USA v. Melton et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
United States of America
Plaintiff,
v.
Elijah Melton,
Defendant.
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No. 1:24-cr-00059-JJM-AEM-1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
AMY E. MOSES, United States Magistrate Judge.
This matter came before the Court via a Status Report submitted by Defendant Elijah
Melton, notifying the Court that Mr. Melton’s counsel, Beau B. Brindley, had been disqualified
from representing Mr. Melton in a currently pending case in the District of Massachusetts. ECF
No. 67. The Report attached Judge Sorokin’s opinion from the District of Massachusetts regarding
the disqualification. 	ECF No. 67-1. 	Based on that Status Report, Chief Judge McConnell
instructed the parties to show cause why Attorney Brindley should not be disqualified from
representing Mr. Melton in this case. 	Text Order (Aug. 18, 2025). 	Attorney Brindley and the
Government each filed a response (ECF Nos. 68, 71) and Attorney Brindley filed a reply (ECF
No. 73). The issue of disqualification was then referred to me for determination. Text Order (Oct.
3, 2025). 	After hearing, I find that Attorney Brindley’s representation does create a conflict of
interest, but that the conflict can be waived.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Mr. Melton has three pending federal cases. 	In December 2023, he was charged via
superseding indictment in the District of Massachusetts with conspiracy to distribute and to possess
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with intent to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl (hereinafter Melton I). 	United States v.
Fonseca, 1:22-cr-10356-LTS (D. Mass. Dec. 6, 2023), ECF No. 52. In June 2024, he was indicted
in this District for conspiracy to commit murder, solicitation to commit a crime, and conspiracy to
tamper with a witness, victim, or informant by killing or attempting to kill (hereinafter Melton II).
ECF No. 1. Finally, in April 2025, he was charged via complaint in a second case in the District
of Massachusetts with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute fentanyl and
cocaine (hereinafter Melton III). 	United States v. Richards, 1:25-cr-10288-LTS (D. Mass. Apr.
23, 2025), ECF No. 4.
A. Relevant Factual Background
In December 2022, Samuel Fonseca, Mr. Melton’s co-defendant in Melton I, was arrested
in Massachusetts while allegedly on his way to deliver fentanyl at Mr. Melton’s behest and charged
via complaint that same day. ECF No. 67-1 at 2. Mr. Melton was not charged for his alleged role
in this conspiracy until December 2023. Melton I, ECF No. 52. When Mr. Melton was arrested
on the charges, investigators seized three cell phones. ECF No. 67-1 at 3. A search of these phones
revealed communications between Mr. Melton and an individual named Theodore Richards1
between September and December 2023 about shipping cocaine, fentanyl, and marijuana for
distribution in Massachusetts. Id. When the arrest warrant issued for Mr. Melton in Melton I in
December 2023, he was in California to attend a party thrown by Mr. Richards. Melton I, ECF
No. 183-1 ¶¶ 21, 25-28.
Mr. Melton was briefly detained in Melton I but ultimately released on bond and pretrial
conditions after a detention hearing. Melton I, ECF Nos. 61, 69. In February 2024, Mr. Melton’s
1 Mr. Richards communicated with Mr. Melton using the name “James Jackson,” but investigators
allege—and Judge Sorokin found by a preponderance of the evidence—that James Jackson is in
fact Mr. Richards. ECF No. 67-1 at 10; Melton I, ECF No. 183-1 ¶¶ 12-28.
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bond was revoked based on violations of his release conditions and he was detained pending trial
at the Wyatt Detention Center in Rhode Island. Melton I, ECF No. 91, 112. Between March and
April 2024, while detained at Wyatt, Mr. Melton allegedly communicated with an individual
named Kareem Pires to arrange for the murder of three individuals involved in Melton I—a
cooperating witness and two Assistant United States Attorneys working on the case. ECF No. 67-
1 at 10. 	Mr. Pires was present with Mr. Melton at Mr. Richards’ December 2023 party in
California. Melton I, ECF No. 183-1 ¶ 26. In June 2024, Messrs. Melton and Pires were indicted
for the murder-for-hire scheme as co-defendants in Melton II, the case now before this Court. ECF
No. 1.
