’ ‘that will be
affected by the official action’; (2) ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards’; and (3) the government’s interest, including ‘the
fiscal and administrative burdens’ posed by alternative procedural requirements.’”
Penobscot Air Servs., Ltd. v. F.A.A., 164 F.3d 713, 723 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
As to the first factor of this test, this Court has recognized that “[a] driver’s
license is a significant and considerable private interest, impacting one’s ability to
earn a living and enjoy the liberty of travel, among other things.”
	Aurelio, 985 F.
Supp. at 57. 	Nevertheless, Courts have also cautioned that the revocation of a
driver’s license is “not so critical” that a state is “obligated to replicate a judicial model
for resolving its revocation.”
Packard v. Hinden, No. CIV A 05-11906-DPW, 2007 WL
2746799, at *5 (D. Mass. Sept. 7, 2007).
The 	second factor requires 	the 	Court 	to 	consider the 	risk 	of 	erroneous
deprivation of the right. 	Rhode Island law authorizes the Governor to enter into
reciprocal agreements with other states in “order to improve standardization and
compatibility” in driver’s license operations in the United States. 	R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 31-29-6. 	In the present case, the Rhode Island DMV received information from the
Massachusetts Registry of Motor Vehicles that indicated Mr. Isijola had obtained a
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license in Massachusetts. 	Following the receipt of this information, the State
Defendants provided notice of the potential cancellation of Mr. Isijola’s license, and
the opportunity to contest the Rhode Island DMV’s determination by emailing the
help desk. Mr. Isijola availed himself of that opportunity. Based on these allegations
in the Complaint, the risk of an erroneous deprivation does not weigh in the Plaintiff’s
favor.
The final factor that the Court must consider is the Government’s interest.
Here there are at least two important interests held by the State of Rhode Island.
The first is “the substantial public interest in administrative efficiency [that] would
be impeded by the availability of a pretermination hearing in every case.”
Dixon, 431
U.S. at 114 (citing
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 347). The Supreme Court elaborated that if
a state were required to provide a hearing to each licensee prior to terminating their
license, 	it 	“would 	encourage 	drivers 	routinely 	to 	request 	full 	administrative
hearings.”
	Id. (citing
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 347). 	This would cause a substantial
drain 	on 	administrative 	efficiency. 	Yet, 	the 	Court 	also 	recognized 	that 	the
administrative burden was less concerning than “the important public interest in
safety on the roads and highways, and in the prompt removal of a safety hazard.”
Id.
Given these important interests, this factor weighs in the State’s favor.
The Court has determined that although Mr. Isijola holds a private interest in
his Rhode Island REAL ID driver’s license, the risk of erroneous deprivation was low
given the State Defendants’ written notice to Mr. Isijola and the thirty-day window
to dispute the information before his license was made inactive. Further, the public
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interest does not tilt the balance. The Court concludes Mr. Isijola has not plausibly
stated that the State Defendants’ actions violated his due process rights.
B. 	The Equal Protection Claim
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause dictates that a state is
prohibited from treating similarly situated individuals differently on account of their
“classification in a particular group.”
Mulero-Carrillo v. Román-Hernández, 790 F.3d
99, 105-06 (1st Cir. 2015). 	The basis for Mr. Isijola’s claim is that he is an African
American male (ECF No. 1 ¶ 4) and that the RI DMV violated his “clearly established
rights to equal protection as a member of a protected class despite repeated
pleadings” that his license not be cancelled.
Id. ¶ 68. “To survive a motion to dismiss
this claim, he must plead that (1) he was treated differently than others similarly
situated, and (2) that the motivation behind the different treatment was based on
race.”
	Fosu v. Univ. of Rhode Island, 590 F. Supp. 3d 451, 459 (D.R.I. 2022). 	As to
the first prong, Mr. Isijola has not provided any factual allegations asserting that he
was 	treated 	differently 	than 	any 	other 	Rhode 	Island 	resident 	in 	similar
circumstances. He therefore fails to set forth facts that satisfy the first prong of the
test. 	He also does not allege any facts that, taken as true, could plausibly establish
that the motivation behind any differential treatment was race. Instead, Mr. Isijola’s
complaint is simply a recitation of the legal standard without any allegations that
demonstrate he was treated differently. 	As such, he has failed to “set forth facts
sufficient to state a legal claim on which relief could be granted.”
Giragosian v.
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Bettencourt, 614 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2010). 	The Equal Protection claim fails as a
matter of law.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and
Mr. Isijola’s Complaint is DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
Melissa R. DuBose
United States District Judge
March 10, 2026
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