In April 2025, a complaint issued against Messrs. Melton and Richards in Melton III for
drug charges, based in part on the September-December 2023 communications found on
Mr. Melton’s phone after his arrest in Melton I. Melton III, ECF No. 4.
Of note, in December 2025, Mr. Pires filed a signed plea agreement in Melton II. ECF No.
76. 	The plea agreement indicates that in exchange for his guilty plea, the Government will not
bring conspiracy to distribute charges against Mr. Pires in Massachusetts relating to Mr. Pires’
“narcotics trafficking with Elijah Melton and Theodore Richards in [Melton III].” Id.
B. Background of Attorney Brindley’s Involvement
As summarized in Judge Sorokin’s order on Attorney Brindley’s disqualification in
Melton I, the history of Attorney Brindley’s involvement with the defendants in these cases began
in 2013. 	ECF No. 67-1 at 2. 	Attorney Brindley is a criminal lawyer based in Chicago who
represented Mr. Richards in a 2013 appeal of a substantial federal drug conviction in the Northern
District of Illinois. Id. The Seventh Circuit remanded Mr. Richards’ case and Attorney Brindley
represented Mr. Richards in the subsequent retrial, which ultimately ended in acquittal. Id.
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It is not clear from the record how Messrs. Melton and Richards met and began
communicating, but September and October 2023 messages between the two include references to
Mr. Richards’ work with a law firm in Chicago. Melton I, ECF No. 183-1 ¶¶ 15-16. For example,
on October 21, 2023, Mr. Richards stated: “Another thing to I want you to know this my
drivers . . . are tight you never have to worry about anything ever everybody has my lawyer and
we never talk. 	We never cooperate. 	We know the law!!!!!” 	Id. ¶ 16. 	On October 24, 2023,
Mr. Richards wrote: “I’ve been to the Feds twice I have 14 years total Fed time under my belt”
and “I work closely with a law firm out of Chicago, so please tap my knowledge I’ve done enough
Fed time for the both of us if you pay attention and listen to me, you’re not going to ever have to
do any!!!!!” Id. ¶ 15.
At his initial appearance in Melton I in December 2023, Mr. Melton was appointed counsel.
Melton I, ECF No. 61. On February 16, 2024, Mr. Melton filed a motion to substitute Attorney
Brindley as his counsel. 	Melton I, ECF No. 84. 	The Court allowed the motion and Attorney
Brindley entered his appearance for Mr. Melton. 	Melton I, ECF Nos. 85, 97. 	In his decision,
Judge Sorokin inferred based on the texts between Messrs. Richards and Melton, and the fact that
Attorney Brindley has never entered an appearance in Massachusetts before Melton I, that
Mr. Richards referred Mr. Melton to Attorney Brindley. ECF No. 67-1 at 7.
In March 2024, after his pretrial release was revoked in Melton I, Mr. Melton wrote a letter
to Mr. Pires expressing frustration with Attorney Brindley’s representation, stating: “tell unc I said
for this n[*****] to put them f[***]ing motions in, DA said 30 yrs for this” and “Tell my peoples
too I said no more $ for lawyer until he starts doing shit n[****] just came on docket day I had
court been gave him that 2 month before.” 	ECF No. 67-1 at 8. 	The letter also referenced the
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payment of various sums of money to “unc.” 	Id. 	Judge Sorokin found that “unc” refers to
Mr. Richards and “lawyer” refers to Attorney Brindley. Id.
In June 2024, Messrs. Melton and Pires were indicted in this case, Melton II, for conspiring
to arrange the murder of three individuals involved in Melton I. 	ECF No. 1. 	On July 8, 2024,
Attorney Brindley entered his appearance on Mr. Melton’s behalf in this case. ECF No. 10. At
that 	point, 	he 	represented 	Mr. Melton 	in 	both 	cases 	pending 	against 	him—Melton 	I 	in
Massachusetts and Melton II in Rhode Island. In April 2025, however, when Messrs. Melton and
Richards were charged in Melton III, Attorney Brindley entered his appearance on behalf of
Mr. Richards in the Northern District of Illinois, where he was arrested. 	ECF No. 67-1 at 11.
Mr. Melton appeared at his initial appearance in Massachusetts in Melton III without counsel, and
the Court provisionally appointed Keith S. Halpern as Mr. Melton’s attorney pursuant to the
Criminal Justice Act. Melton III, Dkt. Entry (July 11, 2025). Attorney Halpern has continued to
represent Mr. Melton in Melton III.
C. Disqualification Proceedings before Judge Sorokin
On May 16, 2025, the Government filed a Motion for Hearing on Potential Conflicts of
Interest in Melton I and Melton III, seeking to disqualify Attorney Brindley from representing
Mr. Melton in Melton I based on his representation of Mr. Richards in Melton III. Melton I, ECF
No. 183; Melton III, ECF No. 11. After extensive briefing and multiple hearings, Judge Sorokin
issued a decision finding that Attorney Brindley’s simultaneous representation of Messrs. Melton
and Richards in the two Massachusetts cases creates a serious potential of an unwaivable conflict
of interest for Mr. Melton and thus disqualified Attorney Brindley from representing Mr. Melton
in Melton I. ECF No. 67-1 at 17.
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Judge Sorokin reached this conclusion for three reasons: (1) questions about Attorney
Brindley’s credibility, based both on his conduct around the waiver issue in Melton I as well as a
documented history of issues with candor to the tribunal and prior disqualifications on conflict
grounds (id. at 18-19); (2) the lengthy history between Mr. Richards and Attorney Brindley and
the ensuing concern that his “overriding loyalty” will be to Mr. Richards and will create “a
significant risk of limiting his ability to effectively and vigorously represent Melton” (id. at 20-
23); and (3) concerns about whether Attorney Brindley could provide full and impartial advice
about whether Mr. Melton should plea or cooperate in Melton I, when such a decision would at
worst, likely be conditioned upon the possibility of testifying against Mr. Richards in Melton III,
and 	at 	best, 	implicate 	potentially 	differing 	interests 	or 	strategic 	preferences 	between
Messrs. Melton and Richards in Melton III (id. at 24-27). Judge Sorokin ultimately concluded that
based on the totality of the circumstances, “Attorney Brindley cannot constitutionally and ethically
represent Melton in [Melton I] and no waiver or colloquy responses from Melton can avoid this
result.” Id. at 27. Following Mr. Brindley’s disqualification, Attorney Halpern was appointed to
represent Mr. Melton in Melton I and thus now represents him in both Massachusetts cases.
The Government’s May 16, 2025 Motion for Hearing on Potential Conflicts of Interest also
challenged Attorney Brindley’s representation of Mr. Richards in Melton III on the same grounds.
Melton III, ECF No. 11. 	In that case, Judge Sorokin decided that the strongest basis for
disqualifying Attorney Brindley as Mr. Melton’s attorney in Melton I—his “longstanding and
overriding loyalty” to Mr. Richards—has no impact on Attorney Brindley’s representation of
Mr. Richards in Melton III, because nothing suggested his efforts on Mr. Richards’ behalf would
be impacted by his much less robust history with Mr. Melton. Melton III, ECF No. 57 at 4-5. He
also noted that Mr. Richards is facing only one criminal case, so his decisions about cooperation
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or plea are much less complicated than Mr. Melton’s and far less likely to create conflicts of
interest. Id. at 5-6. Judge Sorokin also stated that the Court will remain alert to any developments
that give rise to additional concerns, and he is confident that Mr. Melton’s independent counsel in
Melton I—appointed permanently following Attorney Brindley’s disqualification—will bring any
concerns to the Court’s immediate attention. 	Id. at 6. 	In a footnote in his decision regarding
Brindley’s representation of Richards, Judge Sorokin described the interplay between the
Massachusetts cases and Melton’s case in Rhode Island:
The Court notes that Melton remains Brindley’s current client. 	Though he no longer
represents Melton in this Court due to the Disqualification Order in Melton I, as of the time
of this decision he remains Melton’s lawyer in Melton II. That matter involves a different
type of charges and is pending in a different District Court. Any conflicts present in Melton
II as to Melton are not for this Court to evaluate. 	Moreover, the record now before the
Court does not suggest Brindley’s involvement in Melton II has a meaningful impact on
the potential conflicts of interest in this case.
Id. at 4 fn. 1.
In conclusion, at this point, Attorney Brindley represents Mr. Melton in Melton II before
this Court, and Mr. Richards in Melton III in Massachusetts. It is this dual representation that is
now being challenged in Melton II.
II. 	DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
Judge Sorokin concisely summarized the important constitutional rights implicated by the
questions in these cases:
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees to each criminal
defendant “the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” 	U.S. Const. amend. VI. 	This
includes “the right to select and be represented by one’s preferred attorney.” 	Wheat v.
United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988). 	However, this right is not absolute. 	“The
essential aim of the Sixth Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each
criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by
the lawyer whom he prefers.” 	Id. (citation modified). 	Therefore, a defendant’s right to
choose his own attorney may be limited where there is a “realistic potential for a conflict
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of interest,” such that the defendant’s chosen attorney may be unable to render effective
assistance of counsel. United States v. Laureano-Perez, 797 F.3d 45, 56 (1st Cir. 2015).
ECF No. 67-1 at 14.
The Rhode Island Rules of Professional Conduct govern the conflicts issue in this case and
provide further ethical requirements for attorneys practicing before this Court. 	LR Gen 208.
Pursuant to these Rules, a concurrent conflict of interest exists if “there is a significant risk that
the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities
to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.” R.I. R.
Prof’l Conduct 1.7(a)(2).
If a concurrent conflict of interest exists, a lawyer may represent the client only if: (1) “the
lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent
representation to each affected client;” (2) “the representation is not prohibited by law;” (3) “the
representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client
represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal;” and (4)
“each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.” R.I. R. Prof’l Conduct 1.7(b).
Thus, “[i]f a conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer ordinarily must
withdraw from the representation, unless the lawyer has obtained the informed consent of the
client” required by Rule 1.7(b). R.I. R. Prof’l Conduct 1.7, cmt. 4.
Informed consent “denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after
the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of
and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.” R.I. R. Prof’l Conduct
1.0(e). 	A client may revoke the consent and terminate the lawyer’s representation at any time.
R.I. R. Prof’l Conduct 1.7, cmt. 20.
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If the circumstances laid out in Rule 1.7(b) are not met, then the conflict is deemed
unwaivable, and the attorney must be disqualified. This determination requires careful balancing
of “the party’s right to choose its counsel against the need to protect the integrity of the judicial
process.” Haffenreffer v. Coleman, C.A. No. 06-299T, 2007 WL 2972575, at *2 (D.R.I. Oct. 10,
2007). 	The Government bears a “heavy burden” of demonstrating that disqualification is
necessary, as it should be a “measure of last resort.” 	In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 859 F.2d
1021, 1026 (1st Cir. 1988); see also Gray v. Rhode Island Dep’t of Children, Youth & Families,
937 F. Supp. 153, 156 (D.R.I. 1996) (“[U]nless the underlying judicial process will be tainted by
an attorney’s conduct, courts should be reluctant to grant disqualification motions.”).
B. The Parties’ Arguments
Attorney Brindley argues that because this case involves a different type of charge and is
pending in a different Court, Judge Sorokin’s reasoning does not support disqualification. ECF
No. 68 at 1. 	He also states there is no risk that evidence potentially implicating Mr. Richards
would be presented in this case. Id. at 2. Attorney Brindley opines that the only potential conflict
in this case would arise if the Government were to reach an agreement with Messrs. Melton or
Richards to testify against one another in Melton III, though he emphasized both in his briefing
and at hearing that Mr. Melton has no desire to plea or cooperate. Id. at 5 (quoting a footnote from
Judge Sorokin’s opinion indicating he found the question of whether Attorney Brindley can
adequately advise Mr. Melton on issues of cooperation or plea in Melton I “more theoretical than
urgent at this time, given Melton’s unequivocal statements after consultation with independent
counsel that he has no desire to pursue a plea or cooperation.”). And, Attorney Brindley argues,
even if Mr. Melton decided to cooperate and testify against Mr. Richards in Melton III,
unconflicted standby counsel could cross-examine Mr. Melton and negate any risk of conflict
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preventing Attorney Brindley from representing Mr. Melton in this case. Id. at 6. He concludes
that the Court could and should request a separate written waiver of any potential conflict from
Mr. Melton, undertake a colloquy of Mr. Melton to ensure that waiver is made knowingly and
voluntarily, and then accept the waiver. Id. at 5, 9.
The Government’s response largely quotes from Judge Sorokin’s opinion in Melton I to
argue that Attorney Brindley should also be disqualified here. 	ECF No. 71. 	The Government
states that a plea agreement or cooperation “has not been broached in this current case,” but if it
were, “it would likely involve information or testimony regarding Richards.” 	Id. at 4. 	The
Government also notes Attorney Brindley has a policy against representing defendants who
cooperate with the Government, so if Mr. Melton wishes to cooperate, Attorney Brindley would
withdraw—thus signaling to Mr. Richards that Mr. Melton is cooperating. 	Id. at 4. 	The
Government concludes that:
All three pending cases against Melton are directly related and not separate distinctive
cases. 	Facts from Melton I will be introduced in this current case, as the allegation is
Melton attempted to kill the person who he believed to be the cooperator in Melton I, and
to kill the original prosecutors in Melton I. If Brindley is disqualified in Melton I, then he
must be disqualified in the current case.”
Id. at 5.
In reply, Attorney Brindley notes that if facts from Melton I are introduced in this case,
those facts “will not be ones that involve Mr. Richards even tangentially,” a “critical difference
that the government ignores.” ECF No. 73 at 2. He also states it is “an absurd leap of logic” to
conclude that Mr. Richards would automatically assume his withdrawal was because Mr. Melton
had opted to cooperate, and if he were to make such an assumption, it would be based on
Mr. Melton reversing course and pleading guilty rather than on anything to do with Attorney
Brindley. Id. at 5-6.
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At a hearing on the disqualification issue on January 22, 2026, the Government argued that
Attorney Brindley’s loyalty to Mr. Richards is now preventing them from engaging in any
conversations with Mr. Melton regarding a global resolution of all three of his cases, because such
a resolution would implicate Mr. Richards in Melton III. The Government reiterated its assertion
that all three cases are inextricably related, though later confirmed that there is no evidence that
Mr. Richards is in any way involved in the criminal conduct at issue in Melton I or Melton II. In
response, Attorney Brindley noted that Mr. Melton has independent counsel in Melton I and
Melton III with whom the Government can speak about a resolution involving those cases, and
that furthermore, Mr. Melton is prepared to state under oath that he will not cooperate or plead
guilty in this case or any other. 	Attorney Brindley argued that there is no risk that this case
implicates his representation of Mr. Richards in Melton III and that disqualification is not the “least
restrictive” path forward.
C. Analysis
The circumstances present in this case, Melton II, do not weigh as heavily in favor of
disqualification as they did in Melton I. 	First, unlike in Melton I, there is no indication that
evidence implicating Mr. Richards would be introduced in this case. Melton I and Melton III are
both drug cases, and the Government is clear in its briefing that it anticipates seeking to admit
evidence of Mr. Melton’s conduct in Melton I to support his electronic communications with
Mr. Richards in Melton III, and that evidence of Mr. Melton’s communications with Mr. Richards
in Melton III supports the underlying facts of Mr. Melton’s role in the drug trafficking conspiracy
in Melton I. Melton III, ECF No. 43 at 7-8; Melton I, ECF No. 191 at 9-10. Thus, there was a
high likelihood in Melton I that Attorney Brindley would be forced to confront evidence harmful
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to Mr. Richards, and that his overriding loyalty to Mr. Richards would hinder his ability to
represent Mr. Melton under such circumstances.
In contrast, this case relates to a murder-for-hire scheme targeting prosecutors and a
witness involved in Melton I. 	While it of course stands to reason that evidence from Melton I
would be introduced in this case, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Mr. Richards is in
any way involved in the conduct at issue in Melton I or connected to Mr. Melton’s co-defendant
in that case. The Government confirmed at the hearing that the earliest communications between
Messrs. Richards and Melton took place in September 2023—well after the events underlying
Melton I took place—and that it does not believe evidence implicating Mr. Richards will be
introduced in Melton I. The Government also affirmed that at this point, there is no evidence that
Mr. Richards was in any way involved in the murder-for-hire scheme in this case. Furthermore,
the only evidence that the Government believes may be introduced in this case that involves
Mr. Richards is the March 2024 letter between Messrs. Melton and Pires that references the
exchange of moneys owed and includes language about Attorney Brindley. 	Attorney Brindley,
however, affirmed that nothing in that letter harms Mr. Richards’ interests and it does not even
refer to him by name; therefore, its introduction as evidence in Melton II would not in any way
hinder Attorney Brindley’s representation of Mr. Melton.
Finally, it does appear that Mr. Pires, Mr. Melton’s co-defendant in Melton II, knew
Mr. Richards and may have been involved in the conduct at issue in Melton III. The Government
stated at hearing that at this point, it cannot confirm whether evidence from Melton III—other than
the March 2024 letter between Messrs. Melton and Pires—will be introduced in this case, but
Mr. Brindley stated that he sees no risk of the facts of Melton III becoming an issue in this case.
There is thus nothing before the Court at this time to indicate that Attorney Brindley’s overriding
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loyalty to Mr. Richards would be in any way implicated or impacted by any evidentiary issues in
this case, Melton II.
The Court does find, however, that the same risk exists that Attorney Brindley would be
unable to provide Mr. Melton with meaningful advice on whether to plea or cooperate in this case
if such a decision hinges on Mr. Melton’s willingness to testify against Mr. Richards in Melton III.
The Government has expressed that it would be willing to seek global resolution of Mr. Melton’s
cases. The Court also notes that Mr. Melton’s co-defendant in this case recently filed his intention
to plead guilty, though the Government stated at the hearing that it does not believe this plea
agreement creates any additional risk of a conflict of interest for Attorney Brindley. However, as
discussed at the hearing, Mr. Melton now has independent counsel to advise him on the implication
of a plea or cooperation in both Melton I and Melton III, as such a decision would necessitate the
consideration of all three cases. In addition, as acknowledged by Judge Sorokin and reiterated at
the hearing for this case, Mr. Melton has stated unequivocally that he does not intend to plea or
cooperate, mitigating the potential for this concern to ripen into an actual conflict. The Court is
not inclined to infringe upon Mr. Melton’s constitutional right to counsel of his choosing based on
this potential conflict.
In conclusion, the Court finds that there is a significant risk that Attorney Brindley’s
responsibilities to Mr. Richards in Melton III could materially limit his representation of
Mr. Melton in this case, and that a concurrent conflict of interest thus exists. 	However, at the
hearing, Attorney Brindley confirmed that he believes that he will be able to provide competent
and diligent representation to each affected client. Given the totality of the circumstances present
in this case, the Court concludes that belief is reasonable.
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The Court notes that the Rhode Island Rules of Professional Conduct create an ongoing
ethical obligation for all attorneys practicing before this Court to raise and address conflicts of
interest. To the extent the Government seeks Mr. Melton’s cooperation or Mr. Melton changes his
mind about cooperation or plea, or there are any other developments that create potential or actual
conflicts of interest, those issues must be raised promptly with the Court.
III. 	CONCLUSION
The Court finds that Mr. Melton can waive this conflict. 	First, he must be advised by
independent counsel of the potential and actual conflicts created by Attorney Brindley’s
representation. 	Second, Mr. Melton must give his informed consent, confirmed in writing, as
required by Rhode Island Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(b). And third, Mr. Melton must appear
before the Court to undergo a colloquy regarding the waiver. 	If the Court is satisfied that
Mr. Melton makes a knowing and voluntary waiver at that time, then Attorney Brindley may
continue to represent him in this case.
The Court will appoint independent counsel via a separate order for the limited purpose of
advising Mr. Melton on the conflicts issue. 	If Mr. Melton wishes to proceed with waiving the
conflict, then the independent counsel will procure a written waiver signed by Mr. Melton with his
informed consent to waive the conflict and continue with Attorney Brindley’s representation. If
Mr. Melton proceeds with the waiver, then the Court will schedule a hearing to undergo a colloquy
with Mr. Melton regarding the waiver. 	If deemed necessary, the Court may seek Mr. Melton’s
sworn testimony at that hearing regarding how he plans to proceed.
/s/ 	Amy E. Moses
AMY E. MOSES
United States Magistrate Judge
January 27, 2026
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